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Material abstract 
 
 
 
Atsushi Hayase 
Plato’s Later Dialectic 
 
 
This thesis proposes to examine the method of collection and division, Plato’s 
philosophical method prominent in certain later dialogues, i.e. the Phaedrus, Sophist, 
Politicus, and Philebus, with a particular emphasis on the continuity of his methodology 
throughout his career. In the modern development of the interpretation of Plato’s later 
metaphysics, scholars have often assumed a revisionist interpretation of this method: 
collection and division were advanced by Plato in the dialogues listed as a 
revolutionary method for the investigation of the interrelation of transcendental 
Platonic Forms with each other. By contrast, on the basis of a close examination of 
relevant texts, this thesis tries to defend a unitarian interpretation of collection and 
division. The argument of this thesis comprises three main proposals: (1) that the 
method of collection is equivalent to Socrates’ procedure for definition, as described in 
the early dialogues; (2) that the objects of the method of collection and division are 
Socratic forms as distinguished from Platonic Forms; and (3) that there are two kinds of 
application of collection and division: one is the procedure for definition, the other 
internal analysis. The procedure for definition provides us with knowledge of a 
Socratic form, i.e. the understanding in the form of a simple proposition that 
distinguishes a subject-matter from all the other things, while internal analysis 
provides us with expert knowledge or knowledge of a Platonic Form. 
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Notes on texts and translations 
 
 
 
   I have used the OCT (Oxford Classical Texts) edition of Plato’s texts. For the 
first volume (which includes the Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Cratylus, 
Theaetetus, Sophist, and Politicus) I have referred to the new edition of E. A. Duke, 
W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan (1995), for 
the Republic to the new edition of S. R. Slings (2003), and for all the others to the 
editions of J. Burnet (1900-03). 
   In quoting passages from Plato, I have used published translations (except 
for a couple of passages which I translated). I have used the translations 
included in John M. Cooper, ed. (1997) Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis) 
except for the translations of the Symposium and the Phaedrus. As for these two 
dialogues, I have used Christopher Rowe’s translations: (1986) Plato: Phaedrus 
(Warminster), and (1998) Plato: Symposium (Warminster). The translations 
quoted have been modified when necessary. I have attached passage numbers, 
e.g. (P32), to key passages. I have tried to make clear which passage I am 
referring to in each case, but I have also attached the list of my key passages at 
the end of my thesis. 
   I have adopted the abbreviations of the titles of Plato’s works from H. G. 
Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, eds. (1968) A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford): 
Ap. = Apology   Men. = Meno 
Chrm. = Charmides  Phd. = Phaedo  
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Cri. = Crito   Phdr. = Phaedrus 
Cra. = Cratylus   Phlb. = Philebus 
Epist. = Letters   Plt. = Politicus 
Euthd. = Euthydemus  Prm. = Parmenides 
Euthphr. = Euthyphro  Prt. = Protagoras 
Grg. = Gorgias   R. = Republic 
Hi. Ma. = Hippias Major  Smp. = Symposium 
La. = Laches   Sph. = Sophist 
Lg. = Laws   Tht. = Theaetetus 
Ly. = Lysis   Ti. = Timaeus 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
§1. The background of my research 
   I have entitled my thesis Plato’s Later Dialectic because I intend it to be a 
counterpart of Richard Robinson’s famous study of Plato’s method: Plato’s 
Earlier Dialectic.1 His book was written more than 50 years ago, but still remains 
one of the most important studies on Plato’s dialectical method. However, as 
his title announces, his seminal work is not concerned with Plato’s entire 
method. Robinson opens his preface by saying ‘This book is called Plato’s Earlier 
Dialectic, and not simply Plato’s Dialectic, because it contains no examination of 
the theory of synthesis [or collection] and division prominent in certain late 
dialogues, namely the Phaedrus, Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus.’2 I would like 
                                                       
1 I divide Plato’s dialogues into ‘early’, ‘middle’, and ‘late’ roughly in accordance with 
commonly accepted chronological order, following the present custom of Platonic 
scholarship. Early dialogues are (in alphabetical order): Apology, Charmides, Crito, 
Cratylus, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, 
Menexenus, Meno, Protagoras. Middle dialogues are: Symposium, Phaedo, Republic, 
Parmenides, Phaedrus, Theaetetus. Late dialogues are: Sophist, Politicus (Statesman), 
Philebus, Timaeus-Critias, Laws. (According to the stylometrically established order, the 
Symposium and Phaedo belong to the ‘early’ group, but I have moved them to the 
‘middle’ group, since scholars usually refer to them as middle dialogues. For a concise 
and useful review of the past studies on the chronology of Plato’s dialogues, see Kahn 
(2002)). I have arranged my chapters or sections accordingly, but no substantial part of 
my argument depends on this supposed chronological order. 
   I sometimes attribute philosophical ideas proposed in the early dialogues to 
‘Socrates’, and, by contrast, those proposed in the middle and late dialogues to ‘Plato’, 
following again the present custom of Platonic scholarship. Thus I discuss the Socratic 
method or Socratic forms in contrast to the Platonic method or Platonic Forms in my 
thesis. This custom is based on a belief commonly held by scholars that Plato’s early 
dialogues depict the historical Socrates truthfully, while Plato expresses his own ideas 
in the middle and late dialogues. By adopting the distinction between Socrates and 
Plato, however, I do not mean to commit myself to any specific views about the 
relation between the Socrates described in Plato’s early dialogues and the historical 
Socrates. 
2 Robinson (1953, v). 
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to supply here at least some of what he omitted.3 My work is especially 
concerned with an examination of the method of collection and division 
prominent in the dialogues listed. Keeping in mind the development of the 
studies on Plato’s later dialogues after Robinson––briefly summarised below––I 
believe that there is a growing need for such a work. 
   But first some explanation of ‘dialectic’ is in order. In a word, dialectic is 
Plato’s archetypal philosophical method for giving an account of the essence of 
each thing. The word ‘dialectic’ (διαλεϰτιϰή) is an abbreviation of ‘the science of 
dialectic’ (διαλεϰτιϰὴ τέχνη or ἐπιστήµη, see Phdr. 276e5; Sph. 253d2-3), and is 
derived from the verb διαλέγεσθαι, ‘to make conversation’, ‘to discourse’, or ‘to 
discuss’.4 An apparent gulf between the philosophical method and ordinary 
conversation may be bridged by the historical Socrates, who was fond of 
transforming casual conversation into philosophy: once he is engaged in a 
conversation with somebody about something, in one way or another he directs 
his interlocutors towards discussing a particular philosophical topic, e.g. the 
nature of a virtue, or of beauty (cf. La. 187e6-188a2). Plato saw the dialogue 
form as encapsulating Socrates’ philosophical spirit, and established ‘dialectic’ 
as a systematic method available for philosophers generally in their pursuit of 
knowledge. 
   Now Robinson, among others, proposed that Plato calls different methods 
                                                       
3 My own conclusions, however, are significantly different from Robinson’s. For 
example, in Chapter 1 I reject his interpretation of Socrates’ procedure for definition 
(see pp. 49-53 in his (1953)), and my general view of the method of collection and 
division is completely different from his, which he outlines when he deals with 
possible interpretations of the upward path in the Republic (see pp.162-65, ibid.). 
4 Dixsaut (2001, 354-54) offers useful classifications of the occurrences of the words 
διαλέγεσθαι, διαλεϰτιϰός, διαλεϰτιϰή, διαλεϰτιϰόν, διαλεϰτιϰῶς in Plato’s dialogues. 
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‘dialectic’ at different stages of his career.5 He recognised a significant gap 
between the account suggested in the Phaedo and Republic, on the one hand, and 
the one provided in the Phaedrus, Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus, on the other.6 I 
suspect that the gap as he saw it has considerably widened in the minds of 
Platonic scholars since the publication of his book in 1953––the year in which G. 
E. L. Owen published his deeply influential paper,7 which gave rise to the still 
now continuing controversy over Plato’s theory of Forms between the so-called 
‘unitarians’ and ‘revisionists’. Broadly speaking, the unitarians are those 
scholars who believe that Plato’s theory is consistent throughout the dialogues, 
while the revisionists think that Plato changed his fundamental doctrines at one 
or more points of his career apparently in order to overcome certain weaknesses 
of his theory.8 Owen put forward a radical revisionist view; he argued that 
Plato completely abandoned his theory of transcendent Forms after having 
described some difficulties it involved, in the Parmenides. Under his influence, 
the interpretative pendulum has decisively swung to the revisionist side. It is 
true that few scholars would fully accept his radical claim now, but many have 
                                                       
5 See Robinson (1953, 70): ‘The fact is that the word “dialectic” had a strong tendency 
in Plato to mean “the ideal method, whatever that may be”. In so far as it was thus 
merely an honorific title, Plato applied it at every stage of his life to whatever seemed 
to him at the moment the most hopeful procedure’. Cf. also Hackforth (1952, 135): ‘It 
should be realised that there can be no objection to Plato, or any philosopher, having 
two or even more διαλεϰτιϰαὶ µέθοδοι, according as he διαλεϰτιϰῶς µετέϱχεται this 
goal or that’. 
6 See Robinson (1953, 69-70). 
7 Owen (1953). 
8 This is a simplified way of characterising different approaches to Plato’s theory of 
forms/Forms. Complexity may arise from the fact that some scholars prefer 
‘development’ or ‘sophistication’ to ‘revision’ (I think no unitarian is willing to say that 
there is no development at all in Plato’s theory after e.g. the Euthyphro), and that they 
may think of Plato as refusing to commit himself to ideas he discusses. Because of this 
complexity and for other reasons, it is not easy to say who exactly belongs to which 
group, ‘unitarians’ and ‘revisionists’. 
 14 
licensed themselves to believe that a revisionist view less radical than Owen’s is 
the most balanced and plausible choice. In the context of this trend and 
especially when they are examining one of the late dialogues without 
considering its connection with other dialogues, scholars tend to assume the 
following revisionist interpretation: in the middle dialogues Plato posited 
Forms as simple, uniform, solitary entities, but in the late dialogues, in order to 
overcome the difficulties he himself posed in the Parmenides, he changed them 
into complex, manifold, interrelated entities; the task of new dialectic, or the 
method of collection and division, introduced in the late dialogues is to 
examine the interrelation of Platonic Forms with each other.9 
   To my mind, the fact that such an interpretation has been widely assumed, 
while no systematic treatment of Plato’s later dialectic is available, shows the 
necessity for a reassessment of this revisionist interpretation in connection with 
Plato’s methodology. For once we start to think about these issues with a 
particular emphasis on our understanding of Plato’s method, some objections 
can be easily raised: for example, why did Plato introduce the method of 
collection and division in the Phaedrus, the dialogue which is usually supposed 
by revisionists to have been written before the Parmenides? Or, how is it possible 
for us to investigate the interrelation of Platonic Forms (if they are the 
quasi-religious entities described in the middle dialogues, and do not exist in 
our world), and even if it is possible, what is the use of such an investigation? 
   In this thesis I shall defend a version of the unitarian interpretation. I shall 
attempt to undermine the assumption made by Robinson and others that there 
                                                       
9 I shall list some supporters of this view in Chapter 3 §1, n.59. 
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opens up a huge gap between Plato’s earlier and later methods. My aim, which 
I admit to be ambitious, is to push back the pendulum of the interpretation of 
Plato’s intellectual history towards the unitarian side, if only to a small extent, 
in the belief that, whenever it is possible, being able to understand Plato’s view 
as a coherent whole is preferable to making him inconstant in the most 
important aspects of his philosophy. 
 
§2. An overview of my argument 
   In view of the complicated nature of the subject of my argument, I think it is 
useful to present its detailed summary as an aid which a reader can always 
refer back to while he or she is working through the chapters. I advise the 
first-time reader who is not already familiar with the specific texts and 
arguments discussed in my thesis just to have a quick look at it or to skip it 
entirely at this stage. This summary is chiefly intended to clarify my position in 
relation to the topic dealt with in each chapter, and to explain how my 
arguments in different chapters can be connected together so as to constitute 
one single argument. (I am not going to describe the progress of my discussion 
in detail section by section; for the structure or outline of successive chapters, 
see the individual chapter-introductions.) 
 
§2.1. The general purpose of my study and my main proposals. 
   The general purpose of my thesis is to investigate the method of collection 
and division which Plato describes and/or employs in the Phaedrus, Sophist, 
Statesman, and Philebus. I have three specific proposals that constitute the kernel 
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of my overall interpretation: 
(1) The method of collection is the same as Socrates’ procedure for definition, as 
described in the early definitional dialogues. 
(2) The objects of investigation through collection and division are Socratic 
forms as distinguished from Platonic Forms. 
(3) There are two kinds of application of collection and division: one is the 
procedure for definition, the other internal analysis. The procedure for 
definition provides us with knowledge of a Socratic form (or knowledge by 
definition), i.e. the understanding of a simple proposition that distinguishes a 
subject-matter (F) from all the other things, while internal analysis provides us 
with knowledge of a Platonic Form or (the theoretical aspect of) expert 
knowledge.10 
 
§2.2. A synopsis of my argument 
   Chapters 1 – 3 (The preparatory part of my thesis): Since my main 
proposals are essentially concerned with what may be characterised as the 
Socratic features of Plato’s method, I shall first clarify what Socrates’ procedure 
for definition is (in Chapters 1 and 2) and what the Socratic forms are (in 
Chapter 3) before turning to the proper examination of the method of collection 
and division. 
                                                       
10 I use F as a variable that is to be filled out with the name of any kind of characteristic 
shared by many things, without being committed to the precise range of such 
characteristic (Socrates’ favourites are things like goodness, beauty, virtue, but he also 
mentions speed, colour, shape, clay, etc.). The ‘definition’ is a proposition that specifies 
this characteristic by distinguishing it from all the other characteristics. Scholars 
sometimes characterise the Socratic definition as ‘real’ definition in contrast to ‘lexical’ 
or ‘nominal’ definition. See e.g. Fine (1993, 46-49; 265 n.10). 
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   Chapter 1: I start my discussion by establishing the following two points: (i) 
that Socrates’ procedure for definition is the method of generalization or 
abstraction, and (ii) that it uses obviously true examples, or what I shall call 
‘instances’, as data before proposing a definition. Socrates’ use of examples as 
data for a definition has been a matter of controversy among scholars: some 
scholars have proposed that Socrates’ procedure for definition is the method of 
generalization or abstraction based on examples, while others have claimed that 
he cannot know which examples are genuine or bogus (and so cannot use 
examples as reliable data), because of his commitment to the following aspect of 
the principle of the priority of definition: 
 
(PD) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know, for any x, 
that x is an F. 
 
I shall propose a solution to this issue by making (PD) weaker. I shall first point 
out that there are different kinds of examples Socrates and his interlocutors 
mention before proposing a definition: (1a) F as instantiated in a certain thing, 
action, or situation (e.g. the virtue of a man), (1b) a part or kind of F (e.g. 
courage as a part of virtue), (2) a particular type of thing or action (e.g. being 
able to manage public affairs, which one might think is an example of virtue), 
(3) an individual action or thing (e.g. Pericles, who was thought to be virtuous 
by many people). I shall then suggest that in the case of (1a) it is absurd, and in 
the case of (1b) it is implausible, to hold (PD); everyone knows that the virtue of 
a man is virtue, or that courage is a virtue, even if he or she does not know the 
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definition of virtue. I shall propose to call (1a) and (1b)––obviously genuine 
examples of F––‘instances’ as distinguished from mere ‘examples’ which can 
belong to any one of the four kinds described above (i.e. both examples which 
are merely ostensibly F and are bogus in reality and those which are genuinely 
F). I shall then undertake a close examination of Plato’s text, in order to show 
that it is exactly these ‘instances’ that Socrates in the early definitional dialogues 
makes use of as data before proposing a definition. My conclusion is that 
Socrates is not committed to (PD), but to the following weaker principle: 
 
(PDweak) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know, for any 
x that is not an instance of F (but may nevertheless be an example of F), that x is 
an F. 
 
(PDweak) certainly restricts the range of examples as data for a definition to 
instances (i.e. (1a) and (1b) above), but it does not prevent Socrates from 
employing the method of generalization and abstraction for acquiring a 
definition. On the basis of this analysis, I shall propose that Socrates’ procedure 
for definition is the method of generalization or abstraction based on instances, 
or, in other words, that it is the examination of various instances with a view to 
finding the distinctive characteristic that is common to them all and thus 
providing the definition of a subject-matter. 
   Chapter 2: Next I shall turn to a passage close to the beginning of the 
Theaetetus, in which Socrates resumes his favourite ‘What is F?’ question. My 
argument in Chapter 1 is at odds with the explanation usually given of 
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Socrates’ rejection of Theaetetus’ enumeration of various kinds of knowledge 
(e.g. geometry, cobbling) as an answer to the question, ‘What is knowledge?’ 
(Tht. 146c7-147c6). Many scholars suppose that in rejecting Theaetetus’ answer 
Socrates is appealing to (PD); he is not only pointing out that the enumeration 
of examples is not the answer he is after, but is also suggesting that examples 
do not offer reliable data for a definition, since those who are looking for the 
definition of F are not in a position to know that the examples of F are really 
examples of F. By contrast, my argument in Chapter 1 indicates that Theatetus’ 
examples do offer reliable data for a definition, since they are (1b) parts or kinds 
of knowledge, and so ‘instances’ of knowledge. By closely analysing the 
passage at issue, I shall argue that Socrates is not appealing to (PD), but to a 
different principle, i.e. what I shall call the principle of the priority of the 
definition of the whole (over the definitions of parts): 
 
(PDWP) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know the 
definition of any part (or any kind) of F. 
 
(PDWP) prevents us from knowing, for example, the definition of cobbling, i.e. 
‘knowledge of making shoes’, before knowing the definition of knowledge. But 
it does not prevent us from using cobbling as a reliable datum for the definition 
of knowledge. My suggestion is, then, that Socrates is committed to two 
independent principles, i.e. (PDweak) and (PDWP), and not to the single 
principle (PD), as many scholars have supposed. 
   Through the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2, I wish to call attention to the 
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fact that Socrates’ procedure for definition described in the early definitional 
dialogues and the Theaetetus anticipates the method of collection and division 
developed in later dialogues. First, it seems fairly clear that Socrates’ procedure 
for definition anticipates the method of collection. My discussion in chapter 1 
shows that Socrates’ procedure for definition consists in examining many 
instances of F in order to find the distinctive characteristic (F) that is common to 
them all, and to provide the definition of F. In the Phaedrus Plato describes the 
method of collection as ‘perceiving together and bringing into one form items 
that are scattered in many places, in order that one can define each thing […]’ 
(265d3-4). I shall argue in Chapter 4 that these two procedures are one and the 
same. Second, an obvious implication of (PDWP) is that one must first define F 
as a whole before turning to define parts or kinds of F. In Chapters 4 – 6, I shall 
make it clear that, in applying the procedure of division, one must first define F 
as a whole (or consider F as a whole to be something obvious), and then 
proceed to define a part of F by providing the distinctive characteristic that 
distinguishes the instances of this part of F from the whole set of instances of F. 
(PDWP) offers a good reason why Plato invented such a procedure. 
   Chapter 3: Having discussed Socrates’ procedure for definition, I shall next 
turn to the objects of this procedure, i.e. Socratic forms. The main purpose of 
Chapter 3 is to bring home the idea that Plato maintains Socratic forms in the 
middle and late dialogues too. It has been almost unanimously believed by 
scholars that in the middle dialogues Plato replaced immanent Socratic forms, 
which had been at issue in the early dialogues, with his own transcendent 
entities, i.e. Platonic Forms. This belief seems to have made scholars inclined to 
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take such views as that Plato’s later method is radically different from his 
earlier method because of the difference between their respective objects, and 
that Plato in the late dialogues launched the examination of the interrelation of 
Platonic Forms with each other. I do not share such a belief. Instead, I shall 
argue that Socratic forms play a role different from that of Platonic Forms in 
Plato’s ontology, and that he simply added Platonic Forms to the Socratic 
framework as the ultimate goal of our search for knowledge. 
   In order to show this, I shall first clarify the ontological and epistemological 
status of Socratic forms. In connection with their ontological status, there are 
two points particularly relevant for my overall argument. The first is that the 
following widely-shared view is not correct: Socratic forms are always 
considered by Socrates as immanent, or spatio-temporally located, in concrete 
particulars. I shall argue that actually he sometimes regards a Socratic form as 
the common characteristic of many universals having it (for example, Socrates 
says that the virtue of a man, the virtue of a woman, etc. have virtue as their 
common characteristic; see Men. 72c6-d1). This point is significant insofar as it 
recognises the fact that the distinction between universals and particulars (or 
between types and tokens) does not constitute the basic framework of Socratic 
ontology. Thus, for instance, there is absolutely no ground for the claim 
sometimes made by scholars that Socrates in the early dialogues is solely 
interested in the relation between one universal and many particulars sharing it, 
while Plato in the late dialogues turns his attention to the investigation of the 
interrelation of universals. The second point about the ontological status of 
Socratic forms is that every Socratic form is both one and many, since it is the 
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common characteristic shared by many instances (which may be either 
particulars or universals). That is to say, the Socratic form of F is one because 
every instance of F is liable to one and the same definition, but the Socratic form 
of F is also many because it is instantiated in many things and actions. In 
Chapter 5, this point will turn out to be crucial for our understanding of 
‘dividing a form’ through the procedure of division; I shall argue there that 
‘dividing the form of F’ means dividing the ‘plural aspect’ of the Socratic form 
of F, or dividing many instances of F, into certain subgroups. Next, in 
connection with the epistemological status of Socratic forms, I shall argue that 
knowledge of the Socratic form of F merely consists in knowing a definition, i.e. 
a certain simple proposition. The implication is that knowledge of the Socratic 
form of F does not make one an expert in F, since it is unlikely that one can be 
an expert in anything just by knowing a simple proposition. 
   With this argument about Socratic forms in mind, I shall next attempt an 
elucidation of the status of Platonic Forms which basically relies on what is 
commonly called the ‘ascent’ passage in the Symposium. I suggest that in this 
passage Plato distinguishes three items: (1) beautiful things (e.g. beautiful 
bodies), (2) beauty in things (e.g. beauty in bodies), and (3) the Platonic Form of 
Beauty, and then propose that (2) beauty in things corresponds to the Socratic 
form of beauty. These two kinds of beauty/Beauty are different in status and 
have different roles: the Socratic form of beauty is instantiated in things and 
actions, is both one and many, and is known by the definition of beauty, while 
the Platonic Form of Beauty is never instantiated in things or actions, is simply 
one, and is known only at the end of a certain systematic process of 
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understanding various kinds of beauties. Bearing these different status and 
roles in mind, I suggest that Plato has both Socratic forms and Platonic Forms in 
view in the middle and late dialogues. (After this argument, I shall briefly argue 
that my interpretation is compatible with, and even sheds a new light on, 
metaphysical passages in the Phaedo and Republic.) 
   Chapters 4 – 6 (The main part of my thesis): Armed with a clear 
understanding of Socrates’ procedure for definition and its objects, I shall 
embark on my principal topic: the method of collection and division. The main 
part of my thesis is divided between those dialogues in which Plato explains or 
employs collection and division: in Chapter 4 I shall discuss the Phaedrus, in 
Chapter 5 the Sophist and the Politicus, and in Chapter 6 the Philebus. I basically 
intend my argument as developed in each one of these chapters to be 
understandable independently of the other chapters. For example, in each 
chapter I shall offer independent reasons for identifying the ‘forms’ or ‘kinds’ 
that appear as the objects of collection and division with Socratic forms. 
However, I claim that one of the real advantages of my interpretation is that it 
enables us to explain relevant passages in all four dialogues consistently in the 
same way. 
   Chapter 4: By analysing canonical passages about the method of collection 
and division in the Phaedrus, i.e. (A) 265c8-266c1 and (B) 277b2-c6, together with 
their surrounding context, I shall propose in this chapter (1) that the method of 
collection is the same as Socrates’ procedure for definition, and (2) that there are 
two kinds of application of the method of collection and division: one is the 
procedure for definition, the other what I shall call ‘internal analysis’. I shall 
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also propose (3) that, when the procedure for definition is at issue, division (of 
the genus of a definiendum) is applied in the course of collection (of the 
definiendum). In bringing forward these proposals, I intend to refute a 
dominant view about the method in question, or what I shall call the traditional 
interpretation, according to which (i) collection is the procedure for the 
identification of the genus of a definiendum, and (ii) collection is applied before 
division. Scholars tend to support this interpretation by relying on the canonical 
passages without paying much attention to their context. I wish to show that a 
good grasp of the context uncovers serious defects in the traditional 
interpretation. 
   I shall first discuss passages closely connected with (A) (265c8-266c1), 
paying particular attention to Socrates’ reference to the benefit of definition or 
collection. My basic argument runs as follows. There is little room for doubt 
that in (A) Socrates is suggesting that the method of collection provides 
speeches with self-consistency and clarity. It follows from this that the 
traditional interpreters, who identify collection with the determination of the 
genus of a subject-matter, would by implication be claiming that the 
determination of the genus is beneficial in this regard. However, Socrates 
reiterates the benefit of definition without saying anything about the benefit of 
the specification of the genus: first, at the beginning of Socrates’ first speech 
(237b7-238c4) an imaginary speaker indicates that the definition of the subject of 
a speech helps interlocutors agree with themselves and with each other; second, 
in the course of the examination of scientific features of speeches Socrates 
suggests that the definition of the subject-matter created structure within his 
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first speech (see 263d1-264e3). These passages testify to the view that, in 
referring to the benefit of collection in (A), Socrates has in mind these benefits of 
definition. Accordingly, I shall propose that collection is the procedure for 
definition, and not simply for the identification of the genus. The description of 
collection naturally indicates that this is indeed Socrates’ procedure for 
definition: examining many instances of F in order to specify the common 
characteristic, or the Socratic form of F, so that one can provide the definition of 
F. My suggestion that division is applied in the course of collection also 
naturally follows from this proposal, since in his first speech Socrates applied 
the division of desire in the course of the procedure for the definition of human 
love. 
   Next, I shall turn to passage (B) (277b2-c6), which is quoted by some of the 
traditional interpreters as crucial evidence for their view. I shall argue that the 
superficial plausibility of their claim can be explained away by taking into 
consideration the fact that in this passage Socrates has two kinds of application 
of the method of collection and division in mind. I shall suggest that these 
constitute (1) the procedure for definition and (2) what I call ‘internal analysis’. 
The procedure for the definition of F is simply concerned with F as a whole and 
provides the definition––a simple proposition––of F. By contrast, the internal 
analysis of F Socrates introduces later in the dialogue (269c6-272b6) analyses F 
as a whole into its species and subspecies, and provides the definitions of every 
internal element of F. The procedure for definition provides us with knowledge 
by definition, while internal analysis provides us with (the theoretical aspect of) 
expert knowledge. In Chapter 6 I shall suggest that internal analysis is 
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ultimately concerned with Platonic Forms; the immediate or direct objects of 
internal analysis are the Socratic form of F and its species-forms and 
subspecies-forms, but the goal of this method is to acquire knowledge of the 
Platonic Form of F. 
   Chapter 5: I shall then move on to discuss the Sophist and the Politicus, in 
which the Eleatic Stranger extensively employs the method of collection and 
division in order to define sophistry and statesmanship. In this chapter I am 
chiefly interested in clarifying the mechanism of single steps of division, 
thereby making it clear that dividing the form of F implies collecting the form of 
G, a species-form of the form of F. My first step is to clarify the elements 
involved, at least tacitly, in each single step of division: (1) the form of G that 
results from a particular step of division, (2) its instances, (3) its genus (F) and 
differentia, (4) its detailed explanation, and (5) its name. I shall then argue that 
the controversial operation, ‘dividing the form of F into the form of G and the 
form of H’, should be understood as dividing the plural aspect of the Socratic 
form of F (or dividing many instances of the Socratic form of F) into the 
instances of the form of G and those of the form of H. When seen from a 
different point of view, this operation is collecting the instances of the form of G 
and those of the form of H into unities by finding their common characteristics 
(G and H) and providing their definitions. My conclusion is that Socrates’ 
procedure for definition is working in each step of division as described in the 
Sophist and the Politicus. I shall also argue that the seventh, successful definition 
of sophistry, taken as a whole procedure, can be seen as a clear example of 
Socrates’ procedure for definition: it starts by surveying the instances of 
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sophistry (see Sph. 232b1-234e4) and moves on to provide the distinctive 
characteristic common to all these instances, first roughly describing it as ‘a 
kind of imitation’, but eventually, with the help of the method of collection and 
division, reaching the accurate definition. 
   Chapter 6: In the final chapter I shall minutely examine the opening 
passages of the Philebus in which Socrates discusses methodological issues 
(14c1-18d2). My main task is to show that the dialectical method described at 
16c10-e2 is the same as the internal analysis we have been introduced to in the 
Phaedrus; in the Philebus Plato is merely re-describing the same method in a 
slightly different manner, before applying it in the main part of the dialogue for 
the scientific investigations of pleasure and knowledge. This task, however, 
cannot be carried out straightforwardly, because the description of the method 
is prefaced with extremely controversial passages. 
   I shall first explicate the flow of the argument in the opening passages. Two 
points are particularly important. First, the purpose of the ‘opening skirmish’ 
between Socrates and Protarchus (12c1-14b8) is to establish the following 
principle about one and many: 
 
(OM1) F is one qua F, but qua instances of F it is many, and these instances are 
dissimilar to one another. 
 
Second, Socrates says that the objections described at 15b1-8 can be raised easily 
against a case of (OM1), e.g. ‘pleasure is one qua pleasure, but qua instances it is 
many’, which implies that one thing is many, or many things are just one (see 
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14c8-9), and which posits something universal as one (see 15a1-2). He also says 
that it is generally admitted that one should not try to deal with or refute the 
case in which someone posits something particular as one, for instance: 
 
(OM2) Protarchus is one by nature, but is many and opposite Protarchuses by 
being tall and short, heavy and light, etc. 
 
This second point indicates that it is misleading to contrast (OM2) as the ‘easy 
one-and-many problems’ with the objections described at 15b1-8 as the ‘serious 
one-and-many problems’, as many scholars do. (OM2) is contrasted by Plato 
with (OM1), and not with the objections. 
   I shall then turn to the objections described at 15b1-8 which Socrates says are 
easy to raise, and which I shall propose to call the ‘apparent objections’. It has 
been fiercely discussed by scholars (a) whether there are two or three objections, 
and (b) how these objections are dealt with by Socrates. I shall suggest that 
there are only two objections, and that at 16e4-17a5 Socrates dismisses these 
objections as merely eristic, together with a young boy’s way of dealing with 
cases of (OM1) described at 15d8-16a3. This reading would require an 
emendation of the text (I shall propose to replace ὅµως at 15b4 with ὄντως or 
ὅλως), but it is perfectly harmonious with the context. Many scholars have 
argued recently that there are three questions, the second of which is crucial for 
understanding the context, because it deals with what they think is Plato’s main 
concern in the late dialogues, i.e. the interrelation of the Platonic Forms. This 
second question, according to these scholars, asks how one genus-Form (e.g. 
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Pleasure) can be many species-Forms (e.g. Pleasure-in-Body, Pleasure-in-Soul). I 
shall argue, however, that my discussion of the opening passages shows that 
their interpretation does not fit the context: if this line of interpretation were to 
be correct, the answer to the second objection would have already been given in 
the opening skirmish (12c1-14b8), before the apparent objections are described. 
   I shall then address the dialectical method described at 16c10-e2, by 
discussing three points particularly significant for our understanding of the 
method. First, the objects it directly deals with are Socratic forms. Second, the 
‘unlimited’ (ἄπειϱον) in the dialectical method refers to an unlimited quantity 
of instances. Third, the function of the illustration of the dialectical method 
(17a6-17e6) is merely to show that grasping the number between one and the 
unlimited makes one knowledgeable in each case; Socrates does not mean to 
offer examples of the actual process of the application of dialectic. In relation to 
the second and third points, I shall defend the traditional interpretation against 
the view that has recently become very influential, according to which the 
dialectical method in the Philebus is essentially the method for finding certain 
ratios (e.g. 2:3, 4:5) on a certain continuum (e.g. the hot-and-cold continuum). I 
shall conclude my argument by pointing out that the dialectical method in the 
Philebus, when its controversial points are clarified, turns out to be the same 
procedure of internal analysis as described in the Phaedrus. 
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Chapter 1: Socrates’ procedure for definition and 
the positive use of examples 
 
 
 
§1. Introduction 
   Socrates as described in Plato’s early definitional dialogues is notoriously 
persistent in asking his interlocutors for the definition of a certain item (e.g. 
courage, justice, beauty) and in destructively examining definitions proposed 
by them. It is not the case, however, that he is only interested in knocking down 
proposed definitions; he also seems to have a constructive procedure for 
acquiring a correct definition. I shall call this ‘Socrates’ procedure for definition’. 
In this chapter, I wish to show that Socrates’ procedure for definition is the 
method of generalization or abstraction based on obviously true examples, or 
what I shall call ‘instances’ (i.e. F as instantiated in certain things, actions, or 
situations, or parts of F). My interpretation offers a solution to a puzzle as to 
how Socrates can make use of examples for acquiring a definition while being 
committed to what is called ‘the principle of the priority of definition’. More 
importantly, it will provide, I believe, a valuable insight into Plato’s later 
dialectic, which is centrally concerned with definitions and instances. 
   In section 2, I shall describe two views about Socrates’ positive use of 
examples. Some scholars think that it is clear from the texts that Socrates makes 
use of examples as data for acquiring a definition. Other scholars suggest that 
he cannot consistently use examples for that purpose, since his commitment to 
 31 
the principle of the priority of definition implies that he does not know which 
examples are genuine. These two opposing views have created a puzzle about 
Socrates’ procedure for definition. In section 3, I shall critically examine the 
single solution that has been proposed so far, namely that Socrates can have a 
true belief as to which examples are true (and so he can use examples as data for 
acquiring a definition), even when he does not know which examples are true. 
In section 4, I shall offer my own solution. First, I shall point out that scholars 
have failed to notice that there are different kinds of ‘examples’. In my view, 
some of them are obviously true examples, or ‘instances’, and when these kinds 
of examples are at issue, it is not problematic that Socrates claims to know that 
such and such things are true examples. Second, by closely examining the 
relevant texts, I shall argue that he uses only these kinds of examples as data for 
acquiring a definition. 
 
§2. Two interpretations on Socrates’ positive use of examples 
   It is a controversial issue whether Socrates makes use of examples in order 
to reach a definition or not. A general impression we get at the beginning of 
Socrates’ attempt at defining a virtue or beauty in the early dialogues is that 
Socrates’ interlocutors, when asked the definition of a thing under 
consideration, offer an example rather than a definition at first, and then 
Socrates rejects their answer as inappropriate, sometimes having pointed out 
that there are other examples as well (cf. Euthphr. 5d8-6d10, La. 190e4-192b8, 
Men. 71e1-77b1, Tht. 146c7-148d7). Broadly speaking, some scholars think that 
the fact that examples are usually mentioned at the beginning of the search for a 
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definition is a clear indication that the review of these examples is an essential 
part of Socrates’ procedure. By contrast, others underscore Socrates’ rejection, 
and deny any use of examples as data for a definition, thereby appealing to the 
so-called ‘principle of the priority of definition’. 
   Those who take examples as the primary source for a definition (let us call 
them ‘example-prioritisers’) suppose that, first, Socrates’ procedure for 
definition consists in the method of abstraction or generalization, and second, 
examples are often given by Socrates’ interlocutors.11 Thus, in the inquiry into a 
subject-matter (F), Socrates first collects many examples of F, which are often 
given by his interlocutors, and then examines these examples in order to find 
out the distinctive characteristic that is common to them and to provide the 
definition of F. The first attempt at defining courage in the Laches is often 
quoted in this connection: Laches, Socrates’ interlocutor, proposes ‘remaining at 
one’s post and defending oneself against the enemy without running away’ as 
the definition of courage. The example-prioritisers understand this inchoate 
stage of the dialogue in the following way.12 First, although Socrates does not 
think Laches’ proposal is a proper one since he is not asking for an example of 
courageous act but for the definition of courage, at any rate Socrates accepts 
                                                       
11 The clearest statement of this interpretation is given by Guthrie (1971, 112-14): 
‘According to his [Socrates’] method, […] the inquiry consists of two stages. The first is 
to collect instances to which both parties to a discussion agree that the name under 
consideration may be applied, e.g. if it is piety, to collect instances of agreed pious acts. 
Secondly, the collected instances are examined in order to discover some common 
quality in them by virtue of which they bear that name. […] The fault that he usually 
had to correct in his interlocutors is that when faced with a question of definition like 
‘What is courage?’ or ‘What is piety?’ they saw no further than the first stage of the 
dual process.’ Other example-prioritisers are e.g. Cornford (1957, 185), Santas (1972, 
133), Beversluis (1987 [1992, 109-10; 121 n.13]), Vlastos (1990 [1994, 74-75]). Cf. also 
Benson (1990, 44 n.41). 
12 See Beversluis (1987 [1992, 109-110]), Vlastos (1990 [1994, 74-75]). 
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Laches’ proposal as an example of courageous act: 
 
   (P1) SOCRATES: That man, I suppose, is courageous whom you yourself mention, 
that is, the man who fights the enemy while remaining at his post? 
LACHES: Yes, that is my view. 
SOCRATES: And I agree. 
(191a1-5) 
 
Next, Socrates encourages Laches to examine a wide variety of examples before 
stating the definition of courage, by offering a host of examples himself: 
 
   (P2) SOCRATES: So as I said just now, my poor questioning is to blame for your 
poor answer, because I wanted to learn from you not only what constitutes 
courage for a hoplite but for a horseman as well and for every sort of warrior. 
And I wanted to include not only those who are courageous in warfare but 
also those who are brave in dangers at sea, and the ones who show courage 
in illness and poverty and affairs of state; and then again I wanted to include 
not only those who are brave in the face of pain and fear but also those who 
are clever at fighting desire and pleasure, whether by standing their ground 
or running away. […] So try again to state first what is the courage that is the 
same in all these cases. (191c7-e11) 
 
This procedure is even clearer in the definition of speed which Socrates gives  
as a paradigmatic case of the procedure for definition immediately after (P2) in 
 34 
order to clarify for Laches the sort of definition that is required: 
 
(P3) SOCRATES: Suppose I asked what speed was, which we find in running and in 
playing the lyre and in speaking and in learning and in many other 
instances––in fact we may say we display the quality, so far as it is worth 
mentioning, in movements of the arms or legs or tongue or voice or thought? 
[…] Then if anyone should ask me, “Socrates, what do you say it is which 
you call swiftness in all these cases,” I would answer him that what I call 
swiftness is the power of accomplishing a great deal in a short time, whether 
in speech or in running or all the other cases. (192a1-b3) 
 
In (P3), Socrates, apparently applying the procedure of generalization or 
abstraction, first collects various examples of speed or swiftness, abstracts the 
common factor that exists in all these examples, and offers a concise definition 
by describing this common factor. The example-prioritisers think that, at the 
beginning of the other definitional dialogues in which Socrates’ interlocutors 
offer examples, a similar procedure is being applied too (see Euthphr. 6d6-e1, 
Hi.Ma. 288a8-9, Men. 73c6-8), although none seems as clear as (P3). In short, 
according to this interpretation, the survey of examples, which are often given 
by Socrates’ interlocutor, is an essential part of Socrates’ procedure for 
definition. 
   By contrast, other scholars (let us call them ‘definition-prioritisers’) reject the 
interpretation described above, claiming that Socrates cannot consistently use 
examples as data for a definition because he is committed to the principle of the 
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priority of definition or, more precisely, to one aspect of that principle, 
namely:13 
 
(PD) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know, for 
any x, that x is an F.14 
 
According to (PD), those who are still in pursuit of the definition of F cannot 
know, for anything that is given as an example, if it is a genuine example of F or 
a bogus one. Therefore, they conclude, it is impossible to reach a definition by 
way of the examination of examples. For instance, consider the following 
passage from the Hippias Major. 
 
   (P4) SOCRATES: So when I go home to my own place and he [Socrates’ imaginary 
second-self] hears me saying those things [e.g. that it is excellent to be able to 
present speeches well and finely], he asks if I’m not ashamed that I dare 
                                                       
13 This interpretation is supported by e.g. Robinson (1953, 51), Burnyeat (1977, 384), 
Benson (1990, 44-64). 
14 As is made clear by Beversluis (1987 [1992, 108]), Vlastos (1990 [1994]), and Benson 
(1990, 19 n.2), the principle of the priority of definition consists in the conjunction of 
(PD) and the following principle: 
 
(PD*) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know, for any 
property G, that F is G. 
 
For instance, if one fails to know what temperance is, then one fails to know that 
temperance is fine. But (PD*) is irrelevant to the positive use of examples we are 
considering here, and so I shall simply discuss (PD) in what follows. 
  Whether Socrates is committed to the principle of the priority of definition ((PD) and 
(PD*)) or not has been a matter of considerable discussion, and accordingly the 
relevant literature is very extensive. Cf. Geach (1966), Santas (1972), Nehamas (1975a 
[1999]), Burnyeat (1977), Irwin (1977a), Woodruff (1982 [1992]), Nehamas (1987 [1999]), 
Beversluis (1987 [1992]), Lesher (1987), Vlastos (1990 [1994]), Benson (1990), Prior (1998), 
Wolfsdorf (2003), Forster (2006). However, I think that Benson has persuasively shown 
Socrates’ commitment to this principle. See the next note. 
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discuss fine activities when I’ve been so plainly refuted about the fine, and 
it’s clear I don’t even know at all what that is itself! ‘Look’, he will say. ‘How 
will you know whose speech––or any other action––is finely presented or not, 
when you are ignorant of the fine? And when you’re in a state like that, do 
you think it’s any better for you to live than die?’ (Hi.Ma. 304d5-e2) 
 
It is clearly suggested in this passage that Socrates fails to know, for any given 
activity, if it is fine or foul as long as he does not know the definition of the fine. 
Such activities, then, cannot be used as data for the definition of the fine, on the 
basis of which the common factor, the fine, is to be generalised or abstracted. 
Indeed, so long as we are not certain about the fineness of such activities, there 
will be no guarantee that the common factor found in them will be the fine, or 
even that any common factor should be found in them. 
   On the other hand, the definition-prioritisers admit that the definitional 
dialogues are full of arguments based on examples. They claim, however, that 
Socrates’ use of these examples is restricted to the examination of a proposed 
definition, for which knowledge of examples is not necessary. Following an 
interpretation that is supported by many scholars, they consider that Socratic 
argument in the definitional dialogues essentially consists in the examination of 
the consistency of the interlocutor’s beliefs. A typical procedure is that, after a 
definition is proposed, Socrates, putting forward several premises, asks his 
interlocutor whether he agrees to these premises or not, and then, having 
secured agreement, moves on to show the inconsistency between the proposed 
definition and the agreed premises. The definition-prioritisers assume that 
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Socrates makes use of examples just to create these premises. If this is the case, 
then Socrates and his interlocutor need not know the genuineness of the 
examples, for what matters in argument is simply whether these are accepted 
by the interlocutor or not. Therefore, they conclude, Socrates’ predilection for 
examples in argument does not cause any difficulty to their claim; Socrates is 
committed to (PD) and uses examples only in a way that does not require 
knowledge of their authenticity. 
   In my view, Socrates’ use of examples has not been sufficiently understood 
by either the example- or the definition-prioritisers. On the one hand, Socrates’ 
commitment to (PD) has been persuasively argued by Benson,15 and in this 
                                                       
15 Benson’s argument runs in essence as follows. There are many passages that seem to 
show Socrates’ commitment to the principle of the priority of definition: Euthphr. 
4d9-5d1, 6e3-6, 15d4-e1; La. 190b7-c2, 189e3-190b1; Chrm. 176a6-b1; Prt. 312c1-4; Grg. 
463c3-6; Hi.Ma. 286c8-d2, 304d5-e2; Ly. 223b4-8; Men. 71a5-b7, 100b4-6. It is true that 
each passage, taken separately, admits explanations based on a weaker principle, and 
that there is no one passage that shows Socrates’ commitment to the principle by itself. 
However, when taken together, these passages demand an explanation about why 
Socrates is committed to many different weaker principles, and his commitment to the 
principle of the priority of definition provides this explanation. 
  As reported by Benson (1990, 21 n.3), many scholars have thought that Socrates is 
committed to the principle of the priority of definition or one of its two aspects (i.e. 
(PD) or (PD*)): e.g. Ross, Robinson, Crombie, Friedländer, Geach, Gulley, Allen, 
Cherniss, Guthrie, Santas, Taylor, Irwin, Burnyeat, Woodruff. By contrast, some 
scholars have tried to deny Socrates’ commitment to this principle: e.g. Nehamas (1987 
[1999]), Beversluis (1987 [1992]), Vlastos (1990 [1994]), Kahn (1996), but I do not think 
that their arguments are convincing. First, Vlastos, Beversluis, and Kahn, while 
admitting that there are passages in which Socrates’ commitment to the principle of the 
priority of definition is described, deny Socrates’ commitment on the basis of different 
assumptions, none of which I share. Vlastos and Beversluis, on the one hand, attribute 
the commitment in question to Plato, not to Socrates, by assuming a distinction 
between the transitional dialogues (Hi.Ma., Ly., Men.) that show certain Platonic 
aspects and the elenctic dialogues that are really Socratic. Kahn, on the other hand, 
denies Socrates’ commitment by assuming that the Hippias Major is not composed by 
Plato himself. Second, Beversluis and Nehamas argue that Socrates is committed to a 
weaker principle: 
 
(C) If one fails to know what F is, then one fails to know, for any x that is a 
controversial or borderline case, that x is F. 
 
But as Benson has argued (1990, 31-33), there seems to be no textual evidence that 
Socrates distinguishes controversial cases from non-controversial cases. (It should be 
noticed in this connection that this distinction is different from the one between 
controversial concepts (e.g. good, just) and non-controversial concepts (e.g. iron, silver), 
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respect and in its consequence (i.e. that Socrates cannot use examples as data for 
a definition) the view of the definition-prioritisers seems to be justified.16 On 
the other hand, the passages quoted by example-prioritisers (i.e. (P1) – (P3)) 
strongly suggest that Socrates uses examples constructively in order to reach a 
definition, and not just destructively in order to create premises that will 
eventually show the inconsistency of his interlocutor’s beliefs as the 
definition-prioritisers claim, and in this respect the view of the 
example-prioritisers seems to be justified. In a nutshell, we have a dilemma: 
Socrates seems to appeal to examples before reaching a definition, but he also 
says that one cannot know what examples are genuine before reaching a 
definition. 
 
§3. The true belief theory 
   Some scholars have proposed that the puzzle will be solved if we take into 
consideration the distinction between knowledge and true belief: Socrates’ 
procedure for definition starts by collecting true examples which are selected on 
account of true belief, not on account of knowledge (let us call this ‘the true 
belief theory’). 17  According to the famous passage in the Meno (98a1-4), 
knowledge is true belief that is tied down by an account of the reason. Thus, so 
long as we have not acquired knowledge, we cannot give reasons why x is F, but 
we can still judge correctly that x is F. To put it somewhat differently, the 
                                                                                                                                                                
which clearly interests Socrates (Euthphr.7b6-d8; cf. Phdr.263a2-c12).) 
16 However, I shall later try to find a way of making (PD) weaker. 
17 This interpretation is supported by Irwin (1977a, 40-41), Burnyeat (1977, 386-87), 
Santas (1979, 116; 120-21), Woodruff (1982, 140), Prior (1998), Wolfsdorf (2003, 308-10), 
Forster (2006, 34 n.82). (As a matter of fact, although Burnyeat (1977) is typically 
grouped into these interpreters, his view might be slightly different. See n. 24 below.) 
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definition of F is not necessary for collecting some true examples; it is necessary 
for justifying the claim that these examples are true ones. It is true, these 
interpreters continue, that the distinction between knowledge and true belief 
has not been fully developed until the Meno, a dialogue that is usually 
considered to have been composed just before the middle dialogues, but there is 
no reason to suppose that this distinction has completely escaped Socrates’ 
attention. 18  Socrates’ position, then, does not involve any incoherence: 
according to him, one cannot know which examples are true before reaching a 
definition because of his commitment to (PD), but one can form a true belief 
about examples and, therefore, can collect true examples on account of his true 
belief even before reaching a definition. 
   However, it is difficult to understand how true belief fits into Socrates’ 
procedure for definition. Three problems can be pointed out. First, the true 
belief theory seems incompatible with Socrates’ explicit statement that he wants 
a definition in order to judge correctly whether a certain action is a case of F. 
Consider what has motivated Socrates’ search for the definition of the pious in 
the Euthyphro: it is, at least in part, 19  a wish to judge correctly whether 
Euthyphro’s action, i.e. his prosecuting his own father for the murder of his 
hired worker who himself had committed murder, is an example of pious act or 
                                                       
18 See Irwin (1977a, 294 n.5), Forster (2007, 6-13). By contrast, Beversluis (1987 [1992, 
115]) argues that, even though the incipient awareness of the distinction between 
knowledge and true belief is discerned in Cri.44c6-47d5 and Grg.454b3-e9, the relevant 
terms ‘are not employed in the technical epistemic senses which they acquire in the 
Meno and post-Meno dialogues and which are presupposed by TB [i.e. the true belief 
theory]’. 
19 Of course, Socrates’ more immediate motivation for asking Euthyphro for the 
definition of piousness would be a wish to examine Euthyphro in accordance with 
what Socrates believed to be the order of god. Cf. Benson (1990, 48-57), Forster (2006, 
10-22). 
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not (see 9a1-b4). In the following passage Socrates expresses his wish in more 
general terms:20 
 
   (P5) SOCRATES: Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it, 
and using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another’s that is of 
that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not. 
(6e4-7) 
 
But, according to the true belief theory, the capacity for judging examples 
correctly must be a prerequisite of the search for a definition, and cannot be its 
purpose. This interpretation, then, seems incapable of explaining the fact that 
Socrates makes the acquisition of the capacity for judging examples correctly a 
purpose of his search for a definition. Secondly, it is unclear how true belief is 
acquired. (Remember that, on the supposition that Socrates and his 
interlocutors collect true examples as data for a definition, we have to suppose 
that they have already acquired true belief before any attempt of definition.) 
True belief might be acquired by divine inspiration, as suggested in the Meno 
(99b11-d9),21 or perhaps by chance. But true belief acquired in such ways seems 
hardly helpful, for we will be unable to distinguish the state in which we have 
true belief from the one in which we do not, and accordingly we shall be 
uncertain as to whether we are choosing true examples or not. Of course, if 
someone who has already acquired knowledge of F attends the conversation, 
                                                       
20 Cf. also Hi.Ma.286c3-e4. 
21 Cf. Forster (2007). 
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and gives Socrates and his interlocutor examples of F without revealing the 
definition of F, they will be able to acquire true belief about examples. But, 
needless to say, this is not what happens in Socratic dialogues. Finally, the true 
belief theory would implausibly represent Socrates as setting great importance 
on knowledge as distinguished from true belief. In the passage of the Hippias 
Major that has been quoted above as (P4), Socrates’ imaginary second-self 
speaks to him: ‘How will you know whose speech––or any other action––is 
finely presented or not, when you are ignorant of the fine? And when you’re in 
a state like that, do you think it’s any better for you to live than die?’ (304d8-e3). 
According to the true belief theory, the first sentence only means that, if we do 
not know the fine, then we will not be able to explain why x is an example of 
the fine, and this will not prevent us from forming a true belief about examples in 
the sense of judging correctly that x is an example of F. But, if that is the case, 
the situation that is so negatively described in the second sentence includes the 
one in which we have only true belief without knowledge.22 Such a dismissive 
attitude towards true belief, however, sounds not only implausible, but in fact 
incompatible with Socrates’ evaluation of true belief in the Meno: ‘Correct 
opinion is then neither inferior to knowledge nor less useful in directing actions, 
nor is the man who has it less so than he who has knowledge.’ (98c1-3)23 In 
short, if true belief, or the capacity for judging examples correctly, has place at 
all in Socrates’ procedure for definition, then it will be so effective as to make 
one of the chief purposes of the search for a definition redundant, it will be 
                                                       
22 Cf. Vlastos (1990 [1994, 73]). 
23 I do not think that Socrates is simply ironical when he says this. 
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acquired only in a mysterious way, and it will be strangely condemned by 
Socrates in spite of its usefulness. But these consequences seem unacceptable. 
   One might propose that belief, rather than true belief, is sufficient for 
collecting those examples on the basis of which we abstract or generalise a 
definition.24 An obvious problem for this proposal is that, if we collect some 
false examples of F together with true ones, then we will not be able to find the 
F we are looking for. But one could argue that this problem is avoidable by 
supposing that it is not true examples that Socrates is collecting as data for a 
definition. Two interpretations along these lines might readily come to mind. 
First, one might contend that Socrates is appealing to common sense. To be sure, 
common sense is not sufficient for distinguishing true examples from false ones, 
but it may be useful for judging whether some examples are controversial or 
uncontroversial. Examples are uncontroversial when they are considered to be 
true by many people, and controversial when they are only by few. Thus, 
Laches’ example of courageous action may be an uncontroversial example, but 
Euthyphro’s prosecution of his own father, which is considered impious by his 
father and his other relatives (see Euthphr. 4d5-6), is a controversial example. 
According to this interpretation, then, Socrates aims at discovering the 
characteristic that is common to uncontroversial examples, thereby relying on 
common sense. Second, it might be argued that Socrates’ use of example is 
purely hypothetical. Socrates accepts examples only provisionally and might 
dismiss some of them in the course of discussion. Socrates will revise his list of 
examples when it has turned out that the distinctive characteristic that is 
                                                       
24 Burnyeat (1977) may hold this view. Cf. n. 17 above. 
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common to these examples appears something different from what he has been 
looking for, or when simply the distinctive characteristic has turned out 
extremely difficult to find. In this case, Socrates is collecting not true examples, 
but examples that are temporarily supposed to be true. 
   However, it seems fairly clear that neither of these interpretations offers a 
plausible description of Socrates’ procedure for definition because there is no 
textual evidence that would support them. Socrates nowhere appeals to 
common sense to collect examples. Quite to the contrary, he famously detaches 
himself from commonsensical opinions.25 Also, Socrates never revises the list of 
examples he has previously presented; indeed he shows no sign of noticing the 
possibility that there was something wrong with the examples given at the 
beginning of the discussion even when the discussion ends up in aporia. At any 
rate, all these interpretations are, in my view, only proposed, speculatively, in 
order to find a way out of the dilemma we are caught in, without much 
attention to how Socrates is described when he is collecting examples in the text. 
In what follows, I would like to observe closely what kind of examples Socrates 
is in fact collecting and, on the basis of this observation, propose another 
interpretation. 
 
§4. My interpretation 
   First of all, I would like to point out that, when scholars talk about 
‘examples’, they seem to have in mind various kinds of examples without 
making any distinction among them. Thus, Laches’ proposal for a definition of 
                                                       
25 Cf. Benson (1990, 31-33). 
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courage, i.e. remaining at one’s post and defending oneself against the enemy 
without running away, is regarded as an ‘example’ of courageous action, and 
Socrates’ enumeration of those who show courage in many different situations 
in (P2), e.g. those who show courage in warfare, those who show courage in 
illness and poverty, is labelled as an enumeration of ‘examples’. But these two 
kinds of ‘examples’ seem quite different in nature: the former is a particular type 
of action, one about which it is not immediately clear whether it is really 
courageous or not, but the latter is courage as instantiated in people who are dealing 
with various situations. Then again, ‘examples’ that passage (P4) from the Hippias 
Major most likely prevents us from using as data for a definition are individual 
speeches and actions that appear fine to an observer, but might not really be fine. 
Further, in the dialogue named after him, Meno proposes ‘examples’ of virtue 
in two different ways. On the one hand, he gives ‘examples’ in the following 
way: 
 
(P6) ‘First, if you want the virtue of a man, it is easy to say that a man’s virtue 
consists of being able to manage public affairs and in so doing to benefit his 
friends and harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to 
himself; if you want the virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to describe: she 
must manage the home well, preserve its possessions, and be submissive to 
her husband; the virtue of a child, whether male or female, is different again, 
and so is that of an elderly man, if you want that, or if you want that of a free 
man or a slave’ (71e1-72a1). 
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Meno’s intention is clear enough: he first distinguishes virtue as instantiated in 
different situations in accordance with sex, age, and status, and adds a few 
particular types of action to each of them. On the other hand, in the course of 
discussion, he also comes across different ‘examples’ of virtue: ‘I think courage 
is a virtue, and moderation, wisdom, and munificence, and very many others’ 
(74a4-6). These are later referred as parts of virtue (cf. 79a9-e6). 
   Now, I would like to propose that we should make distinctions within the 
notion of the ‘example’: (1a) F as instantiated in a certain situation, action or 
thing, (1b) a part (or a kind) of F, (2) a particular type of action or thing, (3) an 
individual action or thing. The significance of this distinction becomes 
immediately clear if we substitute the variable (x) in (PD) with an example of 
each of them in turn. Suppose the following are all examples of virtue: (1a) the 
virtue of a man, (1b) courage, (2) being able to manage public affairs, (3) 
Pericles, who is regarded as virtuous by many people. 
 
(PD-1a) If one fails to know the definition of virtue, then one fails to 
know that the virtue of a man is a virtue. 
(PD-1b) If one fails to know the definition of virtue, then one fails to 
know that courage is a virtue. 
(PD-2) If one fails to know the definition of virtue, then one fails to 
know that being able to manage public affairs is a virtuous act. 
(PD-3) If one fails to know the definition of virtue, then one fails to 
know that Pericles is virtuous. 
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A glance will show that (PD-1a) is absurd. Everyone knows that the virtue of a 
man is a virtue, for this is simply an analytical statement. It is, then, not the case 
that (PD) is valid for any kind of examples; the ‘examples’ in the sense of (1a) 
are exceptions. We should not therefore be bewildered even if we find that a 
Socrates who is committed to (PD) collects this kind of example as data for a 
definition. Indeed, we shall observe soon, when we examine Plato’s text closely, 
that Socrates’ procedure for definition is mostly based on this kind of example. 
Further, I would like to suggest that Socrates does not think that (PD-1b) is 
valid either. Although it is not absurd like (PD-1a), at least it seems plausible to 
suppose that everyone who has minimal understanding of what courage is 
knows that it is a virtue.26 Thus I consider that (PD) is not valid for the 
examples in the sense of (1b) either. By contrast, Socrates will consider (PD-2) 
and (PD-3) valid because of his commitment to (PD). In short, I suggest that 
(1a) and (1b) are obviously true examples of F, which are available as data for a 
                                                       
26 I am of course aware of the fact that, in the passage that closes Book I of the Republic, 
Socrates seems to be suggesting the exact opposite of my proposal: ‘when I don’t know 
what justice is, I’ll hardly know whether it is a kind of virtue or not, or whether a 
person who has it is happy or unhappy’. (354c1-3) But I think that, when the context is 
taken into consideration, this passage will not create difficulties to my proposal. In the 
Republic, to Socrates’ astonishment, Thrasymachus claims that justice is not a virtue. 
Socrates sums up his claim as follows: ‘But now, obviously, you’ll say that injustice is 
fine and strong and apply to it all the attributes we used to apply to justice, since you 
dare to include it with virtue and wisdom’ (348e9-349a3), and then develops 
arguments against Thrasymachus’ claim to the effect that justice is goodness (or a 
virtue) and wisdom (349b1-c11), that justice is strong (349c12-352d1), and that justice 
makes one happy (352d1-354a11). In this context, what is at stake is not just the 
classification of justice as a virtue (as is the case with passages in which (PD) is at 
stake), but whether justice is a virtue in the sense presupposed by the interlocutors or 
not. This is clear from the fact that Socrates uses ‘virtue’ and ‘goodness’ 
interchangeably in his first argument; compare esp. 350c10-11 with 350d4-5. 
Thrasymachus denies that justice is a virtue on account of the attributes commonly 
associated with a virtue, and the passage in question (354c1-3) echoes this 
understanding of virtue. What is at issue in this passage is therefore analogous to the 
question as to whether virtue is teachable or not; it is not (PD) but (PD*) that is at issue 
here, and this is not relevant to the positive use of examples for definition. 
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definition, and (PD) is not valid in the case of these two kinds of examples. 
Hereafter I would like to call them ‘instances’ as distinct from ‘examples’ which 
I will treat as a more vague expression and as referring to the examples in any 
of the four senses given above. 
   In what follows I would like to consider passages in which Socrates or his 
interlocutor mentions examples of F before proposing the definition of F. First I 
shall examine the examples in the sense of (1a) before turning to the examples 
in the other senses. 
 
§4.1. F as instantiated in a certain situation, action, or thing 
   First, let us consider two of the three passages from the Laches that we have 
seen quoted as the evidence that Socrates makes use of examples in order to 
reach a definition, i.e. (P2) and (P3). In (P2), on the one hand, after it has turned 
out that Laches had in mind only the case of a hoplite when he gave his 
definition of courage (191b5-7), Socrates expands his perspective by pointing 
out that it is not only a hoplite or a horseman or even every sort of warrior that 
show courage, but also those who are dealing with different situations, such as 
dangers at sea, illness, poverty, public affairs, pain and fear, and desire and 
pleasure.27 And he wants to know the same courage that people show in all 
these different situations. In other words, he wants to know the same courage that 
is instantiated in various situations. In (P3), on the other hand, before proposing 
                                                       
27 Note that these people are organized in accordance with the genus-and-species 
relationship. The most general groups are those who show courage in the face of desire 
and pleasure, and those who show courage in the face of pain and fear. To the latter 
belong as species those who show courage in public affairs, illness, poverty, dangers at 
sea, or warfare. To the last of them, again, belong as species a courageous hoplite, 
horseman, and every sort of warrior who is courageous. 
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the definition of speed, he enumerates different actions in which we recognise 
speed, i.e. running, playing the lyre, speaking, learning, movements of the arms 
or legs or tongue or voice or thought. And he asks himself what it is that he 
calls speed in all these cases. To put it differently again, he wants to know the 
same speed that is instantiated in all these actions. The examples given in (P2) and 
(P3) thus belong to (1a), and therefore Socrates can validly use them as 
instances while being committed to (PD). 
   Note that Socrates’ point in giving examples in (P2) and (P3) is not to offer 
several examples of courageous people or quick actions, but to enumerate the 
wide variety of people or actions in which courage or speed appears. In his 
request for the definition of F, Socrates is asking about the F that is universal, i.e. 
the same thing in every case. Indeed, if we do not take into consideration the 
wide variety of situations, actions or things in which F appears, then we might 
make a mistake by giving a definition that is only related to unduly restricted 
cases. Laches has committed exactly this kind of mistake in his first attempt at 
defining courage. Similarly, one might propose ‘the capacity for moving a long 
distance in a short time’ as the definition of speed, thinking only of the speed of 
running and neglecting the speed that is related to learning or the movement of 
thought. It is in order to prevent this kind of mistake that Socrates turns his 
interlocutor’s attention to different situations, actions, or things in which F 
appears. 
   A similar procedure will be found in Socrates’ review of various situations, 
actions, or things considered in so far as these are (or will become) F, and I suggest 
that these too should be regarded as examples in the sense of (1a). Since these 
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examples are considered only in so far as they are (or will become) F, we have 
to suppose that F is always instantiated (or will be instantiated) in them. Clearly, 
there is no point in saying that we do not know if these examples are F or not; 
(PD) is not valid for these examples either. There are passages that refer to the 
examples in this sense in the Hippias Major and the Charmides. Although 
scholars seem to have neglected these passages when they discuss the role of 
examples in Socrates’ procedure for definition, these passages will turn out to 
constitute strong evidence that Socrates makes use of ‘instances’ before 
proposing a definition. 
   In the Hippias Major, Socrates, after having refuted Hippias’ first definition 
of the fine, i.e. the fine is a fine girl, turns his interlocutor’s attention to different 
things and actions that will become fine if the fine itself is added to them. 
 
  (P7)  SOCRATES: Aren’t you capable of remembering that I asked for the fine itself? 
For what when added to anything––whether to a stone or a plank or a man 
or a god or any action or any lesson––anything gets to be fine? (292c9-d3) 
 
In this passage, Socrates first reminds Hippias of the fact that his question was 
about the fine itself, and then explicates––thereby referring to the things and 
actions mentioned in the parenthesis––what the fine itself is: the same fine that is 
instantiable in all these things and actions. Hippias then undertakes another 
attempt at defining the fine, and so clearly they make use of examples in the 
sense of (1a) before proposing a definition. 
   In the second half of the same dialogue, Socrates himself proposes 
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definitions of the fine instead of Hippias who has already admitted that there 
are no more definitions readily available to him. Except for the case of his first 
proposal (i.e. the fine is appropriateness), whenever Socrates proposes 
definitions of the fine he never fails to refer to things and actions considered in so 
far as these are fine. (P8), (P9) and (P10) are the passages in which Socrates offers 
his second, third and fourth proposals respectively: 
 
   (P8) SOCRATES: We say eyes are fine not when we think they are in such a state 
they’re unable to see, but whenever they are able, and are useful for seeing. 
[…] And that’s how we call the whole body fine, sometimes for running, 
sometimes for wrestling. And the same goes for all animals––a fine horse, 
rooster, or quail––and all utensils and means of transport on land and sea, 
boats and warships, and the tools of every skill, music and all the others; and, 
if you want, activities and laws––virtually all these are called fine in the same 
way. In each case we look at the nature it’s got, its manufacture, its condition; 
then we call what is useful “fine” in respect of the way it is useful, what it is 
useful for, and when it is useful; but anything useless in all those respects we 
call “foul”. (295c4-d2) 
 
(P9) SOCRATES: Then that’s the way fine bodies and fine customs and wisdom and 
everything we mentioned a moment ago are fine––because they’re beneficial. 
(296e2-4) 
 
   (P10) SOCRATES: Men, when they’re fine anyway––and everything decorative, 
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pictures and sculptures––these all delight us when we see them, if they’re 
fine. Fine sounds and music altogether, and speeches and storytelling have 
the same effect. So if we answered that tough man, “Your honor, the fine is 
what is pleasant through hearing and sight”, don’t you think we’d curb his 
toughness? 
HIPPIAS: This time, Socrates, I think what the fine is has been well said. 
SOCRATES: What? shall we say that fine activities and laws are fine by being 
pleasant through hearing and sight? Or that they have some other form? […] 
In the case of laws and activities, those could easily be seen not to be outside 
the perception we have through hearing and sight. But let’s stay with this 
account, that what is pleasing through them is fine, and not bring that about 
the laws into the centre. (298a1-8) 
 
Socrates examines ‘the same way’ (τῷ αὐτῷ τ ϱόπῳ 295d6) in which, or ‘the 
cause’ (ὅτι 296e4) by which, things and actions are fine ‘in so far as they are fine’ 
(ἃ ἂν ϰαλὰ ᾖ 298a3). It is clear that in these passages various things and actions 
are mentioned as data for a definition. In (P8) Socrates considers that these are 
fine when they are able and useful, and then proposes a definition: ‘the fine is 
ability and usefulness’. In (P9) Socrates thinks that these are fine when they are 
beneficial, and thus proposes that ‘the fine is beneficialness’. Again, in (P10), 
Socrates thinks that most of the things in question are pleasant through hearing 
and sight, although he shows some reservation in the case of laws and activities. 
In all these passages Socrates first collects examples in the sense of (1a) and then 
examines them in order to find the distinctive characteristic that is common to 
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them all. 
   In the Charmides, clever Charmides, when asked the definition of 
temperance, appears not to require Socrates’ instruction that what is asked is 
the same thing in different things and actions. The fact that he has understood 
this much is shown by his reference to different actions in his proposal of a 
definition: 
 
   (P11) SOCRATES: Finally, however, he [Charmides] said that in his opinion 
temperance is doing everything in an orderly and quiet way––things like 
walking in the streets, and talking, and doing everything else in a similar 
fashion. (159b2-4; cf. 160c6-7) 
 
Charmides seems to have formulated his proposal after having considered 
various actions, e.g. walking in the streets and talking, insofar as these are done 
with temperance. It is clear, then, that he makes use of examples in the sense of 
(1a) before proposing a definition.28 
   In short, we have good evidence that Socrates (and his interlocutor) appeals 
to examples in the sense of (1a) before proposing a definition. The examples in 
this sense are obviously true examples of F, and therefore there will be no 
inconsistency in making use of these examples as data for a definition while 
being committed to (PD). 
 
                                                       
28 Cf. also Nicias’ proposal in the Laches 194e11-195a1: ‘What I say, Laches, is that it is 
the knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful in war and in every other situation.’ 
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§4.2. Parts (or kinds) of F 
   Now let us turn to the consideration of examples in the sense of (1b): parts 
(or kinds) of F. There is only one place in the early dialogues in which Socrates 
and his interlocutor review parts (or kinds) of F before proposing a definition: 
in the Meno, after his attempt at defining virtue by offering various descriptions 
sorted out by sex, age, and status, which I have quoted as (P6) above, is rejected 
by Socrates because it is a unique definition of virtue that is looked for, Meno 
comes across parts of virtue: 
 
   (P12) MENO: So I too say that not only justice is a virtue but there are many other 
virtues. 
SOCRATES: What are they? […] 
MENO: I think courage is a virtue, and moderation, wisdom, and munificence, 
and very many others. 
SOCRATES: We are having the same trouble again, Meno, though in another 
way; we have found many virtues while looking for one, but we cannot find 
the one which covers all the others (διὰ πάντων τούτων). 
MENO: I cannot yet find, Socrates, what you are looking for, one virtue for 
them all (ϰατὰ πάντων), as in the other cases. 
(73e7-74a10) 
 
It is not clear from this passage alone whether Socrates considers parts of virtue 
to be available as data for a definition or not. But the fact that he does will be  
strongly suggested if we take into consideration the cases of shape and colour, 
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which are put forward by Socrates as parallel cases. Concerning shape and its 
kinds, Socrates performs the following imaginary dialogue in order to elucidate 
what it is that he is looking for: 
 
(P13) SOCRATES: Then if he [an imaginary questioner] pursued the argument as I 
did and said: “We always arrive at the many; do not talk to me in that way, 
but since you call all these many by one name, and say that no one of them is 
not a shape even though they are opposites, tell me what this is which applies 
as much to the round as to the straight and which you call shape, as you say the 
round is as much a shape as the straight.” […] If then you answered the man 
who was questioning about shape or colour: “I do not understand what you 
want, my man, nor what you mean,” he would probably wonder and say: 
“you do not understand that I am seeking that which is the same in all these 
cases?” Would you still have nothing to say, Meno, if one asked you: “What is 
this which applies to the round and the straight and the other things which you call 
shapes and which is the same in them all?” 
 (74d4-75a8) 
 
Socrates here presupposes that the round and the straight, parts (or kinds) of 
shape, are shapes, and says what he is seeking is the same thing that applies to 
them all. This clearly means that parts (or kinds) of shape are available as data 
for a definition. And since this is a paradigmatic case for the search for virtue (cf. 
Men. 77a9-10), the definition of virtue is also expected to be attainable in the 
same way: by collecting parts (or kinds) of virtue first and then examining them 
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in order to find the common characteristic that applies to them all.29 Indeed, 
there seems to be no problem in generalising the object of definition in this 
procedure, and so I would like to conclude that Socrates considers that parts (or 
kinds) of F are available as data for a definition. (And this is unproblematic 
because, as I have already suggested, it seems plausible to suppose that anyone 
who has a minimal understanding of what x is knows that x is a part (or a kind) 
of F, as is the case with courage and virtue, or the round and shape.30) 
 
§4.3. Particular types of actions or things 
   Next, let us consider whether Socrates makes positive use of examples in the 
                                                       
29 In this connection it is significant to note the distinction between the following two 
propositions: 
 
   (a) We can know that courage is a virtue before the acquisition of the definition 
of virtue. 
   (b) We can know what courage, a part of virtue, is before the acquisition of the 
definition of virtue. 
 
Socrates is committed to (a), as I have argued, but denies (b) in the Meno 79c7-d5 on 
account of what I call ‘the principle of the priority of the definition of the whole’ (I shall 
discuss this principle in Chapter 2). This distinction seems to have escaped Santas’ 
attention, for he translates the Meno 79c8-9 (ἀλλ’ οἴει τινὰ εἰδέναι µόϱιον ἀϱετῆς ὅτι 
ἐστίν, αὐτὴν µὴ εἰδότα;) both in the way in which the question is related to (a) rather 
than (b) (‘Do you suppose that anyone can know that something is an element (part) of 
virtue when he does not know virtue?’ (1979, 63)) and in the way that is more naturally 
connected with (b) rather than (a) (‘Do you suppose that anyone can know a part of 
virtue when he does not know virtue itself?’ (1979, 130)). I suggest that the sentence 
should be translated in a way that is unambiguously connected with (b), for instance: 
‘Do you suppose that anyone can know what a part of virtue is when he does not know 
virtue?’ 
30 It should be noted in this regard that a widely-accepted interpretation of the method 
of collection (what I shall call ‘the traditional interpretation’) seems to reject this 
supposition concerning Plato in his later dialogues. According to this view, Plato in his 
later dialogues invented the method of collection as a means to identify the genus of x. 
If this is the case, then we will need the method of collection in order to know that F is 
the genus of x, or that x is a species of F, and certainly a minimal understanding of 
what x is will not be sufficient for knowing that x is a part (or a kind) of F. As a 
consequence, anyone who supports this view will have to claim either that Plato later 
rejected Socrates’ supposition that a part (or a kind) of F is an obviously true example 
of F, or that my interpretation given here is wrong; even Socrates does not support this 
supposition. However, I shall argue in Chapter 4 that the traditional interpretation of 
the method of collection is not correct, and that the identification of the genus of x is 
just as trivial for Plato in his later dialogues as for Socrates. 
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sense of (2): particular types of actions or things. Laches’ first proposal of the 
definition of courage, i.e. remaining at one’s post and defending oneself 
without running away, belongs to this category, and other examples in the 
sense of (2) will be found in the Euthyphro and Meno among the definitional 
dialogues. As we have seen, the example-prioritisers claim, citing (P1) [La. 
191a1-5] quoted above as evidence, that Laches’ first proposal is accepted by 
Socrates as an example that is available as data for a definition. If this is the case, 
then it will follow that Socrates appeals to examples about which it is not 
immediately clear whether these are examples of F or not before reaching the 
definition of F. However, I shall argue in what follows, starting by examining 
passages from the Euthyphro, that this is not the case; Socrates never makes use 
of the examples in the sense of (2) as data for a definition. 
   When asked about ‘What is the pious?’, Euthyphro first proposes 
‘prosecuting wrongdoers about a religious crime’ (which is intended to cover 
his prosecution against his own father) as the definition of the pious,31 but he 
subsequently admits that the action described in his proposal is only one of the 
many pious actions he can think of. This proposal, then, can be regarded as one 
of the examples in the sense of (2). Now, the question is whether Socrates makes 
use of this example in order to reach a definition or not. Consider the following 
passage: 
                                                       
31 Nehamas’s careful treatment of Socrates’ interlocutors’ misunderstanding of ‘What 
is F?’ question (1975a [1999, 159-75]) has persuasively shown that the mistake 
Euthyphro is said to have committed in (P14) is not the confusion between a particular 
and a universal as assumed by Burnet. But he does not seem to be justified when he 
infers from this that such proposals as Euthyphro is offering here cannot be regarded 
as an example. For there seems to be no good reason why an example should not be 
universal. 
 57 
 
(P14) SOCRATES: For now, try to tell me more clearly what I was asking just now, 
for, my friend, you did not teach me adequately when I asked you what the 
pious was, but you told me that what you are doing now, in prosecuting 
your father for murder, is pious. 
EUTHYPHRO: And I told the truth, Socrates. 
SOCRATES: Perhaps (ἴσως). You agree, however, that there are many other 
pious actions. 
EUTHYPHRO: There are. 
SOCRATES: Bear in mind then that I did not bid you teach (διδάξαι) me one or 
two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious 
actions pious. 
(6c9-d11) 
 
Socrates only concedes here that this type of action might be pious. Certainly, he 
thinks Euthyphro’s attempt can be seen as ‘teaching’ (διδάξαι) one of the many 
pious actions, but he does not say that Euthyphro has taught him correctly one 
of the many pious actions.32 Indeed, Socrates makes clear in the passage that 
immediately follows (P14), which has been quoted as (P5) above, that he first 
needs the definition of the pious in order to judge whether Euthyphro’s action 
                                                       
32 Nehamas (1975a [1999, 163]) aptly suggests that ‘sacrificing before a journey’ is 
another example of many pious actions. But I do not agree with him when he says that 
‘all sacrifices before journeys’ are ‘obviously pious things’. Consider, for example, the 
story of Iphigeneia; Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his daughter before his departure for 
Troy appears too appalling to be an obviously pious act. Also, we might perform 
sacrifice before journey simply as a remnant of some obsolete religious belief without 
believing in the existence of gods. It is at least not immediately clear whether this kind 
of sacrifice is really pious or not. 
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is pious or not. It is then fairly clear that he does not regard Euthyphro’s 
example as a datum for a definition. 
   In fact, apart from not being an obviously genuine example of pious actions, 
Euthyphro’s action seems to constitute a counter-example to his own example; 
it shows ‘prosecuting wrongdoers about a religious crime’––which would be a 
plausible example of pious actions––is not always a pious act. Thus, readers 
might be struck by the lenient manner in which Socrates treats Euthyphro’s 
example: he only says that ‘perhaps’ Euthyphro told the truth, and does not 
voice any real doubt about Euthyphro’s dogmatic assertion that his prosecution 
against his own father is pious. But there is an obvious reason for Socrates’ 
apparently lenient manner: Socrates’ disavowal and Euthyphro’s avowal of 
knowledge of the pious. Somewhat earlier in the dialogue (4e4-5a4), Socrates 
asks if Euthyphro has so precise knowledge about the divine and pious things 
that he need not be afraid of performing an impious act in prosecuting his own 
father, and Euthyphro answers that he has, which prompts Socrates to say that 
he should become Euthyphro’s student. Since Socrates is committed to (PD), he 
has every reason to suppose that Euthyphro is appealing to the definition of the 
pious in his judgment that his action is pious. But, since Socrates himself does 
not know the definition of the pious, he has no right to object to an example  
that is given as a pious act by a person who claims knowledge––at least until he 
shows that this person is in fact ignorant. That is why he simply replies to 
Euthyphro: ‘Perhaps’. 
   I suggest that a similar thought is working in (P1) when Socrates agrees with 
Laches that a man who fights the enemy while remaining at his post is 
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courageous: since Socrates does not know the definition of courage, he has no 
right to dispute the assertion that such a man is courageous. There are also 
three other reasons for holding the view that Socrates does not regard Laches’ 
first proposal as a true example of courageous actions. First, Socrates’ argument 
that immediately follows (P1) makes it less plausible that Laches’ example is 
true. Socrates there secures agreement from Laches that ‘remaining at one’s 
post’ is not necessary for a courageous act even for hoplites: the Spartan 
hoplites who fought the Persians at Plataea by first running away and then, 
after the ranks of their enemies were broken, turning back are also courageous 
(191b8-c6). Laches’ example was plausible presumably because it excluded a 
man who runs away from the battle as a coward. But it seems that, as the 
situation has turned out more complex, his example also loses its appearance of 
plausibility to some extent. Second, it will be easy to think of a counter-example 
if we consider the later development of the dialogue. Later Nicias proposes 
‘knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful’ as the definition of courage 
(194e11-195a1), and distinguishes courage from rashness or madness (197a6-c1). 
If the distinction is accepted, then it will be easy to point out that a man who 
fights the enemy while remaining at his post because of madness is not 
courageous. Third, Laches’ example is an isolated case; Socrates does not 
enumerate other examples in the sense of (2). As I have argued, the various 
examples of courageous people Socrates offers immediately afterwards in (P2) 
are examples in the sense of (1a), and these two types of examples are quite 
different in nature. Therefore, when Socrates asks Laches to state ‘what is the 
courage that is the same in all these cases’ in (P2), he does not mean to include 
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Laches’ example; his example is not among the data used for reaching the 
definition. 
   In the Meno, as we have seen in (P6) quoted above, Meno’s first proposal of 
the definition of virtue is a combination of examples in the sense of (1a) and (2): 
he classifies virtue as instantiated in a man, a woman, a child, an elderly man, a 
free man and a slave, and adds particular types of action to each of them 
(although in reality he describes only the virtue of a man and a woman). Now, 
consonant with my interpretation, I would like to suggest that Socrates, in his 
enquiry into the definition of virtue, examines only different situations in which 
virtue appears, such as a man and a woman, and does not take into 
consideration the particular types of action described by Meno. In order to 
defend this position, however, it will be necessary to examine the passage in 
which Socrates refers to these descriptions in the course of the argument that is 
intended to persuade Meno that virtue is the same in all these different 
situations (73a6-c5). Concerning this passage, one might argue that Socrates 
uses the particular types of action described by Meno as an acceptable premise 
of the argument, which will imply that Socrates problematically makes use of 
examples in the sense of (2) while being committed to (PD). By contrast, I shall 
suggest that this argument does not rely on the particular types of action given 
by Meno; on the contrary, it is intended to persuade Meno that these particular 
types of action are irrelevant for people’s becoming virtuous. 
   The argument in question is the following: 33 
                                                       
33 For the analysis of this argument, cf. Robinson (1954, 56-57), Bluck (1964, 231), Allen 
(1970, 118-20), White (1976, 39-40), Scott (2006, 26-30). 
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(S1) The virtue of a man consists in managing a city well (εὖ), and that 
of a woman in managing a household well. 
(S2) It is not possible to manage a city, a household, or anything else 
well, while not managing it temperately and justly (σωφϱόνως ϰαὶ 
διϰαίως). 
(S3) Whenever a man or a woman manages justly and temperately, he 
or she does so with justice and temperance (διϰαιοσύνῃ ϰαὶ 
σωφϱοσύνῃ). 
(S4) Both a man and a woman need the same things, justice and 
temperance, if they are going to be good (ἀγαθοί). 
(S5) If a child or an elderly man are intemperate and unjust (ἀϰόλαστοι 
ὄντες ϰαὶ ἄδιϰοι), they cannot possibly be good. 
(S6) If a child or an elderly man are temperate and just, they will be 
good. 
(S7) All human beings become good by acquiring the same things. 
(S8) All human beings are good in the same way. 
(S9) The same virtue belongs to all human beings. 
 
It is usually supposed that Socrates here offers a systematic argument that 
shows that virtue is the same for all human beings. If this view is correct, then it 
will follow that Socrates regards (S1) as an acceptable premise of the argument; 
he considers Meno’s descriptions are correct as the virtue of a man and that of a 
woman. However, as has been pointed out by many scholars, the argument 
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seems faulty as it stands. Among other things, (S7) does not seem to follow 
from (S4) and (S6), for (S4) treats the acquisition of temperance and justice as a 
necessary condition for being good, but (S6) and (S7) treats this as a sufficient 
condition for being good.34 Given (S1), there seems to be no good reason for 
claiming that a man and a woman are good in the same way, for they are good in 
so far as they are engaged in the different activities described by Meno. According 
to this view, then, ‘Plato’s argument will not establish what he wishes it to’.35 In 
short, this is a bad argument. 
   But such an interpretation seems, in my view, too uncharitable towards 
Plato’s logical insight, and accordingly I shall offer a different interpretation. I 
suggest that Socrates’ wish is not to offer a systematic argument based on 
acceptable premises, but simply to persuade Meno that there is a factor in 
becoming virtuous that is sufficiently significant to render being engaged in a 
particular type of activity less relevant or totally irrelevant, and that this factor 
is common to all human beings. A strict logical validity then will not be 
required here. (S1) – (S4) are steps for the introduction of this factor, i.e. the 
acquisition of temperance and justice. It is true that Socrates does not directly 
attack (S1) at any step, but it seems reasonable to suppose that, by the time he 
and his interlocutor reach (S6), which suggests that a child and an elderly man 
become good by the acquisition of temperance and justice irrespective of the 
activities they are engaged in, Meno has realised that the same condition can apply 
                                                       
34 Cf. Scott (2006, 26-30). I follow Scott in regarding (S6) and (S7) as treating sufficient 
conditions. By contrast, White (1976, 40) considers (S4), (S6) and (S7) are all related to 
necessary conditions: ‘the point of the argument is that because for any person justice 
and self-control are necessary conditions of virtue, anyone who is virtuous must be so 
“in the same way” as anyone else.’ 
35 White (1976, 40). 
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to a man and a woman too.36 That is why, I suggest, Meno does not object to 
Socrates even when he puts forward (S7), which is not a logical consequence of 
(S4) and (S6). To put it differently, Meno accepts (S7) simply because he does 
not think temperance and justice, which have replaced virtue, are different in 
accordance with sex or age. If my analysis is correct, then it will follow that 
Socrates does not accept (S1); he does not rely on the particular types of actions 
described by Meno, the example in the sense of (2), in this argument. 
   By contrast, Socrates’ positive use of the various situations in which virtue 
appears, which have been taken out of the examples mentioned by Meno, is 
quite obvious. Immediately after the argument we have just examined, Socrates 
restates the question as to what is the same virtue that is related to all those 
situations, and then Meno answers: ‘What else but to be able to rule over people, 
if you are seeking one description to fit them all.’ (73c9-d1) But Socrates quickly 
points out that his description does not fit a child or a slave. This exchange 
shows that Meno has to be prudent enough to take into consideration all the 
situations in which virtue appears before proposing a definition. This 
procedure exactly matches up with Socrates’ procedure for definition we have 
investigated so far. 
   Let us sum up. I have argued that Socrates never appeals to examples in the 
sense of (2), particular types of actions, proposed by his interlocutors in the 
Euthyphro, Laches, and Meno as data for a definition. It is true that Socrates never 
                                                       
36 By contrast, Scott (2006, 26), who finds here a systematic argument for ‘applying the 
unitarian assumption to virtue’, writes: ‘It might be that justice and temperance form a 
common core but, in those other than children and the elderly, other qualities are also 
needed to suffice for virtue’. But I do not think that it is reasonable to suppose that 
children and the elderly make exception in terms of the acquisition of virtue. 
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undertakes to show that these examples are false, but it is because he thinks he 
needs the definition of F in order to judge that a particular type of action is F or 
not because of his commitment to (PD). 
 
§4. 4. Individual actions or things 
   Finally, I would like to mention briefly examples in the sense of (3): 
individual actions or things. It is fairly clear, I think, that Socrates does not 
make use of examples in this sense as data for a definition. In fact, Socrates and 
his interlocutors nowhere mention them before proposing a definition except 
when Euthyphro mentions his own individual action in connection with an 
example in the sense of (2), which has already been discussed.37 As is clear from 
the passage of the Hippias Major quoted above as (P4) [304d5-e2], Socrates 
assumes that one cannot know whether an individual case is F or not before the 
acquisition of the definition of F. Indeed, he himself has never violated this 
assumption. 
 
§5. Conclusion 
   I have argued that the puzzle of Socrates’ procedure for definition that has 
haunted scholars so long, i.e. that Socrates seems to appeal to examples before 
reaching a definition, but he also says that one cannot know which is a genuine 
example before reaching a definition, will be dispelled if we make distinctions 
                                                       
37 Note in this connection that the Scythians, Aeneas, and the Spartans at Plataea 
mentioned by Socrates in the Laches (191a8-c6) are not introduced as examples of 
courageous people. Socrates here only wishes to show that these people can never be 
courageous if Laches’ first proposal is correct. It is fairly clear, I think, that Socrates does 
not regard, for example, every Scythian as courageous. 
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within the notion of ‘examples’. The close examination of the text has shown 
that Socrates only appeals to either (1a) F as instantiated in a certain action or 
thing, or (1b) parts (or kinds) of F––obviously true examples, or ‘instances’, 
about which it is either absurd or implausible to hold (PD), before reaching a 
definition. Indeed, I shall propose to weaken (PD) in the following way, so that 
Socrates’ strategic coherence becomes clear: 
 
(PDweak) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to 
know, for any x that is not an instance of F, that x is an F. 
 
It is these instances that Socrates collects and examines in order to generalise or 
abstract the distinctive character that is common to them all. 
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Chapter 2: The Priority of the definition of the whole 
 
 
 
§1. Introduction 
   In Chapter 1, I have argued that Socrates’ procedure for the definition of F 
essentially consists in generalization or abstraction based on the ‘instances’ of F 
(i.e. F as instantiated in a certain situation, action, or thing, and parts (or kinds) 
of F), thereby weakening one aspect of the principle of the priority of definition, 
which has often been attributed to Socrates, that is, 
 
(PD) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know, for 
any x, that x is an F, 
 
into the following principle: 
 
(PDweak) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to 
know, for any x that is not an instance of F (but may nevertheless be an 
example of F), that x is an F. 
 
However, one might point out that this interpretation is incongruous with a 
widely-shared view on the reasons why Theaetetus’ first attempt at defining 
knowledge is rejected in the dialogue named after him. In this post-Republic 
dialogue, when asked about the definition of knowledge, Theaetetus gives his 
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first answer by enumerating various parts or kinds of knowledge, but this answer 
is instantly rejected by Socrates, who then concisely sets out a few reasons why 
it is not appropriate (146c7-147c6). Concerning this passage, scholars have 
proposed that Socrates is appealing to (PD); Socrates rejects Theaetetus’ 
examples even as data for a definition because he thinks they are still unable to 
judge which examples count as correct ones. (PDweak), on the other hand, does 
not allow us to explain this passage in the same way, for Theaetetus’ examples 
are instances of knowledge, and must therefore be available as data to find out 
the definition. 
   In what follows, I shall argue that in the Theaetetus Socrates is appealing to a 
different principle––what I call the principle of the priority of the definition of 
the whole (over the definitions of parts): 
 
(PDWP) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know 
the definition of any part (or any kind) of F. 
 
(PDWP) is a principle that is independent of (PD), and should not be 
assimilated to it. The Theaetetus is not the only dialogue in which Socrates 
appeals to this principle; he seems to be appealing to it also in the Meno, at 
78c8-79e1 (quoted as (P18) below). He therefore holds two principles, (PDweak) 
and (PDWP), instead of a single principle, (PD), which has been thought, 
wrongly in my view, to cover the features that are related to the former two 
principles. 
   Socrates’ procedure for definition thus reexamined will turn out to have the 
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following two features. First, Socrates collects the instances of F in order to 
examine the distinctive characteristic that is common to them all and reach the 
definition of F. Second, he first defines the whole of F before turning to the 
definition of each part of F. We shall see in Chapters 4 – 6 that these two 
features in fact anticipate the procedure for definition by means of the method 
of collection and division in such a way as is suggested in the introduction of 
the present thesis. 
 
§2. The text: Theaetetus 146c7-147c6 
   In the Theaetetus, Socrates shows himself once again to be an enquirer into 
the ‘What is F?’ question. ‘Knowledge’ (ἐπιστήµη) is his concern on this 
occasion; he asks Theaetetus, the most intelligent student of a great 
mathematician, Theodorus, to tell him what knowledge is. Theaetetus then 
gives his first answer––in a manner that is reminiscent of the passages we have 
examined in Chapter 1 (especially (P12) [Men. 73e7-74a10])––by enumerating 
various branches (or parts, cf. Sph. 257c7-d3) of knowledge: 
 
   (P15) THEAETETUS: Then I think that the things Theodorus teaches are knowledge 
(ἐπιστῆµαι)––I mean geometry and the subjects you enumerated just now [i.e. 
astronomy, arithmetic, and music]. Then again there are the crafts (αἱ τῶν 
ἄλλων δηµιουϱγῶν τέχναι) such as cobbling, whether you take them together 
or separately. They must be knowledge, surely. (146c7-d3) 
 
But this answer immediately meets with objections from Socrates. He offers two 
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arguments. First, he argues that Theaetetus’ answer does not match up with the 
question. 
 
   (O1) (O1-1) Theaetetus is speaking of ‘knowledge of making shoes’ when he 
mentions ‘cobbling’. (146d7-10) 
(O1-2) He is speaking of ‘knowledge of making wooden furniture’ 
when he mentions ‘carpentry’. (146e1-3) 
(O1-3) He is only determining what each branch of knowledge is 
related to. (146e4-6) 
(O1-4) He has given an answer to a question (i.e. ‘What kinds of things 
is knowledge related to?’ or ‘How many branches of knowledge are 
there?’) different from ‘What is knowledge itself?’ (146e7-11) 
 
Second, Socrates offers an argument from analogy. He describes an imaginary, 
analogical case in which someone asks them what clay is, and they answer 
‘potters’ clay’, ‘stovemakers’ clay’, and ‘brickmakers’ clay’. He says that this 
kind of answer is ridiculous, and goes on to show why it is so. This argument 
will be further divided into two movements. The first concerns each item 
enumerated in the answer. 
 
   (O2) (O2-1) A questioner who does not know what clay is will not 
understand (συνιέναι) the word ‘clay’. (147b2-4) 
(O2-2) This questioner will not understand ‘dollmaker’s clay’ (or any 
other phrase that is created by the addition of the name of a craftsman) 
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either. (147a7-b2) 
(O2-3) Similarly, a questioner who does not know what knowledge is 
will not understand ‘knowledge of making shoes’. (147b5-7) 
(O2-4) This questioner will not understand ‘cobbling’ (or any other 
name of a craft) either. (147b8-10) 
(O2-5) Therefore, it is ridiculous to give the name of a craft (= 
knowledge of something) when the question is about what knowledge 
is. (147b11-c2) 
 
The second movement, on the other hand, concerns the form of the answer, i.e. 
enumeration. 
 
  (O3) The answer is ridiculous because the answerer would have to 
enumerate an unlimited number of items when it is possible to give a 
concise answer such as: ‘clay is earth mixed with water’. (147c3-6) 
 
§3. An analysis of the text 
   Many scholars believe that in this passage Socrates not only argues that 
Theaetetus’ enumeration of various branches of knowledge is a wrong sort of 
answer, but also refuses to count them even as examples on the basis of which a 
definition might be reached.38 It is obvious that argument (O1) is intended to 
                                                       
38 It seems to have become a common custom to quote Wittgenstein’s criticism (1958, 
20) in this connection: ‘When Socrates asks the question, “What is knowledge?”, he 
does not regard it even as a preliminary answer to enumerate cases of knowledge’ (his 
emphasis). Similarly, McDowell (1973, 114): ‘It would be in the spirit of (1) 
[=(O2-1)-(O2-5)] that we could not be sure of the correctness of the list unless we 
already knew what knowledge was’; Bostock (1988, 34), criticizing Plato: ‘And to come 
 71 
show that Theatetetus’ answer does not correspond to Socrates’ question but to 
certain different questions. The issue is then what the point of argument (O2) is. 
The answer often given is that it is a further attack against the examples given 
by Theaetetus: deprived of the definition of knowledge, they are in no position 
to understand its examples, or in other words, they cannot use the proposed 
examples as reliable data for the definition of knowledge. In short, these 
scholars connect argument (O2) with (PD). 
   However, these scholars suggest at the same time that Socrates’ argument 
under this interpretation is not successful. There are three types of objection 
against this argument. First, it is argued that Socrates’ assumption in (O2-1) that 
anyone who does not know the definition of F will not understand the word ‘F’ 
is implausible.39 If this assumption is true, then Socrates’ interlocutors who are 
unable to offer the correct definition of F will not understand Socrates’ question 
‘What is F?’, which contains ‘F’, in the first place. Further, our everyday 
experience refutes such an assumption: we can understand the words, say, 
‘potato’ and ‘aubergine’, and identify the vegetables these words refer to 
without being able to give their definitions, which will inform us that both of 
                                                                                                                                                                
back to the question of what knowledge is, there is in principle no reason why one 
should not rely upon the learner’s ordinary and lower-level understanding of 
geometry and cobbling when using these as examples to impart a lower-level 
understanding of what knowledge is. Plato is no doubt right to say that a higher-level 
understanding of what knowledge is cannot be imparted in this way, but that is 
because––as he conceives of a higher-level understanding––it cannot be imparted by 
examples anyway. It is not because the examples cannot be understood until we have 
first understood what they are examples of’; Burnyeat (1990, 4): ‘Yet in reply Socrates 
insists (146d-147c) not only that a plurality of examples is something quite different 
from the unitary definition he requested, but also, more strongly, that they are in no 
position to know any examples of knowledge until they know what knowledge itself 
is.’ By the same token, Chappell (2004, 36) calls (O2-1)-(O2-5) the ‘uninformativeness 
argument’ on the ground that it is intended to show ‘that examples are not sufficient 
for definition because they are uninformative’. Cf. also Benson (2000, 218-19). 
39 See McDowell (1973, 114). 
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them belong to the Solanaceae family, and so are close cousins. However, this 
objection seems too uncharitable, for Socrates probably has in mind a 
higher-level understanding, the one that is required to understand ‘F’ 
philosophically.40 The two other types of objection assume that Socrates means 
‘understanding’ in this sense. The second objection is that it is unlikely that a 
philosophical understanding is necessary for choosing examples; there seem to 
be no reasons that we should not make use of our lower-level understanding of 
‘cobbling’ or ‘carpentry’ in order to reach the definition of knowledge.41 By 
contrast, one might concede that we may need a philosophical understanding in 
order to choose correct examples, but still argue (this is the third objection) that 
argument (O2) involves a fallacious step, i.e. (O2-4), in which Socrates replaces 
‘knowledge of making shoes’ with ‘cobbling’. 42  This replacement will be 
warranted only if we are sure that ‘cobbling’ is ‘knowledge of making shoes’, i.e. 
a correct example of knowledge; in other words, only if we have the 
philosophical understanding of knowledge. Socrates then has no right to 
paraphrase ‘cobbling’ into ‘knowledge of making shoes’ since he denies himself 
                                                       
40 The distinction between a lower- and higher-level of understanding is discussed by 
e.g. McDowell (1973, 114), Burnyeat (1977, 387-88), Bostock (1990, 32-34), Sedley (2004, 
24-25). 
41 See Bostock (1990, 32-34). 
42 Burnyeat (1977, 389-90) argues that Plato made this mistake because he overlooked 
the fallacy involved in the substitution into an opaque context. In effect, according to 
him, Plato made the following inference: 
 
Socrates does not understand ‘knowledge of making shoes’. 
‘Cobbling’ means knowledge of making shoes. 
Therefore, Socrates does not understand ‘cobbling’. 
 
But, he continues, this is not valid. Cf. also Sedley (1993, 135-40), Brown (1994, 239-42). 
However, I think Sedley (2004, 22-23) is right when he says: ‘we are not compelled to 
read Socrates as accusing Theaetetus of having said, or meant, something that he 
neither said or meant. We can, more charitably, read the argument as resting on the 
assumption that definition is transitive.’ Still, the problem I describe in what 
immediately follows will remain. 
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this understanding. 
   But these objections only show, in my view, that the interpretation from 
which they derive is wrong, since, as a matter of fact, Socrates nowhere states 
that they are in no position to make use of examples. On the contrary, the 
section that immediately follows these arguments shows that examples are 
useful as data for a definition. Theaetetus there, having realised that the 
question Socrates is asking is similar to the one that occurred to his companion 
and himself while engaging in a geometry lesson, reports how he reached his 
first mathematical achievement, i.e. the definition of ‘power’ (δύναµις). A 
glance at the beginning of this report will show that Theaetetus is drawing on 
the examples of ‘power’ given by Theodorus before reaching the definition. 
 
   (P16) THEAETETUS: Theodorus here was demonstrating to us with the aid of 
diagrams a point about powers (πεϱὶ δυνάµεων). He was showing us that the 
power of 3 square feet and the power of 5 square feet are not commensurable 
in length with the power of 1 square foot; and he went on in this way, taking 
each case in turn till he came to the power of 17 square feet; there for some 
reason he stopped. So the idea occurred to us that, since the powers were 
turning out to be unlimited in number, we might try to collect the powers in 
question under one term (συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἕν), which would apply to them all 
(ὅτῳ πάσας ταύτας πϱοσαγοϱεύσοµεν τὰς δυνάµεις). (147d4-e1) 
 
Theodorus here first took up a square (or a power) with an area of 3 square feet 
and one with an area of 5 square feet, and proved somehow that the lengths of 
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their sides (i.e. √3 feet and √5 feet respectively) are incommensurable with that 
of a square with an area of 1 square foot. He continued the same sort of 
procedure for squares with areas of 6 to 17 square feet successively43 before 
stopping (of course, squares with areas of 9 and 16 square feet, each of which 
has a side whose length is commensurable with that of the side of a square with 
an area of 1 square foot, are excluded from this process). Since it was obvious 
from Theodorus’ procedure that there exists an unlimited number of this 
particular type of square (or power), 44  Theaetetus and his companion 
undertook to collect the examples (those which would have been given by the 
application of the same sort of procedure to the squares with areas of more than 
18 square feet, as well as those which had already been given by Theodorus) 
and to give a definition that would show the distinctive characteristic that 
applies to all these examples (or ‘instances’––these are parts of power). It is then 
beyond doubt that Theaetetus and his companion make use of examples as data 
                                                       
43 As is apparent from the context, it is only the squares whose area can be given by the 
natural numbers that are relevant here. 
44 As has often been noted by scholars, Theaetetus’ usage of ‘power’ (δύναµις) is very 
awkward in his report. At 147d4 he introduces this word to refer to the square in 
general, but at 147d9 he narrows down the objects that are referred to by this word to a 
particular type of square which has a side whose length is incommensurable with that 
of the side of a square with an area of 1 square foot. On top of this, at 148b1 and b8 he 
uses this word (δύναµις) as the name of the sides of this particular type of square without 
referring to this particular type of square (the same awkwardness will be found in the 
case of ‘length’ (µῆϰος): Theaetetus not only refers by this word to the length of the 
sides of the square in general, but also uses it as the name of the sides of a particular 
type of square which has a side whose length is commensurable with that of the side of 
a square with an area of 1 square foot). But this complexity should not mislead us into 
thinking that Theaetetus has no more in mind the examples given by Theodorus or, as 
Bostock (1988, 35) assumes, that ‘Theaetetus could hardly tell, before he had defined 
‘power’, whether some number was a power or not.’ Theaetetus accepted the examples 
of ‘power’ given by Theodorus and just defined it in terms of the sides rather than in 
terms of the whole square. As Burnyeat (1978, 502) observes: ‘[…] no change of 
mathematical substance is involved when the definition is eventually given in terms of 
lines. Whether incommensurability is taken as a property that certain squares have in 
respect of their sides or as a property of the sides themselves is just a matter of which 
way one chooses to express the same facts.’ Cf. also Høyrup (1990, 204-6). 
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for a definition in their attempt at defining the powers. And that this is not just 
a peculiar feature of the procedure of a mathematical definition is evident from 
Socrates’ request for the analogous approach to the definition of knowledge 
made soon after Theaetetus finished the report of his achievement. 
 
(P17) SOCRATES: You gave us a good lead just now. Try to imitate your answer 
about the powers. There you brought together the many powers within a 
single form (ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἑνὶ εἴδει πεϱιέλαβες); now I want you in 
the same way to give one single account of the many branches of knowledge 
(οὕτω ϰαὶ τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήµας ἑνὶ λόγῳ πϱοσειπεῖν). (148d4-7) 
 
Socrates thus makes it crystal clear that the instances of knowledge enumerated 
by Theaetetus in passage (P15) [146c7-d3] should be treated in the same way as 
the examples of power given by Theodorus: one should collect them in order to 
find the definition of knowledge. I therefore conclude that there is no truth in 
the claim that Socrates, by appealing to (PD), refuses to count Theaetetus’ 
instances even as examples on the basis of which a definition might be reached. 
   We then need a different answer to our question: what is the point of 
argument (O2)? My answer is that Socrates argues here that we do not know 
what a part of F is unless we know what F is. In other words, Socrates claims 
that we have to first find out the definition of the whole before turning to the 
definition of parts since the latter contain the name of the whole as part of their 
definition. In fact, some scholars have noticed that this is exactly what Socrates 
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wants to point out in argument (O2),45 but, so far as I know, no one has ever 
clarified the fact that the principle Socrates is implicitly appealing to in this 
argument is different from (PD) and does not prevent us from using instances 
as data for a definition.46 In order to establish this fact, I shall examine this 
argument more closely. 
   First of all, it is crucial to understand the reason why Socrates brings up 
argument (O2). I suggest that the key lies in the observation that (O2) is 
concerned with items taken singly. 47  Singular expressions used throughout 
argument (O2) such as ‘any other craft’ (τινα ἄλλην τέχνην 147b9), ‘the name of 
one of the crafts’ (τέχνης τινὸς ὄνοµα 147b12), and ‘something that knowledge 
is of’ (τινὸς … ἐπιστήµην 147b12-c1) clearly show that Socrates is talking about 
the case in which an answerer gives only one instance such as ‘dollmaker’s clay’ 
or ‘cobbling’. Of course, it is not the case that Theaetetus has mentioned just one 
branch of knowledge as an answer to the question about knowledge, or that 
Socrates supposes that they have given just one instance of clay as an answer to 
the question about clay. But it is reasonable to suppose that, when someone 
                                                       
45 E.g. Burnyeat (1977, 388-89), Brown (1994, 232-34), Sedley (2004, 24-27). 
46 So, for example, Burnyeat (1977, 388) writes, referring to (P18): ‘To argue thus is to 
assert (A) [= (PD)] for those examples of virtue which are kinds rather than instances of 
the concept.’ Similarly, Sedley (2004, 25) states that Socrates is implicitly appealing to 
the ‘more modest version’ of the principle of the priority of definition in this argument. 
47 By contrast, (O1) is not concerned with the case in which an answerer gives only one 
instance. I therefore disagree with Sedley (2004, 23-24), who thinks that (O1) or (O2) 
can be brought in depending on whether in the reformulation as ‘Knowledge is 
knowledge of making shoes (etc.)’ the second occurrence of ‘knowledge’ is considered 
to be redundant or not. Sedley’s classification matches up well with (O1-3) and 
Socrates’ suggestion that this is an answer to the question ‘What kinds of things is 
knowledge related to?’ in (O1-4), but does not correspond to the other question ‘How 
many branches of knowledge are there?’ On the other hand, the author of the ancient 
commentary of Plato’s Theaetetus quoted by Sedley (1993, 133-34) seems to have 
correctly discerned the distinction: ‘Theaetetus has enumerated many […] and has 
gone wrong both in not representing the essence of knowledge, and in enumerating 
many. But he would have been wrong even if he had listed one […].’ 
 77 
gives instances of F as an answer to the question about what F is, he is not 
thinking that many instances, only when taken together, give a philosophical 
understanding of what F is, but rather he is thinking that each instance will give 
a certain philosophical understanding of what F is (though it will be not as 
philosophical as that which is given when they are taken together).48 To put it 
somewhat differently, Socrates is not directly criticizing answers by 
enumeration here, but rather he is criticizing a thought that he suspects to lie 
behind these answers. That is why Socrates says: ‘[It is] absurd [of us], to begin 
with, I suppose, to imagine (γέ που οἰόµενοι) that the person who asked the 
question would understand anything from our answer when we say 
[‘dollmaker’s clay’].’ (147a7-8) It is then of some significance to show that the 
name of each instance will not give any philosophical understanding of what F 
is. It is in order to show this, I suggest, that Socrates puts forward argument 
(O2). 
   Let us recall here the distinction between a higher- and lower-level of 
understanding in order to see how the suggestion given above would help us 
understand argument (O2). A higher-level understanding of F is that which 
enables anyone who possesses it to reach the definition of F and to answer the 
‘What is F?’ question correctly, and any understanding that is not sufficient for 
this purpose will be classified as a lower-level understanding of F. The focus of 
the ‘What is F?’ question is a higher-level understanding of F. But we may have 
a higher- or lower-level understanding in respect of instances of F as well. Now 
                                                       
48 Recall that Theaetetus says in (P15) rather emphatically that the branches of 
knowledge he enumerated are knowledge ‘whether you take them together or separately’. 
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one might give many instances of F as a preliminary answer to the ‘What is F?’ 
question, thinking that a lower-level understanding of many instances of F will 
lead us to a higher-level understanding of F.49 Socrates does not deny this 
(argument (O2) is not concerned with this case). On the contrary, he would 
agree to this proposal and encourage us to examine many instances of F. By 
contrast, one might give many instances of F, thinking that what an instance of 
F is is easier to understand than what F itself is, and that a higher-level 
understanding of this single instance of F will lead us to a higher-level 
understanding of F. For example, one might think that what cobbling is is easier 
to understand than what knowledge is, and that the definition of the former 
somehow clarifies the latter. Socrates denies this. It is in order to attack this 
kind of thought that he puts forward argument (O2). 
   Understood this way, Socrates’ argument will be very simple and, I think, 
plausible. He only claims that we do not have a higher-level understanding of a 
part of F unless we have a higher-level understanding of F itself, because the 
name or definition of the former contains the name of the latter. Since 
‘dollmaker’s clay’ contains ‘clay’, and the definition of cobbling, i.e. ‘knowledge 
of making shoes’, contains ‘knowledge’, one has to know first what clay is (or 
what knowledge is) in order to know what dollmaker’s clay is (or what 
cobbling is). This, I suggest, is the point of argument (O2). Socrates’ claim 
therefore is perfectly compatible with the effort to attain the definition of F by 
                                                       
49 It is exactly this kind of procedure that Wittgenstein and Bostock, I think, believed 
unjustly to be denied by Plato; see n.38 above. Since Plato does not deny this, I do not 
think their views are correct. It is, however, possible that Wittgenstein is criticising 
Plato not on this basis, but rather because Socrates does not accept many instances of F 
as a definition by example. If so, he will be acquitted of the charge that he misunderstood 
the passage in question; Plato certainly would not accept any definition by example. 
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way of many instances of F. 
 
§4. The Meno and the principle of the priority of the definition of the whole 
   Now that Socrates’ claim in argument (O2), i.e. that we do not know what a 
part of F is if we do not know what F is, has been neatly separated from (PD), I 
would like to discuss his claim in a little more detail. First, let us make sure that 
his claim as expressed there has more or less the status of a principle in 
Socrates’ procedure, and is not just an ad hoc device in argument (O2). This will 
be ascertained from the fact that (as has been noted by some scholars)50 the 
Theaetetus is not the only dialogue in which Socrates appeals to this claim; he 
does so also in the Meno. 
   At Meno 77b2-5, after Socrates has illustrated the sort of definition he is 
asking, i.e. the single definition of virtue that applies to any part of virtue, 
through the analogical cases of shape and colour, Meno proposes ‘the desire for 
good things [later it is agreed that these are health, wealth, and fame] and the 
power of acquiring them’ as the definition of virtue. Socrates first prunes off the 
first half of Meno’s proposal as unnecessary on the ground that everyone 
desires good things, and then secures an agreement from Meno that to be 
considered virtue the acquisition of good things has to be accompanied by 
justice, piety, or temperance. This agreement, Socrates claims, renders his 
proposal substantially the same as ‘any action performed with a part of virtue’, 
and he dismisses it since it presupposes the knowledge of virtue. Then this 
exchange follows: 
                                                       
50 E.g. Burnyeat (1977, 388), Brown (1994, 232-34), Sedley (2004, 25). 
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   (P18) SOCRATES: Do you think one knows what a part of virtue is if one does not know 
virtue itself (οἴει τινὰ εἰδέναι µόϱιον ἀϱετῆς ὅτι ἐστίν, αὐτὴν µὴ εἰδότα)? 
MENO: I do not think so. 
SOCRATES: If you remember, when I was answering you about shape, we 
rejected the kind of answer that tried to answer in terms still being the 
subject of inquiry and not yet agreed upon. 
MENO: And we were right to reject them. 
SOCRATES: Then surely, my good sir, you must not think, while the nature of 
virtue as a whole is still under inquiry, that by answering in terms of the 
parts of virtue you can make its nature clear to anyone or make anything else 
clear by speaking in this way (δηλώσειν … ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τούτῳ τῷ αὐτῷ τϱόπῳ 
λέγων). 
(79c8-79e1) 
 
Socrates suggests here, in a manner very similar to argument (O2), that one 
does not know what a part of virtue is if one does not know what virtue itself is. 
This suggestion of course does not prevent us from making use of parts of 
virtue as data for a definition;51 indeed we have seen in Chapter 1 (§4.2.) that 
Socrates encourages his interlocutor to search for the definition of virtue that 
applies to any part of virtue (naturally we have to collect parts of virtue first in 
                                                       
51 Pace Brown (1994, 233), who writes on this passage: ‘The argumentation is equally 
objectionable to that at Tht. 147b. Again there is an invalid substitution in an 
intentional context; again a resource for gaining understanding of a term is unfairly 
disqualified.’ 
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order to see if a proposed definition of virtue applies to them or not). It only 
prevents us from understanding the definition of any part of virtue 
philosophically prior to the definition of virtue itself. But there are also 
differences between the passages in the Meno and Theaetetus. First, Socrates 
does not further explain in the Meno the reason why we cannot know what a 
part of virtue is before knowing what virtue itself is,52 although it seems natural 
to assume that the reason is the same: the definition of any part of virtue will 
contain the word ‘virtue’, and we need to understand ‘virtue’ philosophically 
before understanding ‘the virtue of such-and-such’ philosophically. Meno’s 
proposal then will be equivalent to ‘any action performed with the virtue of 
such-and-such’, and he will be answering ‘in terms still being the subject of 
inquiry’ (79d3). Second, unlike in argument (O2), Socrates explicitly generalises 
his suggestion here, so that we can assuredly attribute to him the principle of 
the priority of the definition of the whole over the definitions of parts:53 
                                                       
52 Sedley (2004, 25) emphasises this point. 
53 Of course, taking into consideration the commonly assumed chronological order of 
Plato’s dialogues, it may not be wise to attribute this principle to the historical Socrates 
or Socrates described in the early dialogues. To begin with, if he is committed to this 
principle, it will follow that he knows that all the efforts he makes in some of the early 
dialogues (i.e. the Euthyphro, Charmides, Laches, and (for some scholars) Republic I) are 
simply beside the point. Moreover, he himself violates this principle in the Laches: ‘Let 
us not, O best of men, begin straightaway with an investigation of the whole of 
virtue––that would perhaps be too great a task––but let us first see if we have a 
sufficient knowledge of a part. Then it is likely that the investigation will be easier for 
us.’ (190c8-d1) However, perhaps these points do not show that Socrates does not hold 
this principle either. First, let us recall that the main purpose of these dialogues lies just 
in the examination of Socrates’ interlocutors’ claim that they know a part of virtue. 
Socrates might be expecting that his interlocutors will define a part of virtue in terms of 
virtue as a whole and then explain what virtue is. (The notorious problem of the unity 
of virtue might point to this kind of explanation.) As to the Laches, the fact that Nicias’ 
definition of courage is rejected on the ground that it is concerned with the virtue as a 
whole, and not just a part of it, might point to Plato’s implicit message that there was in 
fact a problem in Socrates’ strategy in taking up a part of virtue first. On balance, I 
think that this principle is coloured with more Platonic tint than Socratic one, but it 
gradually comes to surface through various attempts at defining parts of virtue in the 
early dialogues. 
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(PDWP) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know 
the definition of any part (or any kind) of F. 
 
   I hope to have made sufficiently clear by now that Socrates’ procedure for 
definition principally consists in generalization or abstraction based on 
instances, and that he does not hold a (PD) that is incompatible with his own 
procedure. He is instead committed to two principles elucidated thus far: 
(PDweak) and (PDWP). (PDweak) prevents us from basing our search for the 
definition of F on examples that might turn out to be true or false. (PDWP), on 
the other hand, prevents us from defining a part of F before defining F itself. 
These two principles are perfectly compatible with the procedure for reaching 
definition Socrates endorses in Plato’s dialogues. 
 
§5. Sophist 239c9-240a8 
   Thus far I have examined the positive use of instances that is made by a 
Socrates who may be roughly identified with Socrates described in Plato’s early 
dialogues. Here, before closing this chapter, I would like to briefly analyse one 
more scene from the Sophist (239c9-240a8) that provides striking parallel to the 
scenes of Meno’s or Theaetetus’ answer by enumeration. The Sophist is one of 
the late dialogues, and scholars often claim that in these dialogues Plato has 
replaced the Socratic method with his own that is radically different from its 
predecessor. No matter what interpretation we hold on this new method, we 
shall have at least a glimpse of continuity between the Socratic and Platonic 
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method in the short passage we are going to examine. 
   In this dialogue, which was written as the sequel of the Theaetetus, the 
Eleatic Stranger replaces Socrates as the leading speaker, and undertakes the 
definition of sophist with Theaetetus as his interlocutor. After several initial 
attempts end up unsatisfactorily, he comes up with the proposal that the 
science of sophistry belongs to ‘the science of image-making’ (εἰδωλοποιιϰὴν 
τέχνην 235b8-9). However, as he divides the science of image-making into that 
of ‘likeness-making’ (ἐιϰαστιϰήν 236b2) and ‘appearance-making’ (φανταστιϰήν 
236c4), he draws Theatetus’ attention to the fact that they are facing difficulties 
involved in the concept of ‘not-being’ (τὸ µὴ ὄν). After the contradictory nature 
of this concept is elucidated, he envisages an imaginary situation in which a 
sophist asks them a question ‘What is an image?’ in order to bring home to 
Theaetetus how the attempt at defining sophistry in terms of image-making 
involves this problematic concept. Theaetetus answers this question again by 
enumerating instances: 
 
   (P19) THEAETETUS: Obviously we’ll say we mean images in water and mirrors, and 
also images that are drawn and stamped and everything else like that. 
(239d7-9) 
 
And again his answer by enumeration is instantly rejected, but this time in 
quite a different way: the Stranger says that the sophist will scoff at this answer, 
shutting his eyes or pretending that he does not have any eyes at all, because it 
is given in terms of perceptible things. (We shall consider soon why the reason 
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for the rejection is different here from the one in the Theaetetus.) He then says 
that the sophist will ask them to answer in terms of words. 
 
   (P20) STRANGER: He’ll ask about what runs through all those things (διὰ πάντων 
τούτων) which you call many, but which you thought you should call by the 
one name, image, to cover them all, as if they were all one thing (ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὡς 
ἓν ὄν). (240a4-6) 
 
Theaetetus thus gives one single definition of image: ‘something that’s similar 
to a true thing and is another thing that’s like it’ (240a8). But this answer shows 
that an image is entangled with the concept of not-being since it is only an 
image and not really that which is. 
   This passage not only confirms my interpretation of Socrates’ procedure for 
definition, but also shows that Plato maintains this procedure in his late 
dialogues too. Theaetetus here enumerates images as instantiated in various 
things, the examples in the sense of (1a) we have classified in Chapter 1. The 
Eleatic Stranger then says that the sophist will not be satisfied with those 
instances, and will ask for the characteristic that is common to them all. This 
request, of course, implies that instances are useful as data for a definition, on 
the basis of which the common characteristic is generalised or abstracted. 
Theaetetus thus finds this characteristic on the basis of his own instances and 
offers the definition of an image by describing it. The structure seems exactly 
identical with Socrates’ procedure for definition. And this fact is all the more 
significant because we find this passage in a late dialogue. Even though the 
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Eleatic Stranger replaces Socrates as the leading speaker of the dialogue, it does 
not mean that the Socratic method has disappeared into thin air. On the 
contrary, while being succeeded by this newcomer, his method is still alive. 
Small wonder then even if it should turn out, on close examination, that there 
appears much more continuity between the Socratic and Platonic method than 
scholars have usually believed. 
   However, before concluding thus, we have to consider the implication of the 
unfamiliar reason for rejecting Theaetetus’ answer by enumeration. In relation 
to this, Burnyeat writes: ‘The irony is appropriate because the new methods of 
definition and inquiry which Plato elaborates in his last works imply a 
relaxation of Socratic principles and a rather less disparaging attitude to 
examples.’54 Burnyeat mentions ‘the irony’ presumably because he thinks that 
the rather comical description of the sophist’s behaviour is intended to 
highlight the formidable nature of sophists in contrast to philosophers who (at 
least in Plato’s late dialogues) accept examples as a sufficient answer.55 But is 
that really so? I think not. Instead, I suggest that the contrast is between 
sophists who deftly hide behind perplexing puzzles and philosophers who 
pursue them, thereby unearthing philosophical problems, on the one hand, and 
ordinary people in an unreflective state, on the other. Recall here a famous 
distinction Socrates and Plato make among things: there are things about which 
there is general agreement as to what they are, and ones about which there is no 
                                                       
54 Burnyeat (1977, 390). 
55 Burnyeat cannot mean that a philosopher accepts them just as examples, for, as I 
have mentioned in the previous paragraph, it is clear enough from (P20) that even the 
sophist accepts them as examples. 
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agreement at all (cf. Phdr. 263a2-c1, Euthphr. 7b6-d8, Plt. 285d9-286b1). An 
image belongs to the former; there is no controversy among ordinary people as 
to what an image is; normally, to point to some images in mirrors or water is 
sufficient for a grasp of what it is. 56  Sophists, however, convert this 
uncontroversial thing into a controversial one by shutting their eyes or 
pretending that they do not know mirrors or water. Certainly, there is no 
denying that the description of the way in which they reject instances as an 
answer to the question is ironical. But this irony belongs to the general tone of 
the dialogue, which is full of ironical descriptions of sophists, and is nothing to 
do with a dismissive attitude towards examples, for the problem uncovered by 
the rejection of instances of an image is a real philosophical problem which is 
treated intensively later in the dialogue, and therefore such an attitude must be 
shared by philosophers as well. Besides, philosophers described by Plato often 
do not trust their perceptions (cf. e.g. Phd. 66b1-67b6, R. 475d1-476d6, 511b2-c2) 
and look ridiculous to many people (cf. e.g. R. 516e7-517a7, Tht. 173c7-175b7, 
Sph. 216c4-d2). I therefore conclude that the unfamiliar reason for rejecting 
Theaetetus’ answer by enumeration does not damage my interpretation; it is 
only devised to convert a normally uncontroversial thing into something 
philosophically controversial. 
                                                       
56 The ‘clay’ in the Theaetetus also belongs to the former, but Socrates treats it as if it 
belonged to the latter in order to give an analogical case of the definition of the thing 
under consideration. This is also the case with the ‘speed’ in the Laches, and the ‘shape’ 
and ‘colour’ in the Meno. 
 87 
Chapter 3: Socratic forms and Platonic Forms 
 
 
 
§1. Introduction 
   The main purpose of this chapter is to put forward an interpretation that 
will make it possible to integrate Plato’s earlier and later dialectics in terms of 
their objects on the basis of the examination of the aspects of Socratic forms and 
Platonic Forms that are connected with methodological procedures. The 
analysis of the objects of dialectic becomes particularly vital for an 
interpretation of Plato’s method, since it has often been believed that a striking 
contrast between Plato’s earlier and later methods precisely lies in the 
difference between their objects: Socrates’ procedure for definition deals with 
Socratic forms, while Plato’s method of collection and division deals with 
Platonic Forms. In my opinion, such a belief is often imprinted on our mind 
through the secondary literature (starting from Aristotle’s account) 57 , and 
prompts us to turn a blind eye to what actually goes on in the text. Consider the 
following two cases: in the Hippias Major (299d8-300b5), inquiring after the form 
of the fine, Socrates asks what it is that both pleasure through sight and 
pleasure through hearing have in common, by which both of them are fine, and 
in the Sophist (219a10-c1), the Eleatic Stranger says that the sciences of farming, 
caring for living things and equipment, and imitation have the common 
                                                       
57 See Metaphysics A 6, 987a29-b8; M 4, 1078b12-32; M 9, 1086a31-b11. For a useful analysis 
of these passages, see Fine (1984 [2003, 264-273]). 
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capacity, i.e. ‘to bring anything into being that wasn’t in being before’, by which 
all of them are grouped under the science of production. The structural 
correlation of these two cases is obvious.58 But, then, why should we suppose 
that Socrates deals with the Socratic form of the fine, while the Eleatic Stranger 
deals with the Platonic Form of the Science-of-Production? Because, one might 
answer, lots of things have happened between the Hippias Major and the Sophist. 
I myself will argue in this chapter that nothing happened in between that 
would require the metamorphosis of the science of production into the 
Science-of-Production. 
   This chapter can be read as offering an approach alternative to, and perhaps 
radically different from, what I shall call the standard approach to Plato’s 
central doctrines of metaphysics. In my version, Socratic forms survive. Plato 
simply added Platonic Forms as the ultimate goal of our search for knowledge 
to the Socratic framework. In both of the passages from the Hippias Major and 
the Sophist mentioned above, Plato deals with Socratic forms. In the standard 
version, by contrast, Plato replaced immanent Socratic forms with his own 
transcendent Platonic Forms and so-called immanent characters (or 
Form-copies), and later reconsidered the simplicity of Platonic Forms and 
started to investigate the interrelation of Platonic Forms with each other.59 Thus, 
                                                       
58 I.e. in both passages, the following three items are at issue: instances (pleasure 
through sight and hearing; the sciences of farming, caring for living things, etc.); a 
common characteristic (what the pleasures have in common; the common capacity); 
and the name of the common characteristic (‘beauty’; ‘the science of production’). The 
instances of F have a common characteristic by which they are labelled as ‘F’. 
59 For a recent, minutely discussed defense for this view, see Silverman (2002). In §4.2. 
of this chapter, I shall examine the view that Plato deals with Platonic Forms and 
immanent characters in the Phaedo. For the view that Plato changed his mind about the 
simplicity of Platonic Forms in the late dialogues, see e.g. Anscombe (1966), Moravcsik 
(1973a, 160; 1973b, 326), Benitez (1989, 58), De Chiara-Quenzer (1993, 51), Frede (1997, 
336-37). 
 89 
in the passages in question, only the structure is parallel; the objects are 
different. Plato deals with immanent Socratic forms in the Hippias Major, but 
with the interrelation of transcendent Platonic Forms in the Sophist. 
   My overall strategy is to set a line of demarcation between Socratic forms 
and Platonic Forms by clarifying their respective ontological and 
epistemological status. I shall start my discussion with an examination of the 
ontological status of Socratic forms in section 2, which consists of two 
sub-sections. In the first sub-section (§2.1), I shall argue that the so-called 
immanentist view, according to which Socratic forms are always located in 
concrete particulars, is too narrow; particulars do not constitute an essential 
factor in Socrates’ procedure for definition. Instead, I shall propose that Socratic 
forms are always considered in connection with various things, actions, 
situations, or their parts, whether particulars or universals (or, in short, I shall 
argue that Socratic forms are context-restricted). In the second sub-section (§2.2), 
I shall describe a distinctive way of analysing our world that will result from 
Socrates’ view that forms are perfectly present in each context. One of the 
inevitable consequences of Socrates’ position is that each Socratic form is both 
one and many: it is one in that it is liable to one and the same definition, and it 
is many in that it appears perfectly in many contexts. Next, in section 3, I shall 
turn to the epistemological status of Socratic forms. I shall argue that Socratic 
forms can be sufficiently grasped by definitions, i.e. simple propositions. Thus, 
having established that each Socratic form is context-restricted, both one and 
many, and the subject of definition (or knowledge by definition), I shall suggest 
in section 4 that each Platonic Form is context-independent, simply one, and the 
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subject of knowledge (or expertise). Section 4 consists of two sub-sections. In 
the first sub-section (§4.1), I shall examine the so-called ascent passage in the 
Symposium (209e5-212a7), and shall suggest that Socratic forms correspond to 
beauty in bodies, activities and laws, and sciences, which appears prior to the 
final goal of the mysteries, i.e. Beauty itself, with the result that Plato has both 
Socratic forms and Platonic Forms in mind in the middle dialogues. In the 
second sub-section (§4.2), I shall argue that in the Phaedo and the Republic ‘the F 
itself’ or ‘the εἶδος or ἰδέα of F’, the expressions that have often been regarded 
as the technical terms for Platonic Forms, in fact ambiguously designate both 
Socratic forms and Platonic Forms. Let us then start our discussion with 
Socratic forms. 
 
§2. Socratic forms and contexts 
   The subject of Socrates’ ‘What is F?’ question is the form (εἶδος or ἰδέα) of F. 
Socrates makes this clear when his interlocutor gives the sort of answer that 
Socrates did not intend to ask for. When his interlocutor gives an example 
which is related to an unduly limited case of F out of various F phenomena, or a 
list of examples of this kind, Socrates usually rejects the answer on the ground 
that what he is asking for is something quite different, thereby implying that his 
interlocutor has simply misunderstood the question. He then tends to clarify 
the meaning of his question by explaining that what he wants his interlocutor to 
teach him is the form of F (see Euthphr. 6d10-e7; Men. 72c6-d1. Cf. Hi.Ma. 
289c9-d5). Let us call forms that can stand as subjects of Socrates’ ‘What is F?’ 
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question ‘Socratic forms’.60 
   Although what Socrates means by ‘form’ is not immediately clear, a closer 
look at various passages in early dialogues seems to indicate that the Socratic 
form of F has the following three features: (a) it is one and the same in many 
items, (b) it is that by which all F things are F, and (c) it is (always and for 
everyone) F.61 For example, in the Meno, Socrates tries to persuade Meno that, 
although the instances of virtue given by Meno are many and various, (a) these 
instances have one and the same form of virtue, and that (b) it is because of this 
form of virtue that they are virtues (72c6-8). And in the Hippias Major, Socrates, 
as a preliminary to the question as to what the fine is, elicits assent from 
Hippias that (b) all the fine things are fine by the fine (287c8-d2), and says 
somewhat later in the dialogue that (c) what he is seeking for is that which is 
always and for everyone fine (292e1-2). 
   In what follows I will bring feature (a) into focus, asking in what sense or in 
what way a Socratic form is one and the same in many items. It is true that the 
two latter features, i.e. (b) and (c), have recently received much more attention 
than (a) from scholars. In relation to feature (b), the form is often characterized 
as the logical cause or the aetiological principle of something: the form of F 
causes F things to be F or explains why F things are F. And in relation to (c), the 
form is thought by scholars to self-predicate: the form of F is itself F. I shall 
                                                       
60 Note that Socratic forms include the items that Socrates makes subjects of ‘What is 
F?’ questions just in order to illustrate the sort of answer he is asking for, e.g. speed, 
figures, colour, and clay, as well as the items whose definitions are the real objects of 
his search, e.g. virtue, beauty, and knowledge. 
61 For the general characterization of Socratic forms (or the general conditions that the 
definition of a Socratic form has to satisfy), see e.g. Santas (1979, 72-96), Teloh (1981, 
18-46), Woodruff (1982, 149-160), Fine (1993, 49-54). My characterization is roughly in 
agreement with theirs. 
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come back briefly to each of these two features later when it becomes relevant 
to my discussion. They have, however, been especially discussed in connection 
with Plato’s mature theory of Forms developed in the middle dialogues. In 
order to investigate how the object of the Socratic method should be understood, 
I myself suggest that it is more significant to clarify feature (a) than (b) or (c), 
since feature (a) seems to be the peculiar feature of Socratic forms. I shall 
therefore concentrate on feature (a) hereafter; first in §2.1 I shall consider a 
popular view that Socratic forms are immanent in particulars, and second in 
§2.2 I shall try to clarify feature (a) by contrasting two different approaches to it, 
i.e. (what I shall call) the ‘approximationist’ and the ‘contextualist’ approach. 
 
§2.1. Immanence 
   Concerning the issue of the relation between a Socratic form and many items, 
scholars have often proposed that a Socratic form is immanent in many particular 
things on the ground that, in order to describe this relation, Socrates uses such 
expressions as: things ‘have’ F, or F is ‘present to’ things, or F is ‘in’ things (I 
shall consider these expressions immediately below). 62  According to this 
                                                       
62 Cf. Mabbott (1926, 77): ‘If Socrates did originate the Theory of Forms, his forms must 
have been immanent, for immanence is essential to the Socratic methods’; Grube (1935, 
9): ‘It follows that all these expressions [that seem to imply the theory of Ideas], 
whatever hidden meaning, if any, they may hold for Socrates, are taken by the other 
speaker as describing no more than the common characteristics of particular things to 
which the same predicate is applied, these common qualities being considered not as 
transcendentally existing but as immanent in the particulars’; Ross (1953, 21): ’Apart from 
this one passage [in the Symposium], this whole group of early dialogues treats the 
Ideas as being immanent in particular things’; Rowe (1984, 55): ‘[Socrates] will have 
begun […] by tending to analyse the beauty of a particular thing in terms of the 
possession by the thing, or the presence in the thing, of the form of beauty (beauty, 
beautiful), where the form of beauty comes to be seen as an element in the thing, or a 
part of it’; Malcolm (1991, 36-37): ‘Certain scholars undertake to shroud the idea of an 
immanent universal in impenetrable mystery. But all that is meant thereby is a 
common characteristic existing in the particulars as given by Euthyphro 5d […] and 
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immanentist view, the many items are concrete particulars that exist in space 
and time, and so the ‘in’ in the phrase ‘F is in things’ may be understood as 
specifying the spatio-temporal location of F; Socrates is searching for a Socratic 
form as located in many concrete particular things that exist in space and time. 
For instance, the Socratic form of courage is one and the same while being 
located in many courageous people such as Achilles, Laches, etc. Also, in this 
account, it seems natural to suppose that a Socratic form constitutes a property 
or an attribute of these particular things.63 If the Socratic form of courage is 
located in Achilles, it constitutes the property or the attribute of courage 
Achilles has in himself. 
   The immanentists call on a wide range of textual evidence to support their 
view. They quote various Greek expressions used for the relation between a 
Socratic form and the many items as suggesting the immanentist interpretation. 
(Note that, although most of these expressions in fact mention not the form of F 
but only F, this fact does not devalue them as evidence for the immanentist 
view, since F as a subject of Socrates’ ‘What is F?’ question is always identical 
with the Socratic form of F.) Now, I would like to divide these expressions into 
the following three groups: (1) the ‘have’ locution, (2) the ‘(come to) be present 
                                                                                                                                                                
Laches 191e’; Fine (1993, 52): ‘But to say that forms are in things is only to say that 
various sensibles have them, i.e. have the relevant properties.’ Other scholars who 
seem to agree with this view include Irwin (1977a, 318 n.24), Teloh (1981, 14), and 
Vlastos (1991, 58; 74). By contrast, Woodruff (1982, 166) and Dancy (2004, 186-206) 
argue that Socrates is not committed to any specific view about the relation between a 
Socratic form and relevant many items on the ground that the expressions that might 
be quoted as evidence for immanence are ordinary, theoretically unloaded, locutions. 
63 See Vlastos (1991, 74): ‘to speak of an attribute as being “in” something is current 
usage for saying that it is instantiated there; this would be ordinary Greek for saying 
that the thing has the property associated with the Form. […] [Socrates] takes it for 
granted that if temperance or piety or beauty exist they exist in something in the world 
of time’. See also Fine’s view quoted in the previous note. 
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to’ locution, and (3) the ‘in’ locution. Let us consider them in turn. First, (1) the 
‘have’ locution comprises different expressions: things can ‘have’ (ἔχειν) or 
‘come to acquire’ (ϰτῆσθαι) or ‘have acquired’ (ϰεϰτῆσθαι) a Socratic form. For 
instance, in the Euthyphro, Socrates uses this locution in the following question: 
 
   (P21) SOCRATES: Everything that is to be impious has some one form (ἔχον µίαν 
τινὰ ἰδέαν) with respect to its impiety, doesn’t it?64 (5d3-5) 
 
Similarly, in the Laches: 
 
   (P22) SOCRATES: So all these men are courageous, but some have acquired 
(ϰέϰτηνται) courage in pleasure, some in pains, some in desires, and some in 
fears. (191e4-6) 
 
This ‘have’ locution can also be found at Chrm. 169d9-e8, 171d8, 175e6-176a7; La. 
189e3-190c2, 192a4; Hi.Ma. 298b2-4, 299d8-300b2; Cra. 389b8-10; Men. 72c6-d1.65 
                                                       
64 This is my own translation. Grube’s translation in Cooper (1997) is less literal: 
‘everything that is to be impious presents us with one form or appearance in so far as it 
is impious?’ 
65 With one exception, I have restricted the passages I quote as containing one of the 
three types of locution to those that appear in the dialogues in which Socrates asks a 
‘What is F?’ question. It is true that Socrates or his interlocutor sometimes use parallel 
expressions for the relation between F and relevant many items in other dialogues as 
well (e.g. Ly. 217b4ff.; Euthd. 301a4), and indeed these passages have been quoted as 
suggesting the immanentist view (cf. Ross (1953, 228-30), Fujisawa (1974, 42)), but it is 
not clear, I think, whether or not Socrates, by using these expressions, has the Socratic 
form of F in mind. Dancy (2004, 192-206), for example, argues that he does not. The 
single exception is the Cratylus (389b8-10), in which Socrates directly mentions the form 
of F: ‘Hence whenever he has to make a shuttle for weaving garments of any sort, 
whether light or heavy, linen or woolen, mustn’t it possess the form of a shuttle (τὸ τῆς 
ϰεϱϰίδος ἔχειν εἶδος)?’ With this restriction in mind, I intend my quotations to be 
exhaustive as far as possible. It should be also noted that I have included the passages 
that mention the relation between a thing that is proposed as an answer to the ‘What is F?’ 
question and relevant many items, for such a thing is temporarily treated as the form of 
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Next, (2) the ‘(come to) be present to’ locution comprises a Socratic form’s being, 
or coming to be, ‘present to’ (παϱεῖναι, ἐπεῖναι, παϱαγίγνεσθαι) many things; it 
may also ‘be in’ (ἐνεῖναι), or ‘come to be in’ (ἐγγίγνεσθαι), or ‘be added to’ 
(πϱοσεῖναι, πϱοσγίγνεσθαι), many things. Consider the following two examples: 
 
   (P23) SOCRATES: Now it is clear that if temperance is present in (πάϱεστιν) you, you 
have some opinion about it. (Chrm. 158e7-159a1) 
 
   (P24) SOCRATES: Do you still think that the fine itself by which everything else is 
beautified and is seen to be fine when that form is added to it (πϱοσγένηται 
ἐϰεῖνο τὸ εἶδος)––that that is a girl or a horse or a lyre? (Hi.Ma. 289d2-5) 
 
The other occurrences of the ‘(come to) be present to’ locution are: Chrm. 
157a5-b1, 158b5, 159a1-10, 175e2; La. 189e3-190c2, 190d7-e3; Hi.Ma. 292d1, 
293d6-294c6, 300a10; Men. 70a3, 71a4, 86d1, 99e3-100c2. Finally, (3) the ‘in’ 
locution indicates that a Socratic form is ‘in’ (ἐν) many things. In the Euthyphro, 
just before (P21), we find Socrates using this locution: 
 
(P25) SOCRATES: [O]r is the pious not the same and alike in (ἐν) every action? 
(5d1-2) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
F, and as such it is supposed to stand in the same ontological relation to those items as 
the form of F does. For instance, I have included Chrm. 169d9-e8, where Socrates and 
his interlocutors agree that a person will know himself if he has self-knowledge, in the 
examples of (1) the ‘have’ locution. In this passage, I think, self-knowledge is given the 
same ontological status as the form of temperance, i.e. the subject of the ‘What is F?’ 
question in the Charmides. 
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The ‘in’ locution also appears at La. 191c7-192b8 and Men. 72d8-73a3. From the 
survey of these passages, I think, we might get the strong impression that the 
immanentist view must be correct; Socrates seems always to be interested in the 
relation between the form of F and concrete particulars, and he seems always to 
be saying that (1) the particulars have the form of F, or (2) the form of F is present 
to the particulars, or (3) the form of F is in the particulars, especially as testified 
by (P21) – (P25). However, this impression is, I suggest, mistaken. 
   But before arguing why it is so, I would like to make clear the point on 
which I disagree with the immanentist view: I do not deny that it is the relation 
between a Socratic form and concrete particulars that Socrates refers to in (P21) 
– (P25); what I do deny is that Socrates, in using (1) the ‘have’, (2) the ‘(come to) 
be present to’, and (3) the ‘in’ locution, is exclusively and always interested in the 
relation between a Socratic form and concrete particulars. To put it somewhat 
differently, I would like to challenge a view that the distinction between a 
Socratic form and concrete particulars constitutes the basic framework of the 
Socratic method. It is clear, I think, that the immanentist interpretation strongly 
suggests such a view, and this view, if connected with the interpretation I 
defended in Chapters 1 and 2 that Socrates’ procedure for definition is the 
method of abstraction or generalization from instances, might incline us to 
agree with Cornford when he writes: ‘The Socratic method contemplates a 
single form (such as the beautiful itself) and many individual things which 
partake of that form. Only one form is in view, and the definition is to be gained 
by a survey of individual instances.’66 Remember, however, that in Chapter 1 I 
                                                       
66 Cornford (1957, 185), slightly adapted. 
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have introduced two types of instances, i.e. (1a) the F as instantiated in various 
things, actions, and situations, and (1b) parts of F. Certainly, on the surface of it, 
it might seem plausible to suppose that (1a) is equivalent to the F as instantiated 
in particulars, and that the distinction between the F and the particulars lies at 
the heart of the method when this type of instances are at issue. But when 
Socrates is dealing with (1b), no such distinction seems to be in view. It is 
evident that parts of F are not concrete particulars, and that F is not located in 
parts of F. For example, courage is not a concrete particular any more than 
virtue is, and virtue is not located in courage, justice, wisdom, and so on, not at 
any rate in the same way as virtue is located in Achilles, Laches, and so on (i.e. 
spatio-temporally). But Socrates does not seem to distinguish two relationships, 
i.e. between the F and (1a) and between the F and (1b), as can be ascertained 
from the following passage: 
 
   (P26) SOCRATES: [An imaginary speaker] would probably wonder and say: “you do 
not understand that I am seeking that which is the same in (ἐπί) all these 
cases?” Would you still have nothing to say, Meno, if one asked you: “What 
is this which applies to (ἐπί) the round and the straight and the other things 
which you call shapes and which is the same in (ἐπί) them all?” (Men. 
75a3-8)67 
  
In this passage, Socrates uses a locution for the relation between the Socratic 
form of F and parts of F that very much resembles (3) the ‘in’ locution. Of 
                                                       
67 I have quoted this passage as a part of (P13) [Men. 74d4-75a8] in Chapter 1. 
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course, the immanentists can lay emphasis on the fact that it is ‘on’ or ‘over’ 
(ἐπί) instead of ‘in’ (ἐν) that Socrates uses in order to describe the relation at 
issue, and reply that Socrates consciously uses this preposition because shape is 
not immanent in the round, the straight and so on. But I myself refuse, for 
reasons I shall shortly give, to put such emphasis on the choice of a 
preposition.68 It does not make any difference for Socrates, as we shall see, 
whether many instances are particulars or universals, and accordingly the two 
types of instances are treated by him in exactly the same way. 
   With this in mind, let us come back to the reason why the immanentist view 
is not correct. My strategy is simple; I shall show that some of the passages that 
have been quoted by the immanentists as evidence for their view in fact do not 
support it. I shall first argue that a few examples of (1) the ‘have’ locution and 
(2) the ‘(come to) be present to’ locution are used for the relation between a 
Socratic form and universals, and then move on to discuss (3) the ‘in’ locution, 
which will turn out to give no support at all to the immanentist interpretation. 
   Let us then start with the consideration of examples of (1) the ‘have’ locution 
and (2) the ‘(come to) be present to’ locution. First, I shall consider a passage 
close to the beginning of the Meno. On being asked ‘What is virtue?’ by Socrates, 
Meno first enumerates virtues sorted out in accordance with sex, age, and status 
with a couple of particular types of action attached to each of them in the 
                                                       
68 It will be useful to consider the following passage in the Laws here: ‘So it looks as if 
we have to compel the guardians of our divine foundation to get an exact idea of the 
common element through (διά) all the four virtues––that factor which, though single, is 
to be found in (ἐν) courage, temperance, justice and in (ἐν) wisdom, and thus in our 
view deserves the general title “virtue”.’ (965c9-d3) I think that even in the Laws, which 
has been usually considered to be Plato’s last work, Plato is talking about Socratic 
forms. But I will not press the point here. 
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following way: the virtue of a man is such and such actions, and the virtue of a 
woman is such and such actions (quoted as (P6) [71e1-72a1] in Chapter 1). But it 
is not this kind of answer that Socrates was asking for. In order to bring home 
to Meno his real intention in asking ‘What is virtue?’, Socrates describes an 
analogical imaginary situation in which his interlocutor enumerated ‘many and 
various’ (πολλὰς ϰαὶ παντοδαπάς 72b2) bees as an answer to the question 
‘What is a bee?’ In this situation, he says, it is the essence of a bee in respect of 
which bees do not differ from one another that is being asked about. He then 
continues: 
 
   (P27) SOCRATES: The same is true in the case of the virtues. Even if they are many 
and various (πολλαὶ ϰαὶ παντοδαπαί), all of them have (ἔχουσιν) one and the 
same form which makes them virtues, and it is right to look to this when one 
is asked to make clear what virtue is. (72c6-d1) 
 
Obviously, in this passage it is virtues and not individual persons that are said 
to have the form of virtue. It is also clear from the context that the virtues are  
not particulars, e.g. this virtue of Socrates, but universals, e.g. masculine 
virtue,69 for Socrates here refers to the virtues classified by Meno, and is trying 
to persuade him that virtue does not differ whether it is in a man, in a woman, 
                                                       
69 It is true that, in the analogical imaginary situation, the ‘bees’ that are said to be 
many and various at 72b2-4 are likely to be particular bees rather than kinds of bee. But 
this should not mislead us into supposing that Meno also had particulars in mind 
when he enumerated the virtues. The point is well argued by Nehamas (1975a [1999, 
166]): ‘And because bees are particular objects, it may have been thought that what 
Meno offered were also particular objects. But, of course, this is an analogy, and this 
inference is illegitimate. The virtues are likened to the bees in respect of being “many 
and of every sort” (72b2-5), not in respect of being particulars.’ 
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in a child, or in an elderly person (see 73a1-3). Socrates therefore claims in (P27) 
that the virtue of a man, the virtue of a woman, etc. have the form of virtue, 
using (1) the ‘have’ locution to describe the relation between a Socratic form 
and universals. The ‘have’ locution, then, does not support the immanentist 
view here, since the form of virtue is certainly neither spatially nor temporally 
located in the virtue of a man, or the virtue of a woman. 
   Second, consider passages close to the end of the Hippias Major, where 
Socrates himself proposes ‘the pleasant (or pleasure) 70  through sight and 
hearing’ as the definition of the fine in view of a survey of various instances of 
the fine at 298a1-8 (quoted as (P10) in Chapter 1). In order to examine his own 
proposal, he first makes it explicit that this proposal in effect distinguishes a 
part of pleasure from the whole, restating it in this way: ‘This is what we say is 
fine, the part (τὸ µέϱος) of the pleasant that comes by sight and hearing (ἐπὶ τῇ 
ὄψει τε ϰαὶ ἀϰοῇ γιγνόµενον).’ (299b3-4) In other words, he reformulates his 
proposal in accordance with the genus-and-species relation: beauty is both of 
the two species of pleasure, the one occurring through sight and the one 
occurring through hearing. Socrates then introduces an assumption that, if there 
are two instances of F, then they must have one thing in common, the F, that 
makes both of them and each of them F.71 The two species of pleasure, Socrates 
claims, will have to have such a common characteristic if they are both and each 
                                                       
70 In his reference to abstract concepts, Socrates sometimes uses the substantivized 
adjective and the abstract noun interchangeably. This is the case with the Hippias Major, 
in which he uses ‘the pleasant’ (τὸ ἡδύ 298a6-299d3, 302e3-303d10) and ‘pleasure’ 
(ἠδονή 299d3-300b5, 302b6-302e2) interchangeably. See esp. 299d2-6, and compare 
299b2-4 with 299d8-e2. 
71 This assumption is a variation of feature (a) that a Socratic form is one and the same 
in many items, with particular emphasis on ‘both’ and ‘each’. 
 101 
fine. And obviously the common characteristic is not ‘being pleasure’, since 
‘being pleasure’ applies to other kinds of pleasure too that are not fine, e.g. 
pleasure of eating. Thus he says: 
 
(P28) SOCRATES: ‘So,’ [an imaginary speaker] will say. ‘You selected those 
pleasures from the other pleasures because of something different from their 
being pleasures. You observed on the pair of them that they have something 
that differentiates them from the others (ὅτι ἔχουσί τι διάφοϱον τῶν ἄλλων), 
and you say they are fine by looking at that.’ (299d8-e2) 
 
Socrates also dismisses the possibility that the common characteristic is either 
‘occurring through sight’ or ‘occurring through hearing’ because neither of 
them makes both of the two species of pleasure fine. He then continues: 
 
(P29) SOCRATES: “But both are fine, as you say.” We do say that. 
 HIPPIAS: We do. 
 SOCRATES: Then they have (ἔχουσιν) something that itself makes them to be 
fine, that common thing that is present to (ἔπεστι) both of them in common 
and to each privately. (300a9-b1) 
 
After this exchange, Socrates moves on to propose that the common 
characteristic is not ‘occurring through sight and hearing’ either, since it does 
not apply to each of the two kinds of pleasure,72 and finally gives up his own 
                                                       
72 This part of the argument (300b6-302b6) is rather long and complicated because of 
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proposal.73 Now, it should be observed that in (P28) and (P29) Socrates uses (1) 
the ‘have’ locution and (2) the ‘(come to) be present to’ locution for the relation 
between the two kinds of pleasure and the common characteristic, i.e. the 
relation between universals and a Socratic form. It is clear that Socrates is not 
interested in particular pleasures here, for his focus is on the genus-and-species 
relation of pleasure. Again, it is clear that he has the Socratic form of the fine in 
mind when he mentions the common characteristic, for he says that this 
common characteristic makes these pleasures fine. In these passages, then, the 
‘have’ locution and the ‘(come to) be present to’ locution do not support the 
immanentist view. 
   Thus I hope to have shown that there are some clear examples of (1) the 
‘have’ locution and (2) the ‘(come to) be present to’ locution that are used for 
the relation between a Socratic form and universals and so do not support the 
immanentist view. These examples are admittedly only a few, but they are 
sufficient to show that these locutions do not imply, by themselves, that the F is 
                                                                                                                                                                
an excursus in which Socrates argues that there are characteristics, such as being 
two-in-number and even-numbered, that apply, in relation to any two things, to both 
of them but not each of them, or vice versa, against Hippias’ position that there are no 
such characteristics. In the end, however, Socrates concludes that the fine is not such a 
characteristic, and so the definition of the fine has to apply to each of the two kinds of 
pleasure as well as both of them. 
73 It may not be precisely right to say that Socrates has given up the proposal that the 
fine is pleasure through sight and hearing at this point, since he seems to suppose that 
his next proposal, i.e. that the fine is ‘beneficial pleasure’ (ἡδονὴν ὠφέλιµον 303e9), is 
not an independent proposal (pace Woodruff (1982, 87): ‘the last fresh start’) but a 
consequence of that proposal. This can be seen from Socrates’ words at 298c5-7 
expressed in relation to the proposal that the fine is pleasure through sight and 
hearing: ‘We could well be thinking we’re in the clear again, when we’ve gotten stuck 
on the same point about the fine as we did a moment ago.’ I take these words to mean 
that the proposal at issue involves the same problem as the previous proposal, i.e. that 
the fine is the beneficial. If I am correct, then Socrates is showing at 298c9-303d10 how 
the proposal that the fine is pleasure through sight and hearing can be reduced to the 
proposal that the fine is beneficial pleasure. In this case, it is at 303e11-304a3 that 
Socrates finally gives up his proposal. 
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spatially and temporally located only in many particulars. Socrates says that the 
virtue of a man, virtue of a woman, etc. have the form of virtue, that the two 
kinds of pleasure have the form of the fine, and that the form of the fine is 
present to the two kinds of pleasure. Although we do not find any passages in 
which these locutions are applied to the relation between F and parts of F, there 
seems to be no reason to reject the possibility of such an application. I therefore 
suggest that Socrates did not find the following expressions objectionable: 
courage, justice, etc. have the form of virtue, or that the form of virtue is present 
to courage, justice, etc. 
   Next, I would like to turn to (3) the ‘in’ locution, by clearing up a 
widespread confusion about a passage in the Laches which has often been 
quoted, along with (P25) [Euthpr. 5d1-2], as testifying to the immanentist view.74 
The passage in question runs like this: 
 
(P30) SOCRATES: So try again to state first what is the courage that is the same in all 
these cases (ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις). (191e10-11) 
 
Many scholars have understood this passage as indicating that the form of 
courage is immanent in individuals such as Achilles or Laches. But it can be 
easily seen from a slightly wider context that this interpretation is not correct. 
Consider first the passage that immediately precedes (P30): 
 
                                                       
74 This passage is quoted as evidence for the immanentist view by e.g. Ross (1953, 228), 
Fujisawa (1974, 42), Rist (1975, 344 n.9), Teloh (1981, 20), Malcolm (1991, 37), Vlastos 
1991, 74 n.135). 
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(P31) SOCRATES: So all these men are brave, but some possess courage in (ἐν) 
pleasures, some in (ἐν) pains, some in (ἐν) desires, and some in (ἐν) fears. 
And others, I think, show cowardice in (ἐν) the same respects. 
LACHES: Yes, they do. 
SOCRATES: Then what are courage and cowardice? This is what I wanted to 
find out. [(P30)] So try again to state first what is the courage that is the same 
in all these cases (ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις). 
(191e4-11) 
 
In this passage, Socrates, consistently using the preposition ‘in’ (ἐν) in the sense 
of ‘in relation to’, mentions various situations or conditions in relation to which 
people possess courage before asking Laches to make a fresh attempt at 
defining courage. It is then natural to suppose that in (P30) too Socrates uses the 
‘in’ in the same sense; he is asking what is the courage that is the same in 
relation to all the situations or conditions he enumerated in (P31). One might still 
object, however, that, even though the ‘in’ of ‘in pleasures, pains, etc.’ means ‘in 
relation to’, we do not need to understand the ‘in’ of ‘in all these cases’ in the 
same way. It is equally natural to take Socrates as enumerating people who stand 
in relation to various situations rather than to take him as directly enumerating 
these various situations, and as such (P30) may be understood as the request for 
the definition of the same courage that is immanent in these people (who possess 
courage in relation to various situations and conditions). This objection may 
stand so far as (P31) is concerned, but the following passage will decide the 
issue beyond question: 
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   (P32) SOCRATES: What power is it which, because it is the same in (ἐν) pleasure and 
in (ἐν) pain and in (ἐν) all the other cases in which we were just saying it 
occurred, is therefore called courage? (192b5-8) 
 
Here Socrates clearly says that courage is the same in pleasure, pain, and other 
conditions. Needless to say, he does not mean by these words that courage is 
immanent in pleasure, pain, and so on; he does not mean that pleasure or pain is 
courageous. What he means is only that courage is the same in relation to 
pleasure, pain, and all the other situations. And it is obvious that (P30) is 
intended to describe the same matters. I therefore conclude that (P30) does not 
support the immanentist view. 
   This result is crucial for the proper assessment of (3) the ‘in’ locution, for it 
seems to suggest the following two points. The first point is that there are no 
passages in which Socrates uses the ‘in’ locution that offer good evidence for 
the immanentist view. The two passages that have often been quoted as the 
most promising candidates for such evidence are (P25) [Euthphr. 5d1-2] and 
(P30).75 But now that the ‘in’ in (P30) has turned out to mean ‘in relation to’, 
there seems to be little reason to suppose the ‘in’ in (P25) has such a strong 
implication as immanence; Socrates probably means there that the pious is the 
                                                       
75 I have also quoted Men. 72d8-73a3 as an example of (3) the ‘in’ locution. This 
passage has less often been quoted than (P25) and (P30), and it is easy, I think, to 
observe that this passage does not corroborate the immanentist view. Socrates suggests 
there that virtue is the same whether it is in a man or in a woman or in a child or in an 
elderly person just as health or strength is the same whether it is in a man or in a 
woman. The ‘man’, ‘woman’, etc. mentioned here are clearly not particulars, but 
universals as identified by Meno’s classification of people in accordance with sex, age, 
and status. 
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same and alike in relation to every (particular or type of) action, rather than that 
the pious is the same and alike while being immanent in every particular action. 
Socrates’ words are admittedly very concise, and it seems impossible to settle 
decisively which reading is correct. But, if so, (P25) does not offer evidence for 
the immanentist view without begging the question, i.e. without the 
assumption that the ‘in’ in (P25) means ‘being immanent in’. 
   The second point is that there is no good reason to single out the preposition 
ἐν as suggesting immanence from many prepositions that appear in similar 
contexts. In particular, there is no good reason to suppose that Socrates makes a 
distinction between the ἐπί that is used for the relation between a Socratic form 
and its parts in (P26) [Men. 75a3-8], on the one hand, and the ἐν which has been 
proven to mean, at least sometimes, ‘in relation to’, on the other. Of course, it 
might be tempting to suppose that the ἐν always but the ἐπί never implied 
immanence; and it is certainly absurd to say that, for example, shape is spatially 
and temporally located in the straight, the round, and so on. By suggesting that 
there is no distinction between the ἐπί and the ἐν, I am not suggesting this 
absurdity. The ἐν in (P30) means ‘in relation to’, and so does the ἐπί in (P26): 
Socrates says that shape is the same in relation to the straight, the round, and so 
on. Similarly, Socrates seems to use other prepositions that only mean ‘in 
relation to’ interchangeably with the ἐν. For example, at 192a1-b3 in the Laches 
(quoted as (P3) in Chapter 1), Socrates poses the question as to what is the 
speed that is the same ‘in (ἐν) all these cases’ i.e. ‘in (ἐν) running and in (ἐν) 
playing the lyre, etc.’, and then answers himself that it is the power of 
accomplishing many things in a short time ‘whether in relation to (πεϱί) speech 
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or in relation to (πεϱί) running or in relation to (πεϱί) all the other cases’. The 
following is the list of such prepositions used in similar contexts and the 
locations in which each preposition is found in dialogues (I shall indicate by (+ 
…) whether the noun that follows a preposition is a thing or an action or a 
situation or a part). 
 
διά [only with πάντων] (+ situations) La. 192c1; (+ parts) Men. 
74a9. 
ἐν (+ things) Men. 72d8-73a3, Sph. 239d7, e5;76 (+ actions) La. 
192a1-10, Euthphr. 5d1; (+ situations) La. 191c7-e11, 192b5-8. 
ἐπί (+ parts) Men. 75a4-8. 
πεϱί (+ things and actions) La. 192b2-3. 
πϱός (+ situations) La. 191d5-7. 
ϰατά [only with πάντων] (+ things) Men. 73d1; (+ parts) Men. 74b1. 
 
On the basis of this list, I suggest that, although Socrates assumes a certain 
relationship between a Socratic form and many items, (3) the ‘in’ locution is not 
used to specify more exactly how this relationship should be understood. It is 
true that ἐν is the most commonly used preposition, but it always means ‘in 
relation to’ when it is combined with situations. Most importantly, Socrates 
often in similar contexts chooses other prepositions that do not suggest 
                                                       
76 I have added these places from the Sophist, since Plato keeps the Socratic method 
there as I have argued in Ch. 2 §4. On the other hand, I have excluded διὰ πάντων at 
240a4 and ἐπὶ πᾶσιν at 240a5 that appear immediately after these places on the ground 
that the Eleatic Stranger there discusses the relation between one name and many 
instances. 
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anything specific about the nature of the relation.77 Only with a few cases of ἐν 
is there any room for arguing that Socrates endorses the immanentist view. I 
myself do not find any convincing reason for supposing that he sometimes 
implies a more specific relation than ‘in relation to’ by saying that a Socratic 
form is the same ‘in’ (ἐν) many things or actions. 
   Let us sum up. Many scholars have proposed to interpret the relation 
between a Socratic form and many items in terms of immanence of the form in 
particular things on the ground that Socrates uses (1) the ‘have’, (2) the ‘(come 
to) be present to’, and (3) the ‘in’ locutions. Against this line of interpretation, I 
have argued that Socrates is not committed to such a view; he sometimes uses 
(1) and (2) for the relation between a Socratic form and universals, and he seems 
only to mean by (3) that a Socratic form is the same in relation to many items, 
whether they are things, actions, situations, or parts. In fact, Socrates is not 
specifically interested in particular things in which a Socratic form might come 
to be immanent; the distinction between a Socratic form and many particulars 
does not constitute the basic framework of the Socratic method. This 
interpretation allows us to treat the two types of instances on the basis of which 
the definition of F is generalised or abstracted, i.e. (1a) F as instantiated in 
things, actions, situations, and (1b) parts of F, in exactly the same way. In order 
to convey the implication of my argument, I would like to describe the Socratic 
method as the search for a Socratic form that is one and the same in various 
contexts. 
                                                       
77 In the passages I have quoted, διὰ πάντων means ‘(checking) through all these cases’, 
and ἐπί, πεϱί, πϱός, and ϰατά can all be translated as ‘in relation to’. 
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§2.2. The approximationist and the contextualist approach to Socratic forms 
   Next, I would like to consider another aspect of feature (a) (i.e. that a 
Socratic form is one and the same in many items), namely the way a Socratic 
form is instantiated in many contexts. Specifically, I suggest that a Socratic form 
is always present perfectly in each context, or, to put it differently, that each of 
many Fs that are instantiated in various contexts is the Socratic form of F. Thus, 
for example, when Helen and Andromache are beautiful (these individuals are, 
on my account, contexts in which beauty may appear), the Socratic form of 
beauty is present perfectly in both of them, and the beauty in Helen and the 
beauty in Andromache are both the Socratic form of beauty. As a matter of fact, 
this suggestion itself is, I think, nothing original or surprising, for it seems also 
to be a natural consequence of the immanentist view, and in this sense it is 
shared by many scholars.78 However, the implications of the interpretation I am 
suggesting has not been fully discussed so far, and, as we shall see, they 
certainly involve some counterintuitive aspects. I shall therefore develop my 
interpretation in what follows. 
   In order to understand important aspects of the interpretation in question, I 
suggest that it is instructive to introduce a different, but I think mistaken 
interpretation of the way a Socratic form is instantiated in many contexts, i.e. 
                                                       
78 I am not aware of any views that clearly oppose this interpretation. It is true that a 
few scholars might be considered to be dissenters, notably Allen, an influential 
separationist, who writes in his (1970, 147): ‘The truth of the matter is that in a strong 
sense of term Forms are as “separate” from their instances in the early dialogues as 
they are later on. For they are not identical with their instances, and ontologically prior 
to their instances. That is, they exist “apart”.’ However, it is not clear whether or not, in 
referring to ‘instances’, Allen means, in conformity with our usage, the F as 
instantiated in things or actions (e.g. the beauty in Helen or Andromache). I take him 
only to mean that the Socratic form of F is ‘not identical with’, and is ‘ontologically 
prior to’, F things (e.g. Helen or Andromache). This might be a correct interpretation of 
Socrates’ view, but, taken by itself, is irrelevant to the issue at hand. 
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what is called the approximationist interpretation or view.79 According to the 
approximationist view, a Socratic form is instantiated imperfectly in each 
context; there are many Fs that are instantiated in different contexts and these 
are necessarily inferior to the Socratic form of F in the very respect of their 
being F. These many Fs only approximate to the Socratic form of F. For example, 
the Socratic form of beauty is instantiated imperfectly, i.e. only to a certain 
degree, in Helen or Andromache, and the beauty in Helen, or the beauty in 
Andromache, only approximates to, and so is different from, the Socratic form 
of beauty. I have to add hastily here that, although this view is often held 
unreflectively towards Plato’s theory of forms/Forms in general (i.e. both 
Socratic forms in the early dialogues and Platonic Forms in the middle 
dialogues),80 it is clearly indefensible in relation to Socratic forms; I have 
introduced this view just in order to illustrate my interpretation as put forward 
in the previous paragraph. As I have argued in the previous sub-section, 
Socrates is trying to define the F that appears in relation to things, actions, and 
situations, or the F that is instantiated in the parts of F, and not the F that might 
exist independently of any of these contexts. 
   I suggest that it is crucial for a proper understanding of the Socratic method 
to observe the following difference between these two views. The 
approximationist view makes it possible to distinguish each instance of F by the 
degree to which it approximates to the Socratic form of F. The beauty in Helen 
                                                       
79 The ‘approximationist’ interpretation or view is so named by Nehamas in his (1975b 
[1999, 141]). 
80 Nehamas argues against the approximationist interpretation in relation to the 
middle dialogues in (1975b [1999, 138-158]); cf. also Silverman (2002, 88-89). 
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and the beauty in Andromache are distinguishable in virtue of their respective 
degrees of approximation. By contrast, under my interpretation, there is no 
such thing as this ‘approximation’; each F that is instantiated in its own 
particular context is itself the Socratic form of F, and is distinguishable only 
with reference to the context in which it appears. The beauty in Helen and the 
beauty in Andromache are distinguishable in virtue of the fact that the former 
appears in Helen and the latter appears in Andromache. Since this 
interpretation distinguishes each F not by the degree of its instantiation but by 
the context of its instantiation, I shall hereafter call this the contextualist view. 
   An important consequence of the contextualist view is that a Socratic form 
will turn out to be both one and many at the same time. On the one hand, the 
Socratic form of F is one because one and the same definition of F applies to 
every Socratic form of F that appears in its particular context; many Fs are 
unified by a single definition that applies to them all. Thus, for example, the 
same definition of beauty applies to the (Socratic form of) beauty in Helen and 
the beauty in Andromache, and in this sense the Socratic form of beauty should 
be considered as one. On the other hand, the Socratic form of F is many because 
each Socratic form of F is individuated by the context in which it appears. As 
suggested above, the beauty in Helen and the beauty in Andromache are 
distinguishable in virtue of the fact that the former appears in Helen and the 
latter in Andromache. In this sense, then, the Socratic form of beauty should be 
considered as two in relation to Helen and Andromache. It is particularly 
important to keep in mind this latter aspect (i.e. that a Socratic form is many), 
for scholars sometimes overlook it by overemphasising the former aspect (i.e. 
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that a Socratic form is one), which leaves them in danger of conflating the 
approximationist and the contextualist views. 81  According to the 
approximationist approach, the Socratic form of F is just one, and not many; the 
many instantiations of F in the various contexts are only approximations. But 
according to the contextualist approach, these many Fs are themselves the 
Socratic form of F, and so the Socratic form of F is many as well as one. 
   Now let us examine the contextualist view in more detail by considering its 
application to the Socratic method. Here again I shall appeal to my (by now 
familiar) distinction within examples: under Socrates’ procedure for definition, 
some items are treated as ‘instances’, obviously true examples of F, but other 
items are treated as examples which might but also might not turn out to be F. 
(Recall that, as I have discussed in Chapter 1, in some cases at least,82 Socrates 
tries to reach the definition of F through the examination of instances of F in 
order to judge whether other items are F or not by the application of the 
definition of F.) In accordance with this distinction, first I shall observe that the 
contextualist approach clearly applies to instances of F, and then I shall consider 
how this approach can be adopted in relation to those other items about which 
it is uncertain whether they are F or not. 
   That the contextualist approach is in use in the examination of instances as 
the first step of Socrates’ procedure for definition is, in my view, fairly obvious. 
First, in the case of F as instantiated in things, actions, and situations, consider 
                                                       
81 For example, Woodruff (1982, 171-172) writes: ‘The fine is one in contrast to many 
fine things.’ In the same vein, I think, Woodruff (1978, 101) says: ‘That Socrates’ forms 
are not numerically identical with their instances no one would deny.’ 
82 In other cases, Socrates tries to reach the definition of F in order to judge whether or 
not F has another characteristic G (e.g. whether or not virtue is teachable). 
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once more the following passage from the Laches: 
 
   (P2) SOCRATES: So as I said just now, my poor questioning is to blame for your 
poor answer, because I wanted to learn from you not only what constitutes 
courage for a hoplite but for a horseman as well and for every sort of warrior. 
And I wanted to include not only those who are courageous in warfare but 
also those who are courageous in dangers at sea, and the ones who show 
courage in illness and poverty and affairs of state; and then again I wanted to 
include not only those who are courageous in the face of pain and fear but 
also those who are clever at fighting desire and pleasure, whether by 
standing their ground or running away. […] So try again to state first what is 
the courage that is the same in all these cases. (191c7-e11) 
 
Socrates says that the subject of definition, i.e. the form of courage, is the same 
in relation to all the situations enumerated here. Accordingly, in conformity 
with the contextualist view, courage is itself (perfectly) present whether in 
relation to warfare or poverty, and courage in warfare and courage in poverty 
are the same form of courage. In general, the instances of courage are identical 
with one another in that they are liable to the same definition, but are 
distinguished from one another on the basis of the situations in which they 
manifest themselves. Thus the Socratic form of courage is both one and many. 
By contrast––it may be useful to note––the approximationist approach will not 
work out at all in relation to (P2). Socrates is not looking for the form of courage 
that is different from all the instances, which are, under the approximationist 
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view, inevitably mere approximations. Second, in the case of parts of F, I refer 
to (P26) [Men. 75a3-8] again, in which an imaginary speaker is looking for the 
definition of shape that is the same in relation to the round, the straight, and the 
like. Here again, the contextualist approach applies: the Socratic form of shape 
manifests itself perfectly as the round or as the straight, and the shape that 
manifests itself as the round and the shape that manifests itself as the straight 
are the same Socratic form of shape. 
   However, in relation to (individual or universal) examples that might be F 
but might not be F, the situation is less clear because we have little textual 
evidence. Now, a natural way of determining this would be that one should 
judge that an example in question is F if the definition of F is successfully 
applied, and not F if it is not. This much seems to be confirmed in the following 
(already quoted) passage from the Euthyphro. 
 
   (P5) SOCRATES: Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it, 
and using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another’s that is of 
that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not. 
(6e4-7) 
 
However, it sounds absurd that we should always have to decide whether 
something is F or not F at all. Perhaps one may concede that Socrates’ not 
running away from prison in Athens while awaiting his execution is simply just, 
and that Thersites, a famously ugly soldier in the Iliad, is not beautiful at all. But 
it seems certainly absurd that we always have to say either that Simmias is big 
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or that he is not big at all, or either that Andromache is beautiful or that she is 
not beautiful at all. In this connection, both approximationists and 
contextualists have their own ways of avoiding such absurdity: according to the 
approximationists, if one knows the definition of F, one can judge that 
something is F to such and such a degree, while according to the contextualists 
one can judge that something is F in such and such a context. 
   It is particularly instructive to compare these two approaches here, for the 
approximationist view might look more natural than the contextualist view. 
The contextualists maintain that being F is a matter of all or nothing; things or 
actions either have or fail to have the form of F. For example, in contexts in 
which the definition of beauty applies to Andromache, she has the form of 
beauty, i.e. is perfectly beautiful, but in contexts in which the definition does 
not apply to her, she simply fails to have the form of beauty, i.e. is not beautiful 
at all. Let us suppose that Helen and Andromache are both very famous for 
their beauty, but Helen, a daughter of Zeus, is more beautiful than Andromache. 
In this situation, Andromache has the form of beauty, i.e. is perfectly beautiful, 
in the context in which she is compared with an ordinary woman, but fails to 
have the form of beauty, i.e. is not beautiful at all, in the context in which she is 
compared with Helen.83 Certainly, this may appear counterintuitive, and it may 
be tempting to say that, even when she is compared to Helen, Andromache is 
still beautiful. This is the sort of view that will be held by the approximationists: 
                                                       
83 Note that, on my account, Helen herself is a constituent of contexts in which beauty 
may appear. I do not analyse ‘beauty appears in Helen, when she is compared with 
Andromache’ in a way in which Helen is a subject and ‘when she is compared with 
Andromache’ is a context the subject is in. Beauty is a subject, and Helen belongs to a 
context. When I speak of the context in which Helen is compared with Andromache, I 
am simply specifying details of a context. 
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both Helen and Andromache instantiate the form of beauty to a much higher 
degree (say, at 85% and 83% respectively) than an ordinarily beautiful woman 
(who instantiates it, say, at 60%), but Helen instantiates it to a slightly higher 
degree than Andromache does, and so Helen is more beautiful than 
Andromache. 
   However, this outcome does not show that the contextualist approach is 
inherently problematic; it only points to the fact that this approach involves 
some distinctive ways of viewing or analysing our world.84 In general, Socrates 
considers that, concerning any item, x, x is either perfectly F or not F at all, or x 
either has or fails to have the form of F, depending on the context in which x is 
put into. However counterintuitive it may sound, Andromache simply ceases to 
be beautiful, in spite of her well known beauty, when she is compared with 
Helen. It should also be noticed that this approach implies the following two 
points. First, in the application of the Socratic method, there is no point in 
distinguishing a comparative concept, e.g. ‘more beautiful’, from a simple 
concept, e.g. ‘beautiful’. Indeed, under the contextualist approach, both ‘x is F’ 
and ‘x is more F’ are to be analysed as ‘x is F in such and such a context’ or ‘x 
has the form of F in such and such a context’.85 Second, it is not the case that x is 
                                                       
84 I suggest that this approach, which is only assumed by Socrates, is taken over by 
Plato and explicitly made use of in the preliminary to the final argument in the Phaedo 
(100b1-103a3, esp. 102b8-c5). Note, however, that I am not saying that, as Nehamas 
(1975b [1999, 138-158]) and Silverman (2002, 88-89) may claim, Plato maintains the 
contextualist approach in relation to Platonic Forms. I am only saying that Plato 
maintains this approach in relation to Socratic forms. (I shall argue in §4 in this chapter 
that Plato maintains both Socratic forms and Platonic Forms in the middle and late 
dialogues.) 
85 This point resonates with a passage in the Phaedo, in relation to which Gallop (1975) 
correctly points out: ‘Note that at 100e5 the Form Largeness is given as the reason not 
only for large things being large, but also for larger things being larger. Separate Forms 
are not posited for comparative adjectives. It is the Form F that accounts for things’ 
being “more F”, just as it does for their being simply “F”. […] In general, “F” and 
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F by itself. Andromache is not beautiful by herself; she owes her beauty to the 
form of beauty in her and she acquires this form only in certain contexts. If she 
is separated from all these contexts, Andromache will not be said to be beautiful. 
Similarly, Thersites is not ugly by himself; there are some rare contexts in which 
even he may be considered beautiful. By contrast, Socrates’ not running away 
from prison in Athens may be simply said to be just, but this is because the 
context in which his action is taken is fully articulated. A particular type of 
action, e.g. not running away from prison while awaiting execution, is not just 
by itself. This action, when put in the context in which Socrates takes it, 
becomes just. In this case, I suggest that ‘x is F’ should be analysed as ‘x in such 
and such a context is F’. 
   Thus far I have discussed the issues about Socratic forms that would be 
roughly considered to be ontological. In the next section, I shall turn to the 
epistemological status of Socratic forms. 
 
§3. The Socratic model of knowledge and its limit 
   The Socratic method, in so far as it is understood as the procedure for 
acquiring the definition of F, the procedure that I think will be by now 
adequately reconstructed on the basis of the interpretation I have suggested,86 
seems to have certain limits as the method for acquiring knowledge of F. A 
glance at the several examples of definition Socrates offers to illustrate the sort 
of answer he asks for by his ‘What is F?’ question will suffice to show this. 
                                                                                                                                                                
“more F” are subjects of the same conceptual inquiry’ (184). 
86 I shall offer a schema of the Socratic method as I reconstruct it later in this section. 
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Socrates defines a shape as ‘the limit of a solid’ in the Meno (76a4-7) and clay as 
‘earth mixed with water’ in the Theaetetus (147c4-6). These definitions may be 
said to give us certain knowledge about a shape and clay, but it is just a bit of 
information; they will not help us much when we deal practically with a shape 
or clay, let alone make us a geometrician or a potter. In general, the proposals 
that are examined in the early definitional dialogues are simple propositions of 
the form ‘F is such and such’ (e.g. ‘The pious is what is loved by gods’ (Euthphr. 
6e11-7a1); ‘The fine is the pleasant through hearing and sight’ (Hi.Ma. 
297e5-298a1)),87 and it seems unreasonable to claim that such propositions, 
when they are given correctly,88 will make us experts in the pious, the fine, or 
whatever––experts in the sense in which we say that a shoemaker, a carpenter, 
a musician, a doctor, and those others whom Socrates is fond of mentioning in 
his discussion,89 are experts. But it is exactly these experts that Socrates usually 
refers to as cases of knowers. Socrates’ procedure for the definition of F, then, 
seems to take us only halfway towards the knowledge of F. 
   However, it is not the case that, in pursuit of the correct answer to the ‘What 
is F?’ question, Socrates is uninterested in the knowledge of F. On the contrary, 
his paramount concern is often to examine his interlocutors’ claim to the 
knowledge of F (cf. Ap. 20c4-24b2). Thus, Euthyphro, Laches, Hippias, Meno, 
                                                       
87 A useful, exhaustive list of the definitions in the early dialogues is given in Santas 
(1979, 98-101). 
88 There are scholars who think that some of the proposals in the early dialogues in fact 
define a subject correctly; these are dismissed only because their proponents have 
turned out to be unable to defend them sufficiently in the conversation with Socrates. 
The most popular candidate for such a proposal seems to be Nicias’ definition of 
courage, ‘Courage is knowledge of what is to be feared and dared’ (La. 194e11-195a1). 
See Benson (2000, 144; 144 n.6-8). 
89 Cf. e.g. Euthphr. 13d5-14a10; Chrm. 165c4-166d7, 173a7-174b10; La.197e10-199e12; 
Euthd. 288d5-292e7; R. 332c5-334b6, 340c6-342e11. 
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and Thrasymachus claim that they know what F is,90 and Socrates undertakes to 
examine their answers in order to decide whether their claims are legitimate or 
not. In the light of this context, it seems natural to suppose that Socrates will 
accept a correct definition of F as evidence for his interlocutors’ having 
knowledge of F. (Of course, it is also possible to suppose that for Socrates the 
correct definition of F is just a necessary condition for having the knowledge of 
F. I will soon consider this possibility.) But if this is the case, that is, if Socrates 
supposes that the knowledge of F which is claimed by his interlocutors 
essentially consists in possessing the definition of F, there will be a certain 
inconsistency in the way Socrates treats the relation between the knowledge of 
F and the definition of F, since apparently he also thinks of knowledge in terms 
of expert knowledge. Here is a question, then: ‘How should we understand the 
relation between the knowledge of F and the definition of F?’ 
   I suggest that in this connection91 Socrates has two different concepts of 
knowledge, which he treats separately: (a) knowledge that consists in 
possessing the definition, or more concisely, knowledge by definition, and (b) 
knowledge that consists in being an expert, or simply, expertise. When Socrates’ 
                                                       
90 See e.g. Euthphr. 4e4-5a2; La. 190c4-5; Hi.Ma.286c3-287a1; Men. 71b9-d8; R. 
337d1-338a3. 
91 Note that the distinction between concepts of knowledge I am proposing here is 
different from the distinctions that have been proposed by scholars (e.g. Vlastos 1985 
[1994], Woodruff 1990 [Benson 1992], Brickhouse and Smith 1994) in connection with 
the question of Socrates’ avowal and disavowal of knowledge, namely the question as 
to how the tension should be solved between Socrates’ claim that he knows, e.g., that it 
is bad and shameful to do wrong and to disobey one’s superior (see Ap. 29b6-7), on the 
one hand, and his profession of general ignorance, on the other. The knowledge 
Socrates is considered to be claiming in the passages relevant to the question of his 
avowal and disavowal of knowledge is neither (a) knowledge by definition nor (b) 
expertise. Nevertheless, I suggest that in some cases, e.g. speed, shape, colour, clay, (a) 
knowledge by definition belongs to knowledge Socrates avows, and in other cases, e.g. 
virtue, beauty, it belongs to knowledge Socrates disavows. Needless to say, Socrates 
never claims that he has any kind of (b) expertise. 
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interlocutors claim the knowledge of F, and when Socrates undertakes to 
examine their professed knowledge, it is (a) knowledge by definition that is at 
stake. Indeed, Socrates’ procedure for definition should be regarded as a 
method for acquiring (a) knowledge by definition. In this sense, then, it is right 
to say that Socrates knows those things about which he can give definitions; he 
knows what a shape is, what clay is, etc.92 In contrast to (a) knowledge by 
definition, which is of direct concern to the Socratic method, (b) expertise is 
only of indirect concern; Socrates mentions various types of expertise as 
examples of knowledge to which virtue and parts of virtue, the main subjects of 
the definitional dialogues, are often compared.93 In fact, it is not clear, in my 
view, how Socrates thinks we can attain to (b) expertise; it is not clear, in other 
words, what kind of method there is that will lead us to (b) expertise, and in 
what way the Socratic method will contribute, if it can contribute at all, to the 
acquisition of (b) expertise. I myself suggest that Socrates, or Plato in writing 
the early dialogues, left these points unsettled, and that, as we shall see in 
Chapter 4, in the Phaedrus Plato proposed the method of collection and division 
for the first time as a method for acquiring about something both (a) knowledge 
by definition and (b) expertise. 
   In order to avoid such ambiguity in Socrates’ usage of ‘knowledge’, one 
might propose that having the definition of F is a necessary condition for the 
                                                       
92 Similarly, in the Phaedo (74b2-3), where Socrates and Simmias agree that they know 
what the equal is, it is in my view (a) knowledge by definition that is at issue. 
93 Thus, I suggest that the sentence ‘one knows that virtue is knowledge of good and bad’ 
(let us suppose that the correct definition of virtue is knowledge of good and bad) 
should be analysed as ‘one possesses (a) knowledge by definition that virtue is (b) 
expertise in good and bad. 
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knowledge of F.94 By this proposal one can secure consistency; ‘knowledge’ 
always means expertise. Just as a simple proposition that defines health could 
be the most basic information about medicine at best and is a far cry from 
making any of us a doctor, the definition of F Socrates is trying to find does not 
by itself bring us far towards the knowledge of F. Still, the definition of F has 
this much importance: if someone cannot give the correct definition of F, it 
shows without any room for doubt that he is not an expert in F.95 That is why 
Socrates begins by asking his interlocutor to tell him the definition of F; he only 
means to determine whether or not they satisfy this necessary condition for a 
knower of F. 
   But the proposal in question does not seem to match up with what actually 
happens in the exchanges in which Socrates asks his interlocutors to offer the 
definition of F. According to the proposal, Socrates’ interlocutors who claim the 
knowledge of F are evidently claiming more than that they can say correctly 
what F is; they are claiming that they are experts of some kind. In proposing a 
definition, then, they are not showing what they claim to know, but only a 
preliminary to it. But consider the following passages: 
 
   (P33) SOCRATES: So tell me now, by Zeus, what you just now maintained you 
clearly knew: what kind of thing do you say that piety and impiety are, both 
                                                       
94 For this line of interpretation see e.g. Irwin (1995, 27-28) and Benson (2000, 154-55). 
95 One might object here that it is implausible to suppose that, for example, every 
shoemaker can give the correct definition of shoes. But I suggest that in this case, and 
in any other cases in which the subject of knowledge belongs to things about which 
there is general agreement as to what it is, Socrates and Plato think that definition is 
not necessary. The definition of F is required exactly in case there is disagreement as to 
what F is. Cf. Phdr. 263a2-c1; Euthphr. 7b6-d8; Plt. 285d9-286b1. 
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as regards murder and other things. 
(Euthphr. 5c8-d1) 
 
   (P34) SOCRATES: We say, then, Laches, that we know what it [sc. virtue] is. 
LACHES: Yes, we do say so. 
SOCRATES: And what we know, we must, I suppose, be able to state? 
LACHES: Of course. 
(La.190c4-7) 
 
   (P35) SOCRATES: I do not altogether remember, Meno, so that I cannot tell you now 
what I thought then. Perhaps he does know [sc. what virtue is]; you know 
what he used to say, so you remind me of what he said. You tell me yourself, 
if you are willing, for surely you share his views. 
(Men. 71c8-d2) 
 
   (P36) SOCRATES: How can someone give an answer, I said, when he doesn’t know 
it and doesn’t claim to know it […]? It’s much more appropriate for you to 
answer, since you say you know and can tell us. 
(R. 337e4-338a1) 
 
It is particularly obvious in (P34), but reasonably clear in the other passages as 
well, that Socrates, having secured agreement from his interlocutors that they 
know what F is, asks them to state what they say they know. In response to this 
request, Socrates’ interlocutors eventually offer a simple proposition. Note that 
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Socrates is always ready to reject their answers if he thinks they misunderstand 
his request, as can be seen in the cases of Euthyphro, Laches and Meno (see 
Euthphr. 6c9-e10; La. 190e7-9; Men. 72a6-d3). The fact that he accepts a simple 
proposition as a legitimate answer, then, seems to suggest that Socrates and his 
interlocutors agree that that is what is known. Thus, it is clear that Socrates and 
his interlocutors consider in these passages that ‘knowledge’ is not equivalent 
to expertise but to knowledge by definition. 
   Another consideration that might make one inclined to take the view in 
question (i.e. that having the definition of F is a necessary condition for 
knowledge of F) is that Socrates sometimes requests his interlocutors to teach or 
show him the form of F (see Euthphr. 6e4-7 and Men. 72c6-d1, which I shall 
discuss below). Some scholars understand this as indicating that the object of 
Socrates’ search is not just the definition of F but something else, which is 
considered by them to be something harder to attain than the definition of F.96 
If their view is correct, then it will follow that Socrates at least sometimes asks 
his interlocutors to do more than just to offer the definition of F. Probably, then, 
on this view Socrates’ words in (P33) – (P36) are not precise; the knowledge of F 
should not be equated with possessing the definition of F but with seeing or 
grasping the form of F. It is exactly this seeing or grasping a form, according to 
these scholars, that is equivalent to knowledge or expertise. 
   However, the assumption that the form of F is more difficult to attain than 
                                                       
96 Cf. Benson (2000, 146): ‘Whatever relationship between this passage [sc. Euthphr. 
6e4-7] and the theory of Forms of the middle dialogues, Socrates here appears to 
equate knowledge of what F-ness is, what I have been calling definitional knowledge 
of F-ness, with knowledge of the form (ἰδέαν), not––or at least not necessarily––with 
knowledge of definition.’ 
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the definition of F is in my view simply mistaken. Two points are relevant here. 
First, if my interpretation of Socrates’ procedure for definition is correct, the 
order of discovery should rather be: the form of F first, and the definition of F 
second. Now let us briefly review the Socratic method, which under my 
reconstruction consists of the following three steps: 
 
(S1) Enumeration and examination of instances of F. 
(S2) Identification of the common characteristic (i.e. the form of F) and 
acquisition of the definition of F. 
(S3) Applications of the definition of F. 
(S3-1) A judgment as to whether or not x is F in such and such a 
context (e.g. Andromache is beautiful in the context in which she is 
compared with an ordinarily beautiful woman), or as to whether or 
not x in such and such a context is F (e.g. not running away from 
prison while awaiting execution in the context in which Socrates finds 
himself is just). 
(S3-2) A judgment as to whether or not F is G (e.g. virtue is teachable). 
 
Socrates’ procedure for definition, i.e. (S1) and (S2), is essentially the method of 
generalization or abstraction (from instances in my sense). The kernel of this 
procedure consists in a part of (S2), that is, the identification of the distinctive 
characteristic that is common to the instances enumerated and examined in (S1). 
In the Meno, Socrates calls this part of (S2) ‘looking to the form’ and clearly 
regards it as the process that precedes stating the definition. The passage in 
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question is (P27), in which Socrates says: ‘it is right to look to this [sc. the form of 
virtue] when one is asked to make clear what virtue is’ (εἰς ὃ ϰαλῶς που ἔχει 
ἀποβλέψαντα τὸν ἀποϰϱινόµενον τῷ ἐϱωτήσαντι ἐϰεῖνο δηλῶσαι, ὃ τυγχάνει 
οὖσα ἀϱετή 72c8-d1). In the case of the Euthyphro, another dialogue in which 
Socrates mentions ‘looking to a form’, one may need to be careful, for at first 
sight one might be tempted to think that the order of discovery is the reverse of 
the one we have just seen in (P27).97 The following is the (already quoted) 
passage in question: 
 
   (P5) SOCRATES: Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it (εἰς 
ἐϰείνην ἀποβλέπων), and using it as a model, say that any action of yours or 
another’s that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not. 
(6e4-7) 
 
It is true that in this passage Socrates says that the looking to the form of the 
pious comes after the ‘telling what the form itself is’, i.e. giving the definition of 
the pious. It might look, then, as if he contradicts my supposition that the 
looking to a form precedes the acquisition of definition, thereby implying that 
the looking to a form belongs to (S3) rather than (S2). However, this 
contradiction is more apparent than real, for what is at issue in (P5) is not 
                                                       
97 See White (1976, 20-22), who finds ‘not a trivial’ problem involved in Plato’s method 
in this regard: ‘the suggestion [in (P5)] is that somehow it is with the help of the 
definition that one looks to the Form, rather than the other way around, as the Meno 
passage [i.e. (P27)] indicates. […] [I]t is easy to see that the two portrayals of the 
situation threaten to lead us up a circular path, on which we are required both to look 
to the Form in order to determine the correctness of any putative definition and also to 
find the definition first, in order to look to the Form.’ 
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discovery, but teaching and learning of a form. Learners, including Socrates, are 
not trying to look to the form of F or to acquire the definition of F by 
themselves; they are waiting for their teachers’ instruction. Since the teachers 
cannot show the form of F itself, they guide the learners to look to it through 
providing the definition of F. Thus in (P5) teachers’ giving the definition 
precedes learners’ looking to the form. By contrast, as indicated in (P27), anyone 
who intends to find the definition of F by himself must look to the form of F 
before giving the definition. In the course of Socrates’ procedure for definition, 
therefore, it is not the case that the form of F is more difficult to attain than the 
definition of F. 
   Second, it is wrong to think––as one might be tempted to think under the 
influence of a certain tradition of Platonism––that the definiendum is not the 
form of F that is restricted by contexts but the Form of F that exists separately 
from any contexts (or the Platonic Form of F; more on this in §4) on the ground 
that the definition of F does not refer to ‘contexts’. For example, the definition of 
speed given by Socrates in the Laches (192a1-b3), i.e. ‘the power to accomplish a 
lot of things in a short time’, does not contain any reference to ‘contexts’, in 
view of which one might be tempted to think that this definition is not related 
to the speed of, e.g., Theaetetus’ learning but to the Speed itself that exists 
separately from any contexts. To put it differently, according to this view, we 
are somehow concerned with the context-independent subject at the end of the 
procedure for definition, having broken away from the context-restricted 
instances with which we have started the procedure. If this line of thought were 
sound, then there would certainly be every reason to distinguish having the 
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definition of F from knowledge of the Form of F, especially when one takes into 
account Plato’s description of the extreme difficulty involved in acquiring 
knowledge of Forms (see e.g. Smp. 209e5-212a7, Phd. 66b1-68b7, R. 531c9-535a2). 
However, this line of thought is not sound; it overlooks the fact that the 
context-restrictedness also constitutes an aspect of the common characteristic. In 
general, if we enumerate many Fs as instantiated in various contexts (i.e. F as 
instantiated in c1, F as instantiated in c2, F as instantiated in c3, etc.), what is 
common among these instances is not just ‘F’ but ‘F as instantiated in (…)’. 
Since Socrates’ procedure for definition is the method of generalization or 
abstraction, those who adopt this procedure cannot remove this ‘as instantiated 
in (…)’ or the context-restrictedness from the definition of F, even though such 
definitions do not normally refer explicitly to such a feature.98 In other words, 
by the very nature of the method, the Form of F that may exist independently of 
any contexts do not come into view for those who adopt Socrates’ procedure for 
definition. 
   Thus the appeal to ‘seeing or grasping the form of F’ fails. The form of F is 
an entity that is not independent of contexts but restricted by them, and the 
identification of the form of F precedes the acquisition of the definition of F. If 
showing or teaching the form of F is a case of knowledge, it is equivalent to (a) 
knowledge by definition and not (b) expertise. I therefore conclude that 
Socrates treats these two concepts, i.e. (a) knowledge by definition and (b) 
                                                       
98 In fact, Socrates’ definition of speed is one of the few examples that remind us of the 
context-restrictedness of forms. See La. 192a10-b3: ‘I would answer him what I call 
speed is the power to accomplish a lot of things in a short time, whether in speech or in 
running or all the other cases.’ Cf. also Nicias’ definition of courage in La. 194e11-195a1: 
‘What I say, Laches, is that it [sc. courage] is the knowledge of the fearful and the 
hopeful in war and in every other situation.’ 
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expertise, separately. Indeed, what he is mainly concerned with in the 
definitional dialogues is the examination of his interlocutors’ (a) knowledge by 
definition and his own acquisition of (a) knowledge by definition. 
 
§4. Platonic Forms 
   Now let us turn to the entities that are introduced by Plato in the middle 
dialogues and are typically described by formulae such as ‘itself by itself’ (αὐτὸ 
ϰαθ’ αὑτό)99 or ‘always the same in every respect’ (ϰατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως)100, 
the entities which play a fundamental role in Plato’s mature philosophy and 
whose emergence has been considered as an epoch-making event in the history 
of philosophy. It is conventional among scholars to use the words ‘Forms’ or 
(noncapitalised) ‘forms’ to designate the entities in question. I shall always use 
the capitalised ‘Forms’ or, more fully, ‘Platonic Forms’ in the belief that it is 
significant for the correct understanding of Plato’s method to distinguish 
carefully these entities from Socratic forms. Plato characterises the Platonic 
Forms in various ways, calling attention to different features in different 
contexts,101 but, in accordance with my treatment of Socratic forms, I shall bring 
into focus only those aspects of Platonic Forms which are relevant to 
methodological procedures. I have argued so far in this chapter about Socratic 
forms that: 
 
                                                       
99 See e.g. Smp. 211b1; Phd. 66a2, 78d6, 100b6; Prm. 128e6, 130b8, 133a9, c4. 
100 See e.g. Phd. 78d6, 80b2; R. 479a2, e6-7, 484b5, 500c3; Phlb. 59c4; Ti. 28a2. 
101 For comparatively recent attempts at describing the general characterization of 
Platonic Forms, see e.g. Vlastos (1991, 66-76), Fine (1993, 54-65), Kahn (1996, 340-70). 
The characterization I shall give in the argument that follows is, however, significantly 
different from theirs. 
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(SF1) The Socratic form of F is always in contexts, or is context-restricted.102 
(§2.1) 
(SF2) The Socratic form of F is both one and many; it is one in that every 
Socratic form of F is liable to one and the same definition, and it is many in that 
every Socratic form of F is individuated by its own particular context. (§2.2) 
(SF3) If one possesses the definition of F (= knowledge by definition), then one 
can show or teach the Socratic form of F. (§3) 
 
In contrast to these characteristics of Socratic forms, I shall now suggest that: 
 
(PF1) The Platonic Form of F is never in contexts; it is context-independent. 
(PF2) The Platonic Form of F is simply one; it is ‘uniform’ (µονοειδές) and ‘pure’ 
(εἰλιϰϱινές, ϰαθαϱόν, and ἄµειϰτον).103 
(PF3) One has to be an expert in F in order to show or teach the Platonic Form 
of F. 
 
In this section, I would like to explicate (PF1) mainly by discussing passages 
from the Symposium, the dialogue that may be read as an introduction to the 
doctrine of Platonic Forms. 104  (PF2) and (PF3) should be understood in 
connection with (PF1). I shall not discuss (PF2) here, regarding it as an 
                                                       
102 In other words, Socratic forms depend for their existence on the contexts in which 
they appear. 
103 For µονοειδές, see e.g. Smp. 211b1, e4; Phd. 78d5, 80b2. For εἰλιϰϱινές, ϰαθαϱόν, and 
ἄµειϰτον, see e.g. Smp. 211e1; Phd. 66a3; Phlb. 59c4. 
104 It is not certain whether Plato composed the Phaedo or the Symposium first, but I 
agree with Kahn (1996, 339-40) that ‘from the dramatic and rhetorical point of view, the 
Symposium is certainly designed to be read first’ and that ‘Plato has planned the 
Symposium as the general reader’s introduction to the doctrine of Forms’. 
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inevitable consequence of (PF1), but I shall point to a way in which (PF1) is 
connected with (PF3) by adding a brief, perhaps speculative, sketch of Platonic 
Forms. With these contrasting features in mind, I would like to propose that 
Plato in the middle and the late dialogues has both Socratic forms and Platonic Forms in 
view. So far as I know, no one has ever advanced such a proposal, but the 
proposal is not so outrageous as one might at first sight think. In fact, as we 
shall see, many scholars have suggested that Plato, having eliminated 
immanent Socratic forms, introduced two items: transcendent Platonic Forms 
and immanent characters. It is at least more economical than this suggestion to 
suppose that Plato simply added Platonic Forms to the Socratic framework. 
 
§4.1. The ascent passage in the Symposium and the context-independence of Platonic 
Forms 
   In relation to (PF1), the most illuminating piece of evidence is what is often 
called the ‘ascent’ passage in the Symposium (209e5-212a7). The passage marks 
the grand climax of Socrates’ speech, which is delivered last in the series of 
speeches dedicated to Eros (the god, or according to Socrates the δαίµων, of 
love) by attendants at a celebration party for Agathon’s victory in a tragic 
competition. In this passage, the priestess Diotima, quite clearly a fictional 
character introduced by Socrates, reveals the final mysteries of love: a lover will 
achieve happiness by giving birth to true virtue and becoming as immortal as a 
human being can be. In order to do so, he or she, in their engagement with 
various beautiful things, must be guided by a ‘leader’ (ὁ ἡγούµενος 210a7) and 
follow the correct steps which culminate in the contemplation of Beauty itself. 
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Here are brief descriptions of the correct steps one must follow, in order:105 
 
(B1) A lover loves one beautiful body. (210a6-8) 
(B2) He then realises that beauty is one and the same in relation to106 all bodies, 
and becomes a lover of all beautiful bodies. (210a8-b6) 
(B3) He then contemplates beauty in relation to activities and laws, and sees 
that it is all mutually related. (210b6-c6) 
(B4) He then looks to beauty of sciences. (210c6-7) 
(B5) Finally, he catches sight of Beauty itself (or the science of Beauty itself). 
(210d6-211b5) 
 
In the course of the explanation of (B5), Diotima offers a detailed depiction of 
the Form of Beauty.107 In fact, this is the most detailed continuous description of 
a Platonic Form in Plato’s whole corpus.108 
 
   (P37) First, [a] Beauty always is, and neither comes into being nor perishes, neither 
increases nor diminishes; secondly, [b] it is not beautiful in this respect but 
                                                       
105 In schematizing the correct steps, I have omitted an aspect of the mysteries that is 
important for understanding the ascent passage but not relevant for my current 
purpose, that is, ‘giving birth’ as a result of the interaction between lover and beloved 
(see 210a7-8, c1-3, d3-6, 212a3-5). In general, the giving birth may be regarded as a way 
of participating in immortality by leaving a ‘child’ behind, but in the process of ascent, 
i.e. (B1) – (B4), it also creates the momentum for the attainment of a higher step. 
106 Note that Socrates uses various prepositions to describe the relation between beauty 
and things/actions in which the beauty is instantiated: ἐπί (210b1-3), ἐν (210b6, 7, c3, 
211a8-b1), πεϱί (210c5), παϱά (210d1). Here again, one should be cautious of talking 
about ‘immanence’ of beauty in things. 
107 However, in connection with the argument that follows, it is important to note that 
Plato himself never uses the word ‘Form’ (εἶδος or ἰδέα) to designate the Form of 
Beauty in the Symposium. 
108 Cf. Silverman (2002, 324 n.39). 
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ugly in that, nor beautiful at one moment but not at another, nor beautiful in 
relation to this but ugly in relation to that, nor beautiful here but ugly there, 
because some people find it beautiful while others find it ugly; [c-1] nor again 
will Beauty appear to him the sort of thing a face is, or hands, or anything 
else in which a body shares, or a speech, or a piece of knowledge, [c-2] nor as 
being somewhere in some other thing, such as in a living creature, or in the 
earth, or in the heavens, or in anything else––[d] but rather as being always 
itself by itself, in its own company, uniform (αὐτὸ ϰαθ’ αὑτὸ µεθ’ αὑτοῦ 
µονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὄν) […]. (210e6-211b1) 
 
After (P37), Diotima, summarizing steps (B1) – (B5), announces that the lover 
who catches sight of Beauty itself or ‘knows what Beauty is itself’ (γνῷ αὐτὸ … ὃ 
ἔστι ϰαλόν 211c8-d1) has almost reached the goal of the mysteries. She says that 
life is worth living for a human being in the contemplation of Beauty itself 
above all; the lover will give birth to true virtues and be loved by god, and he 
will, if anyone can, achieve immortality. 
   Now I suggest that in the ascent passage Plato distinguishes the Form of 
Beauty from both beautiful things and beauty as instantiated in things or actions. 
First of all, that both beautiful things and beauty as instantiated in things or 
actions come into play from the very early stage of the ascent can be seen 
clearly in the first two steps, i.e. (B1) and (B2). In (B1) the lover loves one 
beautiful body, but in (B2) he loves all beautiful bodies because he thinks 
beauty as instantiated in all bodies is one and the same. It is true that Diotima 
does not make it clear whether it is a beautiful body or beauty in a body that are 
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of immediate concern for the lover.109 But there is not slightest confusion 
between these two items; it is the characteristic of beauty, as distinct from 
beautiful bodies, that can be one and the same in all bodies. Note that the 
movement from (B1) to (B2) is not just the one from one body to many bodies. 
Indeed, Diotima declares: ‘it’s quite foolish not to regard the beauty in all bodies 
as one and the same.’ (209b2-3) Thus, for example, when one loves many 
beautiful girls and many beautiful pots without thereby seeing the common 
characteristic shared by them all (cf. Hi.Ma. 288c9-d3), one is as foolish as the 
lover who still remains at step (B1). A certain philosophical reflection on the 
nature of beauty, that is, an understanding that beautiful bodies are beautiful 
because of the common characteristic of beauty and not because of some 
accidental features (e.g. a hairstyle, a shiny surface), is necessary for the lover to 
move on to the next step. It seems then plausible to suppose that, when Diotima 
talks contemptuously of those who admire a single beautiful body or activity,110 
her words are also directed at those who love many beautiful bodies without 
seeing the common characteristic shared by them (e.g. the sight-lovers in the 
                                                       
109 (B1) and (B2) might lead us to suppose that what the lover loves is not beauty in 
bodies (which is something abstract) but beautiful bodies (see ‘he must fall in love with 
a single body’ (210a7); ‘he must become a lover of all beautiful bodies’ (210b4-5)). This 
supposition, however, is at odds with Diotima’s later words: ‘no longer slavishly 
attached to (ἀγαπῶν) the beauty belonging to a single thing––a young boy, some 
individual human being, or one activity’ (210d1-3). It is not the case, then, that Diotima 
distinguishes a beautiful body from beauty in a body as what the lover loves from what 
the lover contemplates. (However, she certainly has a tendency to use operative verbs in 
relation to beautiful things (see ἰέναι 210a5, ἐϱᾶν 210a7; ἀγαγεῖν 210c7; ἐπανιέναι 211c2) 
and cognitive verbs in relation to beauty as instantiated in things (see ἡγεῖσθαι 210b3, 7, 
c6; θεάσασθαι 210c3; βλέπων 210c7).) Incidentally, I have tried to avoid speaking of the 
object of love, which, strictly speaking, seems to be the good and not the beautiful of 
any kind (cf. White (1989) and Rowe (1998, 184 on 206e2-3)). 
110 See: ‘He must […] relax this passionate love for one body, despising it and considering 
it a slight thing’ (210b5-6); ‘No longer slavishly attached to the beauty belonging to a 
single thing––a young boy, some individual human being, or one activity––[the lover] 
may cease to be worthless and petty, as his servitude made him.’ (210d1-3) 
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Republic (476b4-7)). On the basis of such observations, I conclude that Plato has 
a clear distinction in mind between beautiful things and beauty in things. 
   Next, it is evident, I think, from (P37) that Plato characterises the Form of 
Beauty by way of contrast with both beautiful things and beauty in things, the 
two kinds of items that have been introduced during the ascent. To be specific, 
what is contrasted with the Form of Beauty are: in [a] both beautiful things and 
beauty in things, in [b] and [c-1] beautiful things, and in [c-2] beauty in things. I 
shall explain this point by point. First, in [a] Plato contrasts the permanence and 
the changelessness of the Form with the changeability and the perishability of 
beautiful things and beauty in things. There is, I assume, little need for an 
explanation as to why beautiful things, like a girl and a pot, are changeable; a 
girl, for example, may grow tall and a pot may be broken.111 But why beauty in 
things is subject to change may require a few remarks. I propose that beauty in 
things changes simultaneously with those changes which affect things in 
respect of their being beautiful. For example, when Andromache is compared 
with an ordinary girl, she obtains beauty, which means that the beauty comes to 
be in her. On the other hand, when she is compared with Helen, she loses her 
beauty, which means that the beauty in her perishes (or retreats).112 Thus, the 
                                                       
111 However, it is not clear what kind of change Plato thinks things are subject to. It has 
been proposed by Irwin (1977b), and widely accepted, that Plato has two types of 
change in mind, i.e. self-change and aspect-change. Self-change is a change that things 
suffer through their own local movement and qualitative alteration (e.g. Socrates is 
young in 455 B.C., but is old in 399 B.C.), while aspect-change is a change that things 
suffer by being considered relationally (e.g. Simmias is tall in comparison with Socrates, 
but is small in comparison with Phaedo). 
112 Here, of course, I have in mind some passages from the final argument for the 
immortality of soul in the Phaedo (100b1-107b10): e.g. ‘the tallness in us will never 
admit the short or be overcome, but one of two things happens: either it flees and 
retreats whenever its opposite, the short, approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach.’ 
(102d7-e2) For the interpretation of the passage, see Devereux (1994, 66-69). Increasing 
and diminishing, I think, only apply to beautiful things, and not to beauty in things. 
 135 
beauty in things is also subject to change, though it is admittedly in a different 
way from the way in which beautiful things are subject to change. Second, in 
[b] Plato contrasts the non-relativity of the Form with the relativity of beautiful 
things. Here it is only beautiful things that are at issue; things which are 
beautiful in one respect (or at one moment, or in one relation, or in one part) 
will turn out to be ugly in another respect (or at another moment, etc.). By 
contrast, beauty in things does not suffer such a relativity; beauty, e.g. in a 
living creature, can never in itself be ugly in any respect (or in any moment, 
etc.), for that would simply be a contradiction. Finally, in [c-1] and [c-2] Plato 
denies that the Form of Beauty appears as beautiful things and beauty in things, 
respectively. I take the point here to be a straightforward distinction between 
the Form of Beauty, on the one hand, and beautiful things and beauty in things, 
on the other hand, in contrast to [a] and [b] in which Diotima was talking about 
features of beautiful things and/or beauty in things. If I am right, then Plato 
makes it plain in this passage that the Form of Beauty is not only different from 
beautiful bodies, or beautiful activities and laws, or beautiful sciences, but also 
that it is nothing like beauty in bodies, or activities and laws, or sciences; in 
effect, it is not instantiated in things or actions at all.113 
   Features Diotima attributes to beauty in things, especially that beauty in all 
                                                       
113 Fine (1992, 82) understands Plato’s point here in this way: ‘The form of beauty has a 
particular nature, which can be specified without reference to the particular things, and 
kinds of things, that instantiate it; the definition of the form of beauty doesn’t mention 
the sorts of things the form exists in. To say that the form of beauty can be defined 
without mentioning its participants is not to say that it can exist without being 
instantiated.’ However, apart from a general worry as to why definition should be at 
issue here, in principle the definition of F can refer to those things which instantiate F 
(as is the case with Nicias’ definition of courage: courage is knowledge of the fearful 
and the hopeful in war and in every other situation). Why should Plato emphasise a very 
trivial point, namely that the definition of F can do without reference to those things 
which instantiate F, at this climactic moment? 
 136 
bodies is one and the same, strongly remind us of the features of Socratic forms 
I have discussed so far. I suggest, indeed, that the beauty in things referred to 
here is nothing other than the Socratic form of beauty. But perhaps it might be 
too rushed to conclude this; there seem to be at least two problems that are 
immediately noticeable. First, Diotima does not explicitly mention one and the 
same beauty that is common to all instances. Certainly, she mentions one and 
the same beauty in all bodies, and the one in activities and laws. But instead of 
coming up with one and the same beauty in all instances (which would be 
unequivocally identified with the Socratic form of beauty), she introduces the 
Form of Beauty. This movement might be taken to suggest that Plato has 
somehow replaced Socratic forms with Platonic Forms in his ontological 
scheme. Second, one might claim that Diotima explicitly denies that there is one 
and the same beauty in all instances. She says that the lover ‘must consider 
beauty in souls more valuable than beauty in the body’ (210b6-7), which, 
according to this view, implies that beauty is not one and the same in all 
instances. I shall deal with these two problems first, before turning to what I call 
(PF1), i.e. the proposal that Platonic Forms are, unlike Socratic forms, 
context-independent. 
   In relation to the first problem, I suggest that the reason why Socrates does 
not explicitly mention one and the same beauty that is common to all instances 
is simply that the procedure for definition is not at issue here. It has often been 
suggested that a certain variant of Socrates’ procedure for definition is being 
hinted at here; the lover acquires knowledge of the Form of Beauty by applying 
the method of generalization and abstraction from beautiful particulars in (B1) – 
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(B5).114  The lover, under this interpretation, first generalises and abstracts 
beauties in bodies, in activities and laws, and in sciences on the basis of 
particular beautiful bodies, activities and laws, and sciences, respectively, and 
then generalises and abstracts Beauty itself which all beautiful particulars 
‘participate in’ (µετέχοντα 211b2). But such an interpretation is untenable for 
the following two reasons. First, the Form of Beauty cannot be attained by the 
method of generalization and abstraction from beautiful particulars or beauties 
in things, since, as has been suggested, the Form of Beauty is not instantiated in 
them; it does not in itself constitute any element of beautiful particulars. The 
‘participation’ does not imply the presence of the Form of Beauty in things, but 
only suggests that there is some sort of relationship between them.115 Second, 
particulars do not seem to provide a valid starting point for the method in 
question if we accept the principle of the priority of definition (or (PD) or 
(PDweak), see Chapter 1). It is impossible, that is to say, for the lover to know 
whether a particular body, activity, and the like is beautiful or not before 
knowing the definition of beauty. It is in this connection that the fact that there 
is a leader who correctly leads the lover turns out to be crucial. I suggest that 
                                                       
114 See Sheffield (2006, 127): ‘It is commonly held that the DHM [sc. the desiring agent 
who occupies the higher mysteries] comes to have knowledge of the form by 
“generalization and abstraction” from the beautiful particulars he encounters.’ Cf. also 
Moravscik (1971, 290-3) and Price (1997, 39-40). 
115 See Rowe (1998, 199 on 211b2-5). I agree with Fine (1984 [2003, 277]) that it is an 
overstatement when Fujisawa (1974, 32) writes: ‘“τὸ A µετέχει τοῦ B” does not imply 
the presence of B itself in A or rather would deny such a presence’, but she is too hasty 
to dismiss the importance of participation language by saying that ‘it can be used quite 
neutrally’. It is significant, I think, to note that in the Symposium Diotima mentions the 
‘participation’ of things in the Form immediately after she has denied the presence of the 
Form in things. Ross (1953, 225-33) is certainly wrong when he ‘counted participation 
language as evidence of immanence’ (quotation from Fine, ibid.). Cf. also Devereux (1994, 
65 n.5). As to the Phaedo 100c-d, where participation seems to be given as an alternative 
to presence, I am going to deal with it later. 
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the leader, a mystagogue of the mysteries of love,116 knows the definition of 
beauty, which is a simple proposition, and so can lead the lover to particulars in 
which beauty is instantiated. The lover, then, is not applying the method of 
generalization or abstraction in order to acquire the definition of beauty, but is 
systematically increasing the scope of the application of the definition of beauty, after 
having received the definition from the leader.117 At this point, one might object 
that, if the lover were provided with the definition of beauty that is applicable 
to any beautiful things or actions, he would not need to linger on beautiful 
bodies; he could directly turn towards ‘the great sea of beauty’ (τὸ πολὺ 
πέλαγος … τοῦ ϰαλοῦ 210d4). However, it is not, I think, hard to imagine a case 
in which one cannot understand how a definition is applicable: for example, a 
schoolboy who dislikes his study may not be able to understand how learning 
can be pleasant, even after having learned the definition of pleasure.118 The 
mere possession of a definition, then, does not entail knowledge of its 
application. And at any rate, the point of the ascent in steps (B1) – (B4) does not 
seem to be just reaching ‘the great sea of beauty’ but reaching it in a certain 
                                                       
116 Cf. Rowe (1998, 194 on 210a6-7): ‘if we follow out the metaphor of the Mysteries, 
“the one leading him” will be a µυσταγωγός, someone who guides the new initiates. 
[…] [I]n the present context the “mystagogue” will be someone already initiated in, i.e. 
experienced in, ‘loving correctly’, but also […] in philosophy.’ 
117 I am suggesting that the ascent is not an application of Socrates’ procedure for the 
definition of beauty, but rather an application of (what I shall call) the internal analysis 
of beauty (although it is admittedly an irregular version of it; for example, in the ascent 
a lover is involved with both theoretical and practical understanding of beauty at the 
same time, while in the internal analysis of soul and speech described in the Phaedrus 
theoretical understanding precedes practical understanding). I shall discuss internal 
analysis in Chapter 4. 
118 It may be difficult to imagine a situation in which the lover, already possessing the 
definition of beauty, applies it only to one body. But it is not impossible; in order to 
understand that the definition is applicable to all bodies, one has to start by applying it 
to one body. At any rate, Diotima is quite dismissive towards such a situation (‘quite 
foolish’ 209b2). 
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specific way, about which the definition would not say anything. Thus, I suggest 
that the passage can and should be read as the procedure for applying the 
definition of beauty, and not as the procedure for acquiring the definition. Both 
the definition of beauty and its referent, i.e. one and the same beauty in all 
instances, are presupposed from the beginning. Small wonder, then, that 
Diotima does not explicitly mention one and the same beauty in all instances in 
the course of the ascent; she does not need to. 
   The second problem with the identification of beauty in things with the 
Socratic form of beauty is related to Diotima’s words that the lover ‘must 
consider beauty in souls more valuable than beauty in the body’ (210b6-7). One 
might think that her words imply the denial of the statement that there is one 
and the same beauty in all instances, or even indicate that beauty in souls 
approximates to the Form of Beauty more than beauty in bodies. However, it is 
wrong to think so, for the statement that beauty is one and the same in all 
instances is compatible with the statement that beauty in bodies is different 
from (and more valuable than) beauty in souls. Recall (SF2), i.e. that the Socratic 
form of F is one and many at the same time: it is one in that every Socratic form 
of F is liable to one and the same definition, and it is many in that every Socratic 
form of F is individuated by its own particular context. (SF2) implies that 
beauty in bodies is the same as beauty in souls in one sense, but is different 
from it in another sense. Besides, if Diotima’s words were to imply the denial of 
one and the same beauty in all instances, it would follow that in the early 
definitional dialogues Socrates, in mentioning one and the same F in all 
instances, believed that F in a thing is always just as valuable as F in another 
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thing. It is, however, very unlikely that, when Socrates asks what is the speed 
that is the same in running, in playing the lyre, in speaking, in learning and so 
on in the Laches (192a1-b4), he assumes that quickness in learning is just as 
valuable as quickness in playing the lyre. It seems then clear enough that 
Diotima’s words do not pose any obstacles to the identification of the beauty in 
things with the Socratic form of beauty. 
   Thus, there seems to be no inconsistency involved in identifying the beauty 
in things in the ascent passage with the Socratic form of beauty. Of course, 
Diotima never uses the term ‘form’ (εἶδος or ἰδέα) in referring to the beauty in 
things. But this should come as no surprise, for she never uses this term in 
referring to the Form of Beauty either. Remember also that Socrates himself 
only occasionally uses ‘form’ when he refers to the subject of definition in the 
early definitional dialogues; he does not use it even once in the Laches and the 
Charmides. In view of the fact that both the beauty in things and the Socratic 
form of beauty are the common characteristic of all beautiful instances, I 
conclude that these are put forward by Plato as equivalent to each other. 
   Bearing this analysis of the ascent passage in mind, I now would like to 
propose: 
 
(PF1) The Platonic Form of F is never in contexts; it is context-independent. 
 
The basic idea is that, by distinguishing the Form of Beauty from beauty in 
bodies, activities and laws, and sciences, Plato is suggesting that the Platonic 
Form of F is not a characteristic or an element of instances of F, which inevitably 
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involve certain contexts, but rather it is independent of such contexts.119 As I 
have argued, the Socratic form of F is the common characteristic of instances of 
F. For example, Socrates indicates in the Meno that the Socratic form of virtue is 
what is one and the same in relation to various virtues, such as the virtue of a 
man, the virtue of a woman (72c6-d1), or that it is what is one and the same in 
relation to various parts of virtue, such as courage, temperance, and wisdom 
(74a7-b1). I have also argued that both of these two kinds of instances are 
equivalent to the form of virtue as it manifests itself in various contexts. The 
Socratic form of virtue, then, is inevitably restricted by contexts. By contrast, the 
Platonic Form of Virtue, I suggest, does not have such a relationship with 
instances of virtue that would imply that the Form is only a characteristic or 
element of the instances. To put it differently, there is no such thing as the 
Virtue of a man, or courage as a part of Virtue; the Platonic Form of Virtue is 
never in those contexts in which the Socratic form of virtue manifests itself. 
Thus, I suggest that the Socratic form of F is context-restricted, but the Platonic 
Form of F is context-independent. 
   Now, in connection with the context-independence of Platonic Forms, the 
                                                       
119 One might object here that Diotima is not concerned with contexts but with places 
or locations, as is clear from her words at [c-2] in (P37). The position that Plato is 
committed to, in this view, must be weaker than the one described in (PF1), namely: 
 
(PF1weak) The Platonic Form of F is not immanent, or spatio-temporally located, in 
particulars. 
 
However, (PF1weak) is in my view too weak to describe Plato’s position in the ascent 
passage. (PF1weak) is compatible with statements that (the Form of) Beauty is 
instantiated in science, since science is not a spatio-temporal entity, or that (the Form 
of) Beauty is instantiated in the (not particular but universal) body. But this will, I think, 
demolish Plato’s strategy for drawing a line between the Platonic Form of Beauty and 
beauty in things. It is true that at [c-2] Diotima speaks about places or locations, but it is 
probably because this is the most effective way to bring home the point that the Form 
of Beauty does not exist in our world. 
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following two questions may naturally arise. First, what is the use of these 
context-independent entities? Second, if Platonic Forms are not instantiated at 
all, how can one get to know them? In order to find a proper answer to these 
questions, we must wait for the chapters that are to follow (Chapters 4 and 6), 
but I would like to anticipate it briefly here, although at this stage I can offer 
little more than a speculative sketch. Very briefly, then, my answer to the first 
question is: the Platonic Form of F is required as the determinant of the 
truth-value of any general statement whose subject is an instance of F; to the 
second question my answer is: in theory one can get to know the Platonic Form 
of F by understanding every non-accidental feature of instances of F. In what 
follows, I shall explain these two points in somewhat more detail. 
   To put the first point differently, the role of the Platonic Form of F is to 
underlie the realization of any non-accidental feature of instances of F. For 
example, the Platonic Form of Virtue underlies the fact that any instance of 
virtue is good, or is beautiful. It is important to note, however, that many 
non-accidental features are shared only by some of the instances of F. For 
example, all instances of madness are mental states, while not all instances of 
madness are beneficial; those which belong to divine madness are beneficial, 
but those which belong to human madness are bad (cf. Phdr. 265e1-266b1). But 
both of the statements, i.e. ‘all instances of madness are mental states’ and ‘such 
and such instances of madness are beneficial (or such and such instances of 
madness are bad)’, are true on account of the Platonic Form of Madness. In 
general, then, that F is G (e.g. virtue is teachable), or that F in a is H (e.g. beauty 
in souls is more valuable than beauty in bodies), or that F in b is I (e.g. beauty in 
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activities is mutually related to beauty in laws) etc., are true or false on account 
of the Platonic Form of F. I have mentioned that the Platonic Form of F 
underlies the realization of any non-accidental feature of instances of F, or that it 
is the determinant of the truth-value of any general statement whose subject is an 
instance of F, in order to rule out accidental cases; for example, that an instance 
of beauty is had by Socrates (at a certain period of time),120 or that an instance 
of shuttle existed in 753 B.C. The Platonic Form of F does not determine the 
truth-value of the statements about these accidental cases, since they become 
true or false depending on the course of becoming processes in our world. 
   Provided Platonic Forms play such a role as I have described, one might 
wonder what kind of things these context-independent entities are like. 
Following Plato, who, in illustrating Platonic Forms, often appeals to similes or 
metaphorical language, I would like to offer my own analogy here. Imagine, 
then, that you are in a colossal library which has incredibly many shelves all 
filled up with thick volumes, which, identically bound, appear all alike, but 
each of them has a title slightly different from the others. Every title starts with 
‘The Book of the Truth about’, and then continues with the name of a particular 
subject and the number of volume, which mark off one volume from the others; 
for example: The Book of the Truth about Beauty vol. LIX. In the whole collection 
of the Books of the Truth about Beauty, every actual and possible true statement 
concerning the essential features of instances of beauty is written down (e.g. 
                                                       
120 I am of course not saying that the Platonic Form of Beauty has nothing to do with 
Socrates’ beauty (when he is beautiful, he participates in the Form of Beauty); all I am 
saying is that the Platonic Form of Beauty does not determine whether Socrates is 
beautiful or not. 
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‘the beauty in the rivers or mountains is most appreciated by those who have 
such and such a soul, and invigorates their soul in such and such a way…’). The 
case is similar for all the other collections, including the collection of the Books 
of the Truth about Health, Number, Life, etc. As a matter of fact, these books do 
not themselves stand for Platonic Forms, but they are decoded or verbalised 
correspondents to Platonic Forms; these books play for Platonic Forms a role 
analogical to the one that definitions play for Socratic forms. Platonic Forms 
themselves are not linguistic entities, but, as it were, components of the 
structure of the universe, on account of which the contents of the Books of the 
Truth are really true, and everything that happens in our world never falsifies 
even a single sentence in the Books of the Truth. The Books of the Truth are 
after all just books; they do not have a power to make things happen as their 
contents tell, but each of them reveals the scope in which each Platonic Form 
has a power to regulate our world. Just like the Socratic form of F is shown by 
the definition of F, the Platonic Form of F is something that is revealed by the 
Books of the Truth about F. 
   This brings us back to my second question: if the Platonic Form of F is not 
instantiated at all, how can one get to know it? I have already suggested my 
own answer in my analogy: by understanding all the contents of the Books of 
the Truth about F. Plato, however, seems to have less strict conditions in mind; 
according to him, at the point at which one has systematically and sufficiently 
analysed instances of F, one suddenly intuits or catches sight of the Platonic 
Form of F.121 In the case of beauty described in the Symposium, for example, one 
                                                       
121 Cf. Epist. VII (341c5-d2): ‘For this knowledge is not something that can be put into 
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will get to know ‘what Beauty is itself’ (211c8-d1) if one has systematically 
investigated instances of beauty in accordance with contexts such as bodies, 
activities and laws, and sciences. This process is, of course, not just to group 
instances of beauty into the three categories; one also has to know whether or 
not these three categories are exclusive, in what way one category is different 
from another, why beauty in activities and beauty in laws constitute one group, 
and the like; or to put it concisely, one has to know various essential features of 
instances of beauty. Having sufficiently surveyed and analysed instances of 
beauty, one ‘suddenly’ (ἐξαίφνης 210e3) takes a leap from the context-restricted 
instances of beauty into the context-independent horizon; one intuits the Form 
of Beauty, on account of which every essential feature of instances of beauty is 
as it is. This is, I suggest, how we get to know the Form of Beauty, and this is 
also how we become experts in beauty. An expert in beauty must know not 
only the definition of beauty, which is a simple proposition, but also must know 
various essential features of instances of beauty. Here is, then, a junction at 
which (PF1) is connected with what I call (PF3), i.e. that one has to be an expert 
in F in order to show or teach the Platonic Form of F. Note, however, that Plato 
seems to suppose that even his less strict conditions for knowing the Platonic 
Form of F can be fulfilled only in theory, that is why Socrates says in the Phaedo: 
‘It seems likely that we shall, only then, when we are dead, attain that which we 
desire and of which we claim to be lovers, namely, wisdom, […] not while we 
                                                                                                                                                                
words like other sorts of knowledge (µαθήµατα); but after long-continued intercourse 
between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject, suddenly (ἐξαίφνης), like 
light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in the soul and straightway 
nourishes itself.’ For a similar line of the interpretation of the so-called method of 
hypothesis, see Robinson (1953, 169-79). 
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live; for it is impossible to attain any pure knowledge with the body, then one 
of two things is true: either we can never attain knowledge or we can do so after 
death.’ (66e1-6) 
 
§4.2. Socratic forms and Platonic Forms in the Phaedo and the Republic 
   Finally, in this sub-section, I would like to argue that the interpretation 
suggested above is not only compatible with the metaphysical passages in the 
Phaedo and the Republic, but also sheds new light on them. A full investigation 
of these extensively discussed dialogues is, however, beyond the scope of my 
present work. Here I shall limit myself to bringing two central passages into 
focus: first, the final argument for the immortality of soul in the Phaedo 
(100b1-107b10), and second, the argument for the separation of true 
philosophers from mere sight-lovers in the Republic (475d1-480a13). 
   The final argument in the Phaedo (100b1-107b10) is a perennial subject of 
discussion in relation to the ontological status of forms/Forms. What is at issue 
is the following question: does Plato, in mentioning largeness and smallness in 
Simmias (102b5-6), suggest (A) that Platonic Forms can be immanent in things, 
or (B) that there is a third kind of entities, i.e. the so-called immanent characters, 
in addition to Platonic Forms, which Socrates has been dealing with before the 
introduction of the immanent characters, and particulars? 122  Whichever 
alternative one may choose, one seems to face problems. For those who choose 
                                                       
122 Scholars who support (A) include O’Brien (1967, 210-13), Stough (1976, 22-28), Fine 
(1986 [2003, 303-9]), Bostock (1986, 179-84), Dancy (2004, 186), and scholars who 
support (B) include Cornford (1939, 78-79), Vlastos (1969 [1981, 83-86]), Fujisawa (1974, 
31), Gallop (1975, 195-56), Devereux (1994, 64-77), Silverman (2002, 95-103). 
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(A), two problems seem to be easily pointed out: first, this position makes the 
characterization of Platonic Forms in the Phaedo incoherent with the 
characterization in the Symposium ([c-2] in (P37)) and in the Timaeus (see 52a2-3: 
‘[a Platonic Form] neither receives into itself anything else from anywhere else, 
nor itself enters into anything else anywhere’); second, Plato ‘seems to imply 
that things like largeness in us are perishable’123, but Platonic Forms are, 
needless to say, imperishable. On the other hand, those who choose (B) seem to 
encounter the following three problems: first, Socrates seems to accept 
expressions like the ‘presence’ (παϱουσία) or the ‘association’ (ϰοινωνία) of 
Platonic Forms (see 100d3-7), which strongly suggests that Forms can be 
immanent; second, Socrates seems to be inconsistent in his treatment of causes, 
for he makes an assumption that Platonic Forms are the only causes, but later 
he speaks as if immanent characters were also causes;124 third, Plato uses εἶδος 
or ἰδέα, typical designators for forms/Forms, to refer to things like largeness in 
Simmias, which suggests largeness in Simmias is a form/Form.125 
   In relation to this issue, I suggest that Plato’s uses of ‘the F itself’ (αὐτὸ F) 
and ‘the εἶδος or ἰδέα of F’ (I assume that Plato uses εἶδος and ἰδέα 
                                                       
123 Devereux (1994, 67). Devereux’s argument for showing that this problem strongly 
weighs against position (A) is very clear and convincing. 
124 Compare ‘everything that is larger is made larger by nothing else than by 
Largeness’ (101a2-3) with ‘it is not, surely, the nature of Simmias to be larger than 
Socrates because he is Simmias but because of the largeness he happens to have?’ 
(102c1-3). I think this second problem for position (B) is obvious, but, so far as I know, 
no one has even mentioned it. 
125 Devereux (1994, 71) tries to solve this third problem by appealing to the distinction 
between the usages of εἶδος and ἰδέα: ‘So the suggestion should be that εἶδος is used 
for the most part for separate Forms but sometimes for both Forms and immanent 
characters, while ἰδέα is used exclusively for immanent characters.’ (1994, 71 n.16) I do 
not think this suggestion is convincing especially in view of the fact that Plato uses ἰδέα 
exclusively in order to refer to the Form of the Good in the Republic (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα 
505a2, 508e2, 517b8, 526e2, 534b9). 
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interchangeably) are deliberately ambiguous; they can designate both the 
Socratic form and the Platonic Form of F, and whether they designate both of 
them or only one of them depends on the context in which they are used.126 
Certainly, it is almost unanimously agreed by scholars that the expressions in 
question are standard terms for Platonic Forms, but this agreement in my view 
has its source in the (I think ungrounded) supposition that Plato has replaced 
Socratic forms with Platonic Forms. If Plato has, as I have suggested, both 
Socratic forms and Platonic Forms in view in the middle dialogues, it is not 
unreasonable to expect the expressions in question to be used for Socratic forms 
as well as Platonic Forms, since Plato used them (though only occasionally) to 
designate Socratic forms in the early definitional dialogues.127 Of course, this 
will be true only if there are situations in which it is meaningful or useful for 
Plato to designate both forms and Forms by the same expressions. And I think 
there are; these expressions are indeed useful to demarcate the philosopher’s 
realm from the many people’s unreflective experience where only many F 
things are recognized. I suggest, then, first, that both the Socratic form and the 
                                                       
126 Morrison (1977, 213-219) also suggests a certain distinction within the notion of 
εἶδος or ἰδέα, but his distinction is significantly different from mine in that it appeals to 
different ways the same entity is thought of, rather than different entities these words 
refer to. His distinction is the following: ‘(1) a common characteristic visible in a 
number of particulars’, and ‘(2) a common characteristic abstracted from a number of 
particulars and regarded as unique and separate in some way’. Thus, he says (212-214) 
that, in the Euthyphro, µίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν at 5d4 means the form of the pious in the sense of 
(1) while αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος at 6d10-11 means the form in the sense of (2), although both of 
them refer to the same subject of Socrates’ inquiry. To my mind, Morrison’s distinction 
is no real distinction, since it seems to be just a different way of presenting the 
contention given by scholars who support (A), i.e. that Forms can be immanent in 
things. Nonetheless, I am very sympathetic with him when he writes: ‘It is […] likely to 
be misleading to talk about a “Theory of Ideas”, as if εἶδος or ἰδέα had a single precise 
philosophical connotation in themselves.’ 
127 Socrates uses ‘the F itself’ (αὐτὸ F) in, e.g., Hi.Ma. 288a9, 289c3, 292c9 (Ross (1953, 
17) proposes that Prt. 360e8 may be an earlier example; cf. also Vlastos (1969 [1981, 84 n. 
26])). For εἶδος see, e.g., Euthphr. 6d10-11; Hi.Ma. 289d4, 298b4; Men. 72c7, d8, e5; for 
ἰδέα see, e.g., Euthphr. 5d4, 6e1, 4. 
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Platonic Form of F are called ‘the F itself’, because they are the real bearers of 
the name (‘F’) in contrast to many F things which have only eponym, or are F 
only derivatively;128 second, that both the Socratic form and the Platonic Form 
of F are called ‘the εἶδος or ἰδέα of F’, because they have unity which the many 
F things do not have. 
   With the ambiguity of the expressions in mind, let us turn back to the final 
argument in the Phaedo. Among the problems raised about the interpretation of 
things like largeness in Simmias, the problems for those who support (A), i.e. 
that Platonic Forms can be immanent in things, are matters of the fundamental 
philosophical theories and so in my view insoluble, while the problems for 
those who support (B), i.e. that there are immanent characters, are mostly 
related to terminological issues and so seem to be remediable with some 
revision. Let us replace, then, ‘immanent characters’ with our familiar Socratic 
forms. We also should suppose that both forms and Forms are at issue from the 
beginning of the argument, but this may need some explanation. The argument 
starts with Socrates’ securing agreement from Cebes in hypothesising that there 
is something itself by itself, i.e. a Platonic Form, such as the Beautiful, the Good, 
the Largeness, and so on (100b1-c2). After this agreement, Socrates proposes the 
following famous proposition: 
 
(P38) If there is anything beautiful besides the beautiful itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ϰαλόν), it is 
beautiful for no other reason than that it participates in (µετέχει) that beautiful 
                                                       
128 For the importance of the distinction between ‘name’ and ‘eponym’ in Plato’s 
ontological scheme, see Allen (1960 [1965, 45-47]), Silverman (2002, 87; 96). 
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(ἐϰείνου τοῦ ϰαλοῦ). (100c3-6) 
 
In this passage, it seems unquestionable that ‘the beautiful itself’ refers to the 
Platonic Form of the Beautiful. Nevertheless, the replacement of ‘the beautiful 
itself’ with ‘the Beautiful itself’ is seriously misleading, for whether or not ‘the 
beautiful itself’ is a Platonic Form is not Socrates’ point. Instead, his point here 
is a variation of the contrast I have suggested between the philosopher’s realm 
and the many people’s unreflective experience, namely that all beautiful things 
are beautiful, not because of a bright colour or shape or the like, as many people 
might think, but because of the beautiful itself (see 100c10-e3). Under this sort of 
structure, as has been indicated, ‘the beautiful itself’ can ambiguously designate 
the Socratic form of the beautiful and the Platonic Form of the Beautiful.129 
Now let us substitute ‘participates in’ in (P38) with the relationship that implies 
presence, as is indicated by Socrates himself immediately afterwards (see 
100d4-6). The outcome will be the following proposition: 
 
   (P38*) If there is anything beautiful besides the beautiful itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ϰαλόν), it is 
beautiful for no other reason than that that beautiful is present to (or is 
associated with) it. 
 
                                                       
129 The ambiguity of ‘the F itself’ (αὐτὸ F) is later confirmed in the following passage: 
‘what was said then is that an opposite thing came from an opposite thing; now we say 
that the opposite itself (αὐτὸ τὸ ἐναντίον) could never become opposite to itself, neither 
that in us (τὸ ἐν ἡµῖν) nor that in nature (τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει).’ (Phd. 103b2-5) Observe that in 
this passage too, it is the contrast between many F things, which appear in many 
people’s unreflective experience, on the one hand, and both the Socratic form and the 
Platonic Form of F, on the other hand, that is at issue. 
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In this version, I suggest, ‘the beautiful itself’ refers to the Socratic form of the 
beautiful. However, this does not alter the fact that Socrates accepts the 
substitution of the expressions in question in (P38), for (P38) itself does not 
specify the referent of ‘the beautiful itself’. Of course, this will be true only if 
Socrates holds (P38*) in relation to the Socratic form of the beautiful. But it 
seems clear that he does, since (P38*) under my interpretation is simply one side 
of the coin whose other face is (P38); x has the Socratic form of F if and only if x 
participates in the Platonic Form of F. Understood this way, I suggest, we can 
reasonably suppose that both Socratic forms and Platonic Forms are at issue 
from the beginning of the final argument of the Phaedo. 
   Now it is easy to see how the problems posed for those who choose (B) will 
be solved by my new position that has emerged as the result of the revision of 
(B). Let us call it (C): largeness in Simmias belongs to a third kind of entities, i.e. 
Socratic forms, in addition to Platonic Forms and particulars, and both Socratic 
forms and Platonic Forms have been regarded as the cause for F things to be F 
before Socrates explicitly mentions largeness in Simmias at 102b5-6. The first 
problem for those who support (B), i.e. that Socrates seems to accept the 
‘presence’ or the ‘association’ of Platonic Forms, and the second problem, i.e. 
that Socrates seems to be inconsistent in his treatment of causes, both stem from 
the supposition that is included in (B) itself, namely that Socrates has been 
dealing with only Platonic Forms before mentioning largeness in Simmias. 
According to (C), Socrates only says that he accepts the ‘presence’ or the 
‘association’ of the F itself, which means the Socratic form of F in this context, 
and there is no inconsistency in his treatment of causes, for he has posited both 
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Socratic forms and Platonic Forms as causes, although he hardly uses Platonic 
Forms as causes in the argument. The third problem for (B), i.e. that εἶδος or 
ἰδέα are not natural designators for immanent characters, is clearly not a 
problem for (C) at all, for these terms are natural designators for Socratic forms. 
   Next, let us turn to the metaphysical books of the Republic, which also seem 
to be compatible with the assumption that Plato, in using ‘the F itself’ or εἶδος 
or ἰδέα, has both Socratic forms and Platonic Forms in mind. In Book V, 
Socrates introduces the so-called theory of forms/Forms, in order to define true 
philosophers who should become the rulers of Callipolis, Plato’s ideal city. His 
first task is to exclude from the candidates as philosopher-kings mere 
sight-lovers, who appear to resemble true philosophers in their eagerness for 
learning. Socrates starts the argument by introducing ‘forms’ in the following 
way: 
 
   (P39) Since the beautiful is the opposite of the ugly, they are two. 
Of course. 
And since they are two, each is one? 
I grant that also. 
And the same account is true of the just and the unjust, the good and the bad, 
and all the forms (τῶν εἰδῶν). Each of them is itself one, but because they 
manifest themselves everywhere in association with (τῇ ϰοινωνίᾳ) actions, 
bodies, and one another, each of them appears to be many. 
(476a1-8) 
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The ‘forms’ serve as the touchstone by which one can distinguish true 
philosophers from mere sight-lovers; true philosophers are ‘able to advance 
towards the beautiful itself [= the ‘form’ of the beautiful] and see it by itself’ (ἐπ’ 
αὐτὸ τὸ ϰαλὸν δυνατοὶ ἰέναι τε ϰαὶ ὁϱᾶν ϰαθ’ αὑτό 476b9), while sight-lovers, 
who are solely interested in many beautiful things, do not admit the existence 
of such an entity. It has often been supposed that by mentioning ‘forms’ in (P39) 
Plato introduces Platonic Forms.130 But this is, I think, impossible. Recall (P37), 
in which Diotima says that the Platonic Form of Beauty ‘will not appear as being 
somewhere in some other thing (φαντασθήσεται … οὐδέ που ὂν ἐν ἑτέϱῳ τινι), 
[…] but rather as being always itself by itself, in its own company, uniform’. But 
in (P39) Socrates says that the ‘forms’ manifest themselves everywhere (πανταχοῦ 
φανταζόµενα) so that each of them appears to be many. If the ‘forms’ in (P39) 
designate Platonic Forms, the two descriptions about the same entities will be 
hopelessly incompatible. This is the point, I submit, at which my suggestion 
gives a way out of the difficulty. The ‘forms’ ambiguously cover both Socratic 
forms and Platonic Forms. When Socrates says that the ‘forms’ appear to be 
many, the referents are Socratic forms, but when he says that true philosophers 
can see the ‘form’ of the beautiful by itself, he means that they can see the 
Platonic Form of the Beautiful. The reason for the ambiguity is again the same 
as before, namely that the contrast between the philosophers and the many is 
the main concern for Plato in this argument. In other words, this argument is 
                                                       
130 Cf. e.g. Burnyeat (2000, 36 n.51): ‘The Theory of Forms makes its first appearance in 
the Republic […] at 475e-476d. Socrates starts by saying it would not be easy to explain 
to someone other than Glaucon. That marks the context as more metaphysical than the 
earlier ones. In such a context, a phrase like “the beautiful itself” does indicate a 
transcendent Platonic Form.’ 
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not intended to characterise the advanced philosophers who have already 
caught sight of Platonic Forms by contrasting them with less advanced 
philosophers and others; indeed, even Socrates’ interlocutors in the early 
definitional dialogues, who know nothing about Platonic Forms, will admit the 
Socratic form of F is itself one, but appears to be many in association with 
actions, bodies, and other forms. It seems then reasonable to suppose that in the 
Republic too Plato has both Socratic forms and Platonic Forms in mind. 
   One might object here that later in the course of the argument (479a1-2) 
Socrates associates the ‘form’ in question with one of the characteristic formulae 
of Platonic Forms, i.e. ‘always the same in every respect’. A careful reading, 
however, will show that my interpretation is not inconsistent with the passage 
in question: 
 
   (P40) I want to address a question to our friend [sc. a sight-lover] who doesn’t 
believe in the beautiful itself (αὐτὸ … ϰαλόν) or a certain form of the beautiful 
itself that remains always the same in all respects (ἰδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ ϰάλλους 
µηδεµίαν ἡγεῖται ἀεὶ ϰατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν) but who does believe in 
the many beautiful things. 
 (478e7-479a3) 
 
Note that Socrates does not simply say that the ‘form’ of the beautiful is always 
the same in every respect, but that only ‘a certain form’ of the beautiful is so. I 
suggest that the reason for Socrates’ phrasing is precisely that the word ‘form’ is 
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itself ambiguous.131 The implication of (P40) is in effect that the sight-lovers do 
not believe in the beautiful itself, or a fortiori the Platonic Form of the Beautiful. 
   Another, and perhaps more compelling, objection is related to the contrast 
between being (οὐσία) and becoming (γένεσις). In the Republic, Plato treats the F 
itself or εἶδος or ἰδέα as being, and many F things as becoming.132 One might be 
tempted to think, then, that this simple classification already implies that the F 
itself or εἶδος or ἰδέα always are, and neither come into being nor perish, or, in a 
word, that they are Platonic Forms. To put it differently, one might object that 
the characterization I have given to Socratic forms in relation to (P37), i.e. that 
Socratic forms come to be and perish in a certain way, is not applicable to the F 
itself or εἶδος or ἰδέα in the Republic. My answer to this objection is that the 
‘being’ in this context primarily means being F, and so the Socratic form of F can 
be considered to be a member of this category, since it is always F whenever it is 
instantiated. The ‘being’, in my view, does not have such a strong connotation 
as ‘being always the same in every respect’. This may be ascertained by observing 
                                                       
131 Adam (1969 vol.I, 342) seems to think that ‘a certain’ is used to signal an unfamiliar 
notion when he writes: ‘ἰδέα has not yet been used in the Republic of the Idea; hence 
τινά’. I do not think that this is a plausible explanation. Glaucon, Socrates’ interlocutor 
in this part of the Republic, is described as being quite familiar with the so-called theory 
of forms/Forms (see e.g. 507a7-9), and so the ἰδέα is certainly not a notion that is 
unfamiliar to him, if this word is indeed the technical term for a Platonic Form. Note 
that the situation is quite different from the one in the Euthyphro, in relation to which it 
is certainly true that Socrates mentions ‘some one form’ (µίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν 5d4) in order 
to introduce a notion that is unfamiliar to his interlocutor. 
132 Under my supposition that the F itself (or the ‘form’ of F) is ambiguous between the 
Socratic form and the Platonic Form of F, it is both Socratic forms and Platonic Forms 
that are identified with being. Very briefly, this will be ascertained from the following 
observation. At the beginning of the simile of Sun (507a7-b10), Socrates reintroduces 
the distinction between the F itself (or the ‘form’ of F) and many F things, and then 
identifies the former with the object of intellect (νοῦς) and the latter with the object of 
sight, which later at 534a1-2 turns out to be equivalent to the object of opinion (δόξα). 
He then says: ‘Opinion (δόξα) is concerned with becoming, intellect (νόησις) with being.’ 
(534a2-3) Thus, Plato seems to characterise the F itself (or the ‘form’ of F) as being and 
the many F things as becoming. 
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how the classification is introduced. The first reference to the distinction 
between being and becoming is found at the beginning of Book VI: 
 
   (P41) Let’s agree that philosophic natures always love the sort of learning that 
makes clear to them some feature of the being that always is (τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀεὶ 
οὔσης) and does not wander around because of coming to be and decaying (µὴ 
πλανωµένης ὑπὸ γενέσεως ϰαὶ φθοϱᾶς). 
(485a10-b3) 
 
This passage refers back to the argument for the separation of true philosophers 
from mere sight-lovers (475d1-480a13), in which the distinction is drawn 
between the F itself and many F things: the F itself purely is F,133 and is the 
object of knowledge, while each of many F things is the wandering intermediate 
(τὸ µεταξὺ πλανητόν 479d8) because it is F and not-F (at different moments, in 
different relations, etc.), and is the object of opinion. (P41), then, should be 
understood in this light; the contrast of being and becoming amounts to the one 
between being F and coming-to-be F (or ceasing-to-be F). Further, the passage that 
contains the second reference to the contrast between being and becoming in 
the Sun analogy seems to support this interpretation, for in this passage too 
Socrates seems to connect the contrast with the argument about sight-lovers. 
The passage is worth considering in order to understand Plato’s basic 
distinction, for it is soon after this passage, which is found much later than 
                                                       
133 Here I am following the standard interpretation of the argument, cf. e.g. Annas 
(1981, 195-203). 
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(P41), that Socrates frequently refers to the distinction between being and 
becoming:134 
 
   (P42)  When [the soul] focuses on something illuminated by truth and what is (τὸ 
ὄν), it understands, knows, and apparently possesses understanding, but 
when it focuses on what is mixed with obscurity, on what comes to be and passes 
away (τὸ γιγνόµενόν τε ϰαὶ ἀπολλύµενον), it opines and is dimmed, changes 
its opinions this way and that, and seems bereft of understanding. 
(508d3-8) 
 
Socrates says here that something (F), when connected with ‘what is’, provides 
knowledge, but when understood as ‘what comes to be and passes away’ it 
provides mere opinion. That the contrast in this passage corresponds to the one 
we have seen in the argument about sight-lovers and in (P41) is plain enough. I 
suggest, then, that (P42) indicates that the object of knowledge is what is F, and 
the object of opinion is what comes to be (or ceases to be) F. It seems clear by now 
that Plato’s classification of the F itself or εἶδος or ἰδέα under being in the 
dichotomy between being and becoming in the Republic does not imply that 
they are Platonic Forms. The Socratic form of beauty, for example, may come 
into Helen or perish in her, but it is always beautiful as long as it exists, and 
never comes to be (or ceases to be) beautiful. It stands to reason, then, that the 
Socratic form of beauty belongs to being in contrast to becoming. 
   There are many issues I have left untouched, but I hope to have shown that 
                                                       
134 See e.g. 518c8, 521d5, 525b3, c5, 526e7, 527b4-5, 533a10-c6, 534a2-4. 
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a good case can be made for the assumption that Plato has both Socratic forms 
and Platonic Forms in view in the middle dialogues. The Socratic form of F is a 
context-dependent entity, both one and many, and the subject of definition (or 
knowledge by definition), while the Platonic Form of F is a context-independent 
entity, simply one, and the object of knowledge (or expertise). From the next 
chapter on, I shall discuss Plato’s later dialectic, and argue that Plato contrived 
collection and division as the method for reaching expert knowledge of F 
through the investigation of instances of the Socratic form of F. In the Republic, 
it is adumbrated as the method that makes use ‘only of forms themselves, 
moving on from forms to forms, and ending in forms.’ (511c2) Although 
Socrates here again uses ‘forms’ ambiguously, I suggest that only the last 
‘forms’, the goal of the method, means Platonic Forms. 
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  Chapter 4: Dialectic in the Phaedrus 
 
 
 
§1. Introduction and the outline of the Phaedrus 
   The importance of the Phaedrus for the understanding of the method of 
collection and division cannot be overemphasised. It is chronologically the first 
dialogue that refers to this method, and so, if it is a sound assumption that the 
author explains his ideas attentively when he first introduces them, it is the 
dialogue in which a careful description of the method might be expected. It is 
also the only dialogue that refers to this method explicitly as the ‘divisions and 
collections’ (τῶν διαιϱέσεων ϰαὶ συναγωγῶν 266b3-4). Moreover, whereas all 
the other dialogues in which this method is mentioned or employed belong to 
the group of Plato’s ‘enigmatic’ late dialogues––the dialogues that are 
notoriously even harder to interpret––the Phaedrus is customarily classified as 
one of the middle dialogues, in which Plato still keeps his clear writing style. 
All this shows that the dialogue should be an excellent starting point for the 
investigation into the method of collection and division. 
   However, I believe that the passages in the Phaedrus relevant for the 
understanding of this method have not been properly understood. Specifically, 
I think that the following interpretation of the method of collection, which is 
now virtually a matter of consensus among scholars, is simply mistaken. This 
interpretation is as follows: the main function of collection consists in the 
determination of the genus of the object under consideration prior to the 
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application of the method of division. Indeed, this interpretation seems to me to 
have been one of the principal sources of misunderstandings of Plato’s later 
dialectic in general. Scholars derive this interpretation from some passages in 
the Phaedrus, but, in doing so, they often fail to pay enough attention to the 
surrounding context.135 As a matter of fact, collection and division are actually 
features of the speeches Socrates delivers in the early part of the dialogue, and 
so it is essential for the proper understanding of the method in question to 
observe closely the connection between this method and Socrates’ speeches. As 
it will turn out, however, this connection is highly complicated. A good starting 
point, then, will be a proper grasp of the whole design of the Phaedrus. 
Accordingly, I shall first offer an outline of the Phaedrus as I understand it, in 
order to try to clarify the way Socrates’ speeches are related to the method of 
collection and division. 
*                    *                    * 
   The very basic framework of the Phaedrus is as follows. The dialogue is 
made up of two parts.136 The first part (227a1-257b6) contains three speeches on 
love. The first speech read out by Phaedrus from a book written by Lysias 
makes the recommendation that a beautiful young boy should grant sexual 
favours to a man who does not love him rather than the one who loves him. The 
second and the third speeches are delivered impromptu by Socrates, who, 
sharing Lysias’ opinion at first for the sake of rhetorical comparison, 
                                                       
135 Santa-Cruz (1992) and Dixsaut (2001) have rightly called attention to this point. 
136 A dominant topic in recent discussion on the dialogue is the question how these two 
parts are related to each other, in such a way that the Phaedrus, a dialogue so acutely 
conscious of the significance of the unity of narrative, can be said to have its own unity. 
Cf. e.g. Rowe (1986b; 1989), Griswold (1986), Ferrari (1987), Heath (1989a; 1989b), 
Werner (2007). 
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disapproves of lovers in favour of non-lovers, but immediately after the 
‘revelation’ that such criticism is blasphemous, retracts his first speech and 
praises the blessings of the god of love, Eros, instead. The second part 
(257b7-279c8) is mainly concerned with the examination and evaluation of 
speech writing. There are two main topics in this part: first, what the true 
science of rhetoric is like (259e1-274b5) and, second, how we should evaluate 
the act of writing (274b6-277a5). With this basic framework in mind, let us 
follow the development of the dialogue more closely. 
   At the beginning of the dialogue, Phaedrus reads out Lysias’ speech, which 
proposes that a beautiful young boy should grant sexual favours to a man who 
does not love him rather than the one who loves him. Expressing admiration for 
this piece, Phaedrus says that he would not believe that anyone could write on 
the same topic a speech that is not only different from Lysias’ but also longer 
and more significant. But Socrates does not agree with him, for he has a feeling 
that he himself could give a speech different from and no worse than Lysias’. At 
the urgent request of Phaedrus, Socrates delivers his first speech in which he 
blames a man-in-love in unison with Lysias. 
   Socrates’ first speech takes the form of indirect narrative; he sets the scene in 
which an imaginary speaker, who is in love with a beautiful boy but disguises 
himself as a non-lover, tries to convince this boy (so as to win his favour) that 
love is always harmful to the one who is loved. This speech is conspicuously 
decked out with methodological remarks (237b7-d3 and 238d8-e2), according to 
which one should begin a speech with an agreed ‘definition’ (ὅϱον 237d1) of its 
subject, and arrange the rest of the speech by observing this definition. Without 
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the definition of the subject of an inquiry, the imaginary speaker says, people 
will end up being unable to agree with either themselves or each other. Thus, he 
offers the definition of love as the result of a systematic consideration at the 
beginning of the speech, a part which is visibly separated from the rest by a 
brief intermission at 238c5-d7 (this search for the definition of love is later 
re-described as the division of human madness at 266a3-6). The definition in 
question is: ‘the irrational desire which has gained control over judgement 
which urges a man towards the right, borne towards pleasure in beauty, and 
which is forcefully reinforced by the desires related to it in its pursuit of bodily 
beauty, overcoming them in its course’ (238b7-c3). The rest of the speech reflects 
upon this definition and has a transparent structure because of this.137 
   It is uncertain at this stage how we should estimate the worth and the status 
of Socrates’ first speech. Certainly, the methodological remarks about definition 
remind us of Socrates’ views in the early dialogues. But Socrates argues that 
both Lysias’ speech and his own are grave offences against gods, for they 
blamed Love, a son of Aphrodite and a god himself. He therefore concludes 
that these speeches are not true (242e4-243a2; see also 244a3-5). Moreover, 
Socrates is consistently unwilling to commit himself to his first speech.138 Before 
                                                       
137 This part of the speech further divides into four parts: (1) Love is harmful to soul, 
body, and the property of the one who is loved (238e2-240a9); (2) Love is not only 
harmful, but also unpleasant (240a10-e7); (3) Love is untrustworthy in respect of future 
(240e8-241c1); (4) the recapitulation and conclusion of the speech (241c1-d1). The 
harmfulness of love in (1) is directly deduced from the definition (238e2-239a2), and 
the untrustworthiness of love in (3) is explained on the basis of the bipartite theory of 
soul mentioned during the process of the definition of love. Though the unpleasantness 
of love in (2) is mostly related to the age-gap between the lover and the one who is 
loved, its relation to the definition being at the best unclear, I suggest that the unity of 
the narrative is nonetheless created through its return to the definition in (3). 
138 His unwillingness to accept the authorship of his first speech can also be seen from 
his actions: he gives his first speech with his head covered (237a4) while he delivers his 
second speech with his head bare (243b6). 
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beginning the speech, Socrates denies that the speech is his own creation on the 
grounds of his ignorance, and claims that he heard it from Sappho, Anacreon, 
or some prose-writer (235c3-8). During the speech, he attributes his own fluency 
to the influence of the gods of the place, the Nymphs (238d1, 241a4; also 
mentioned with Pan at 263d5-6). After his remarks on the blasphemy involved, 
he teasingly attributes this speech to Phaedrus (243e9-244a2). It seems, then, 
that Socrates considers his first speech utterly worthless and dismisses it 
quickly when he sees the necessity for its recantation. But later, in the second 
part of the dialogue, it will turn out that this is not exactly the case. 
   Socrates retracts his sacrilegious speech and praises the bliss of Love in his 
second speech, which he calls the ‘palinode’, and which he temporarily 
attributes to Stesichorus because of the similarity of the situation in which the 
recantation is required (244a2-3; cf. 243a2-b7). Socrates first points out what was 
wrong with his first speech: it wrongly presupposed that all madness was bad. 
In fact, there are kinds of madness that are the source of goodness for human 
beings, that is, prophetic, telestic, and poetic madness (244a6-245a8). Likewise, 
love is a divine madness––a fourth kind, one that is the greatest of goods (cf. 
249d4-5). Socrates’ second speech soars up into the poetical heights, bulging in 
the process with various elements of Platonic philosophy, such as a proof of the 
immortality of soul, the tripartite theory of soul, the ‘theory of Platonic Forms’, 
the reincarnation of soul, the theory of recollection. The palinode informs us 
that divine love is inspired by the recollection of the Form of Beauty, and that it 
leads us to a blissful afterlife, potentially shortening the time of our exile from 
the heavens (or at least until the next divine feast). 
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   Phaedrus is greatly impressed by Socrates’ second speech, and now admits 
that Lysias might appear wretched in comparison with Socrates, even if Lysias 
is willing to compete with him. But then Phaedrus says that he doubts Lysias’ 
willingness, since a certain politician criticised Lysias for his being a ‘writer’; 
Lysias will refrain from writing because he does not want to lose face. To this 
Socrates replies that Phaedrus’ idea is ridiculous, for politicians are always 
desperate to compose a speech that will survive them and earn them undying 
fame, as is clear from such examples as Lycurgus, Solon, or Darius. It is clear to 
everyone, he says, that writing speeches is not itself a shameful act, although 
there are acceptable and unacceptable ways of speaking and writing. Socrates 
then proposes to examine what these ways are. (Later it will turn out that in 
Socrates’ view the act of writing becomes shameful when the speaker lacks 
either (1) the science of rhetoric or (2) the appropriate evaluation of the act of 
writing. 139  He discusses the science of rhetoric in 259e1-274b5 and the 
appropriate evaluation of writing in 274b6-277a5.) 
   After a brief digression with the story about cicadas as divine messengers 
(258e6-259d9), Socrates suggests that it is necessary for anyone who wants to 
write well to know the truth of what he is going to talk about (259e4-6). But 
Phaedrus is not so certain about this, for he has heard that what a rhetorician 
needs to learn is not what really is just or good but what appears to be just or 
good to the audience (259e7-260a4). His reaction induces Socrates to offer some 
examples of the terrible situations that might be brought about through an act 
of persuasion based on the belief of the audience: if the audience should 
                                                       
139 See the summary at 277a6-278b6. 
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mistake a horse for a donkey or the good for the bad (the two cases are 
contrasted: the one is merely ridiculous, the other is catastrophic), a rhetorician 
would have to recommend a donkey instead of a horse or what is bad instead 
of what is good (260a5-d2). In order to avoid such terrible situations, then, a 
rhetorician needs to know the truth about the subject of a speech. At this point, 
however, Socrates brings up an imaginary claim made by a personified, 
self-professed ‘science of speeches’, that is, to know the truth is necessary, but 
not sufficient, for anyone to be a rhetorician; he also has to learn the science of 
speeches that is independent of the truth (260d3-9). Phaedrus thinks her claim is 
just, but Socrates has reasons to doubt it: there are arguments that assert this 
‘science of speeches’ is nothing more than an unscientific knack, as well as the 
Spartans’ testimony that there is no science of speaking that is independent of 
the truth (260e1-7). Thus they set out on an examination of those arguments. 
   For the argument I shall later develop, I would like to stop here and propose 
to understand the nature of the dispute between the self-professed ‘science of 
speeches’ and Socrates in the following way. The ‘science of speeches’ concedes 
that a rhetorician needs to know the truth about the subject of a speech, as is 
demonstrated by the examples of horse and donkey or what is good and bad, 
but she still claims that he also has to learn how to compose a persuasive speech, 
how to perform persuasively in front of his audience, and the like, which are in 
her opinion independent of the truth. Socrates, by contrast, suggests that even 
these issues are dependent on the truth. In order to show this, Socrates again 
discusses the truth of the subject of a speech, but this time he argues that 
knowledge of the subject acquired through the method of collection and 
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division is essential for any acts of persuasion in terms of the content of a speech 
(261a7-266c1). And then, after he has dismissed the currently popular skills of 
speech writing (which seem to be the main part of what the ‘science of 
speeches’ claimed to be truth-independent) as a mere preliminary (266c1-269c5), 
he goes on to argue that knowledge of the soul acquired through the method of 
collection and division (and knowledge about what kind of soul is affected by 
what kind of speeches, etc.) is essential for the genuine science of rhetoric in 
terms of its performance (269c6-272b6). The true science of rhetoric is, therefore, 
entirely dependent on the truth, and so what the ‘science of speeches’ claimed is 
not true. 
   But let us come back to the starting point of the refutation of the 
self-professed ‘science of speeches’, where Socrates defines the science of 
rhetoric as ‘a kind of leading of the soul by means of things said, not only in 
law-courts and all other kinds of public gatherings, but in private ones too’ 
(261a7-9). At first, Phaedrus accepts only the science of rhetoric practised in 
lawsuits and public addresses, and so Socrates points out that at the heart of 
every kind of rhetorical practice there is one and the same skill working, i.e. the 
science (or pseudoscience) of antilogic, and this skill is practised not only by the 
opposing parties in law-courts or public gatherings, but also by Zeno in private 
conversation. The function of antilogic is to make the same thing appear to the 
same people at one time F, at another the opposite of F by exploiting the 
similarity that exists between the thing in question and others (261c4-262b4). 
Since this is possible only for those who know what each thing really is, 
Socrates concludes, anyone who follows the appearance instead of the truth of 
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the subject of a speech will be ridiculously unscientific (262b5-c4). 
   The argument above should be sufficient to show that the truth is essential 
for rhetoric in terms of the content of a speech, but it is quite abstract as it stands, 
and requires examples. It is at this point that Socrates refers back to the 
speeches delivered earlier in the dialogue in order to find the examples of 
scientific and unscientific features (262c5-7). Further, he says that these speeches 
seem to ‘have in them an example of how someone who knows the truth can 
mislead his audience by making play in what he says’ (262c10-d2), although he 
does not forget to add that, if it is found in his speech, the gods of the place (i.e. 
the Nymphs and Pan) are responsible for it, and he himself does not share the 
science of speaking. The purpose of the examination of the speeches on love is 
thus twofold: one purpose is to show the scientific features that can be found in 
them, and the other is to show how the speaker was able to mislead the 
audience. This examination starts with Socrates’ remark that there are things 
about which we are in agreement (e.g. iron, silver) and ones about which we are 
at odds with each other (e.g. just, good). The science of rhetoric has a greater 
power when it deals with the latter kinds of thing as its subject, and ‘love’, the 
subject of Lysias’ and Socrates’ speeches, is one of them (263a2-c12). After this, 
Socrates says that his first speech defined what love is at the beginning, but 
Lysias conspicuously neglected to define.140 The Nymphs and Pan, to whom 
Socrates attributes his first speech, are therefore ‘more scientific’ (263d5) than 
                                                       
140 Though Socrates does not make clear whether it is his first or second speech or both 
that gave the definition of love at the beginning, it is evident that he means only his 
first speech. For one thing, the definition of divine love is not explicitly given at any 
point in his second speech (and in any case the first reference to divine love is given 
near the middle of the speech). For another, possession by the Nymphs was mentioned 
in the course of the first speech (238d1, 241e4). 
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Lysias, whose speech was lacking structure because of this negligence 
(263d1-e3). In addition, he mentions that his second speech made use of the 
procedure of division (264e4-265c4). These two procedures, definition and 
division, are apparently intended to be the scientific feature he has been looking 
for. Then he poses the following question: How was his speech able to pass 
over from censure to praise? (265c5-6). He does not, however, give an explicit 
answer to this question. Instead, he introduces the method of collection and 
division in one of the two crucial passages for our interpretation of the method 
(let us call it passage (A)). I shall discuss this passage and its surrounding 
context roughly described in the present paragraph later in great detail. At any 
rate, (A) concludes the section in which Socrates talks about the content of a 
speech. 
   Phaedrus then says that they have not yet hit upon the science of rhetoric. 
His words surprise Socrates, who answers: ‘What do you mean? Could there be 
anything fine, anywhere, which is divorced from these things and is 
nonetheless grasped in a scientific way?’ (266d1-2) Phaedrus here seems to echo 
the self-professed ‘science of speaking’; he seems to be trying to say that they 
have not yet discussed the performance of a speech, in terms of the currently 
popular rhetorical skills that are to be enumerated and downgraded as a mere 
preliminary by Socrates soon afterwards (266d2-269c5). By contrast, in 
answering with the words quoted above, Socrates seems to be suggesting that 
even the performance of a speech is to be based on the method of collection and 
division. This becomes clear when he introduces what he calls the Hippocratic 
method (269d6-272b6). The performance of rhetoric depends on knowledge of the 
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nature of soul, and it is the method of collection and division that provides this 
knowledge. The method of collection and division, or the truth attained by this 
method, is therefore essential for the science of rhetoric in terms of both contents 
and performance. Socrates summarises the discussion on the science of rhetoric 
given thus far in the form of a dialogue with Tisias (272b7-274b5). 
   Next, Socrates moves on to discuss the appropriate evaluation of the act of 
writing. First, he narrates the story of Theuth and talks about the weakness of 
written words (274b6-275e6). Just as Ammon, king of all Egypt, warned when 
Theuth first invented them, written words can be no more than ‘a reminder to 
the man who knows the subjects to which the things written relate’ (275c8-d2). 
One will be mistaken if one thinks that written words are something clear or 
certain. Even if someone asks them something in order to learn, written words 
will just give the same sign to him on every occasion, and will not answer his 
question. On top of this, written words will pass into the hands of everyone, 
whether he knows the subject or not, and will need their author’s protection to 
avoid unjust abuse. But, Socrates says, there is a different kind of words, words 
accompanied by knowledge, which can be imprinted directly in the soul by the 
science of dialectic (276a1-277a5). 
   Socrates then gives a summary of the discussion on the way speaking or 
writing is acceptable (and the way it is unacceptable). First––and this is another 
crucial passage for our investigation, which I shall name passage (B)––Socrates 
sums up the discussion on the science of rhetoric that can be acquired by 
employing the method of collection and division in respect of both contents and 
performance (277a6-c7). Second, he summarises the conclusion of the 
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appropriate evaluation of the act of writing: an author must be aware of the 
limits of written words, and must regard words ‘genuinely written in the soul’ 
(278a3) as superior to them (277d1-278b6). After some remarks about the 
messages Socrates and Phaedrus should deliver to Isocrates and Lysias, the 
dialogue ends with a final prayer (278b7-279c8). 
*                    *                    * 
   In what follows, I would like to suggest that the context shows that there is 
no ground for the widely-shared interpretation of the method of collection as 
the (seemingly trivial) procedure of the specification of the genus of the object 
under consideration prior to the application of the method of division. Instead, I 
shall suggest that collection is Socrates’ procedure for definition, i.e. the 
procedure of finding the distinctive characteristic that is common to many and 
various instances, and this is the procedure that requires our synoptic power 
and is often difficult to employ. I would also like to argue that there are two 
types of application of the method of collection and division in the dialogue: 
definition and what I call ‘internal analysis’. The purpose of definition is to 
distinguish the object under consideration from all the other things, so that we 
can agree both with ourselves and with each other what the object in question is. 
The purpose of internal analysis is, by contrast, to analyse the object under 
consideration scientifically by determining the function of every instance of it, 
so that we can be experts in the domain in question. Division has only limited 
importance as an auxiliary device when it comes to the procedure for definition, 
but comes to the fore when internal analysis is at issue. Since definition (or 
collection) is among the central concerns of Plato’s early and middle dialogues, 
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it is division and internal analysis that freshly come into focus in the Phaedrus 
and is truly Platonic in contrast to the Socratic method. 
   The order of my discussion will be the following. In section 2 I shall present 
the crucial passages for the ensuing discussion. In section 3 I shall describe the 
traditional interpretation which identifies collection with the detection of the 
genus of the object under consideration. In section 4 I shall argue that the 
context does not support the traditional interpretation; rather, it points to a new 
interpretation which identifies collection with definition. In section 5 I shall 
introduce internal analysis mainly in response to an objection from the side of 
the traditional interpretation. Section 6 is the conclusion of our discussion. 
 
§2. The crucial passages and some preliminary observations 
   As is indicated in the outline of the Phaedrus above, the crucial passages for 
the interpretation of Plato’s method of collection and division are (A) 
265c8-266c1 and (B) 277b2-c6. Both passages belong to the second part of the 
dialogue, and are concerned with the science of rhetoric; (A) is found in the 
middle of the discussion on the science of rhetoric, while (B) is placed close to 
the end of the dialogue, summarising the discussion on the science of rhetoric 
after the appropriate evaluation of the act of writing has been discussed. 
 
(A) 265c8-266c1 
SOCRATES: To me it seems that the rest really was playfully done, by way of 
amusement; but by chance these certain two forms (δυοῖν εἰδοῖν) having been 
introduced, it would be gratifying if one could grasp their significance in a scientific 
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way. 
PHAEDRUS: What were these? 
SOCRATES: First, there is perceiving together and bringing into one form items that are 
scattered in many places, in order that one can define each thing and make clear 
whatever it is that one wishes to instruct one’s audience about on any occasion (εἰς 
µίαν τε ἰδέαν συνοϱῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαϱµένα, ἵνα ἕϰαστον ὁϱιζόµενος 
δῆλον ποιῇ πεϱὶ οὗ ἂν ἀεὶ διδάσϰειν ἐθέλῃ). Just so with (ὥσπερ) the things said just 
now about love, about what it is when defined (ὃ ἔστιν ὁϱισθέν): whether it was right 
or wrong, the speech was able to say what was at any rate clear and self-consistent 
because of that. 
PHAEDRUS: And what is the second form (εἶδος) you refer to, Socrates? 
SOCRATES: Being able to divide again, form by form, according to its natural joints (τὸ 
πάλιν ϰατ’ εἴδη δύνασθαι διατέµνειν ϰατ’ ἄϱθϱα ᾗ πέφυϰεν), and not try to break any 
part (µέϱος) into pieces, like an inexpert butcher; as (ὥσπερ) just now the two speeches 
took the unreasoning aspect of the mind as one form (εἶδος) together, and just as a 
single body naturally has its parts in pairs, with both members of each pair having the 
same name, and labelled respectively left and right, so too the two speeches regarded 
derangement as naturally a single form in us (ἓν ἐν ἡµῖν πεφυϰὸς εἶδος), and the one 
cut off the part (µέϱος) on the left-hand side, then cutting it again, and not giving up 
until it had found among the parts a love which is, as we say, ‘left-handed’, and abused 
it with full justice, while the other speech led us to the parts of madness on the 
right-hand side, and discovering and exhibiting a love which shares the same name as 
the other, but is divine, it praised it as cause of our greatest goods. 
PHAEDRUS: Very true. 
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SOCRATES: Now I am myself, Phaedrus, a lover of these divisions and collections (τῶν 
διαιϱέσεων ϰαὶ συναγωγῶν), so that I may be able both to speak and to think; and if I 
think anyone else has the natural capacity to look to one and to many, I pursue him ‘in 
his footsteps, behind him, as if he were a god’. And furthermore, those who can do 
this––whether I give them the right name or not, god knows, but at any rate up till now 
I have called them experts in dialectic (διαλεϰτιϰούς). 
 
(B) 277b2-c6 
SOCRATES: Well then, what is scientific and what is unscientific seems to me to have 
been demonstrated in fair measure. 
PHAEDRUS: I thought so; but remind me again how. 
SOCRATES: Until a man knows the truth about each of the things about which he speaks 
or writes, and becomes capable of defining the whole by itself (ϰατ’ αὐτό τε πᾶν 
ὁϱίζεσθαι δυνατὸς γένηται), and having defined it, knows how to cut it up again 
according to its forms until it can no longer be cut (ὁϱισάµενός τε πάλιν ϰατ’ εἴδη µέχϱι 
τοὺ ἀτµήτου τέµνειν ἐπιστηθῇ); and until he has reached an understanding of the 
nature of soul along the same lines (ϰατὰ ταὐτά), discovering the form (εἶδος) which 
fits each nature, and so arranges and orders his speech, offering a complex soul 
complex speeches containing all the modes, and simple speeches to a simple soul––not 
before then will he be capable of pursuing the making of speeches as a whole (τὸ 
λόγων γένος) in a scientific way, to the degree that its nature allows, whether for the 
purposes of teaching or persuading, as the whole of our previous argument has 
indicated. 
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   First of all, I would like to make some preliminary observations on the 
passages quoted above for the sake of the argument that follows. In (A) the 
following two procedures are introduced: 
 
(A1) The procedure of perceiving together and bringing into one form 
items that are scattered in many places in order that one can define X 
(the subject of instruction)141 and make it clear. (265d3-5) 
(A2) The procedure of cutting things up, form by form, according to 
their natural joints. (265e1-2) 
 
Immediately afterwards, these procedures are collectively referred as ‘divisions 
and collections’ (266b3-4); descriptions such as ‘bringing into one’ or ‘cutting 
up’ clearly indicate that ‘collection’ and ‘division’ refer to (A1) and (A2) 
respectively.142 The primary task of the present chapter is, then, to clarify these 
                                                       
141 I have replaced both ‘each thing’ and ‘whatever it is that one wishes to instruct 
one’s audience about on any occasion’ with X (the subject of instruction). That these 
two do not refer to different objects is clear from the illustration provided, in which the 
object of definition and that of instruction are one and the same thing, i.e. ‘love’. 
142 One might object here that it is not correct to call (A2) ‘division’ as such on the 
ground that was first pointed out by Hackforth (1972, 142-43) and has been accepted by 
many scholars since: dividing things in accordance with forms implies collecting them 
into those very forms; for example, when we divide divine madness into four different 
kinds, i.e. Apollo’s prophetic madness, Dionysus’ mystic madness, the Muses’ poetic 
madness, and Aphrodite’s and Eros’ love-related madness (see 262b2-c3), we 
simultaneously collect each of them out of the multifarious phenomena of divine 
madness (cf. e.g. Dixsaut (2001, 111-30), who would call (A1) ‘rassembler’ and (A2) 
‘diviser et rassembler’). Now, I fully agree that division always works in tandem with 
collection (indeed, I believe my interpretation of collection explains this cooperation of 
division and collection more smoothly than the widely-shared ‘traditional 
interpretation’ I shall discuss in the next section). However, even though the actual 
operation of (A2) involves collection as well as division, the description in (A2) is only 
concerned with one aspect of this actual procedure, and in this sense it is justifiable to 
call it ‘division’. Accordingly, I shall call (A1) and (A2) ‘collection’ and ‘division’ 
respectively without being committed to the view that each procedure is always used 
independently. I shall briefly come back to the cooperation of collection and division in 
the concluding remarks of this chapter, but put off close examination of the subject 
until next chapter in order to avoid unnecessary complication. 
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two procedures in (A). 
   Of course, the illustrations attached to the description of collection and 
division (marked by two ὥσπεϱ’s indicated in bold) claim first consideration. 
The problem is that these illustrations, taken from Socrates’ speeches delivered 
in the first part of the dialogue, are by no means a straightforward explication 
of the method. First, the illustration of (A1) gives us very little information: it 
simply refers us back to ‘the things said just now about love, about what it is 
when defined’ (265d5-6), and does not tell us what is meant by ‘one form’ or 
‘items that are scattered in many places’. It contains, however, one very 
important indication: Socrates’ speech was able to say what is clear and 
self-consistent because of this procedure. It seems at least clear that, whatever 
collection consists in, Socrates thinks that the clarity and self-consistency of his speech 
are the outcome of collection. Second, the illustration of (A2) seems to provide us 
with information that is not naturally expected from the description of a cutting 
process. It noticeably refers to the postulation of the form of madness prior to 
the cutting process twice at 265e4 and 266a2-3, and also to the abuse and praise 
of the things that have emerged as the result of division. Neither of the 
illustrations attached to the procedures, then, taken by itself, provides us with 
clear directions as to how we should understand the procedures illustrated. 
This apparent unclarity, however, can be explained, or so I shall argue later, if 
we understand (A) in its proper context. 
   (B) is also important for the interpretation of the method of collection and 
division, since, on the face of it, the same procedures as those in (A) seem to be 
mentioned, if in a slightly different way. Indeed, as we shall see in a moment, 
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some scholars find crucial evidence for their interpretation of the method in this 
passage. In (B) the following two procedures are mentioned in connection with 
the content of a speech. 
 
(B1) The procedure of defining the whole by itself. (277b6) 
(B2) The procedure, subsequent to the definition, of cutting it up 
according to its forms until it can no longer be cut. (277b7-8) 
 
The mastery of these procedures is one of the requirements of the science of 
rhetoric. The other requirements include the understanding of the nature of the 
soul (obtained in the same way as these procedures) and of the causes of 
conviction and non-conviction in the application of a certain kind of speech to a 
certain kind of soul. 
 
§3. The traditional interpretation 
   Interestingly, even though there is much disagreement about the details, 
many scholars share a basic intuition about the method of collection and 
division. I would like to call this ‘the traditional interpretation’. According to 
this interpretation, (A1) is essentially the procedure of discovering the genus of 
the subject under consideration, and is applied prior to (A2), which is, in turn, 
the procedure of dividing the genus we have discovered through (A1) into its 
species and sub-species until we reach the subject with which we have 
originally started and provide its definition.143 In the interest of brevity, I would 
                                                       
143 This interpretation is supported by e.g. Thompson (1868, 107), Cornford (1957, 170), 
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like to symbolise ‘the subject of teaching’ (or the definiendum) as X and ‘the 
genus of X’ as Y hereafter. The traditional interpretation may then be 
summarised as: (A1) is the procedure of discovering Y by collecting X together 
with other (sub-)species of Y, and (A2) is the procedure of dividing Y into its 
species and sub-species until X is reached and the definition of X is provided. 
   But here is an immediate stumbling block to the traditional interpretation, 
and the supporters of this interpretation divide into two groups according to 
how they avoid this problem. The problem is that the definition is clearly 
mentioned as a purpose of (A1) and not of the whole procedure. If the purpose 
of collection is only to discover Y, and if the definition is given only after both 
collection and division, why does Socrates mention it at this stage? Those who 
belong to the first group answer that the definition is mentioned as a remote 
purpose of collection.144 They admit that just to determine Y is not sufficient for 
providing a definition, but this does not prevent us from saying that definition 
is a purpose of collection, since we undertake (A1) with a view to attain a 
definition. On the other hand, those who belong to the second group suggests 
that the ‘definition’ in (A1) means the determination of Y; it does not mean the 
definition that may be obtained at the end of the whole procedure. Guthrie is 
one of those who propose such a view, writing: ‘Its original meaning of “setting 
a boundary” is still alive and what the dialectician does is to erect a fence, as it 
                                                                                                                                                                
Ross (1953, 81-82), Hackforth (1952, 132 n.4), Moravcsik (1973a, 166-67), Guthrie (1975, 
427-31), White (1976, 120), Rowe (1986a, 299), Griswold (1986, 175), Nehamas and 
Woodruff (1995, xxxii), Frede (2004, 148), Dorter (2006, 260), Delcomminette (2006, 102). 
144 The members of the first group, which is the less popular of the two groups, include 
Cornford and Rowe. Cf. Cornford (1957, 184-87); Rowe (1986a, 200): ‘This does not 
mean that collection itself provides the definition (one can hardly claim to have defined 
something merely by discovering its genus), but that is a necessary preliminary to it’ 
(his italics). 
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were, enclosing an area within which the quarry will be found, though it is not 
alone in it.’145 (In order to avoid confusion, let us call the definition in this 
special sense ‘definition(s)’.) In contrast to the first group, the second group will 
regard the definition(s) as the immediate purpose of collection. 
   It should be noticed here that any supporter of the traditional interpretation, 
whether he or she belongs to the first or the second groups, would have to 
regard the clarity and self-consistency mentioned in the illustration attached to 
(A1) as the outcome of the determination of Y. Under this interpretation, these 
cannot be the outcome of the definition of X that may be acquired at the end of 
both collection and division. For, under the traditional interpretation, if Socrates’ 
illustration were to be an illustration of the definition of X, it would be simply 
out of place, and collection would be left unillustrated.146 As I shall argue later, 
this is one of the fundamental weaknesses of the traditional interpretation. In 
fact, though Socrates mentions the positive outcome of definition many times, 
he does not say a word about the benefit that is derived from the determination 
of Y. 
                                                       
145 Guthrie (1975, 428 n.1). Apart from him, Hackforth, de Vries, Griswold, and 
Nehamas and Woodruff belong to the second group. Cf. Hackforth (1952, 132 n.5): ‘By 
“definition” here we should understand no more than the determination of the genus 
of ἔϱως’; de Vries (1969, 216): ‘In fact, the only definition of love, given so far, was its 
subsumption under µανία’; Griswold (1986, 180): ‘This definition precedes the 
divisions in that it supplies the teacher with a way of focusing and giving preliminary 
direction to the divisions’; Nehamas and Woodruff (1995, xxxii). 
146 Certainly, it is not impossible for someone who belongs to the first group of the 
traditional interpreters to avoid this consequence, by claiming that Socrates has simply 
turned his attention to definition after he has introduced it as a remote purpose of 
collection (in this case, only one line, 265d3, plus one word, διεσπαϱµένα, would be 
related to collection, and 265d4-7 to definition). But this claim seems to me too 
implausible to be a serious option, especially when the wider context is taken into 
consideration. The investigation of scientific features of Lysias’ and Socrates’ speeches 
starts at 262c5 and ends with (A). If the claim above is correct, then why does he give 
collection, one of the important scientific features, only one line out of about 4 
Stephanus pages? 
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   Though the traditional interpretation mostly relies on (A) for the 
understanding of the procedures in question, those who belong to the second 
group also refer to passage (B) in order to justify their view.147 Unfortunately, 
however, they have hardly ever discussed in detail how this passage will 
corroborate their view. In order not to lessen the plausibility of the traditional 
interpretation unjustly, therefore, I myself shall offer the sort of argument that I 
believe is presupposed by those scholars who belong to the second group. This 
argument is strongly motivated by the observation that (B1) and (B2) as 
described in passage (B) refer back to (A1) and (A2) respectively. It seems clear, 
so the argument goes, that these are the same procedures. First, (B1) and (B2) 
are related to the content of a speech (in contrast to the performance), which was 
the topic of the discussion when (A1) and (A2) are introduced. Second, both 
(A1) and (B1) are associated with definition, and both (A2) and (B2) are the 
procedure of cutting things up in accordance with forms. The correspondence 
looks perfect, and so obviously (B1) and (B2) are intended by Plato to be the 
restatement of (A1) and (A2). But if this is the case, a few conclusions will 
inevitably be drawn. First, since it is explicitly stated that (B1) precedes (B2), 
(A1) must precede (A2) too. Second, the function of (A1) will be specified as the 
determination of Y. Socrates says in (A) that he first ‘took the unreasoning 
aspect of the mind as one form together’ (266a2-3) before he set out to divide it. 
Though this description is a part of the illustration attached to division, strictly 
speaking, the taking of the one form does not belong to division, but precedes it 
as a preliminary. But it has already been demonstrated that collection precedes 
                                                       
147 E.g. Ross (1953, 81 n.3), Guthrie (1975, 428), and Griswold (1986, 175). 
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division. It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that this is the function of 
collection, i.e. the determination of Y (in this case, the genus of love). Finally, it 
will follow that the ‘definition’ in (A1) means no more than the determination 
of Y. As is already shown, (A1) and (B1) are the same procedure, but (B1) is 
clearly the procedure of definition(s), and so therefore is (A1). Socrates, then, 
would refer to (A1), the determination of Y, as ‘definition(s)’. The words 
‘defining’ (ὁϱιζόµενος 265d4) and ‘having been defined’ (ὁϱισθέν 265d6) in (A)  
therefore should not be associated with definition here, but only with 
definition(s), i.e. the determination of Y. In a nutshell, if the two procedures 
found in (A) and (B) are identical, as this argument claims, then the view of the 
second group of the traditional interpreters is simply a matter of logical 
consequence. 
   Now let us sum up the traditional interpretation. The basic proposals that 
characterise this interpretation consist in the following two propositions. 
 
(C1) (A1) precedes (A2). 
(C2) Collection is the procedure of discovering Y. 
 
But, depending on how they understand the meaning of the ‘definition’, the 
supporters of the traditional interpretation divide into two groups. Those who 
belong to the first group suppose that the ‘definition’ means definition, i.e. the 
description of the distinctive characteristic of the object under consideration, 
which is the outcome of both collection and division, and so propose that: 
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(C3) Definition is gained after both collection, in the sense given in 
(C2), and division. 
 
By contrast, those who belong to the second group argue that the ‘definition’ 
means no more than the determination of Y, and propose that: 
 
(C4) Definition(s) is the same as collection in the sense given in (C2). 
 
The proposals of the first group, i.e. (C1), (C2), and (C3), are simply derived 
from passage (A), and no further pieces of evidence are found in the Phaedrus. 
The proposals of the second group, i.e. (C1), (C2), and (C4), by contrast, might 
be put forward as some logical consequences of the hypothesis that the two 
procedures found in (A) and (B) are identical. This is the outline of the 
traditional interpretation that is still now widely accepted. But in what follows I 
shall argue that none of (C1) – (C4) offers a correct understanding of the 
method of collection and division. 
 
§4. The role of definition in the Phaedrus 
   In order to see whether or not the traditional interpretation is tenable, I 
would like to examine the role of definition in the Phaedrus. There are two 
passages that I think will shed light on the function of definition in the 
dialogue.148 The first is an imaginary speaker’s attempt to define love provided 
                                                       
148 In the Phaedrus, ‘definition’ (ὅϱος) or ‘to define’ (ὁϱίζω) is used seven times: 237d1, 
238d9, 239d4, 263d2, 265d4, 6, 269b6. The usage at 239d4 is irrelevant, since it is 
concerned with ‘one summary point’ rather than a definition. The other occurrences all 
 182 
at the beginning of Socrates’ first speech (237b7-238c4), and the second is 
Socrates’ remarks about the importance of definition especially in relation to the 
structure of speeches (263c7-264e3). I shall investigate the latter passage––which 
is placed very close to passage (A)––with the surrounding context. 
 
§4.1. The role of definition in Socrates’ first speech 
   Let us then consider Socrates’ first speech. At the outset of the speech, an 
imaginary speaker observes that most people are unaware of their ignorance 
about ‘what each thing [i.e. the subject of a speech] really is’ (τὴν οὐσίαν 
ἑϰάστου 237c3) and, as a speech develops, end up floundering in a situation in 
which ‘they agree neither with themselves nor with each other’ (οὔτε … ἑαυτοῖς 
οὔτε ἀλλήλοις ὁµολογοῦσιν 237c5). It is thus necessary for anyone who wishes 
to avoid this confusion to ‘establish an agreed definition of love’ (ὁµολογίᾳ 
θέµενοι ὅϱον 237d1) about ‘what sort of thing it is and what power it possesses’ 
(οἷόν τ’ ἔστι ϰαὶ ἣν ἔχει δύναµιν 237c8-d1) at the beginning of his speech. After 
these methodological remarks, the imaginary speaker points out ‘that love is 
some sort of desire is clear to everyone’ (237d3-4). But having desire is not a 
sufficient criterion for being a lover, since a non-lover too desires beauty. He 
thus puts forward the idea that there are two forms of soul in each of us, the 
one being ‘an inborn desire for pleasures’ (237d7-8) and the other ‘an acquired 
judgement which aims at the best’ (237d8-9). The state in which the former 
                                                                                                                                                                
belong to the passages I shall discuss below apart from the one at 269b6. This passage 
is also important: ‘one should not get angry, but be forgiving, if some people who are 
ignorant of dialectic prove unable to give a definition of what rhetoric is, and as a result 
of being in this state think that they have discovered rhetoric when they have learned 
the necessary preliminaries to the science’. 
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controls the latter is called by the name of excess, which in turn divides into 
many forms in accordance with a different object of desire. Love is one of them, 
its object being bodily beauty. The full description of love is therefore the 
following: ‘the irrational desire which has gained control over judgement which 
urges a man towards the right, borne towards pleasure in beauty, and which is 
forcefully reinforced by the desires related to it in its pursuit of bodily beauty, 
overcoming them in its course’ (238b7-c3). After a brief interruption by Socrates 
(238c5-d7), the imaginary speaker confirms that they ‘have stated and defined’ 
(εἴϱηταί τε ϰαὶ ὥϱισται 238d9) what love is. 
   Now I think it is fairly clear that the definition of love in Socrates’ first 
speech is not the determination of the genus of love, i.e. ‘love is some sort of 
desire’, as the second group of traditional interpreters will by implication be 
claiming. One might think that the determination of the genus would certainly 
inform us ‘what sort of thing it is’ (237c8).149 However, it is unlikely that it 
would help us agree as to ‘what power [N.B. not what sort of power] it 
possesses’ (237c8-d1). More decisively, the imaginary speaker says ‘that love is 
some sort of desire is clear to everyone’ (237d3-4). If the definition in question 
were to be clear to everyone, surely finding fault with most people about their 
ignorance would be pointless. In short, the definition at issue here must be 
something that is at least more informative and less obvious. The detailed 
description of love given at 238b7-c3 satisfies these conditions, and there seems 
                                                       
149 However, I think οἷον τ’ ἔστι here means ‘what it is’ rather than ‘what it is like’. The 
two things are contrasted at 246a4-6: ‘To say what kind of thing [the form of soul] is 
(οἷον µέν ἐστι) would require a long exposition, and one calling for utterly superhuman 
powers; to say what it resembles (ᾧ δὲ ἔοιϰεν) requires a shorter one, and one within 
human capacities.’ 
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to be no other candidate in the passage under consideration. This description 
therefore must be the definition of love, and it is the description of the 
distinctive characteristic of (human) love. 
   This does not indicate, however, that Socrates’ first speech is harmonious 
with the view of the first group of traditional interpreters. The first group is 
justified only in their claim that definition is provided after the process of 
division. This claim is certainly right; the imaginary speaker’s progression 
towards the definition of love could be best described as the process of dividing 
or discriminating various kinds of desire, and Socrates himself confirms this 
later in the illustration of division when he says that, by applying the method of 
division, he discovered human love and justly abused it (see 266a3-6). 150 
However, in terms of what brings about self-consistency, the traditional 
interpretation, whether represented by the first or the second group, is at 
loggerheads with the passage under consideration. As already noted, the 
                                                       
150 Dixsaut, one of the few non-traditionalists, has a different view: ‘Pour définir erôs 
Socrate a donc tenu ensemble son genre (l’epithumia), le type de force déraisonnable 
(alogos) qui est le sien et qui entraîne en nous la démesure (hubris) ainsi que le type de 
force qu’il cherche à vaincre (la sôphrosunè), et pour finir son objet: le plaisir que 
procure la beauté corporelle. Ce sont ces éléments dispersés qu’il a su voir ensemble et 
rassembler en une idea unique, et c’est ce rassemblement qui lui permet de la définir’ 
(2001, 118). She then suggests that this collection (=(A1)) has only a rhetorical function, 
providing the speaker with clarity and coherence, which are derived from the form of a 
speech, and are independent of the veracity of the content, and that this rhetorical 
collection is distinct from the collection of the dialectic proper which operates together 
with division (=(A2)). However, I do not think that Plato accepts that the clarity and 
coherence are independent of the content; there are plenty of examples in the early 
dialogues in which Socrates’ interlocutor is compelled to confess his inconsistency 
precisely because he gave a wrong definition (cf. Griswold 1986, 59-60). It is true that 
Socrates is not sure whether the definition provided in his first speech was right or 
wrong (see 265d6), but the reason is that it was ‘right, as a definition of love of one 
kind (…), wrong, in so far as it pretended to be a definition of love in general’ (Rowe 
(1986a, 201)). Moreover, the implication of Socrates’ refutation of the self-professed 
‘science of speeches’ seems to be that there is no rhetorical function that is independent 
of the truth (Dixsaut’s rhetorical collection smacks of the popular rhetorical skills 
Socrates disapproves of at 266c1-267d9). From these considerations, I conclude that 
Plato does not make a distinction among collections in the way Dixsaut suggests. 
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illustration of collection indicates that Socrates’ speech was clear and 
self-consistent because of collection. For the traditional interpretation, ‘because 
of collection’ means ‘because of the determination of Y’ (see (C2) above). The 
imaginary speaker, by contrast, clearly regards the self-consistency as the 
outcome of definition, for he says definition helps them avoid the situation in 
which they agree neither with themselves nor with each other. Indeed, he never 
suggests that the determination of the genus of love, ‘love is some sort of desire’, 
can be helpful in this respect. Socrates’ speech is self-consistent because of the 
definition of love and not because of the determination of the genus of love. I 
therefore conclude that Socrates’ first speech does not support either the first or 
the second group among the traditional interpreters. 
   In fact, the argument above seems to point to an interpretation that is quite 
different from the traditional interpretation. The kernel of this new 
interpretation is the idea that collection is the same as the procedure for 
definition.151 The imaginary speaker suggests that the self-consistency is the 
outcome of definition, and the illustration of division refers to the self-consistency 
of Socrates’ speech as the outcome of collection. If this reference in the illustration 
of division refers back to the imaginary speaker’s suggestion, as I think it does, 
then Plato must have the same procedure in mind in his reference to both 
                                                       
151 Incidentally, that this is also the view of Hermias (Couvreur (1971, 233-35)), an 
ancient commentator of the Phaedrus, is clearly seen from the fact that he refers to the 
method of collection and division as ‘definition and division’ (ἡ ὁϱιστιϰή ϰαὶ 
διαιϱετιϰή). See also his comments on εἰς µίαν ἰδέαν at 265d: ‘this means defining 
things that have been divided, for definitions are concerned with forms’ (τουτέστιν 
ὁϱίσασθαι τὰ διαιϱεθέντα· οἱ γὰϱ ὁϱισµοὶ τῶν εἰδῶν εἰσιν) and on τὸ πάλιν ϰατ’ εἴδη at 
265e: ‘having called the one form definitional, namely that one must collect many 
things into one and define […]’ (τὸ ἓν εἶδος εἰπὼν τὸ ὁϱιστιϰὸν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ πολλὰ εἰς ἓν 
συνάγειν ϰαὶ ὁϱίζεσθαι …) (my translations).  
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collection and definition. Of course, if this is the case, ‘definition’ means the 
procedure for definition (as implied by the description of collection) rather than 
the product of definition (as suggested by ‘having established a definition’ 
(θέµενοι ὅϱον 237d1) in the speech). But I do not think that this will cause any 
serious conflict between Socrates’ first speech and the illustration of division. 
The fact is that the imaginary speaker is far from saying that a ready-made 
definition will contribute to a good speech. What he says is that an agreement or 
consideration shared between a speaker and his audience is the requisite of a 
good speech (cf. 237c3-d3). It is thus the comprehension of the process of a 
definition that produces self-consistency. In this sense, then, the self-consistency 
is the outcome of the procedure for definition. 
   On the basis of this idea, I would like to propose my interpretation of the 
method of collection and division. First, I suggest that collection is equivalent to 
Socrates’ procedure for the definition of X. Collection is described as the procedure 
of perceiving together and bringing into one form items that are scattered in 
many places in order to define X and make it clear (=(A1)). And I have just 
argued that collection should be understood as the procedure for definition. 
Now this procedure will, I think, sound very familiar from the preceding 
chapters: it is strongly reminiscent of Socrates’ procedure for definition, namely 
the procedure of examining many instances of F in order to find the common 
characteristic (F), or the Socratic form of F, and to give the definition of F. Such 
an association is, I suggest, exactly the one Plato wanted to evoke when he 
described (A1). In effect, in the Phaedrus, he has simply named Socrates’ 
procedure for definition ‘collection’, thereby contrasting it with its emerging 
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counterpart, i.e. division. If I am right, then it seems clear what ‘one form’ and 
‘items that are scattered in many places’ amount to; they respectively 
correspond to the Socratic form of X and instances of X. Second, I suggest that 
division is the procedure that is applied in the course of collection.152 In other words, 
one posits Y, and then divides it into its species, and again divides these species 
of Y into the subspecies of Y, etc. during the procedure of the collection of X. This 
seems inevitably to follow from the identification of collection with the 
procedure for definition, for surely one has already been engaged in the 
procedure for definition when one posits Y and divides it into its species. 
   Let us consider then how my interpretation explains Socrates’ first speech. 
Under my interpretation, the collection, or the procedure for the definition, 
formally starts by enumerating many instances of human love. I am of course 
aware of the fact that there is no such thing mentioned in Socrates’ first speech. 
But the absence of the enumeration of instances here, I suggest, does not 
indicate that the imaginary speaker has failed to take a proper step, but only 
that he has tacitly assumed it. In undertaking the definition of love, the speaker 
always keeps in mind various instances of human love he encountered or 
experienced in his life, and these instances provide materials for the 
examination that follows. Next, the speaker gradually specifies the nature of 
human love by examining the instances: human love is a kind of desire, it is a 
kind of excessive desire, etc. This examination which constitutes the collection 
                                                       
152 Strictly speaking, division is applied not just in the course of, but also at the end of, 
collection, because the final step of division, which yields the definition of X, coincides 
with the end of the collection of X. I shall analyse the mechanism of single steps of 
division in the next chapter. 
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of human love is, when seen from a different angle, the postulation of the genus 
of human love, i.e. desire, and the division of desire into its species and 
subspecies. Finally, through the examination of the instances of human love, or 
the procedure of division, the speaker discovers the distinctive characteristic 
that is common to all the instances of human love, and provides its definition, 
which means the end of the collection of human love. He then develops his 
speech with this definition in mind so that he can secure self-consistency. Thus, 
Socrates’ first speech is self-consistent because of the collection, or the 
procedure for definition, of human love. 
   To sum up, I propose to replace the propositions put forward by the 
traditional interpretation, i.e. (C1) – (C4), with the following ones. 
 
(C1*) (A2) (the procedure of division of Y) is applied in the course of 
(A1) (the procedure of collection of X).  
(C2*) Collection is the procedure of examining many instances of X in 
order to find the distinctive characteristic that is common to them and 
to provide the definition of X. 
(C3*) Definition is the same as collection in the sense given in (C2*). 
 
These propositions provide a new interpretation of the method of collection and 
division in the Phaedrus. 
 
§4.2. The discussion on the content of a speech (261a7-266c1) 
   My argument in the previous subsection is mainly based on the assumption 
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that the illustration attached to (A1) refers back to Socrates’ first speech. But 
these two passages are widely separated by Socrates’ second speech and the 
early part of the discussion on speech writing. In view of this, one might 
wonder if it is really safe to assume a close connection between these two 
passages, as I have done. One might also wonder, if division is a procedure that 
is applied only in the course of collection, as I have proposed, why the 
illustration of division in 265e3-266b1 is so lengthy––indeed, much longer than 
that of collection. To answer these questions, I would like to examine the part of 
Socrates’ discussion on the science of rhetoric that is concerned with the content, 
in contrast to the performance, of a speech (261a7-266c1). In what follows, I shall 
first clarify the development of this complicated discussion, and suggest that 
the illustration of division is lengthy because it is put forward as an answer to 
the question as to how Socrates’ first speech was able to mislead the audience. I 
shall then focus on one part of this discussion, the part that deals with the role 
of definition (263d1-e2), and argue that this passage also corroborates my 
interpretation of the method of collection and division. 
   The discussion in question is motivated by Socrates’ wish clearly to show 
the necessity of the truth for speech writing. His target is a personified, 
self-appointed ‘science of speaking’, who claims that the science of speaking is 
somehow independent of the truth (260d3-e1). In order to refute her, Socrates 
first discusses this issue in connection with the content of a speech. He begins 
the discussion by defining the science of rhetoric: it is ‘a kind of leading of the 
soul by means of things said’ (ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων 261a8). The science of 
rhetoric is employed not only in lawsuits and public speeches, with which 
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Phaedrus associates rhetoric, but also in private conversations, since a speaker’s 
operation in all these situations can be described in the same way, that is: 
 
(D1) The speaker makes the same thing appear to the same people at 
one time F (e.g. just, good, like), at another the opposite of F (e.g. 
unjust, bad, unlike). (see 261c4-e2) 
 
This is a feat of the science (or mock-science)153 of antilogic that underlies every 
act of speaking irrespective of what situation a speaker is placed in.154 Socrates 
then suggests that (D1) is successfully brought off through a special kind of 
manipulation: 
                                                       
153 Socrates prudently suspends his judgement on whether antilogic is a science or not, 
by saying ‘this one science––if indeed it is one’ (261e2). 
154 Note that in this passage Socrates does not prove that rhetoric is one and the same in 
all the situations enumerated, but only that antilogic is so. Phaedrus seems to be aware 
of this, in view of his words later, after the discussion on the content of a speech: ‘the 
rhetorical kind seems to me still to elude us.’ (266b8-9) In principle, Phaedrus at this 
stage could have replied to Socrates that rhetoric is the part of antilogic that is related 
to lawsuits and public addresses. But he does not do so, presumably because he 
expects that Socrates will eventually explain the relation between antilogic and rhetoric. 
However, the relation in question does not seem to be discussed anywhere in the 
dialogue. So the question seems to remain for us: what is the relation between antilogic 
and rhetoric? One might suggest that the difference lies in the intention of a speaker: an 
antilogical speaker tries to deceive the audience, but a rhetorical speaker tries to lead 
them to the truth. Such an intention of a rhetorical speaker seems to be suggested by, 
e.g., the following passage: ‘In [the science of rhetoric] it is necessary to determine […] 
the nature of soul, if you are to proceed scientifically, and not merely by knack and 
experience, […] to pass on to the other whatever virtuous conviction you wish (πειθὼ 
ἣν ἂν βούλῃ ϰαὶ ἀϱετὴν παϱαδώσειν) by applying words and practices in conformance 
with law and custom’. (270b4-9) The problem with this suggestion is, however, that 
Socrates does not directly deal with the intention of a speaker anywhere in the 
dialogue. Now I suggest that there is a characteristic more obvious than the intention 
of a speaker that distinguishes antilogic from rhetoric. The context shows that antilogic 
is concerned only with the content of a speech, but rhetoric is concerned with both the 
content and performance of a speech. In other words, an antilogical speaker does not 
care who the audience is, but a rhetorical speaker does care who he or she is. Antilogic 
is then just one of the requirements of the science of rhetoric (another requirement 
would be psychology). My suggestion is compatible with the suggestion above that 
sees the difference between antilogic and rhetoric in the intention of a speaker if one 
supposes that the intention of a speaker is one of the elements of performance. 
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(D2) The speaker brings people round little by little through the 
resemblances, leading them away from F to the opposite of F. (see 
261e6-262b9) 
 
Since (D2) is possible only for those who know what each thing really is, 
Socrates concludes, anyone who follows the appearance of things in speeches 
without knowing the truth will be ridiculously unscientific (262b5-c4). In short, 
he is suggesting here that knowledge of the subject of a speech is necessary for a 
scientific rhetorician, since it is this knowledge that enables him to achieve (D1) 
through (D2). 
   At this point, however, Socrates and Phaedrus agree that the argument 
given above is somewhat abstract and would require examples. Thus, Socrates 
suggests that they should take up the speeches on love delivered in the first 
part of the Phaedrus. 
 
   (P43) SOCRATES: So do you want to take the speech of Lysias which you are 
carrying with you, and the ones I made, and see in them something of the 
features which we say are scientific and unscientific? 
PHAEDRUS: More than anything; as things are, our discussion is somewhat 
bare, because we do not have sufficient examples. 
SOCRATES: What is more, by some chance––so it seems––the two speeches 
which were given do have in them an example of how someone who knows 
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the truth can mislead his audience by making play in what he says.155 
(262c5-d2) 
 
It should be noticed that the purpose of the examination of the speeches on love is 
twofold. First, Socrates wants to see if some scientific features can be found in 
them (as we shall see soon, Socrates’ speeches will turn out to have two 
scientific features: definition and division). But this is not the only purpose. The 
second purpose is to find an example of the antilogical speaker who misleads 
the audience. Indeed, Socrates’ two speeches as a pair can be taken as an 
instance of (D1), since he said about love ‘both that it is harmful to beloved and 
lover [= F], and then on the other hand that it is really the greatest of goods [= 
the opposite of F]’ (263c10-12; cf. 265a2-3, 265c5-6). Socrates is, then, trying to 
uncover the manoeuvre by which he brought about the misleading effect in 
Phaedrus’ mind. Though scholars seem rarely to have called attention to this 
point, the context strongly suggests that Socrates is now looking for an example 
of (D2), through which he was able to perform a case of (D1), as well as 
scientific features that may be found in his speeches. As we shall see, this 
complexity of the context explains why the illustration of division is as long as 
it is. 
   At the beginning of the examination, Socrates remarks that there are things 
                                                       
155 There is some disagreement as to what ‘two speeches’ (τὼ λόγω) at 262d1 refers to. 
Hackforth (1952, 125 n.1) and de Vries (1969, 206), for example, propose that the word 
refers to Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ two speeches taken as one. By contrast, Rowe 
(1986a, 197) argues, rightly I think, that the word exclusively refers to Socrates’ two 
speeches on the ground that (1) ‘at this point it would be extremely odd for three to be 
referred to, without warning, as two’ (cf. also his note on 265c6), and that (2) ‘Socrates 
does not regard [Lysias] as “a man who knows”’ as ‘the ensuing critique of Lysias’ 
speech clearly shows’. 
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about which we are in agreement as to what they are (e.g. iron, silver), but there 
are also things about which we are at odds with each other (e.g. just, good). 
When the science of rhetoric deals with the latter, it has a great power, and love 
belongs to this kind of things (263a2-c12). Next, Socrates points out that, though 
his (first) speech defined what love is at the beginning, Lysias entirely neglected 
to define, and that his speech lacked the structure because of this negligence 
(263d1-e3). And then Socrates calls attention to the fact that his speech made 
use of the procedure of division (264e4-265c4). It seems fairly clear that these 
two procedures, definition and division, are mentioned here as the scientific 
features Socrates has been looking for. But he does not explicitly say so; instead 
he speaks to Phaedrus as follows. 
  
   (P44) SOCRATES: Well then, let us take up this point right away: how (ὡς) the 
speech was able to pass over from censure to praise. 
PHAEDRUS: What aspect of that are you referring to, precisely? 
(265c5-7) 
 
Socrates here poses a question as to how his speeches made the same love 
appear both good and bad, so that he first blamed and then praised it. The point 
of this question seems to be the same as the point of that question Socrates 
posed in (P43): ‘how (ὡς) someone who knows the truth can mislead his 
audience by making play in what he says’. Both questions are concerned with 
the manoeuvre by which Socrates has misled his audience. It seems then 
reasonable to suppose that in (P44) Socrates is simply repeating the question as 
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to what an example of (D2) is like. 
   (P44) seamlessly continues to (A), which ends the discussion on the content 
of a speech. Clearly, then, the answer to the question about the example of (D2) 
will be found in (A).156 However, at least at first glance, it is difficult to see what 
his answer to this question is.157 One might even suspect that Plato has simply 
forgotten the question he has just posed because of his enthusiasm for 
introducing the method of collection and division. But this cannot be true. My 
suggestion is, then, that the context requires us to construe passage (A) in such 
a way in which it gives an example of (D2). Let us distinguish the three 
elements contained in (D2). 
 
(D2) The speaker brings people round (1)little by little (2)through the 
resemblances, (3)leading them away from F to the opposite of F. (see 
261e6-262b9) 
 
A close examination of (A) will show that Socrates hints at these three elements 
in describing and illustrating division. (1) First, division is a step-by-step 
process. Socrates’ first speech did not leap from madness to human love, but it 
‘cut off the part on the left-hand side, then cutting it again’ (266a3-4). The cutting 
was repeated until human love was discovered. (2) Second, the suggestion that 
                                                       
156 Cf. Rowe (1986a, 200): ‘But the purpose of the section [=(A)] is not after all just to 
introduce a particular kind of dialectical procedure (cf. 266c1); it is also to explain how 
Socrates was able to “pass over” from censuring love to praising it (265c5-6).’ 
157 Griswold (1986, 279 n. 25) says that ‘the schema [of the division of madness] does 
not inform us as to how the first speech misled its audience or in what sense it was 
composed by one knowing the truth’. He seems to be pessimistic about the possibility 
that Socrates offers an answer to the question he has just posed. Cf. also p. 179, ibid. 
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one should cut things up ‘in accordance to its natural joints’ (265e1-2) seems to 
indicate that one is concerned with the similarity and dissimilarity naturally 
existing among things. In other words, the method of division operates by 
finding a certain dissimilarity in things that are similar to each other.158 For 
example, if madness can be divided into excessive desire and divine madness, 
excessive desire and divine madness are similar to each other in one respect (i.e. 
that both are madness), but are dissimilar to each other in another respect (i.e. 
that the one has merely a psychological cause, but the other has a divine cause). 
This point is later confirmed in Socrates’ address to Tisias in 273d2-e4, where he 
establishes an essential link between knowledge of the resemblances and the 
procedure of division. (3) Finally, Socrates’ suggestion that the second speech 
‘led us to the parts of madness on the right-hand side’ (ὁ δ’ εἰς τὰ ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς 
µανίας ἀγαγὼν ἡµᾶς 266a6) seems to imply that it led us away from human 
love to divine love. The same is true with his first speech; it led us away from 
the greatest of goods to something that was harmful. As already mentioned, the 
illustration attached to division does not just refer to the cutting process itself, 
but also to the blame of harmful love and the praise of beneficial love. This 
seems to be a clear sign that Socrates offers this illustration in order to explain 
something more than the dividing process. I therefore suggest that the 
description and illustration of division has a double role: Socrates is presenting 
the procedure of division as a counterpart of collection, and at the same time 
answering the question he has just posed at 265c5-7, i.e. what an example of 
(D2) might be like. 
                                                       
158 This point is elaborated in the Politicus (261a2-5, 285a8-b6). 
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   Thus we have found Socrates’ answer to the question as to how Socrates 
was able to mislead his audience. But what about the other purpose of the 
examination of the speeches on love? What are their scientific features? As 
indicated above, it seems clear that definition and division, which are 
respectively discussed at 263d1-264e3 and at 264e4-265c4 in the course of the 
examination of the speeches on love, are the features in question. In fact, in 
talking about definition, Socrates says that the Nymphs and Pan, to whom he 
attributes his first speech, are ‘more scientific’ (τεχνιϰωτέϱας 263d5) in speech 
writing because they provided the definition of love and so created the 
structure of the speech. However, immediately afterwards, Socrates introduces 
the method of collection and division, which should be acquired ‘in a scientific 
way’ (τέχνῃ 265d1), without letting us know how this method is related to 
definition and division as just discussed. It seems clear that collection and 
division too are scientific features that are made use of in Socrates’ speeches. 
One might wonder, then, whether there are two scientific features (i.e. 
definition or collection, and division), or three (i.e. definition, collection, and 
division). I suggest that there are only two: when he puts forward the method 
of collection and division in (A), Socrates is describing definition and division in 
general terms, providing the definition of these two forms (εἰδοῖν 265c9). 
   But before concluding thus, I would like to examine more closely the 
passage in which Socrates discusses definition. It runs as follows: 
 
(P45) SOCRATES: But tell me this too––for of course because of my inspired 
condition then, I don’t quite remember––whether I defined (ὡϱισάµην) love 
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when beginning my speech. 
PHAEDRUS: Yes indeed you did, most emphatically. 
SOCRATES: Hey now! How much more scientific you’re saying the Nymphs, 
daughters of Achelous, and Pan, son of Hermes, are than Lysias son of 
Cephalus in the business of speaking. Or am I wrong? Did Lysias too compel 
us when beginning his speech on love to take love as some one definite thing, 
which he himself had in mind (ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων ὃ αὐτὸς ἐβουλήθη), and did 
he then bring the whole speech which followed to its conclusion by ordering 
it in relation to that? 
(263d1-e2) 
 
It seems clear that in this passage Socrates refers back to his first speech. For one 
thing, he offered the definition of love at the beginning of his first speech, and, 
for another, in the brief interlude immediately after the definition was provided, 
he expressed his anxiety about becoming possessed by the Nymphs 
(238c9-238d2; cf. 241e3-5). Unlike Socrates’ first speech, (P45) is placed very 
close to (A), and so it is not reasonable to suppose that Plato gives different 
roles to definition in (P45) and (A). Clearly, then, if Socrates characterises 
‘definition’ in (P45) in the same way as he did in his first speech, we can safely 
conclude that my interpretation of collection and division (which is harmonious 
with Socrates’ first speech) is preferable to the traditional interpretation (which 
is not). 
   First, let us consider the function of ‘definition’. ‘Definition’ is described in 
(P45) as something by means of which a speaker compels his audience to think 
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of X as some one definite thing which he himself has in mind. Two factors 
should be distinguished: first, a definition singles out one definite thing, and 
second, it compels the audience to think of the same thing as a speaker has in 
mind. The first factor indicates the same point as we have seen in Socrates’ first 
speech: ‘definition’ means the description of the distinctive characteristic of X, 
and not definition(S), i.e. the determination of Y, as will be implied by the view 
of the second group of traditional interpreters. The second factor, on the other 
hand, shows a new point about definition: the speaker need not exhibit every 
piece of relevant information when he defines X, for the purpose of definition is 
not to teach the truth of X, but just to compel the audience to think of the same 
thing as he has in mind. Indeed, so far as a manipulation like (D2) is concerned, 
it is essential for a speaker to keep some information hidden in his mind while 
clarifying X.159 To put it differently, deception is possible only when there is a 
gap between the understanding of a speaker and that of the audience. Without 
knowing the truth of X, a speaker would not be able to lead his audience by 
division in the direction he wants, while the audience who knows the truth of X 
could recognise every attempt by the speaker to step slightly sideways. 
Phaedrus was impressed and persuaded by Socrates’ first speech precisely 
because he was compelled to identify love with human, disgraceful, love, 
without knowing the truth about love, e.g., that there exists divine love too. 
                                                       
159 I think Heath (1989a, 155) overlooks this point when he writes: ‘But Socrates does 
not really think of rhetoric (…) as an art of deception. This becomes clear when he goes 
on to deduce from the requirement of knowledge a requirement of definition (263a-d). 
For clearly, if one were trying to deceive someone about a disputed concept like “love” 
it would not necessarily be to one’s advantage to begin by trying to clarify that 
concept.’ On the contrary, Socrates in this passage is talking about how rhetoric can 
successfully practise deception by making use of definition. 
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   (P45) and the ensuing discussion on the structure of speeches also support 
my view that collection and definition are one and the same procedure. Socrates 
argues here that Lysias’ speech lacked structure because he did not provide a 
definition at the beginning of his speech. Surely, the implication is that the 
structure is the outcome of definition. Though Socrates’ famous comparison of a 
speech with a living creature at 264c3-5 (cf. also 263e1-2) is sometimes discussed 
separately from the context, we must keep this in mind: what Socrates suggests 
by this comparison is not that the balance of each part, the order of exposition, 
or the like, are significant for composition, but that the definition of X is so; if 
one observes the definition of X carefully, the structure of a speech will 
naturally follow. When we also take into account Socrates’ first speech, in 
which the imaginary speaker suggests that definition brings about 
self-consistency (237c5), the emphasis in the dialogue on the outcome of 
definition is obvious. By contrast, nowhere in the dialogue does Socrates ever 
mention the outcome of the determination of Y, the genus of X. The clarity and 
self-consistency that arise as the outcome of collection mentioned in the 
illustration of (A1) are therefore these outcomes of definition. Collection and the 
procedure for definition are, then, one and the same, providing consistency, 
structure, and clarity within a speech. 
 
§5. Definition and internal analysis 
   I have so far concentrated on examining the role of definition in the early 
and middle part of the Phaedrus, and have left passage (B) untouched (this 
passage occurs close to the end of the dialogue). Clearly, (B) is also significant 
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for our investigation, since the second group of traditional interpreters claim to 
have found strong support for their view there. In the present section, I would 
like to address myself to this passage. Let us first recall the two procedures 
mentioned in (B): 
 
(B1) The procedure of defining the whole by itself. (277b6) 
(B2) The procedure, subsequent to the definition, of cutting it up 
according to its forms until it can no longer be cut. (277b7-8) 
 
It is perfectly clear in (B) that definition precedes division. But this is a flat 
contradiction of my proposal that division is operating in the course of the 
procedure for definition. One might conclude, then, that my interpretation is 
after all untenable. 
   My first move to meet this objection is to point out that we do not have to 
suppose an exact correspondence between the two passages. Certainly, it is 
impossible to deny that both (A1) and (B1) are collection or ‘definition’, and 
both (A2) and (B2) are division. But, in my view, the two procedures are not 
applied in the same way or for the same purpose in the two passages; the 
purpose of (A1) and (A2) is to provide a definition through the method of 
collection and division, but the purpose of (B1) and (B2) is something different. 
Understood this way, we can avoid the conclusion that ‘definition’ in (B1) has a 
special meaning, i.e. definition(s). But, if this is the case, then what (B) is 
concerned with must be explained. Accordingly, I propose to put a possible 
objection to my interpretation in the following way: why does (B) instruct us to 
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divide X after we have obtained the definition of X and have secured an 
agreement as to what X is? My answer is, because it is an understanding of X 
more advanced than the mere definition of X that is at stake in (B). 
   In fact, Plato seems to suppose that there are two different levels of 
understanding of the ‘essence’ (οὐσία) of things: the one is knowledge by 
definition, the other expertise (see Ch.3 §3). What the imaginary speaker sought 
in Socrates’ first speech is the definition of ‘essence’ (τὴν οὐσίαν 237c3); at the 
beginning of a speech, he suggested, a speaker must secure agreement from his 
audience about ‘what sort of thing [the subject of a speech] is and what power 
(δύναµιν) it possesses’ (237c8-d1). On the other hand, in the course of the 
discussion on the performance of a speech, which starts immediately after 
passage (A), Socrates refers to a higher-level understanding of essence. 
 
   (P46) SOCRATES: Well then, on the subject of nature (πεϱὶ φύσεως), see what 
Hippocrates and the true account say about it. Shouldn’t one reflect about the 
nature of anything (πεϱὶ ὁτουοῦν φύσεως) like this: first, is the thing about 
which we will want to be experts ourselves and be capable of making others expert 
(οὗ πέϱι βουλησόµεθα εἶναι αὐτοὶ τεχνιϰοὶ ϰαὶ ἄλλον δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν) simple 
or complex? Next, if it is simple, we should consider, shouldn’t we, what 
natural capacity (τὴν δύναµιν) it has for acting and on what, or what capacity 
it has for being acted upon, and by what; and if it has more forms (εἴδη) than 
one, we should count these, and see in the case of each, as in the case where it 
had only one, with which of them it is its nature to do what, or with which to 
have what done to it by what? 
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PHAEDRUS: Probably, Socrates. 
SOCRATES: At any rate proceeding without doing these things would be just 
like a blind man’s progress. But on no account must we represent the man 
who pursues anything scientifically (τόν γε τέχνῃ µετιόντα ὁτιοῦν) as like 
someone blind, or deaf; rather it is clear that if anyone teaches anyone 
rhetoric in a scientific way (τῴ τις τέχνῃ λόγους διδῷ), he will reveal precisely 
the essential nature of that thing (τὴν οὐσίαν δείξει ἀϰϱιβῶς τῆς φύσεως τούτου) 
to which his pupil will apply his speeches; and that, I think, is soul. 
(270c9-e5) 
 
In this passage Socrates introduces what I take to be proposed as a new method 
for scientific investigation. This method consists of the following two steps: first, 
one should consider whether the object with which one is concerned is simple 
or complex, and, second, one should examine the power or capacity of the 
simple object (if it is simple) or of every form of the complex object (if it is 
complex).160 First, in the case of a simple object, the scientific investigation just 
reveals ‘what power it possesses’, and the outcome coincides with that of the 
                                                       
160 One might think there to be three steps distinguished in (P46): (1) consideration as 
to whether X is simple or complex, (2) enumeration of the number of the forms of X, 
and (3) examination of the capacity of each form of X. However, I think (2) and (3) are 
just different aspects of one and the same procedure. Under the scientific investigation 
at issue, one cannot know how many forms of X there are before examining the 
capacity of each form of X, since one distinguishes a form of X from another form of X 
on the basis of the different capacities they have. It is true that in (P46) Socrates seems 
to be suggesting that (2) should be carried out before (3) (see especially ταῦτα 
ἀϱιθµησάµενον 270d5-6 (lit. ‘having counted them’)), but I think he is just imprecise 
here (or maybe he has in mind particularly the order of teaching rather than that of 
investigation). Note also what may be similar imprecision at 271a7-8, where, after 
re-describing step (1), he adds: ‘this is what we say is to reveal the nature of something’. 
He clearly has in mind here the whole procedure (i.e. steps (1)-(3)), and not just step 
(1). 
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procedure for definition (see 237c8-d1). One might think that the scientific 
investigation requires more from us than just to specify the power or capacity, 
on the ground that in (P46) Socrates also mentions other things that are related 
to the object under consideration (see ‘on what’ (πϱὸς τί 270d4) and ‘by what’ 
(ὑπὸ τοῦ 270d5)). But this is because we can specify ‘powers’ only in the 
framework of action and reaction in relation to other objects. In a well known 
passage in the Republic (477c1-d7), Socrates says that power can be specified 
only by reference to what it is set over and what it does, since it is devoid of 
colour, shape, and so on––the features that would help us distinguish the object 
under consideration from other things. I am not, however, suggesting that the 
two procedures are one and the same in relation to a simple object, for there is 
an important difference between them: the scientific investigation contains a 
prior consideration as to whether the object is simple or not, but the procedure 
for definition does not. Next, in the case of a complex object, the procedure 
becomes much more complicated. It is one single object that is at issue in this 
case too, but Socrates advises us to count the forms involved in the object, and 
examine the power of each of the forms (or define each of them). Obviously, ‘to 
count the forms of X’ (cf. 270d5-6) is just another way of saying ‘to cut X in 
accordance with forms’ (cf. 265e1). The procedure is therefore a new application 
of the method of division, which brings to light the essence of the single object 
by examining the power of its forms or parts.161 The investigation of a simple 
                                                       
161 In fact, as I have suggested in my outline of the dialogue in §1, it is the context that 
is crucial for observing that Socrates regards this new method as a new application of 
the method of division (or division and collection; for my view on the cooperation of 
these two methods, see n.142). 
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object may be regarded as a very special case of this procedure (because it is 
unlikely that any science can be established or taught by specifying one single 
power). The focus of the new method for scientific investigation is, then, on the 
internal structure of the single object, and so I would like to propose to call this 
method internal analysis. 
   Now let us consider more closely how internal analysis as applied to a 
complex object brings about an understanding of X more advanced than that 
provided by the procedure for definition. There are two points particularly 
relevant here. First, internal analysis of X provides much more information (in 
terms of quantity) than the definition of X, which is just a simple proposition. 
For example, Socrates proposes ‘that which is moved by itself’ (τοῦ ὑφ’ ἑαυτοῦ 
ϰινουµένου 245e3) as ‘the essence and the definition of soul’ (ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε 
ϰαὶ λόγον 245e3). One can learn such a definition very quickly, but it shows the 
nature or power of soul only as distinguished from other things.162 On the other 
hand, Socrates sketches the result of the internal analysis of soul in the 
following way: ‘The number [of the forms of soul] is so and so, and they are of 
such and such kinds, which is why some people are like this, and others like 
that’ (271d2-3). I think he has in mind some kind of table of personality traits (‘a 
simple soul’ and ‘a complex soul’ are given in (B) as examples). If so, the 
                                                       
162 I suggest that ‘that which moves itself’ reveals just one aspect of the essence of soul. 
Certainly, it is natural to understand the phrase ‘the essence and the definition of soul’ 
(245e3) as indicating that the definition reveals the essence in question without residue. 
But if so, there will be two kinds of essence for each thing: one, the essence that is 
revealed by definition, the other the essence that is revealed by internal analysis. 
However, I do not think Plato would accept the idea that each thing has two essences. I 
therefore suggest that there are two ways of approaching one and the same essence. In 
(P46) Socrates suggests that internal analysis shows the essence of things precisely 
(ἀϰϱιβῶς), the implication of which I think will be that definition is not sufficient for 
showing the essence of things precisely. 
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internal analysis of soul seems to provide the descriptions of various 
personality traits, such as honesty, credulity, laziness, suspiciousness, together 
with the explanations of how these personality traits appear in various 
behaviours. In short, in contrast to one sentence or phrase the procedure for the 
definition of soul provides, the internal analysis of soul provides, as it were, a 
textbook of personality psychology. 
   Second, by investigating many forms of X in their interaction with other 
things, internal analysis creates an interconnected structure in a domain of 
science. Again, the example of the science of rhetoric is instructive here. After 
he has described the two steps of the internal analysis of soul (i.e. the 
consideration as to whether soul is simple or complex, and the specification of 
the power of each form of soul), Socrates adds one more step for teaching the 
science of rhetoric: 
 
   (P47) SOCRATES: And then, thirdly, having classified the kinds of speeches and of 
soul, and the ways in which these are affected (τὰ τούτων παθήµατα), he [sc. 
someone who seriously teaches the science of rhetoric] will go through all the 
causes (δίεισι πάσας αἰτίας), fitting each to each (πϱοσαϱµόττων ἕϰαστον 
ἑϰάστῳ) and explaining what sort of soul’s being subjected to what sorts of 
speeches necessarily results in one being convinced and another not, giving 
the cause in each case (διδάσϰων οἵα οὖσα ὑφ’ οἵων λόγων δι’ ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ 
ἀνάγϰης ἡ µὲν πείθεται, ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ). 
(271b1-5) 
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This third step could be further divided into two sub-steps: first, one should 
combine a certain kind of soul with a certain kind of speech and consider 
whether or not this or that soul will be convinced by this or that speech, and, 
second, one should explain the causes of conviction and non-conviction in each 
case (cf. also 271d5-7). Now one might propose that this third step is not a part 
of internal analysis, but is a separate investigation based on the result of 
internal analysis. But I suggest that at least the first sub-step described in (P47) 
largely belongs to the work of internal analysis. Socrates makes it clear that by 
the time one reaches the third step, one has already classified ‘the ways in 
which these are affected’. Since he was talking about both action and reaction in 
the second step (see 271a10-11), it seems reasonable to suppose that Socrates 
means here that one has already classified the ways speeches affect and souls are 
affected through internal analysis. The recognition of which combination is 
possible or impossible, or effective or ineffective, then, at least to large extent 
belongs to the work of internal analysis. In other words, if someone comes up 
with a combination that shows a certain kind of speech or soul acting or being 
acted upon in a way he could not predict from the result of the internal analysis 
of speeches and soul, it only proves that his analysis was insufficient. It is true 
that the second sub-step, i.e. providing the causes of the effect of speeches on 
soul under a certain combination, seems to be beyond the scope of internal 
analysis. But, since understanding the nature of the connections of a certain 
kind of speech with a certain kind of soul mostly belongs to it, internal analysis 
points to the way of creating or understanding an interconnected structure in a 
domain of science. 
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   Having thus clarified the method Socrates introduces after passage (A), I 
would like to return to the main question of this section: why, in passage (B), 
does Socrates instruct us to divide X after we have obtained its definition and 
have secured an agreement? The answer is, I suggest, that he has both the 
procedure for definition and internal analysis in mind here; he instructs us first 
to define X as a whole (= (B1)), and then to analyse it internally to increase our 
understanding of X (= (B2)). This interpretation is supported by Socrates’ 
remarks that immediately follow the description of (B1) and (B2): ‘[one will not 
be capable of pursuing the science of rhetoric] until one has reached an 
understanding of the nature of soul along the same lines (ϰατὰ ταὐτά)’ (277b8). It 
is evident that the procedure at issue here is not the procedure for the definition 
but the internal analysis of soul. It is true that, in the course of the discussion on 
the science of rhetoric (261a7-274b5), Socrates discussed the necessity of 
definition only in connection with contents of a speech, and the necessity of 
internal analysis only in connection with performance of a speech. He never 
combined them together as parts of a single investigation. But they are after all 
combinable. It seems reasonable to suppose that an advanced understanding of 
the subject of a speech is useful for a true rhetorician, and that he needs to 
understand the definition of soul before undertaking its internal analysis. It 
seems then natural that, in the passage that summarises the science of rhetoric 
in terms of both the contents and the performance of a speech, Socrates should 
first put forward the two methods together, and then say that we have to 
investigate the subject of a speech and the nature of soul in the same way. 
   I may note in passing that my interpretation has two advantages over the 
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second group of traditional interpreters. First, I can offer a more natural reading 
of the Greek text. According to the traditional interpretation, (B1) is the 
definition(s) of X (i.e. the subject of a speech) and (B2) is the division of Y (i.e. the 
genus of X), and so different grammatical objects are assumed in (B1) and (B2). 
Now, since Socrates omits the grammatical object of ‘to cut up’ (τέµνειν 277b7) 
in (B2), we have to supply it from the immediate context. But it is not natural to 
supply Y as the grammatical object in question, for there is no mention of the 
genus of the subject of a speech at all in this passage. By contrast, my 
interpretation supposes that both (B1) and (B2) are concerned with X, and I can 
supply the object of (B2) from that of (B1), i.e. ‘the whole’ (πᾶν 227b6). This is 
clearly a more natural reading of the Greek text. The second advantage is that I 
can explain the reason why Socrates instructs us to continue to divide an object 
until ‘it can no longer be cut’ (277b7). If we are engaged in the internal analysis 
of the object in question, we must count all the forms of X. We therefore have to 
continue the dividing process until we discover all of them. By contrast, this 
instruction seems to be inexplicable for the second group of traditional 
interpreters, since they suppose that the dividing process should end when X is 
reached again and the definition of X is provided, which might not be a stage at 
which no further cut is possible. 
 
§6. Concluding remarks 
   Thus I hope to have shown that my interpretation of the method of 
collection and division is harmonious with the relevant passages throughout 
the Phaedrus. As for collection (i.e. the procedure of perceiving together and 
 209 
bringing into one form items that are scattered in many places in order that one 
can define X and make it clear), I have argued that this procedure is the same as 
Socrates’ procedure for definition; in the description of collection ‘one form’ 
and ‘items that are scattered in many places’ respectively stand for the Socratic 
form of X and instances of X. If I am right, then collection is applicable 
independently of division, just as we have seen, for example, in the examples of 
definition in the early dialogues (the definitions of speed, shape, and colour; see 
Ch. 1). However––I would like to make this clear here––division, in contrast to 
collection, always works in tandem with collection. Division is basically the 
procedure of dividing one Socratic form into many Socratic forms, but this 
dividing is at the same time collecting or defining these many Socratic forms. In the 
next chapter, I shall clarify this point in the course of a close examination of the 
mechanism of each step of division. 
   I have also argued that there are two ways of applying the method of 
collection and division: the one is the procedure for definition, the other 
internal analysis. The former provides us with knowledge by definition, but the 
latter brings us towards expertise in a certain domain. Both are ways of 
understanding of the essence of X, but only internal analysis reveals the essence 
‘precisely’ (ἀϰϱιβῶς 270e3). When the procedure for the definition of X is at 
issue, the whole procedure is equal to the collection of X, and the collection and 
division of Y (and species of Y, etc.) are applied, if they are applied, as a 
complementary procedure in the course of the collection of X. On the other 
hand, when the internal analysis of X is at issue, the collection of X is just a 
starting point, and the division of X (and species of X, etc.), which corresponds 
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to the collection of species of X (and subspecies of X, etc.), is the central 
procedure. Since Socrates (or Plato in his early dialogues) is concerned with 
definition or collection, it is division and internal analysis that freshly come into 
focus in the Phaedrus. Indeed, we may be able to call internal analysis the 
Platonic method, the method that makes it possible for us to become experts, in 
contrast to the Socratic method, which provides us merely with knowledge by 
definition. 
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Chapter 5: Dialectic in the Sophist and the Politicus 
 
 
 
§1. Introduction 
   The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the mechanism of the 
procedure for definition through collection and division at work in the Sophist 
and the Politicus. Specifically, I shall try to clarify the elements involved in each 
step of division, and would like to suggest that the ‘form’ (εἶδος or ἰδέα) or the 
‘kind’ (γένος) prevalent throughout the two dialogues as the objects of division 
are Socratic forms, and that the procedure of collection working there is 
equivalent to Socrates’ procedure for definition. I shall not discuss the notorious 
passage in the Sophist (253d1-e2) in which many scholars claimed to have found 
a prescription of the method of collection and division, in the belief that, as 
Gómez-Lobo argued in his influential paper, the passage in question is 
concerned with the ontological preconditions for the method, and not with the 
method itself.163 Nor shall I discuss the passage on the ‘model’ or ‘example’ 
(παϱάδειγµα) in the Politicus (277d1-278e12), for, although some scholars 
believe otherwise,164 I myself do not think that this passage is directly relevant 
                                                       
163 Gómez-Lobo (1977) suggests, in essence, that 253d5-8 is describing the connection 
between the form of being and many other forms, while 253d8-e1 is describing the 
connection between the form of the different and many other forms. For the procedure 
for the definition of F to function at all, the form of F must be (be F or exist) and must 
be different from all the other forms. The connection of the form of F with the forms of 
being and the different is, therefore, the precondition for the procedure for the definition 
of F. 
164 Lane (1998, 13-97) argues that the method used in the Sophist and the Politicus 
should be understood as the method of ‘example and division’, thereby ‘challeng[ing] 
the widespread assumption that the method they use is the “collection and division”’ 
(14). In the same vein, Sayre (2006, esp. 73-91) suggests that ‘the role played by 
 212 
for our understanding of the method of collection and division. The use of 
examples may sometimes turn out to be significant in the course of the 
investigations through the method of collection and division, but it is not 
intrinsic in these investigations. 
 
§2. An analysis of the procedure for definition through collection and division 
   The main purpose of the Sophist and the Politicus, from the point of view of 
my own immediate concern, is the acquisition of the definitions of 
subject-matters by agreement, the purpose that is familiar to us from the early 
definitional dialogues. In fact, some of the fundamental principles involved 
seem to be common to both the early and the late definitional dialogues. First, 
the definitions sought are those that sufficiently (ἱϰανῶς) reveal the nature of the 
subject-matter, or what the subject-matter is: compare e.g. Sph. 221b2, 221c4; Plt. 
267c8, 277c7-8, 279a8, 280b1, 281c8, 282d1, 284d3, 292c3 with Euthphr. 6d2; Men. 
75b11; Hi.Ma. 286d8.165 Second, whether a given definition is sufficient or not is 
                                                                                                                                                                
collection in the earlier dialogue is taken over in the later by the use of paradigms’ (74). 
Against interpretations along these lines, my discussion in this and the next chapter 
will show that collection, or Socrates’ procedure for definition, remains at the heart of 
Plato’s methodology. It may also be worthwhile to note that Lane’s contention seems 
mainly to be based on obvious mistakes. First, in p.29, she mysteriously writes 
‘Acq.-Coerc.-Fighting-Controversy-Argumentation-Disputation’ as ‘Kind(s) shared 
with angling’ in relation to the 7th definition of sophistry, when in fact the seventh 
definition of sophistry shares no kinds at all with angling (angling, according to her, 
functions as the example of sophistry by being akin to it). Second, she writes: ‘The 
shepherd is never announced as an “example” … and so in contrast with the Sophist, 
where clear-cut and explicit adoption of an “example” enabled the division to proceed 
successfully, in the Statesman a tacit adoption of something like an example but never 
clearly recognised, announced or defined leads ultimately to failure and frustration’ 
(40). But at 275b4-5 the Eleatic Stranger explicitly refers to ‘the example (παϱάδειγµα) of 
shepherds and cowherds’. 
165 It is significant to note that the Politicus seems to indicate that what is contrasted 
with a ‘sufficient’ (ἱϰανός) definition is not a ‘complete’ (τέλεος) definition, but 
something beyond definition. The Stranger and young Socrates do speak of 
completeness in relation to definition (see 267d1, 275a9, 277a1, 280e7, 281d2), but, as is 
clear from 267c8-d2 and 281c7-d3, the Stranger seems to regard a sufficient and a 
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decided by mutual agreement between interlocutors: compare Phdr. 237c2-d3; 
Sph. 218c4-5; Plt. 260b6-12, 277a3-4 with Men. 75b8-76e7. This second principle 
is not conspicuous in the early definitional dialogues for the obvious reason that 
a co-operative search for the definition of F is not at issue there; Socrates always 
pretends to learn the nature of F from his interlocutor who claims to know what 
F is. But the importance of a mutual agreement for definition is abundantly 
clear in the Meno passage. 
   However, the method used for finding the definitions of sophistry and 
statesmanship in the Sophist and the Politicus appears to be very different from 
Socrates’ procedure for definition in the early dialogues. Roughly speaking, in 
the Sophist and the Politicus interlocutors start with the specification of the 
whole (or the genus) of which the definiendum is a part (or a species),166 and 
then divide this whole (or the genus) step by step until they reach the 
definiendum and provide the definition. In the early definitional dialogues, by 
contrast, interlocutors simply examine many instances of the definiendum in 
order to provide the definition by specifying the characteristic common to them 
                                                                                                                                                                
complete definition as equivalent to each other. On the other hand, in 284d1-9 ‘what is 
being shown well and adequately in proportion to our present concerns’ (ὅτι δὲ πϱὸς 
τὰ νῦν ϰαλῶς ϰαὶ ἱϰανῶς δείϰνυται), which I take as the definition of statesmanship, is 
contrasted with ‘the demonstration in relation to the precise truth itself’ (τὴν πεϱὶ αὐτὸ 
τἀϰϱιβὲς ἀπόδειξιν). The exact meaning of the latter phrase is unclear and 
controversial, but at least it seems reasonable to suppose that ‘the precise truth’ refers 
not to a precisely true definition (in contrast to a sufficient definition), but to something 
more fundamental than definition. 
166 Although in what follows I shall use Aristotelian terms ‘genus’, ‘species’, and 
‘differentia’ in order to analyse the process of division, it is important to keep in mind 
that the Platonic procedure for definition does not strictly advance in accordance with 
the genus-and-species relation. For example, in the Politicus (264e12-266e11) the 
Stranger offers alternative routes to statesmanship by dividing objects of caring and 
rearing in two different ways. In the longer route, the distinction between feathered 
and featherless precedes the distinction between four footed and two footed, but in the 
shorter route, the reverse seems to be true (although there is some unclarity involved 
in the text; cf. Campbell (1867, 34)). This would not be the case if the Stranger were 
strictly following the genus-and-species relation. 
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all; the whole of which the definiendum is a part hardly draws their attention 
there.167 An obvious and immediate reason for the difference between these 
two methods is related to the status of the target: in the early definitional 
dialogues this is always something that is either itself a whole (e.g. beauty, 
virtue) or a major part of a whole (e.g. justice, courage), while in the Sophist and 
the Politicus it is something that is only a small part of a whole. (The main 
reason for this switch, I suggest, lies in Plato’s intention to describe the rules of 
collection and division in the course of performing a task familiar to us from the 
early dialogues, in order to prepare us for the more difficult task of internal 
analysis.) Nevertheless, the apparent difference between the two methods 
should not obscure the common elements. I have argued in Chapter 4 that the 
method of collection––as I understand collection––is equivalent to Socrates’ 
procedure for definition. A close observation of the operation of collection and 
division in the Sophist and the Politicus will confirm this point. 
   Let us then consider the actual procedures for definition through collection 
and division. The Eleatic Stranger offers Theaetetus an ‘example’ (παϱάδειγµα 
218d9) of the procedure, i.e. the definition of angling, at the beginning of the 
Sophist (219a4-221c5). This example conveniently allows us to see the basic 
operation of the method. The definition of angling starts with an agreement that 
angling belongs to ‘science’ (τέχνη), and then the Stranger divides science as a 
whole step by step until he reaches angling; he first divides science as a whole 
                                                       
167 On a few occasions, in an attempt to define F in the early dialogues, Socrates does 
mention the whole of which F is a part. A notable example is an attempt to define the 
pious as a part of justice in the Euthyphro (11e2-14a10). In the Laches, Socrates touches 
on the relation between the definition of virtue as a whole and that of courage close to 
the end of the dialogue (197e10-199e12). But even in these places, neither the whole of 
which F is a part nor the part-and-whole relation undergoes close examination. 
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into the productive and the acquisitive, and after securing an agreement that 
angling belongs to the latter, he further divides the acquisitive science into the 
one by exchange and the one by taking possession, and so on. If we focus on the 
distinguishing marks in accordance with which a genus is divided into its 
species,168 the whole process of division for the definition of angling may be 
schematised in the following way:169 
 
       Science 
(1) Productive/Acquisitive (= Acquisitive science) 
     (2) By exchange/By taking possession (= Possession-taking) 
          (3) Openly/Secretly (= Hunting) 
               (4) Of lifeless things/Of living things (= Animal-hunting) 
                    (5) Of land animals/Of water animals (= Aquatic-hunting) 
                         (6) Of water birds/Of fishes (= Fishing) 
                              (7) By enclosure/By striking (= Strike-hunting) 
                                   (8) By firelight/By daylight (= Hooking) 
                                                       
168 I shall later clarify the distinction between the distinguishing mark and the name of 
the thing that results from a particular step of division. The tables of the process of 
division for the definition of angling given by scholars are often not sensitive to this 
distinction. For example, Bluck (1975, 55), who mostly organizes his table in terms of 
distinguishing marks, gives ‘By contest/By hunting’ at step (3) in my scheme below, 
but ‘hunting’ (θηϱευτιϰή) is the name of a science, not a distinguishing mark. Sayre 
(2006, 57) does not seem to make any distinction in this regard, so that he makes an 
unbalanced distinction, e.g. ‘inanimate objects/animal hunting (ζῳοθηϱιϰή)’ for step 
(4) in my scheme. 
169 As has been pointed out by some scholars (see esp. Koike (1982, 345-47); cf. also 
Cornford (1957, 172)), the overall strategy here seems to be the specification of angling 
with the descriptive framework of ‘(A) such and such an action (B) towards such and 
such an object (or a goal) (C) with such and such a means’. In my scheme, steps (1) – (3) 
correspond to (A), steps (4) – (6) correspond to (B), and steps (7) – (9) correspond to (C). 
This is an important observation which contributes to our understanding of the 
procedure for division as applied to other kinds of expertise than are mentioned in the 
Sophist and the Politicus, even though such correspondence is not an essential feature of 
the procedure; it is recognizable only in some examples of division in the dialogues. 
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                                        (9) Downwards/Upwards 
            with spears  with hooks 
                                                       (= Angling) 
 
This series of divisions leads the interlocutors to their immediate goal at step (9). 
The Stranger then declares that they have sufficiently grasped the definition of 
angling by agreement, and restates it by connecting the names of the sciences 
that include angling (indicated in italics in the scheme above). By adopting a 
similar procedure, they also define sophistry, weaving, and statesmanship in 
the Sophist and the Politicus. 
   First, I would like to clarify what kind of elements are involved in each step 
of division. Certainly, the process of division is mostly very succinct and 
unclear. For example, step (3) is given as follows: 
 
   (P48) STRANGER: Well then, shouldn’t we cut possession-taking in two? 
THEAETETUS: How? 
STRANGER: The kind that’s done openly we label combat, and the kind that’s 
secret we call hunting. 
THEAETETUS: Yes. 
(219d10-e3) 
 
However, since, as is suggested, definition is essentially a matter of agreement, 
what is involved in the process of division tends to become apparent when 
Theaetetus or young Socrates do not understand how the Eleatic Stranger divides a 
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thing at issue. A good example is found in relation to step (7). 
 
   (P49) STRANGER: Well then, this kind of hunting [i.e. fishing] might be divided into 
two main parts (µέϱη δύο). 
THEAETETUS: What are they? 
STRANGER: (A1) One of them does its hunting with stationary nets and the 
other one does it by striking. 
THEAETETUS: What do you mean? How are you dividing them? 
STRANGER: The first one is––well, (A2) whatever involves surrounding 
something and enclosing it to prevent it from escaping, it’s reasonable to call 
it enclosure. 
THEAETETUS: Of course. 
STRANGER: Shouldn’t (A3) baskets, nets, slipknots, creels, and so forth be 
called enclosures? 
THEAETETUS: Yes. 
STRANGER: So we’ll call this part of hunting (A4) enclosure-hunting or 
something like that. 
THEAETETUS: Yes. 
(220b9-c9) 
 
In this passage the Eleatic Stranger gives the following four items in order to 
bring home to Theaetetus how he divides the thing at issue: (A1) the genus and 
the distinguishing mark (or differentia), (A2) an explanation of the 
distinguishing mark, (A3) instances of the distinguishing mark, and (A4) the 
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name of the thing that results from this particular step of division. This is not 
the only place in which the Stranger mentions these four elements; at Sph. 
223e1-b3, in an attempt to define the sophist as a wholesaler, he offers the same 
kinds of items: (A1) wholesaling of things for the soul (as distinguished from 
wholesaling of things for the body), (A2) ‘things that are transported and sold 
either for amusement or for some serious pursuit’ (224a4-5), (A3) music, 
paintings, and knowledge, and (A4) soul-wholesaling. Note that in this place he 
offers these items only in connection with things for the soul, omitting (A2) – 
(A4) in relation to things for the body, since Theaetetus understands what is 
meant by the latter (see 223e5-6). Sph. 265b4-266d8 and Plt. 287b4-289c3 are 
other examples of this line of exposition of the elements involved in a particular 
step of division.170 On the other hand, there are passages in which the Stranger 
clarifies a particular step of division by offering items slightly different from 
(A1) – (A4); in these passages he directly offers instances of the thing that 
emerges from the step of division under consideration rather than instances of 
the distinguishing mark of the thing in question. Consider, for example, the 
Stranger’s enumeration of instances in the following passage: 
 
(P50) STRANGER: Then let’s say that the hunting of tame animals is twofold. 
                                                       
170 In Sph. 265b4-266d8, the Stranger divides the science of production into four species 
in accordance with whether it belongs to gods or to human beings, and whether it is 
related to real things or to images, thereby putting forward instances of these real 
things and images. In Plt. 287b4-289c3, he divides contributory causes in the city into 
seven species in accordance with the things they provide: the ‘first-born’ (πϱωτογενές), 
tool, vessel, vehicle, defence, plaything, and nourishment. This passage is remarkable 
not only for the large number of instances given of these things and the detailed 
explanatory comments provided, but also for young Socrates’ repeated question, ‘What 
do you mean?’ (see 287e3, 7, 288a7, d6). 
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THEAETETUS: How? 
STRANGER: (B1) Let’s take piracy, enslavement, tyranny, along with 
everything that has to do with war, and let’s define them all together as one, 
(B2) hunting by force (ἓν πάντα, βίαιον θήϱαν ὁϱισάµενοι). 
 THEAETETUS: Fine. 
 STRANGER: (B3) And we’ll also take legal oratory, political oratory, and 
conversation all together in one whole (ἓν αὖ τὸ σύνολον), and call them all 
one single sort of expertise, (B4) expertise in persuasion. 
(Sph. 222c5-d1) 
 
It seems clear that the distinguishing marks at issue here are by force and by 
persuasion, but the Stranger does not mention instances of them in (P50). 
Instead, he enumerates instances of what is named or defined by ‘hunting by 
force’ and ‘hunting by persuasion’; (B1) and (B3) are respectively instances of 
what is named or defined by (B2) and (B4). Similarly, he clarifies the elements 
involved in a particular step of division along these lines in, e.g., the following 
passages: Sph. 227d13-229a11, 229d8-230d4, 235c9-236c8; Plt. 260c6-e3, 
281d5-283a9.171 Thus, strictly speaking, there are two modes in which, facing 
his interlocutor’s puzzlement, the Stranger clarifies the step of division under 
                                                       
171 In Sph. 227d13-229a11, in explaining disease of the soul, the Stranger offers some 
states of conflict in the soul (which Theaetetus paraphrases as cowardice, debauchment, 
and injustice) as its instances. In Sph. 229d8-230d4, he offers a detailed explanation of 
admonition and the Socratic elenchus as parts of education. Again, in Sph. 235c9-236c8, 
he offers the activities of ‘the ones who sculpt or draw very large works’ as instances of 
appearance-making. Plt. 260c6-e3 gives ‘the interpreter, the person who gives the time 
to the rowers, the seer, the herald, etc.’ as instances of the science that is separated off 
from the self-directive. Plt. 281d5-283a9 is full of instances of sciences which are 
concerned with wool-clothes and are eventually separated off from weaving. 
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consideration: the first focuses on the distinguishing mark, and the second on 
the thing itself that emerges as the result of this step of division. But apparently 
the first mode is easily reducible to the second mode.172 For example, if we add 
‘hunting with’ to each instance of the distinguishing mark given in (P49), then 
the outcome (‘hunting with a basket’, ‘hunting with a net’, etc.) would be 
instances of the thing itself that results from the step of division under 
consideration, i.e. enclosure-hunting, rather than those of the distinguishing 
mark. I therefore shall treat the second mode as the exemplary case for the full 
elucidation of the elements involved in each step of division. With this in mind, 
I suggest that each step of division contains, at least tacitly, the following five 
elements: 
 
(C1) the part (or the form or the kind) that results from a particular step of 
division 
(C2) instances of the part in question (cf. (A3), (B1), (B3)) 
(C3) the genus and the distinguishing mark of the part in question (cf. (A1), 
(B2)) 
(C4) a full explanation of the part in question (cf. (A2)) 
(C5) the name of the part in question (cf. (A4), (B4)) 
 
                                                       
172 As a matter of fact, in some passages the distinction between the first and the 
second modes cannot be drawn clearly. Such is the case with the very first step of 
division of sciences as a whole in Sph. 219a8-c9 (cf. also Plt. 258d4-e5), in which the 
parts that appear as the result of this step of division are the productive and the 
acquisitive science, while their distinguishing marks are the productive and the 
acquisitive. In Sph. 226e8-227a5, on the other hand, the Stranger uses both modes at the 
same time, in providing instances of cleansing of bodies (e.g. gymnastics, medicine, 
bathing) and those of the distinguishing mark (e.g. living bodies, non-living bodies). 
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We are now in a position to see that even a concise description of a step of 
division in (P48) refers to the following three elements: (C1) the two parts that 
are being defined or named, (C3) possession-taking as the genus, and the 
openly/secretly distinction as the distinguishing marks, and (C5) combat and 
hunting as the names of the parts in question. This description omits (C2) and 
(C4) because these elements are obvious to the interlocutors in relation to the 
step of division under consideration. 
   Next, let us examine these five items more closely, starting with (C1): the 
‘part’ (µέϱος) or the ‘form’ (εἶδος, ἰδέα) or the ‘kind’ (γένος). Here are two 
preliminary points. First, as is clear from, e.g., the Stranger’s following words: 
‘let’s try again to take the kind we’ve posited and cut it in two (σχίζοντες διχῇ 
τὸ πϱοτεθὲν γένος)’ (Sph. 264d12-e1), the part or the form or the kind are not 
just the outcomes of a particular step of division; they are also the objects of a 
further step of division (apart from ‘indivisible’ ones; cf. Phdr. 277b7; Sph. 
229d5).173 Second, these four terms, which are pervasive throughout the process 
of division in the Sophist and the Politicus, are mostly treated as equivalent to 
each other, but in the Politicus (262a3-e6) the Stranger makes it clear that a part 
of something does not necessarily correspond to a form, and that the part into 
which the method directs us to divide a thing at hand must be a part that 
simultaneously constitutes a form or a kind. In other words, the part that 
matters in the process of division just is the form or the kind as a part of 
something else. 
                                                       
173 For other examples in which the Stranger speaks of dividing a form/kind/part, see 
Sph. 267a1; Plt. 261a3-4, b10-11, c4-5, 262c10-d1, 282d11-e2, 282e1. 
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   What then are these forms or kinds that are the objects and the outcomes of 
division? This is a fundamental question that has often been pressed by those 
scholars who are interested in the method of collection and division.174 The 
question is sometimes posed as: is the form/kind in question a single entity, or 
a plurality of things?175 The term ‘form’ (εἶδος, ἰδέα) and the metaphysical 
argument about the ‘most important kinds’ (µέγιστα γένη) in the central part of 
the Sophist (254b8-259d8) have led some scholars into believing that the 
form/kind stands for a single entity, i.e. a Platonic Form.176 However, it is hard 
to imagine that the Stranger and his interlocutors are somehow cutting a 
Platonic Form into a plurality of its parts, especially because Platonic Forms do 
not even exist in our world.177 Other scholars suggest that the form/kind is 
systematically ambiguous between a Form and a collection of particulars; when 
                                                       
174 See e.g. Cornford (1957, 269), Moravcsik (1973a, 162-3), Cohen (1973, 181), White 
(1976, 128-29 n.17), Wedin (1990, 208-9), Rowe (1995, 4), Frede (2004, 147-8), Sayre (2006, 
209-14). 
175 See esp. Moravcsik (1973a, 161-63): ‘First, we might ask: what is being named, a 
plurality of arts or a single entity? […] Again, as above, the question can be raised 
whether the divisions involve the cutting of a plurality into pluralities, or of one entity 
into a set of singular entities.’ 
176 See e.g. Cornford (1957, 184-87; 262-73), Skemp (1952, 66-85), Moravcsik (1973a; 
1973b). 
177 Of course, this issue mostly depends on how one understands Platonic Forms. 
Cornford and Moravcsik propose that Platonic Forms are being cut on the basis of their 
own characterization of the Platonic Forms: see Cornford (1957, 265): ‘The meanings of 
common names and verbs are the Forms’; Moravcsik (1973b, 339): ‘The assumption is 
that all Forms are intensions’. I reject their proposal on the basis of my own 
characterization of Platonic Forms developed in Ch.3 §4: the Platonic Form of F is, as it 
were, the arbiter or regulator of the truth-value of any proposition concerning an 
essential feature of instances of F. For a different line of objection to this proposal, see 
Rowe (1995, 5): ‘But if this, quasi-religious aspect is supposed still to be part of the 
conception of ‘forms’ attributed to the Statesman, it must be a serious question why 
over and over again young Socrates is asked to think about familiar types of things, 
and to respond on the basis of his experience of them.’ Skemp’s stance on this matter is 
unclear. While he expresses his ‘general agreement with Cornford’ at p.73 n.1 in his 
(1952), he occasionally appears to collapse into speaking of dividing the reflection of 
Forms, rather than Forms themselves; see e.g. at p.72, ibid.: ‘The essential point for 
Plato is that the act of division must be made at a natural “joint” in the body of 
Reality––it must faithfully reflect a real distinction in the world of Forms.’ 
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Plato speaks of dividing a Form, he just means dividing the particulars that 
participate in the Form in question, rather than dividing the Form itself.178 My 
objection to this suggestion is that it is unlikely that the term ‘form’ covers the 
very things, i.e. many F things (which would be the participants of the Form of 
F), from which Plato originally wanted to distinguish the essence or the cause 
(F) by using this philosophically-loaded term. I myself think that the two 
alternatives above are wrongly posed. The unity and the plurality do not stand 
for different entities; they are, I suggest, two aspects of the same entity, the 
Socratic form. 
   If, as I have argued in Chapter 3, Plato has both Platonic Forms and Socratic 
forms in view in the middle and the late dialogues, there is a good reason for 
identifying the form/kind in the Sophist and the Politicus with the Socratic form: 
the features Plato attributes to the form/kind in question closely correspond to 
those of the Socratic form.179 First, (a) the form/kind in question is one and the 
                                                       
178 This is a paraphrase of the suggestion given by Cohen (1973, 184) in proposing what 
he labels the ‘superclean’ model of the logical structure of division. He also writes: ‘To 
push it through all the way one would have to hold, I think, that Plato uses εἶδος in a 
systematically ambiguous way, sometimes meaning Form, sometimes meaning 
extension of a Form’ (ibid.). His superclean model seems to have received the most 
favourable view among five models proposed in the course of the exchange between 
Moravcsik and Cohen; see Rowe (1995, 6 n.18) and Sayre (2006, 213 n.13). It is 
significant to note that Cohen’s suggestion has a close parallel in the development of 
the intense discussion on what is called the communion of forms in the Sophist 
(254b8-257a12). According to some scholars, e.g. Robinson (1953, 260-64), Vlastos (1981, 
270-308), Bostock (1984, 104-10), in some propositions which describe a certain 
combination of forms a Form and its participants are ambiguously referred to; for 
example, ‘Motion is resting’, is ambiguous between ‘the Kind, Motion, is resting’ and 
‘the particulars that participate in Motion are resting’. 
179 For the features of the Socratic form, see Ch.3 §2. (a), (b), (c) here respectively 
correspond to (a), (b), (c) there. I have excluded from consideration the occurrences of 
the term ‘form’ (εἶδος) used for describing the position of the friends of Forms in the 
Sophist (see 246b8, c9, 248a4, 249d1, 252a7). The context requires that in this connection 
the Stranger is talking about the ‘form’ in a special sense, i.e. the Platonic Form, and it 
is just far-fetched to propose, on the basis of this special usage, that the ‘form’ in the 
Sophist generally refers to the Platonic Form. 
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same in many items. This can be seen partly from the fact that the Stranger 
occasionally speaks of the form/kind being in (or in relation to) something; for 
example, he says, ‘all these kinds occur in our souls both as false and as true’ 
(ταῦτα τὰ γένη ψευδῆ τε ϰαὶ ἀληθῆ πάνθ’ ἡµῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνεται Sph. 
263d7-8; see also Sph. 228a11; Plt. 307a1-2). But more direct evidence is that the 
form/kind in question is the common characteristic of many instances. Thus, 
for example, the form of productive science is specified in terms of the function 
that is commonly had by certain sciences, i.e. farming, caring for living bodies 
or equipment, imitation, and so on (see Sph. 219a10-b13 = step (1) in the scheme 
of the definition of angling above).180 Second, (b) the form/kind is that by 
which all F things are F, as is described in the central part of the Sophist (see e.g. 
255e4-6: ‘each of them [the most important kinds] is different from the others, 
not because of its own nature but because of sharing in the form of the 
different’). Third, (c) the form/kind in question is itself F (see Sph. 258b11-c4: 
‘the large was large, the beautiful was beautiful, etc.’). Of course, Plato’s 
terminology supports this identification: the ‘form’ (εἶδος or ἰδέα) is the very 
term used for referring to Socratic forms (and/or Platonic Forms) in the early 
and the middle dialogues.181 Now, among the features mentioned above, (b) 
and (c) are applicable to Platonic Forms as well as Socratic forms, but (a) 
                                                       
180 Cf. Moravcsik (1973b, 328): ‘Here [219a10ff.] the main point is that there is a 
common function (δύναµις) that the arts in question have. This common function is 
then named and characterized.’ 
181 See Chapter 3, n. 127. Plato never uses the term ‘kind’ (γένος) in the passages in 
which he explicitly refers to Socratic forms (and/or Platonic Forms) in the early and 
the middle dialogues. But it is not unreasonable to suppose that Socrates might have 
described his attempt to define one particular subject-matter (e.g. courage, the 
beautiful) as the discussion on one particular kind. Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia 4.5.12: 
‘The very word “discussion” (διαλέγεσθαι), according to him [Socrates], owes its name 
to the practice of meeting together for common deliberation, sorting, discussing things 
after their kind (ϰατὰ γένη διαλέγοντας)’ (Marchant’s translation). 
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decides for Socratic forms as the referent of the form/kind in question. I 
propose, then, that the form/kind in the Sophist and the Politicus is the Socratic 
form. 
   With this in mind, I would like to clarify the controversial point of how we 
should construe ‘dividing a form’ or ‘a part of a form’. First, let us recall one 
feature of the Socratic form I have discussed in detail in Chapter 3, namely: 
 
(SF2) The Socratic form of F is both one and many; it is one by being liable to 
one and the same definition, and it is many by being instantiated in many 
contexts. 
 
The Socratic form has both single and plural aspects, its plural aspect being 
equivalent to the full set of its instances. It seems evident, then, that, when the 
Stranger speaks of ‘dividing a form’ or ‘a part of a form’, he always means, 
respectively, ‘dividing the plural aspect of a form’ or ‘a part of the plural aspect of a 
form’. 
   However, this issue would require some more comments, for there is a 
passage in the Sophist where the Stranger seems to be speaking of a part of the 
single aspect of a form. The passage is worth careful consideration for the 
elucidation of the whole-and-parts relation of forms: 
 
   (P51) STRANGER: The nature of the different appears to be chopped up, just like 
expertise (ἐπιστήµη). 
THEAETETUS: Why? 
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STRANGER: Expertise is a single thing, too, I suppose. But each part of it that 
comes to be in relation to something (τὸ δ’ ἐπί τῳ γιγνόµενον µέϱος αὐτῆς 
ἕϰαστον) is marked off and has a name peculiar to itself. That’s why there are 
said to be many sciences and many expertises (διὸ πολλαὶ τέχναι τ’ εἰσὶ 
λεγόµεναι ϰαὶ ἐπιστῆµαι). 
(257c7-d2) 
 
Here the Stranger is suggesting that the kind (γένος 257e2) of the different is 
divisible into its parts just as expertise or science is (ἐπιστήµη and τέχνη are 
obviously synonyms here).182 Science is a single thing, but each part of this 
single science ‘that comes to be in relation to something’, i.e. that is related to its 
own specific domain of objects,183 gains its own peculiar name, so that there are 
many sciences. We may think of the following examples of parts of science. 
 
parts of science   peculiar names 
sciencea (in relation to musical sounds)    music 
scienceb (in relation to health)     medicine 
sciencec (in relation to numbers)     arithmetic 
        …         … 
 
Now, obviously sciencea is a part of many sciences taken together, i.e. sciencea, 
                                                       
182 For a detailed analysis of how the analogy of science works for the elucidation of 
the nature of the different, see Lee (1972, 269-76). 
183 The evidence that the preposition ἐπί is used for connecting a science with its 
objects is plentiful: e.g. Sph. 229b9, 236b1; Plt. 261b13-c1, 264a6, d6, 265c7-8, 267c1, 
275c10, 283a7, 292b12-c1; Phlb. 57b5. 
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scienceb, sciencec, etc., or in my terminology, sciencea is a part of the plural aspect 
of the form of science. However, this is not what the Stranger is suggesting here; 
instead, he is suggesting that sciencea is a part of the single science, or in my 
terminology, that sciencea is a part of the single aspect of the form of science. This 
seems to imply that the single science, or the single aspect of the form of science, 
is divisible into parts. This implication is surprising, for the singularity of the 
science at issue seems to be incompatible with its divisibility. Contrary to this 
implication, one would be tempted to say that, since the single science is the 
characteristic common to sciencea, scienceb, sciencec, etc., we get to sciencea not 
by dividing this common characteristic, but by specifying what the common 
characteristic in question is related to. In other words, the relation between the 
single science and sciencea seems to be different from the whole-and-part 
relation, at least the whole-and-part relation we normally think of. The 
Stranger’s identification of sciencea as a part of the single science, therefore, 
would require explanation. 
   To my mind, there is only one plausible explanation available: in (P51) the 
Stranger is only loosely or derivatively speaking of sciencea as a part of the single 
aspect of the form of science, since this sciencea is after all a part of (the plural 
aspect of) the same form. One might suppose that, in speaking of sciencea as a 
part of the single science, the Stranger has a special whole-and-part relation in 
mind.184 But this is unlikely because Plato never explains what this special 
                                                       
184 The models of intensional mereology proposed by Moravcsik (1973a, 174-77; 1973b, 
339-45) offer such a special whole-and-part relation. His proposal may have some force 
on his own assumptions that the form/kind in the Sophist and the Politicus is the 
Platonic Form and that the Platonic Form is intension, but in my interpretative 
framework it scarcely has any plausibility. 
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whole-and-part relation amounts to, which would have been indispensable in 
view of the fact that sciencea would rather confusingly stand both as a normal 
part of many sciences and as a special part of the single science at the same time. 
I therefore shall propose that we should adopt an intuitively clear model of 
division, the model in which, precisely speaking, what is being divided is always 
the plural aspect of the form/kind (or the full set of its instances). For example, 
in (P50), in dividing the form of the hunting of tame animals into two, the 
Stranger is in fact dividing many instances of this hunting (i.e. piracy, 
enslavement, tyranny, legal oratory, political oratory, conversation, etc.) into 
two groups. 
   Now that the controversial status of (C1), i.e. the form (or the kind or the 
part) that results from a particular step of division, has been clarified, let us turn 
to the rest of the elements involved in each step of division. A brief review will 
suffice for understanding the roles of (C2) – (C5). In essence, (C2) – (C5) all 
specify (C1) in one way or another. (C2), i.e. instances of the form under 
consideration, clarifies the plural aspect of this form by enumerating the many 
things that appear as the result of this form’s being instantiated in many 
contexts. On the other hand, (C3), i.e. the genus and the distinguishing mark, 
clarifies the single aspect of it by specifying the characteristic that distinguishes 
the instances of the form in question from the instances of its genus. But 
sometimes (C3) does not clarify this single aspect sufficiently for his 
interlocutors to understand it, and in such a case the Stranger offers (C4), i.e. a 
full explanation of the form in question, for further clarification of the single 
aspect of this form. (C3) by itself or (C3) clarified by (C4) may be considered to 
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be the definition of the form in question. (C5), i.e. the name of the form, is given 
mostly for the ease of reference to the form in question. It is important to note 
that (C5) is the only element that is dispensable in the course of the procedure 
of division. If some among (C2) – (C4) are omitted, this is because these 
elements are obvious to the interlocutors; being unable to give even one of them 
means the failure of the specification of the form in question, or the failure of 
division. By contrast, the absence of (C5) does not by itself disrupt the 
procedure. Indeed, the Stranger occasionally makes it clear that he does not 
have a name of the form under consideration.185 This contrast stems from the 
fact that (C2) – (C4) specify what the form at issue is, while (C5) only roughly 
indicates which form the interlocutors are talking about. 
   On the basis of this characterization of the elements involved in each step of 
division, I shall propose the following model of a step of division as 
presupposed by Plato in the Sophist and the Politicus. First of all, there is a 
precondition for any step of division: before an attempt to divide the 
genus-form of F into its species-forms, interlocutors must know both the single 
and the plural aspects of the genus-form of F, or in other words, they must 
know the definition of F, and must be able to enumerate many instances of F. 
Let us suppose that this condition is satisfied. The interlocutors then tackle the 
cardinal task of division, that is, an examination of the many instances of F in 
terms of their kinship, or their similarity and dissimilarity (cf. Plt. 261a3, 
                                                       
185 The Stranger omits (C5) for various reasons: first, that the thing in question is not 
worth naming (Sph. 220a1-4, 225c2-4; Plt. 260e7-9); second, that he does not have an 
ordinary name for it (Sph. 226d5); third, that the form in question should be left for 
somebody else to name (Sph. 267a11-b2); fourth, that the name of the form in question 
would be too complicated to make it necessary to bother with it (Plt. 265c2-d2). 
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285a8-b6). The goal of this task is to discover distinguishing characteristics in 
accordance with which these instances of F are divided into two groups, each of 
which has its own intrinsic unity.186 (When it is not possible to divide them into 
two, they must find distinguishing characteristics that divide them into three, or 
the smallest possible number of, groups; cf. Plt. 287c3-5). This procedure should 
be seen both as division and as collection: it is division because it divides 
instances of F into two groups of instances, i.e. instances of G and those of H 
(provided that instances of F are divisible into two), but it is also collection 
because it collects instances of G and those of H into two unities by offering the 
definition of G and that of H (these definitions are verbalization of the 
distinguishing characteristics coupled with the genus). By this procedure, the 
interlocutors specify both the single and the plural aspects of each of two forms, 
i.e. the form of G and that of H, and come to know them. Note that the 
procedure of collection involved in each step of division, i.e. examining 
instances of F (which are equal to the sum of instances of G and instances of H) 
in order to find the distinguishing characteristics and provide the definitions of 
G and H, corresponds to Socrates’ procedure for definition. 
   Finally, let us turn our attention from a single step of division to a whole 
series of divisions, and consider the procedure for definition through collection 
and division as a whole, for example, the whole procedure for the definition of 
                                                       
186 In the Politicus (262a3-e6) the Stranger dismisses attempts of division that involve a 
pseudo-unity, for example, the separation of the Greek race from what is called 
barbarians ‘which are unlimited in number, which don’t mix with one another, and 
don’t share the same language’ (262d3-4). For analyses of this passage, see Moravcsik 
(1973a, 163-64) and Koike (1982, 348-49; esp. 349: ‘In short, the separation of the Greeks 
from barbarians is not even a division, but is a mere postulation of the Greeks against 
some empty volume unsupported by our synthetic intuition’(translated from 
Japanese)). 
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angling schematised above, or the analogous procedure for the definition of 
sophistry in the Sophist. I have suggested in Chapter 4 that, although the 
procedure in question contains both collections and divisions of various things 
in the process, it should be considered, taken as a whole procedure, to be the 
collection of the subject-matter. Thus, for example, the whole procedure for the 
definition of angling, which contains collections and divisions of various 
sciences (e.g. acquisitive science, possession-taking, hunting) along the way, 
should be considered, taken as a whole, to be the collection of instances of 
angling under a single definition. It follows from this that the real starting point 
of the definition of angling is not an agreement that angling belongs to science, 
as is suggested in the text, but the examination of instances of angling, for 
example, sea angling, shore angling, and river angling. These instances are not 
mentioned in the text for the same reason as the Stranger omits (C2) and (C4) in 
(P48): instances of the thing at hand appear to be obvious to the interlocutors. 
   At this point, one might object that my suggestion above is implausible 
because there is no example, in the Sophist and the Politicus, of the whole 
procedure for definition that starts with the examination of instances. However, 
I think that there is one such example. The example I have in mind is placed at 
the beginning of the seventh, final and authentic, definition of sophistry. Here 
at 232b1-234e4 in the Sophist, the Stranger enumerates various subjects with 
which sophistry is concerned; (1) gods (232c1-2), (2) visible things on earth and 
in the sky (232c4-5), (3) coming-to-be and being (232c8), (4) laws and all political 
issues (232d1-2), and (5) the subject-matters of particular sciences (232d5-e2). He 
then concludes that sophistry is concerned with everything, and, on the basis of 
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this observation, loosely specifies it as a part of imitation. Now, my suggestion 
is that sophistry in relation to gods, sophistry in relation to visible things on 
earth and in the sky, etc., are instances of sophistry, which are enumerated and 
examined so as to provide data for the definition of sophistry. As is clear from 
Theaetetus’ reference to Protagoras’ book on wrestling as an example of (5) at 
232d9, (1) – (5) are not subjects of a single performance of speech. And it seems 
implausible to suppose that all these subjects are a matter of concern to a single 
sophist.187 Rather, we perceive sophistry in relation to one of these subjects in 
various people and on various occasions. For example, if we hear Euthyphro, 
who is not obviously a sophist, speak about piety as if he knows it very well 
after his discussion with Socrates in the eponymous dialogue, we will see an 
instance of sophistry (the insincere and unknowing sort of appearance-making) 
be present in him. I suggest, then, that sophistries in relation to (1) – (5) are 
instances of sophistry, and that the seventh definition of sophistry starts with 
the examination of instances of sophistry. It is true that there are no other 
obvious examples of the examination of instances of a subject-matter of 
definition in the Sophist and the Politicus. But the other six definitions of 
sophistry are not successful definitions, whose failure might be explained 
precisely on account of the absence of the examination of instances.188 Angling 
                                                       
187 It is clear that the Stranger concludes that sophistry is concerned with everything on 
the basis of the observations of (1) – (5), and that, in concluding this, he does not have 
in mind someone like Euthydemus who claims to know everything by exploiting 
fallacious arguments. 
188 I suggest that the first six definitions are uninformative in relation to sophistry 
because they do not mention the essential feature of sophistry, i.e. its lack of 
knowledge of the things it is concerned with. The definitions of sophistry as a 
wholesaler and a retailer of learning about the soul (Sph. 223c1-e5) may be compared 
with the definitions of courage as fighting against enemy while staying and while 
running in the Laches (190e4-c6). I strongly disagree with Cornford (1957, 187) and 
Bluck (1975, 44) when they propose that the seventh definition collects the common 
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and weaving, on the other hand, are explicitly introduced as 
easy-to-understand cases (see Sph. 218d2-6; Plt. 279a7-b6), and so do not seem 
to require an explicit enumeration of instances. The definition of statesmanship 
does not accord with my suggestion, but, in conformity with my account of the 
early dialogues and the Phaedrus, I would like to suggest that the seventh 
definition of sophistry, and not the definition of statesmanship, is the 
exemplary case, and that the procedure for definition through collection and 
division formally starts with the enumeration of instances of the subject-matter, 
and ends with the acquisition of its definition. 
                                                                                                                                                                
element of the first six definitions. 
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Chapter 6: Dialectic in the Philebus 
 
 
 
§1. Introduction 
   On my overall interpretation, after having demonstrated the function of the 
method of collection and division in its application to definition in the Sophist 
and the Politicus, Plato now turns to the clarification of the other application, i.e. 
internal analysis, through the investigation of the nature of pleasure and 
knowledge in the Philebus. The order of the exposition of the two applications is 
certainly of some significance. Definition is a simpler task than internal analysis, 
and so it is more convenient for Plato to offer various points we should note in 
the application of the method of collection and division in the course of the 
procedure for a definition than in an application of internal analysis. With the 
points explained in the Sophist and the Politicus in mind, we are now, in the 
Philebus, embarking on the investigation of what lies beyond Socrates’ horizon 
of definition. Before undertaking the actual examination of pleasure and 
knowledge, Plato offers us once more a general description of the method, at 
the beginning of the dialogue, in order to remind us of the method we should 
adopt for a successful investigation of the nature of things. 
   However, this general picture of mine requires an extensive argument, for 
the methodological passage of the Philebus is extremely controversial, and, so 
far as I know, no scholar has ever defended the view I have just described. The 
main source of this fierce dispute lies in the opacity of the interconnection of the 
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segments that comprise the methodological passage. I shall therefore start my 
discussion by carefully analysing the context in section 2. I shall then, in section 
3, discuss the passage given at 15b1-8 that has posed the major obstacle for our 
understanding of the methodological passage as a whole. This is the passage 
which scholars often say raises the ‘serious one and many problems’, but which 
I propose to call ‘apparent objections against Platonic Forms’. After having 
cleared away this obstacle, I shall turn, in section 4, to the dialectical method 
itself that is described at 16c10-e2, in the hope that it will become clear that this 
method is the same as the procedure for internal analysis described in the 
Phaedrus. I shall then, in section 5, conclude this chapter by briefly discussing 
two issues that have remained unexamined. 
 
§2. The context 
   The original question that has initiated the discussion in the dialogue is 
‘What is the best of all human possessions?’ (τί τῶν ἀνθϱωπίνων ϰτηµάτων 
ἄϱιστον 19c6). Philebus and Socrates each have their own proposals, 189 
although they are in agreement up to a point, i.e. that it will be a certain state or 
disposition of the soul (see 11d4-6). Philebus proposes that pleasure, 
amusement, enjoyment, and the like are the good.190 But he refuses to defend 
his own proposals, so that Protarchus, a follower of Philebus’ hedonistic view, 
undertakes the task and plays the role of Socrates’ interlocutor throughout the 
                                                       
189 The passages that inform us of Socrates’ and Philebus’ respective positions are 
somewhat dispersed across the dialogue: 11b4-c3, 19c4-e5, 60a7-b5, 66d7-e5. 
190 More precisely, as will turn out at 60a7-b5, Philebus has made the following two 
contentions: (1) pleasure is the goal for all living beings, and all living beings must 
strive for it; (2) pleasure is the good for all living beings; it is right to regard the two 
names, i.e. ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’, as belonging to one and the same thing or nature. 
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dialogue. Socrates’ proposal, on the other hand, is that pleasure and its kindred 
states are not the good, but that intellect, knowledge, understanding, science, 
memory, correct judgement, and the like are at least better than Philebus’ 
candidates for the good (or participate in the nature of the good more than 
Philebus’ candidates for the good do). 
   In order to settle the issue at hand, Socrates proposes to examine the nature 
of pleasure. At the very beginning, he says: ‘As to pleasure, I know that it is 
complex and, just as I said, we must make it our starting point and consider 
carefully what sort of nature it has (ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει). If one simply goes by the 
name it is one single thing, but in fact it comes in many forms (µοϱφάς) that are 
in some way even quite unlike each other.’ (12c4-8) His words resonate with the 
first step of the method for internal analysis described in the Phaedrus: 
‘Shouldn’t one reflect about the nature of anything (πεϱὶ ὁτουοῦν φύσεως) like 
this: first, is the thing about which we will want to be experts (τεχνιϰοί) 
ourselves and be capable of making others expert simple or complex?’ 
(270c10-d3) This is clearly no coincidence; rather, it is a tangible sign that the 
investigation of the nature of pleasure in the Philebus is going to be carried out 
through the method for internal analysis, thereby providing a working example 
of the method in question. 
   However, Socrates’ scheme for the examination of pleasure is immediately 
hampered by Protarchus, who quite persistently refuses to share Socrates’ 
‘knowledge’ (12c4) that pleasure is complex, before he is finally persuaded to 
accept it with the proviso that Socrates’ candidates for the good are treated in 
the same way. Let us call this exchange between Socrates and Protarchus at 
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12c8-14b8 ‘the opening skirmish’.191 I shall carefully examine this passage, for I 
think it is important to discern what is at issue here in order to understand the 
controversial methodological passage that follows the opening skirmish 
(14c1-18d2) in its proper context. 
   The opening skirmish runs like this. Immediately after his declaration that 
pleasure is complex (12c4-8, quoted above), Socrates gives the following 
examples as evidence for his claim that pleasure ‘comes in many forms 
(µοϱφάς) that are in some way even quite unlike each other’ (12c7-8): 
 
   (P52) SOCRATES: We say that a debauched person gets pleasure (ἥδεσθαι), as well 
as that a temperate person takes pleasure (ἥδεσθαι) in his very temperance. 
Again, we say that a fool, though full of foolish opinions and hopes, gets 
pleasure (ἥδεσθαι), but likewise a wise man takes pleasure (ἥδεσθαι) in his 
very wisdom. 
(12c8-d4) 
 
He then states that only a fool thinks that ‘these pleasures’ (τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν 
12d4), i.e. a debauched person’s pleasure and a temperate person’s pleasure 
from his own temperance, or a fool’s pleasure and a wise man’s pleasure from 
his own wisdom,192 are similar to each other. Protarchus disagrees.193 He first 
                                                       
191 I have adopted this phrase from Gosling (1975, 139). 
192 As has been noted since Damascius in Westerink (1982, 16), it is important for an 
attempt at understanding the dialogue as a whole to note that Plato adds ‘in his very 
temperance (or wisdom)’ (αὐτῷ τῷ σωφϱονεῖν (or φϱονεῖν)) in the cases of a temperate 
person’s pleasure and a wise man’s pleasure. I suggest that these pleasures anticipate 
‘the pleasures of health and of temperance and all those that commit themselves to 
virtue as to their deity and follow it around everywhere’ (63e4-6) that are given place 
in the good life achieved at the very end of the dialogue (pace Frede (1993, 78 n.1), who, 
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proposes that the dissimilarity Socrates is hinting at derives not from the 
pleasures themselves, but from the sources of the pleasures, and then justifies 
his proposal in this way: ‘For how could pleasure not be, of all things, most like 
pleasure? How could that thing not be most like itself?’ (12d8-e2) To show that 
Protarchus’ justification does not work, Socrates refers to the cases of colour 
and shape. 
 
   (P53) SOCRATES: Colours certainly won’t differ insofar as every one of them is a colour 
(ϰατά γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐδὲν διοίσει τὸ χϱῶµα εἶναι πᾶν); but we all know that 
black is not only different from white but is in fact its very opposite. And 
shape is most like shape in the same way. For shape is all one as a kind 
(γένει), but some of its parts (µέϱη) are absolutely opposite to one another, 
and others differ in innumerable ways. 
(12e3-13a2) 
 
Protarchus falters at this point, thus showing signs of conceding that there are 
                                                                                                                                                                
commenting on 63e4-6, suggests that ‘these pleasures cannot be those of possession but 
only those of the pursuit of these good states.’). Having said that, in what follows for 
the sake of conciseness I shall simply refer to these four instances of pleasure as 
‘pleasure as instantiated in persons’, omitting the phrases in question. 
193 The connection of particles ‘µὲν γάϱ …, οὐ µὴν … γε’ (12d7-8) implies Protarchus’ 
partial agreement with Socrates. But it should be noted that this partial agreement is 
about Socrates’ exposition at 12c4-d6 as a whole, and not particularly about Socrates’ 
rhetorical question at 12d4-6, as Hackforth (1972, 15) seems to suppose in his 
translation: ‘They are unlike, because they arise from opposite sources, Socrates: 
nevertheless in themselves they are not opposites’ (emphasis mine). Hackforth’s 
version implies that Protarchus distinguishes two aspects of pleasure: pleasures are 
different in that they come from opposites, but are the same in themselves. But this is 
very unlikely because the distinction of aspects in question is exactly the point brought 
into the discussion by Socrates immediately afterwards (12e3-13a3). I therefore suggest 
that Protarchus entirely disagrees about Socrates’ rhetorical question at 12d4-6. Cf. also 
Dancy (1984, 185 n.43). 
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pleasures that are opposite to each other. However, when Socrates 
provocatively argues that his concession will lead to the conclusion that there 
are both good and bad pleasures, thereby refuting Philebus’ proposal that 
pleasure is identical with the good,194 Protarchus, dissatisfied with such a quick 
conclusion, decides against the concession after all in the following exchange: 
 
   (P54) SOCRATES: But you will grant that they are unlike each other and that some 
are opposites? 
PROTARCHUS: Not insofar as they are pleasures (Οὔτι ϰαθ’ ὅσον γε ἡδοναί). 
(13c3-5) 
 
Protarchus’ answer in this passage marks the culmination of the opening 
skirmish. But Socrates’ reaction is simply dismissive; he says that this answer 
just brings them back to the situation before he introduced the cases of colour 
                                                       
194 I propose that Socrates’ argument at 13a7-b5, which is very compact and cryptic, 
should be schematised in the following way: 
 
   (A1) All pleasures are good. (A variation of Philebus’ proposal, 13a8; cf. 13b6-7) 
   (A2) There are many and dissimilar pleasures. (Socrates’ claim and Protarchus’ 
temporary admission, 13b2-3) 
   (A3) Some pleasures are good, but others are bad. (Socrates’ suggestion, 13b1) 
   (A4) Protarchus, by saying that all pleasures are good, attributes a name that is 
not appropriate. (13a7-8 explained by 13b2-3) 
   (A5) (A4) would not be the case if there were something that is the same in both 
good and bad pleasures, and by which all pleasures are good––but this is 
impossible. (13b3-5) 
 
I accept Stallbaum’s comment on ἑτέϱῳ … ὀνόµατι at 13a7-8: ‘alio nomine atque 
oportebat quodque cum dissimilitudine illa minime convenit’ (1842, 104) and 
understand the sentence at 13a7-8 as the anticipation of the conclusion. (Others (e.g. 
Bury (1897, 7), Delcomminette (2002, 39)) take it simply as ‘another name’, but the mere 
attribution of another name does not seem to be problematic, as is the case with 
synonyms, e.g. ‘largeness’ and ‘protruding’ (see Hi.Ma. 294b2), νοῦς and φϱόνησις (cf. 
Phlb. 59d1-5), or ἰδέα and εἶδος.) In principle, Protarchus could have avoided (A4) by 
denying (A3), namely by arguing that either what Socrates thinks bad pleasure, e.g. a 
debauched person’s pleasure, is in fact good, or it does not exist at all (i.e. a debauched 
person never gets pleasure). But he does not dare to do this, and so denies (A2). 
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and shape, with the result that they are discussing in a manner only suitable for 
the most incompetent person who is a raw beginner in discussion. He then 
compares Protarchus’ view with the statement that the most dissimilar thing is 
most similar to the most dissimilar thing. Thus, having made clear that 
Protarchus’ view makes for a cul-de-sac in their discussion, he offers a 
compromise: Socrates’ candidates for the good will be treated in the same way; 
there are many sciences and some of them are unlike each other. Protarchus 
accepts this, and finally they reach the agreement that pleasure is complex. 
   Now, what is at issue here? Scholars have often suggested that it is the 
disagreement about the nature of pleasure that is at stake.195 According to these 
scholars, in proposing that the dissimilarity of pleasure Socrates has in mind 
derives not from pleasure itself but from the sources of pleasure (12d7-8), 
Protarchus appeals to a theory of pleasure that is fundamentally different from 
Socrates’. Socrates thinks that pleasure consists in activities or experiences, while 
Protarchus identifies pleasure with mere feelings of pleasure, feelings that are 
separable from their sources, merely accompanying activities or experiences. Thus, 
for Protarchus, it is as silly to say that the pleasure of a debauched person is bad 
as to say that Socrates in bad company is bad. A feeling of pleasure is identical 
with another feeling of pleasure except in quantity; there is no qualitative 
difference among feelings of pleasure. The point of the opening skirmish is, 
then, according to these scholars, to persuade Protarchus into abandoning his 
theory of pleasure and also accepting a Socratic theory of pleasure. 
                                                       
195 See Frede (1993, xviii): ‘A fundamental disagreement about the nature of pleasure is 
at work.’ Cf. also Hackforth (1972, 16 n.1); Gosling (1975, 74-76); Frede (1997, 103-110). 
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   However, this interpretation seems to me to be misleading and to result 
from an unjustifiable attempt to reinforce Protarchus’ position. I myself suggest 
that the point of the opening skirmish is related to a purely logical issue and not 
to competing theories of pleasure. The key to understanding the point of the 
argument is to pay close attention to (P54), in which Protarchus denies Socrates’ 
words with the qualification ‘insofar as they are pleasures’. This qualification is 
important not only because we would expect an unconditional negation if he 
had a different theory of pleasure in mind, but also because it points to the fact 
that Socrates and Protarchus are in agreement that pleasures do not differ from one 
another insofar as they are pleasures. This is clear from (P53) in which Socrates says 
that colours will not differ insofar as they are colours.196 But then why is 
Socrates so dismissive towards Protarchus’ answer in (P54)? Because Protarchus 
has ignored Socrates’ point in (P53) that it is not pleasures insofar as they are 
pleasures, but pleasures insofar as they are ‘instances’197 (i.e. pleasures as 
instantiated in certain persons) that are at issue. In other words, Protarchus, 
while adopting Socrates’ distinction between aspects of pleasures in which all 
pleasures are alike and in which some pleasures are different from others, 
somehow sticks to the former aspect, ignoring and ‘hiding’ (ἀποϰϱυπτόµενοι 
                                                       
196 The Greek expressions for ‘insofar as …’ in (P53) and (P54) are different, but I think 
Frede (1993; 1997) is right in translating both of the expressions in the same way: both 
of them are used for specifying the aspect in which every F is F. In the early dialogues, 
Socrates uses other expressions for specifying the aspect in which every F is F: e.g. τῷ 
ἡδὺ εἶναι (Hi.Ma. 299d3), τῷ µελίττας εἶναι (Men. 72b4-5), ᾗ µέλιτται εἰσίν (Men. 72b8-9), 
πϱὸς τὸ ἰσχὺς εἶναι (Men. 72e6). Plato, at any rate, is consistent in distinguishing the 
aspect in which every F is F from the one in which an instance of F is different from 
another instance of F. Gosling (1975, 162; cf. 73-74) is wrong when he writes: ‘the 
language of 12-13 [in the Philebus] reads like a conscious rejection of views held in the 
Meno and Hippias Major.’ 
197 I mean ‘instances’ in my sense, i.e. F as instantiated in things, actions, and situations, 
and parts of F. More on this later. 
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14b1) the latter aspect.198 Similarly, I suggest that, when Socrates says ‘I could 
say the same thing as you did’ (13d5) in relation to the statement about the most 
dissimilar things, he has the following conversation in mind: 
 
A: The most dissimilar thing is dissimilar to the most dissimilar thing, isn’t 
it? 
B: Not insofar as they are the most dissimilar things. 
 
B’s answer is certainly correct, but this is not the answer A is after. In short, the 
lesson we learn here is that it is ridiculous to stick to the aspect in which every F 
is F, while ignoring the aspect in which an instance of F differs from another 
instance of F. 
   One might think that this is too trivial a point to be discussed so extensively 
by Plato. But Plato himself makes clear that the problem Socrates and 
Protarchus are facing is easy to avoid, by indicating that Protarchus’ position is 
ridiculous. If Socrates or Protarchus take that position, then they will be 
‘behaving and speaking in just the same way as those who are the most 
incompetent and at the same time new-comers (νέοι) in such discussions’ 
(13c9-d1), or they will turn out to be ‘quite childish (νεώτεϱοι τοῦ δέοντος)’ 
(13d6), or again ‘[their] whole discussion would come to an end […] with 
[them] kept safe and sound through some absurdity (τινος ἀλογίας)’ (14a3-5). The 
                                                       
198 For similar lines of interpretation, see Benitez (1989, 34): ‘Protarchus found this easy 
to dispute: pleasures occur in different circumstances, but qua pleasures they are all 
alike (12d7-e2). Socrates then argued that colors qua colors are alike; nevertheless, there 
are many, even opposite, colors’; Irwin (1995, 320): ‘[Protarchus’] argument exploits an 
ambiguity in “qua pleasures”, which might mean (1) “qua some pleasure or other” or 
(2) “qua the sorts of pleasures they are”.’ 
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implication is that one will not make the same move as Protarchus, if one is 
better than a childish or unreasonable interlocutor. On the other hand, even 
though the position in question is unreasonable, Protarchus is not exceptional 
in taking it. Indeed, as we shall see, Socrates later says that whoever ‘among the 
young’ (τῶν νέων 15d9) has first found out that F is both one and many ‘revels 
in moving every discussion, now turning [each thing, i.e. F]199 to one side and 
rolling it all up into one, then again unrolling it and dividing it up’ (15e2-3), and 
end up floundering in utter confusion. Protarchus takes this remark as an 
allusion to him and his companions (16a4-5), and I think he is not mistaken; by 
sticking to pleasures insofar as they are pleasures, he has rolled up pleasures 
into one. Meno in the dialogue named after him is, I suggest, making the same 
kind of mistake, only the other way round. That is to say, he tends to think of 
virtue in terms of instances, neglecting virtue insofar as it is virtue, and so 
Socrates requests: ‘stop making many out of one, as jokers say whenever 
someone breaks something; but allow virtue to remain whole and sound, and 
tell me what it is.’ (Men. 77a7-9) Plato carefully explains Meno’s ‘dividing up’ in 
                                                       
199 I suggest that we should supply ἕϰαστον (from ἕϰαστον τῶν λεγοµένων ἀεί at 15d5) 
as the object of ϰυϰλῶν, συµφύϱων, ἀνειλίττων, and διαµεϱίζων at 15e2-3. Diès (1949) 
and Pradeau (2002), who insert ‘tout’ as the object of these verbs in their translations, 
seem to understand the sentence in the same way. (And perhaps so do Fowler (1925) 
and Hackforth (1972); they insert, respectively, ‘things’ and ‘the stuff’ in their 
translations.) Others, e.g. Gosling (1975), Waterfield (1982), Benitez (1989), Frede (1993; 
1997), Benardete (1993), translate the sentence in such a way that λόγον, taken from the 
main clause at 15e2, is the object of the verbs in question. This is certainly a more 
natural reading of Greek than my own suggestion, but it is unlikely that Socrates is 
talking about one λόγος and many λόγοι here. In fact, none of the scholars mentioned 
here seem to understand that the argument is about the one and many of λόγος. 
Benitez (1989, 35), for example, explicitly supplying ‘definition’ as the object of the 
verbs in question, paraphrases the passage in this way: ‘The paradox monger can 
unroll such a definition by showing that the definiendum applies to many things. He 
can knead a definition into one by claiming that the definiendum, e.g. “pleasure”, 
always means just one thing.’ In Benitez’s version, it is only one definition that is at 
issue; what is divided up is not the definition, but the definiendum. But if so, λόγος 
would not be a suitable object of διαµεϱίζων (dividing up). 
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the Meno (74b2-77b1), using the same examples as in (P53), i.e. shape and colour. 
It stands to reason, then, that Plato wants an opportunity to explain at length 
what ‘rolling F up into one’ amounts to. 
   When the opening skirmish is finally settled, Socrates next turns to 
methodological issues and discusses them in detail. In this methodological 
passage (14c1-18d2), he first refers to some ‘controversy’ or ‘dispute’ (see 
ἀµφισβητῆσαι 14c9; ἀµφισβήτησις 15a7; τὰ ἀµφισβητούµενα 15d2)200 about one 
and many, and then explicates a dialectical procedure. How the controversy 
Socrates describes here should be understood, and in what way it is connected 
with the dialectical procedure, have been matters of fierce and longstanding 
discussion among scholars. I shall examine these matters closely in the next 
section. For the moment, I shall roughly follow Socrates’ words, trying to make 
clear the role of the methodological passage in the dialogue, by paying 
particular attention to the way Socrates first broaches the issues at 14c1-10 and 
also to the lesson of the methodological passage he sums up at 18e3-19a2. 
   First, let us have a look at the introductory part of the methodological 
passage, where Socrates seems to give us some hints about the reasons for 
taking up the controversy about one and many: 
 
                                                       
200 Scholars almost without exception assume that Socrates here refers to some 
one-and-many problems. This assumption is, in my view, one of the main causes of the 
endless discussion on the passage, for, under this assumption, it is natural to expect 
that Socrates gives solutions to these problems, but, to the dismay of these scholars, he 
does not appear to be dealing with these problems anywhere in the dialogue. The truth 
is that Socrates only talks about controversy, and he emphasises the importance of 
agreement. Agreement can be reached even without coping with objections––for 
example, interlocutors can agree that certain objections are made just for their own 
sake, and so are pointless or unproductive. It is precisely this kind of agreement, or so I 
shall argue later, that Socrates and Protarchus reach in the course of the 
methodological passage. 
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(P55) SOCRATES: Let us then give even stronger support to this account by an 
agreement (τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἔτι µᾶλλον δι’ ὁµολογίας 
βεβαιωσώµεθα). 
PROTARCHUS: What account? 
SOCRATES: The one that creates difficulties for everyone, for some willingly, 
for some, sometimes, against their will. 
PROTARCHUS: Explain this more clearly. 
SOCRATES: It is this account that has turned up just now, which somehow has an 
amazing nature. For that the many are one and the one is many are amazing 
statements (θαυµαστὸν λεχθέν), and it is easy (ῥᾴδιον) to dispute with anyone 
who posits (τιθεµένῳ) either of them. 
(14c1-10) 
 
It is clear that Socrates means by the ‘account that has turned up just now’ the 
essential point established in the opening skirmish, namely: 
 
(OM1) F is one qua F, but qua instances of F it is many, and these instances are 
dissimilar to one another.201 
 
Pleasure, for example, is one qua pleasure, but qua a collection of instances (e.g. 
pleasure as instantiated in a temperate person, pleasure as instantiated in a 
debauched person) it is many, and these instances are dissimilar to one another. 
                                                       
201 For the sake of conciseness, I shall use hereafter ‘qua …’ instead of ‘insofar as it is … 
(or they are …)’. 
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This account implies that one thing (e.g. pleasure) is many, or that many things 
(e.g. pleasures) are just one. But both statements are, according to Socrates, 
easily disputable; there are apparent objections readily available. It stands to 
reason, then, that Socrates turns to the controversy about one and many; he 
wants to secure agreement in relation to the one and many so that the apparent 
objections he mentions will not cause any problems for them. 
   Protarchus, however, cannot see what the ‘account that has turned up just 
now’ amounts to. So he asks Socrates whether or not he means the following 
case, which also implies that one thing is many, or that many things are just 
one: 
 
(OM2) Protarchus is one by nature, but is many and opposite Protarchuses by 
being tall and short, heavy and light, etc. 
 
Of course, Socrates does not mean (OM2), which he calls a ‘widely circulated’ 
(τὰ δεδηµευµένα 14d4) version of the paradox about one and many. Indeed, he 
says that it is admitted by virtually everyone that one should not touch or refute 
it, as it is childish, easy, and just a hindrance to discussion (see 14d5-8; cf.15a4). 
It then seems to follow that in this case controversy does not arise at all; there are 
no objections available, for (OM2) is not worth objecting to. Socrates has 
another example of this kind of paradox:202 
                                                       
202 I understand 14d5-8 in the following way: ‘such things (τῶν τοιούτων) are agreed 
by virtually everyone to be no longer even worth touching […]; [I say ‘such things’] 
because the following case is not [worth refuting], either (ἐπεὶ µηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε).’ An ἐπεί 
clause, which introduces a reason for the content of the main clause, sometimes only 
loosely connects with that clause. It is such a loose connection that is given by the ἐπεί 
clause in our passage; Socrates is in effect simply adding another, equally childish and 
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(OM3) Each thing is one, but is many and infinitely many by being divided by 
statements into limbs and parts. 
 
Socrates makes clear that neither (OM2) or (OM3) is the case about which he 
wants to secure agreement.203 Having understood this, Protarchus asks him 
what kind of case he did have in mind; which case is it that has not yet been 
admitted not to be touched or refuted?204 
   Socrates answers that it is the case in which one does not posit ‘one thing’ or 
‘the unity’ (τὸ ἕν) among things that come to be and cease to be. In both (OM2) 
                                                                                                                                                                
easy paradox [i.e. OM3] at 14d8-e4. For similar uses of ἐπεὶ ϰαί (ἐπεὶ µηδέ is its negative 
form) introducing an extra example, see e.g. Ap.20a3, Phdr.244c5. Waterfield (1989, 57 
n.2) and Meinwald (1996, 99), according to whom the use of ἐπεί suggests that either 
(OM2) or (OM3) is more significant than the other, make unnecessarily heavy weather 
of this. 
203 Scholars have often wondered why Socrates is so dismissive towards (OM2) and 
(OM3), while in the Parmenides he appeals to the theory of Forms in order to solve 
analogous problems ((OM2) and (OM3) respectively correspond to 128e6-129b1 and 
129c4-d2 in the Parmenides). But we should be cautious in the treatment of the 
Parmenides, in which Plato deliberately creates puzzles by exploiting the ambiguity of 
εἶδος and ἰδέα (forms/Forms) and by swapping the relation between Platonic Forms 
and particulars, i.e. µετέχειν, with the one between Socratic forms and particulars, i.e. 
ἔχειν (for the replacement of µετέχειν with ἔχειν, see Fujisawa (1974)). I suggest that 
things already go wrong in the Parmenides when Socrates appeals to Platonic Forms in 
order to solve these ‘childish’ problems. In fact, the formulae given by Protarchus and 
Socrates, i.e. (OM2) and (OM3), which make explicit the aspects in which something is 
said to be one or many, neatly resolve the paradox, and no further ado is necessary, let 
alone any appeal to the theory of Forms. Scholars also quote passages from other, 
earlier dialogues in which they claim Plato is dealing with (OM2) or (OM3) at length (cf. 
e.g. Dancy (1984, 176-83), Benitez (1989, 12-24), Frede (1993, xx-xxi; 1997, 114-18), 
Delcomminette (2002, 22-25; 2006, 53)); however, in my view, Plato only makes use of 
his customary distinction between F things and the Socratic form of F in these passages, 
and this does not imply that he is dealing with (OM2) or (OM3). For instance, Plato’s 
point in the Phaedo (102b3-d2) is not to explain how Simmias can be simultaneously 
large and small (and so many), as Benitez and Delcomminette propose, but to explain 
how largeness and smallness in Simmias function as the causes for him to be large and 
small respectively. 
204 Note that Protarchus’ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον (14e6) is not the same as Socrates’ 
τοῦτον … τὸν λόγον (14c1). The former refers to the statements that the one is many or 
that the many are one, which is common among (OM1) – (OM3), but the latter only 
refers to the special case of one and many that gives rise to controversy, i.e. (OM1). 
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and (OM3), the unity at issue is taken from such things. He then continues: 
 
   (P56) SOCRATES: But when someone tries to posit man as one, or ox as one, or the 
beautiful as one, and the good as one, zealous concern with these unities and 
the like (πεϱὶ τούτων τῶν ἑνάδων ϰαὶ τῶν τοιούτων), together with 
division,205 gives rise to controversy. 
(15a4-7) 
 
It is fairly clear from the context that in (P56) Socrates is not introducing a new 
case of one and many, but is referring back to (OM1), thereby viewing it in a 
new light by way of contrast with (OM2) and (OM3). So far it has only been 
agreed that F is one insofar as it is F, and what kind of thing this one F is has not 
been considered. He now points out that F qua F does not belong to things that 
come to be and cease to be. When he and Protarchus posit pleasure, or science, 
as one (see 12c7; cf. 18a6), they do not think of it as an individual or a certain 
thing divisible into limbs or parts. But, then, in relation to (OM1) there are 
apparent objections, as Socrates anticipated in (P55), and now he describes them 
                                                       
205 I think the ‘division’ only anticipates 15b5-7 (‘whether one must posit [such a unit] 
as dispersed … or as a whole separated from itself’). By contrast, Delcomminette (2002, 
29-30), taking this word as a reference to the dialectical method, writes: ‘Socrates 
explicitly presents these problems [at 15b1-8] as resulting from the practice of division. 
[…] [T]his implies that the method is not meant to deal with these problems, but rather 
to give rise to them. In other words, these problems do not appear before the practice of 
dialectic’ (his emphases). However, it is unlikely that Plato would describe the 
dialectical method just as ‘division’ (which is merely a piece of jargon sometimes used 
by Platonic scholars in order to refer to Plato’s later dialectic in general). 
Delcomminette himself seems to suppose that the process of division is only equivalent 
to the second of the three steps of dialectic, thus implying that the first objection, which 
according to him the first step of dialectic invites, arises before division. In any case, 
Socrates makes explicit in (P55) that the opponents make objections simply if one posits 
either that one is many or many are one in the relevant sense; they are not so kind as to 
wait for the practice of division. 
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in detail (15b1-8). I shall examine these objections in the next section. Having 
described the objections, Socrates reemphasises the significance of agreement 
about the one and many that appear in (OM1) and the objections in question.206 
And ostensibly he turns to discuss this issue straightaway (see 15c4-d2). 
However, it is not clear where Socrates in fact secures agreement about the one 
and many, if he does at all. At least it seems evident that he nowhere directly 
addresses the objections he described; he nowhere considers whether they are 
valid or not, and if so, why. 
   At any rate, Socrates turns to what he claims to be an appropriate starting 
point for the battle over the things in dispute, i.e. the kind of one and many that 
is at issue. He first remarks that it is because of the everlasting nature of 
language inherent in human beings that the same thing (F) appears everywhere, 
becoming both one and many (15d4-8). He then describes a young boy’s way of 
dealing with the one and many: he enjoys making mess of every discussion, 
‘now turning [F] to one side and rolling it all up into one, then again unrolling it 
and dividing it up’ (15e2-3), and throws himself and others into confusion. I 
have already suggested that this is partly an allusion to Protarchus’ way of 
dealing with the one and many of pleasure in the opening skirmish. Protarchus 
                                                       
206 I understand ταῦτ’ ἔστι τὰ πεϱὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἓν ϰαὶ πολλά, ἀλλ’ οὐϰ ἐϰεῖνα … 
(15b8-c1) as ‘it is this one and many that is related to this sort of issues [i.e. (OM1) and 
the objections], and not that one and many [that appears in (OM2) and (OM3)] that, 
etc.’, connecting ταῦτα τὰ ἓν ϰαὶ πολλά together. Cf. Stallbaum (1842, 116): ‘Haecce 
sunt in talibus quaestionibus τὰ ἓν ϰαὶ πολλά […], nec vero illa […] quae […] omnis 
dubitationis caussae existunt.’ By contrast, Bury (1897, 14) connects τὰ τοιαῦτα ἓν ϰαὶ 
πολλά together and renders: ‘It is these questions, ––viz. those which deal with the One 
and Many of the kind described, ––and not those first mentioned (ἐϰεῖνα), Protarchus, 
which’, etc. Bury’s rendering seems to have been accepted by many scholars (e.g. 
Taylor (1956, 108), Hackforth (1972, 19), Frede (1993, 7), Benardete (1993, 8), 
Delcomminette (2006, 76)). But I do not think Bury’s view is correct, for, as I have made 
it clear, in the cases of (OM2) and (OM3) controversy does not occur; there are no 
objections or questions that are comparable to those at 15b1-8. 
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seems to perceive a veiled insinuation about himself, but is only jokingly 
indignant. He asks Socrates to teach him a device for clearing up such confusion 
from their discussion and a way finer than the young boy’s to approach their 
discussion.207 
   Responding to Protarchus’ request, Socrates introduces what he claims to be 
the finest way ever, that is, dialectic.208 He first makes some prefatory remarks, 
i.e. that he is always a ‘lover’ (ἐϱαστής 16b6) of this method, and that 
everything in the realm of ‘science’ (τέχνης 16c2) that has been discovered has 
come to light through this method. He then offers a rather detailed depiction of 
this dialectical method (16c5-e2). I shall carefully examine the description of the 
method in section 4, and only give a basic outline here. First, Socrates puts 
forward a theory on the structure of each thing (F) that is said to trace its origins 
back to gods: ‘whatever is always said to be consists of one and many, having in 
its nature limit and unlimitedness.’ (16c9-10) Second, on the basis of this theory, 
he prescribes a method for the investigation or the learning and teaching of F, 
                                                       
207 By ‘their discussion’ (cf. τοῦ λόγου 16a8; τὸν λόγον 16b1), I mean the original 
discussion as to whether pleasure or knowledge is the good. (This will of course be 
included in ‘every discussion’ (πάντα … λόγον 15e2) a young boy can make a mess of.) 
I think that ‘a better way than this towards the discussion’ (ὁδὸν … τινα ϰαλλίω ταύτης 
ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον 16a8-b1; cf. ὁδός 16b5) makes clear that Protarchus somehow 
understands that what is at issue here is a method for approaching their original 
discussion. Similarly, I suggest that Protarchus’ immediately following words, i.e. ‘the 
present discussion (λόγος) is no mean thing’ (16b2-3), emphasise the significance of 
their original discussion. By contrast, many scholars seem to have supposed that the 
λόγος that appears twice in Protarchus’ words at 16a4-b3 refers to the discussion on the 
one and many. But in this case the expression ὁδὸν … ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον seems puzzling, 
and accordingly they give up a strict translation; see, e.g., Fowler (1925): ‘some better 
road than this to bring us towards the goal of our argument‘; Diès (1949): ‘une route 
plus belle vers la conclusion de cette enquête’; Gosling (1975): ‘a better way than this to 
conduct the argument’; Benitez (1989, 37): ‘some better way than this for the 
argument’; Frede (1993): ‘a better solution to the problem’; Benardete (1993): ‘some 
more beautiful way than this for the argument’; Frede (1997): ‘ein besserer Weg zu 
einer Lösung’. 
208 See ‘we are engaged with each other in dialectical discourse’ (τό … διαλεϰτιϰῶς … 
ἡµᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πϱὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους 17a3-5). 
 251 
which consists of the following three steps: (D1) one should posit a single form 
of F and search for it; (D2) one should examine if F is somehow two or three or 
some other number, and then examine if each of them is again somehow two or 
three or some other number, and so on, until one sees how many of F there are 
in total; (D3) one can release each of F into the unlimited. 
   Thus having described the methodological procedure, Socrates contrasts it 
with the attitudes of contemporary ‘intellectuals’ (σοφοί) towards the one and 
many (16e3-17a5). He says that these intellectuals make one haphazardly, and 
many faster or slower than they should, and that they turn to the unlimited 
immediately after the one, while the number between them escapes their 
attention. He then characterises his own method as the dialectical method in 
contrast to the merely eristic attitudes of contemporary intellectuals. It seems 
clear that these intellectuals are also involved with the one and many that 
appear in (OM1), but it is unclear whom Socrates has in mind and what kind of 
attitude they take towards the one and many, or more specifically, whether or 
not these intellectuals are different from the young boys described at 15d8-16a3. 
I shall discuss these issues in the next section. 
   Socrates then offers an illustration of the dialectical method using vocal 
sound and musical sound as examples (17a6-e6). I shall discuss this illustration 
together with the dialectical method in section 4. The illustration is then 
followed by the introduction of a different case, in which someone is obliged to 
get hold of the unlimited of F first, instead of the one (18a6-b4). Socrates advises 
that in this case one should examine the number of F before getting to the one. 
He then adds an illustration for this case too: Theuth, an Egyptian god or 
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godlike person, invented a writing system in this way (18b6-d2). This concludes 
the methodological passage of the Philebus. 
   Protarchus and Philebus accept the explanation of the dialectical method, 
but cannot quite make out the connection of the method with their original 
discussion about pleasure and knowledge. Accordingly, Socrates brings home 
to them the lesson of the methodological passage in the following exchange: 
 
   (P57) SOCRATES: Did we not embark on an investigation of knowledge and 
pleasure, to find out which of the two is preferable? 
PHILEBUS: Yes, indeed. 
SOCRATES: And we do say that each of them is one. 
PHILEBUS: Right. 
SOCRATES: This is the very point in question to which our preceding 
discussion obliges us to give an answer: to show how each of them is one and 
many, and how instead of becoming unlimited straightaway (πῶς µὴ ἄπειϱα 
εὐθύς), each one of them acquires some definite number (τινά ποτε ἀϱιθµόν) 
before it becomes unlimited. 
(18e3-19a2) 
 
As is indicated in (P55), the methodological passage started with a view to 
establishing (OM1) firmly by an agreement. If they agree, in the course of the 
discussion, that any cases of (OM1) should be treated by way of the dialectical 
procedure, then it is reasonable to suppose that this is the agreement Socrates 
wants to secure. However, an important question seems to remain: what has 
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happened to the apparent objections described at 15b1-8? In (P57), Socrates 
seems to confirm that they posit knowledge as one, or pleasure as one, in a 
manner reminiscent of the condition for the objections described in (P56), in 
which someone is said to posit ‘man as one, or ox as one, or the beautiful as one, 
and the good as one’. Plato cannot have simply forgotten the objections in 
question. I suggest, then, that Plato has already given his answer to the 
objections, and we shall find it if we examine the text carefully. 
   So far we have looked at the passages in the Philebus in which the 
methodological procedure is the subject of discussion. In this dialogue, there are 
two other passages that are also important for an understanding of Plato’s later 
dialectic. The first passage is 23b5-25b4, in which Socrates makes it clear that he 
is applying the dialectical method by referring back to the procedure described 
at 16c10-e2. The second passage is 57e3-59d9, in which Socrates introduces 
dialectic as the most exact of all sciences. These two passages may be placed in 
the following context. After (P57), Protarchus complains about the way Socrates 
leads the discussion, for at least he himself cannot show how many kinds of 
pleasure there are, and what each of them is like (19a3-20a8). Socrates then 
suggests that they can do, for the moment at least, without the examinations of 
pleasure and knowledge, and offers an argument that shows that neither a life 
of pleasure nor that of knowledge is the good life (20b1-22b9). But this 
argument does not end the discussion; it only changes the main question of the 
dialogue into this: which of pleasure and knowledge is the more akin to the 
cause of the good life (22c1-23b4)? Socrates ends up undertaking the 
examinations of pleasure and knowledge to find out the answer to this new 
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question. He first sets up the framework of the investigation, i.e. the fourfold 
division of the things now existing in the universe (23b5-31b1). In the course of 
this fourfold classification Socrates explicitly makes use of the dialectical 
method (the first passage mentioned above). Socrates then offers a detailed 
analysis of pleasure (31b2-55c3), which constitutes the main part of the dialogue, 
and also an analysis of knowledge (55c4-59d9). In this analysis of knowledge 
Socrates refers to dialectic (the second passage mentioned above). On the basis 
of these analyses Socrates and Protarchus finally agree that Socrates’ candidates 
for the good are more closely related to the cause of the good life than Philebus’ 
candidates, thus concluding the dialogue (61a4-67b13). 
 
§3. One and Many 
   In this section, as I have anticipated, I would like to address the issues of 
what the apparent objections described at 15b1-8 amount to, and how Socrates 
responds to these objections. A glance at a lengthy list of the secondary 
literature on them will show that these issues are highly controversial. 209 
Indeed, many and various attempts at settling these issues have been proposed, 
but, to my mind, they are all unsatisfactory because they do not sufficiently take 
into consideration the surrounding context. As has been indicated, the main 
subject of the methodological passage (14c1-18d2) is the one and many that 
                                                       
209 Such a list can be found in Delcomminette (2002, 21 n.1; 2006, 51 n.1). Here is mine: 
Archer-Hind (1901); Anscombe (1966, 406-408); Friedländer (1969, 534-36 n.27); Striker 
(1970, 11-30); Shiner (1974, 38-42); Gosling (1975, 143-53); Casper (1977); Hahn (1978); 
Dancy (1984); Benitez (1989); Hampton (1990, 13-21); Löhr (1990); Mirhady (1992); De 
Chiara-Quenzer (1993); Frede (1993, xx-xxx); Barker (1996, 161-64); Meinwald (1996); 
Frede (1997, 112-46); Dixsaut (2001, 285-340); Delcomminette (2002; 2006, 51-78); 
Muniz&Rudebusch (2004); Schmidt-Wiborg (2005, 7-35). 
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appear in (OM1) (‘F is one qua F, but is many qua instances of F’), in which the 
‘one’ does not belong to things that come to be and cease to be. Socrates 
describes the following four ways of being involved with this kind of one and 
many: 
 
   (#1) raising apparent objections (15a4-b8) 
   (#2) the young boys’ way (15d8-16a3) 
   (#3) applying the dialectical procedure (16c10-e2) 
   (#4) the way of contemporary intellectuals (16e4-17a5) 
 
Scholars almost without exception assume that the apparent objections raised at 
(#1) are dealt with by the dialectical procedure at (#3).210 However, it is not 
clear how (#3) is supposed to give answers to (#1), for apparently (#1) and (#3) 
are concerned with quite different cases. By contrast, I shall argue that the 
reference to ‘contemporary intellectuals’ at (#4) is an ironical reference to both 
those who raise the apparent objections at (#1) and the young boys at (#2). I 
suggest that the agreement Socrates secures in the methodological passage is 
that we should adopt the dialectical procedure and dismiss as merely eristic the 
other two ways described at (#1) and (#2). 
   In what follows, I shall first turn to the text in which the apparent objections 
are described (15b1-8) and give a concise description of the interpretations that 
                                                       
210 So far as I know, the only exception is Delcomminette (2002; 2006, 51-78), who 
suggests that the apparent objections are outcomes of the dialectical method. But as I 
have noted in n.205, his interpretation does not seem to be compatible with the way 
Socrates embarks on the methodological issues in (P55). 
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have been proposed so far (§3.1). I shall then move on to an examination of the 
proposals that have been made to connect (#1) with the surrounding context 
(§3.2). After this, I shall explain my own proposal in detail (§3.3). 
 
§3.1. The text and interpretations of 15b1-8 
   First of all, let us have a look at the passage in question. I shall first quote it 
in Greek, for the proper reading of the Greek text has been disputed, and 
alternative ways of punctuating and several proposals for emendation have 
been suggested. In Burnet’s standard edition, at any rate, the passage runs as 
follows: 
 
15b1 πϱῶτον  µ ὲ ν  ε ἴ  τ ι ν ας  δ ε ῖ  τ ο ι α ύ τα ς  ε ἶ ν α ι  µονάδα ς 
ὑπολαµβάνειν  ἀληθῶς οὔσας·  εἶτα  πῶς αὖ  ταύτας,  µίαν 
ἑϰάστην οὖσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ϰαὶ µήτε γένεσιν µήτε ὄλεθϱον 
πϱοσδεχοµένην, ὅµως εἶναι βεβαιότατα µίαν  ταύτην; µετὰ 
  b5 δὲ τοῦτ’ ἐν τοῖς γιγνοµένοις αὖ ϰαὶ ἀπείϱοις εἴτε διεσπα- 
σµένην ϰαὶ πολλὰ γεγονυῖαν θετέον, εἴθ’ ὅλην αὐτὴν αὑτῆς 
χωϱίς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνοιτ’ ἄν, ταὐτὸν ϰαὶ 
  b8 ἓν  ἅµα  ἐν  ἑνί  τε  ϰαὶ  πολλοῖς  γίγνεσθαι . 
 
This text may be translated in the following way (this translation is intended to 
be as literal as possible): 
 
(Q1) First, [the question is] whether one should suppose that there are some 
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such monads truly being; (Q2) then again, how [one should suppose that] 
these, each being one and always the same and admitting neither 
coming-to-be nor perishing, are nevertheless most firmly this one. (Q3) After 
this again, (whether one must posit [such a monad] as having been dispersed 
in the comings-to-be and unlimited things and as having become many, or as 
being itself, as a whole, separate from itself, which would seem to be the 
most impossible of all), [how one should suppose that] the same and one 
comes to be in one and many at the same time.211 
 
It has been commonly agreed by scholars that the ‘monads’ in this passage 
refers to Platonic Forms, and that the objections put forward here correspond, at 
least partially, to Parmenides’ objection to Socrates’ postulation of Platonic 
Forms in the Parmenides (130a3-135c4). Under this supposition, the meanings of 
(Q1) and (Q3) seem fairly clear; (Q1) questions the existence of Platonic Forms 
(cf. Prm. 134e9-135b2),212 and (Q3) questions the possibility of the instantiation 
                                                       
211 The translation is mine. I have taken here, following the majority of scholars, the 
εἴτε … εἴτε … clause (from ἐν τοῖς γιγνοµένοις at 15b5 to φαίνοιτ’ ἄν at 15b7) as a long 
parenthesis. In this case, we must supply an interrogative, i.e. πῶς (‘how’) taken from 
(Q2), to (Q3). Alternatively, one might take it that εἴτε at 15b5 and εἴτε at 15b6 are 
themselves interrogatives introducing the third question by assuming that the second 
εἴτε clause continues up to πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι at 15b8 (cf. e.g. Benitez (1989, 24-30)). 
According to this view, the passage runs as follows: 
 
(Q3*) After this again, whether one must posit [such a monad] as having been 
dispersed in the comings-to-be and unlimited things and as having become 
many, or whether [one must posit that such a monad], as being itself, as a 
whole, separate from itself, which would seem to be the most impossible of 
all, being the same and one, comes to be in one and many at the same time. 
 
In this case, we do not need to supply the interrogative as in (Q3), but we have to 
assume that θετέον (‘posit’) at 15b6 is first connected with participles (διεσµασµένην, 
γεγονυῖαν 15b5-6) and then with an infinitive (γίγνεσθαι 15b8), which seems certainly 
unnatural. This seems to be the reason why the majority of scholars prefers (Q3) to 
(Q3*). 
212 Muniz&Rudebusch (2004) argue that Plato coined the word ἑνάς in order to 
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of Platonic Forms in things that come to be and cease to be (cf. Prm. 
130e4-131c11). However, it is hard to see the meaning of (Q2). In essence, (Q2) 
would be asking ‘how one should suppose that these, each being one […], are 
nevertheless most firmly this one?’, and on the face of it such a question seems 
hardly to make sense. 
   In view of the incomprehensible wording of (Q2), some scholars have 
suggested that we should recognise only two questions in the passage by 
unifying (Q2) and (Q3) into a single objection (let us call these scholars 
‘two-questionists’). Some of them claim that this fusion is possible without 
emendation, but by adopting a punctuation different from the one given by 
Burnet (punctuation was not marked in Plato’s original text) and by construing 
the position of the adversative conjunction at 15b4, i.e. ὅµως, through 
hyperbaton.213 That is to say, they first replace the question mark at 15b4 in 
Burnet’s edition with a comma, and then contrast the ὅµως clause not with the 
preceding clause but with the one that follows. The outcome can be translated 
as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
distinguish it from µονάς ‘much as genera are distinct from species’ (401). According to 
this view, (Q1) questions only the existence of those Platonic Forms which are 
somehow analogous to species. Even if we set aside apparent implausibility involved 
in the supposition that Plato introduces such an important distinction without any 
explanation, there seems to be an argumentative and philosophical reason for denying 
such a supposition. Let us suppose that the view in question is right. Then, either (Q1) 
questions the existence of all species-Forms or only some particular species-Forms. If 
the former, there seems to be little reason to take the objection seriously, for the mere 
existence of black as species of colour (cf. 12e5) or that of man as species of animal (cf. 
15a4) are sufficient for sweeping aside the objection. If the latter, that is, if (Q1) is 
concerned with only some unclear cases, e.g. the existence of the hunting of tame 
animals as a species of hunting (see Sph. 222b6-c3), it will no longer be an objection 
about the one and many in general. 
213 See e.g. Badham (1855a, 8-9), Poste (1860, 9-10), Jackson (1897, 292), Cherniss (1947, 
230 n.62), Ross (1953, 131 n.1), Striker (1970, 14 n.1), Frede (1997, 122 n.17). 
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(Q2*) Then again, how [one should suppose that] these, each being one and 
always the same and admitting neither coming-to-be nor perishing, are most 
firmly this one, and yet after this again (whether one must posit [such a 
monad] as having been dispersed in the comings-to-be and unlimited things 
and as having become many, or as being itself, as a whole, separate from 
itself, which would seem to be the most impossible of all), the same and one 
comes to be in one and many at the same time. 
 
(Q2*) is admittedly a very clumsy and complicated sentence, but the general 
meaning seems clear enough. It is just an elaborated version of (Q3); it 
questions the instantiation of Platonic Forms. There are also scholars who 
appeal to emendation in order to unify (Q2) and (Q3) into a single objection. 
Diès, for example, adopting an emendation proposed and abandoned by 
Badham, changes ὅµως into ὅλως (‘wholly’), and then unifies the two 
objections.214 Similarly, one can plausibly adopt Susemihl’s emendation of ὅµως 
into ὄντως (‘really’) in order to merge the two objections.215 More radical 
emendations than these have also been proposed. However, the sentences that 
emerge as the result of such proposals are only slightly different from (Q2*),216 
                                                       
214 See Diès (1949, 7 n.1). This proposal does not appear in either of Badham’s two 
editions (1855a; 1878), but appears at p.341 in his (1855b), an article in which he offers 
addenda to his first edition. 
215 See Susemihl (1857, 9 n.688). It should be noted that the proposals offered by 
Badham and Susemihl were originally intended to ease the interpretation of (Q2), and 
not as a means of merging (Q2) and (Q3) into a single objection. Benitez (1989, 28-29) 
offers a good argument for the advantage of Susemihl’s proposal over Badham’s, but 
his argument does not seem to me to be conclusive. 
216 Instead of ‘these, each being one […], are most firmly this one, and yet after this 
again …’ in (Q2*), Diès’s proposal will give ‘these, each being one […], are wholly and 
most firmly this one, and after this again …’, and the reading which adopts Susemihl’s 
emendation will give ‘these, each being one […], are really and most firmly this one, 
and after this again …’. 
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and so I shall hereafter treat (Q2*) as standing for the two-questionist 
interpretations in general. 
   By contrast, other scholars, dismissing such interpretations on account of the 
difficulties involved in merging (Q2) and (Q3), claim that it is possible to give a 
relevant sense to (Q2) (let us call them ‘three-questionists’). The difficulties 
raised are partly grammatical and philological:217 
 
   (GP) First, there is no known parallel to the alleged case of hyperbaton of 
ὅµως in Ancient Greek. 218  The appeal to hyperbaton, therefore, 
unreasonably requires a revision of our knowledge of Greek grammar. 
Second, the appeal to emendation is unsatisfactory, especially since 
there are no reported difficulties in the manuscripts.219 
 
Difficulties are also raised on structural and argumentative grounds: 
                                                       
217 I have adopted the distinction between ‘grammatical and philological’ and 
‘structural and argumentative’ grounds from Delcomminette (2002, 26-27). 
218 For this difficulty, cf. e.g. Dancy (1984, 163), Benitez (1989, 27), Frede (1997, 122 n.17), 
Muniz&Rudebusch (2004, 396). Dancy and Benitez point out that the cases that have 
often been quoted as parallels, i.e. Ly. 213a2, Phd. 91c8, Tht. 145d5-7, and Phlb. 12b5-6 
are not really parallels, since these passages all have either ὅµως µέν or ὅµως ϰαί. 
219 Three-questionists also sometimes argue that the use of the three conjunctions, 
πϱῶτον µέν, εἶτα, and µετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, is a clear sign that Plato introduces three distinct 
thoughts. Cf. Friedländer (1969, 534 n.27), Benitez (1989, 25), and especially 
Delcomminette (2002, 27), who writes: ‘actually, this feature is already sufficient by 
itself to show that there must be three parts in the text.’ However, the wrongness of his 
claim can be seen from Lg. 875a5-b3: ‘The first difficulty (µὲν γὰϱ πϱῶτον) is to realize 
that the proper object of true political skill is not the interest of private individuals but 
the common good. […] The second difficulty (δεύτεϱον δέ) is that even if a man did get 
an adequate theoretical grasp of the truth of all this, he might then (µετὰ δὲ τοῦτο) 
attain a position of absolute control over a state, with no one to call him to account.’ In 
my view, the three-questionists have a certain advantage in this regard, but this 
advantage is offset by the fact that there are only two interrogatives, εἴ (15b1) and πῶς 
(15b2), in this passage, which seem to be a clear sign that Plato introduces only two 
distinct questions (provided that, with the majority of scholars, we understand the εἴτε 
… εἴτε … clause (15b5-7) as a parenthesis; cf. n.211). 
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   (SA) (Q1), i.e. the question about the existence of Platonic Forms, and (Q2*), 
i.e. the question about the instantiation of Platonic Forms in particulars, 
do not have any connection with the passages that come before and 
after 15b1-8. For one thing, neither of the questions is relevant to the 
main subject of the opening skirmish, namely that pleasure is both one 
and many. For another, the dialectical procedure does not give any 
solution to either of them. Accordingly, the two-questionists would 
isolate 15b1-8 and turn it into a digression.220 
 
While pointing out such difficulties, the three-questionists customarily claim 
that, when properly understood, (Q2) reveals the connection between the 
opening skirmish (12c8-14b8), the apparent objections (15a4-b8: #1), and the 
dialectical procedure (16c10-e2: #3).221 Thus, according to them, we must posit 
three questions in order to avoid (GP), and we must contrive a proper 
interpretation of (Q2) in order to avoid (SA). 
   The result of all this is that there has been a longstanding controversy 
                                                       
220 For this objection, see esp. Delcomminette (2002, 27; 2006, 57-58). Cf. also Moravcsik 
(1979, 86), Dancy (1984, 166), Barker (1996, 161), Meinwald (1996, 102), 
Muniz&Rudebusch (2004, 401-402). 
221 See e.g. Dancy (1984, 166): ‘In fact, of the three questions we find Socrates raising, it 
is really this second one that is of primary relevance in this context’; Barker (1996, 
161-62): ‘It seems to me clear […] that the main puzzle in which Socrates is interested, 
in the Philebus, is […] a problem about the relation between any rather general kind 
and the lesser kinds which in some sense it includes. […] [T]he second (lines 2-4) 
should be our question about the relation between unities and their sub-kinds’; 
Meinwald (1996, 102): ‘only the middle one is setting the agenda for the Philebus’; 
Muniz&Rudebusch (2004, 402-3): ‘We make sense of this question [i.e. (Q2)], […] 
producing an intelligible question complementary to the First (and Third) 
Controversies and directly connected both to the immediate context of the 
metaphysical discussion and to the larger context of the discussion of the henads 
Pleasure and Knowledge and their alleged division into monads.’ 
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between the two- and the three-questionists;222 the former claim that (Q2) is 
unintelligible, and the latter claim that (Q2*) is fraught with difficulties. At this 
point, I make it clear that I myself belong to the two-questionist qroup. In my 
view, (SA) is not a real difficulty; it just looks like a difficulty under the 
presupposition that the dialectical method at (#3) is an answer to the apparent 
objections at (#1). It is true that (SA) was not settled satisfactorily by any 
previous two-questionists who share this presupposition.223 But, as I shall 
argue, there is a different way of understanding the context; Socrates’ response 
to objections is to be found somewhere else. Moreover, I think I can offer a good 
structural and argumentative reason for saying that. However, I admit that (GP) 
is unavoidable. I would prefer emendation to hyperbaton, but I would not deny 
that ‘it would be nice to do without emendation.’224 I shall therefore first 
examine the interpretations of (Q2) proposed by the three-questionists in the 
hope that it will make us fully realise the necessity for emendation. 
 
§3.2. An examination of proposed interpretations of (Q2) 
   Let us have a look at the controversial question once again: 
 
                                                       
222 For a quick summary of who belongs to the two- or the three questionists, see Hahn 
(1978,159-63) and Delcomminette (2002, 26 n.10). (Note, however, that Delcomminette 
mistakenly includes De Chiara-Quenzer, who is a two-questionist, in the 
‘Three-Question group’.) Since Delcomminette’s article, Pradeau (2002) and 
Schmidt-Wiborg (2005) have joined the Two-Question group, and Dixsaut (2001) and 
Muniz&Rudebusch (2004), as well as Delcomminette (2002; 2006), have joined the 
Three-Question group. 
223 Two-questionists usually suppose that Socrates avoids coping with the apparent 
objections squarely, or implicitly dismisses it, by offering the dialectical method as an 
alternative way of dealing with the one and many at issue. See, e.g. Hackforth (1972, 22 
n.1), Striker (1970, 15), Frede (1997, 136). Cf. also Benitez’s understanding of the context 
in his (1989, 34). 
224 Dancy (1984, 163). 
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(Q2) Then again, how [one should suppose that] these, each being one and 
always the same and admitting neither coming-to-be nor perishing, are 
nevertheless most firmly this one. (15b2-4) 
 
Before undertaking the examination of different proposals for dealing with this 
sentence, one should observe an immediate stumbling block for any attempt at 
finding a relevant sense in this passage: contrary to Socrates’ words in (P55) 
[14c1-10], it is not easy to dispute in this way. Anscombe, for example, declares 
that it takes ‘philosophical acuteness’ to see the meaning of (Q2).225 But any 
interpretation of (Q2) that presupposes a profound philosophical insight seems 
to be incompatible with Socrates’ words, and so fails to identify the objection 
Socrates has in mind. Possibly, one might cope with this difficulty by 
distinguishing the meaning of (Q2) from its expression; the objection itself is not 
difficult to understand, but the words Socrates uses to describe (Q2) just 
happen to be difficult. This does not seem to me to be a plausible explanation, 
but let us assume that such an explanation is right, and turn to particular 
interpretations. 
   At an early stage of the discussion on (Q2), it was commonly held that (Q2) 
should be understood as an oblique reference to some arguments concerning 
the theory of Forms in other dialogues. Thus, for example, some scholars 
claimed to find in (Q2) a reference to the problematic relation between ‘one’ and 
‘being’ that is discussed in the Parmenides (142b1-155e3) and the Sophist 
                                                       
225 See Anscombe (1966, 407 n.4). To this Gosling (1975, 146) replies: ‘When it comes to 
finding the problem in the present text what is needed is not philosophical acuteness, 
but a high degree of clairvoyance.’ 
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(244b6-245e5). They would typically paraphrase (Q2) in the following way (I 
shall omit hereafter, when it is appropriate, the phrase: ‘and always the same 
and admitting neither coming-to-be nor perishing’): 
 
(Q2-1) Then again, how one should suppose that these monads, each being 
one […], nevertheless are most firmly this one [i.e. how one should 
suppose that these monads are not only one, but also being].226 
 
At the same time, there were also scholars who supposed that ‘the relation of 
the special Ideas to the supreme Idea’227 that is mentioned, e.g., in the Republic 
(507a7-509c11) is at issue here.228 This suggests a different version of (Q2): 
 
(Q2-2) Then again, how one should suppose that these [special Forms] (e.g. 
all the Forms except the Form of the Good), each being one […], are 
nevertheless most firmly this one [supreme Form] (e.g. the Form of the 
Good). 
 
                                                       
226 (Q2-1) is proposed by Burnet (1914, 326 n.2) and supported by, e.g., Taylor (1956, 
107-8) and Guthrie (1978, 207). Casper’s view in his (1977, 21) may be regarded as an 
interesting variation of (Q2-1), according to which (Q2) is concerned with the relation 
between a set of ‘several different characteristics (being one, being the same, being 
ungenerated, being imperishable)’ that are assigned to each Form, on the one hand, 
and each Form’s ‘being one’, on the other. 
227 Archer-Hind (1901, 231). 
228 This interpretation seems to have a long tradition. I do not know who first proposed 
it, but Susemihl (1857, 9) already gave a version of it more than 150 years ago: 
‘zweitens, […] die weitere Frage […] angedeutet […] im Grunde nichts Anderes, als 
das Verhältniss von Einheit und Vielheit rein innerhalb der Ideen selbst, von dem 
Fürsichsein jeder einzelnen zu der Inhärenz aller in der höchsten besagt.’ A reference 
to the Form of the Good is proposed by Archer-Hind (1901) and G. E. Moore, whose 
view is mentioned in Bury (1897, 215-16). 
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However, it is now generally agreed that interpretations like (Q2-1) and (Q2-2) 
are, as they stand, plainly inadequate because they do not take into 
consideration the context within the Philebus; the issues referred to in (Q2-1) 
and (Q2-2) do not have any bearing on the issues in the Philebus.229 The 
difficulty that is pointed out in (SA) in relation to the disagreement between the 
two- and the three-questionists is really present here: such interpretations 
would isolate 15b1-8 and turn it into a digression. 
   Recent three-questionists are evidently more attentive to the context than 
those who propose (Q2-1) or (Q2-2). Their proposals are in essence variations of 
(Q2-2); they also suppose that what is questioned by (Q2) is the interrelation of 
Platonic Forms. However, they claim that (Q2) need not be understood as a 
reference to discussions of the theory of Forms in other dialogues. In fact, 
according to these scholars, the interrelation of Forms is at issue both in the 
opening skirmish in the Philebus itself, and in the description there of the 
dialectical method.230 What has turned out in the opening skirmish is that 
pleasure is, like colour, ‘one as a kind, but some of its parts are absolutely 
opposite to one another’ (12e6-13a1), or to put it differently, that the Form of 
Pleasure is one as a genus, but contains many species-Forms which are somehow 
opposite to one another. The dialectical method described at (#3) is basically the 
                                                       
229 As for (Q2-1), it has also been pointed out that it is not really consistent with the 
arguments given in the Parmenides and the Sophist. See e.g. Dancy (1984, 163-64), Löhr 
(1990, 75-81). 
230 Note that interpretations of this kind are also put forward by two-questionists. See, 
e.g., Frede (1993, xxii): ‘The most natural supplement [that would make (Q2) a question 
worth asking] would be the assumption that Plato is somehow referring to the fact that 
the Forms as genera are wholes with parts. This would connect both with what 
preceded and with what is to follow, for the subsequent elucidation of the question of 
the ‘one and many’ is concerned with the division of genera into species.’ 
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procedure of dividing a genus-Form into many species-Forms. In both passages, 
then, the Platonic Form of F is put forward as an item that is somehow both one 
and many. On the basis of such observations, the updated three-questionists 
conclude that (Q2) is asking how the Platonic Form of F can be both one and 
many. 
   It is difficult, however, to extract the genus-and-species relation from (Q2), 
for both ταύτας at 15b2 and ταύτην at 15b4 refer, in all likelihood, to unities 
(ἑνάδες) such as man, ox, the beautiful, and the good mentioned at 15a5, and 
these unities do not themselves constitute the genus-and-species relation. 
Depending on how they solve this difficulty, the recent three-questionists’ 
views take different forms. First, Meinwald, proposing that (Q2) only refers to 
the unities as genera, supplies a whole clause about species: 
 
(Q2-3) Then again, ‘how each of these, [though it is divided into many species 
or sub-species] while not admitting generation or destruction, is 
nevertheless most securely this one.’231 
 
Second, Barker claims that ταύτας at 15b2 and ταύτην at 15b4 can be taken to 
refer to species and a genus respectively, by understanding the ταύτας as an 
instance of what he calls the ‘demonstrative of random selection’.232 The ταύτας, 
                                                       
231 Meinwald (1996, 100) (her parenthesis). 
232 Barker (1996, 163) gives the following example to explain this usage of 
demonstrative: ‘a Lecturer in Philosophy, discoursing on the subject of individuation, 
might say: “Take a box-full of qualitatively identical apples. How are these apples in the 
box distinct items from those ones?” […] In using the expression “these”, he or she is 
obviously not referring to all the apples together; nor […] are we being asked to focus 
on just that particular group of them […] which the Lecturer has in mind. At the most 
we are being invited to think of any random sub-group of (imaginary) apples, and to 
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when used this way, according to him, does not refer to the unities taken 
together or the unities Socrates has specifically in mind, but to ‘any arbitrarily 
chosen group of them’. With this in mind, he paraphrases (Q2) as follows: 
 
(Q2-4) ‘How can these (the plurality, red, green, yellow, etc.) most firmly be 
this one (the ‘one thing’, colour)?’233 
 
Third, Muniz and Rudebusch propose that Plato tacitly assumes a distinction 
between the two kinds of unities, i.e. henads and monads, ‘much as genera are 
distinct from species’,234 and then claim that ταύτας at 15b2 and ταύτην at 15b4 
respectively refer back to τοιαύτας µονάδας (‘any such monads’) at 15b1 and 
τούτων τῶν ἑνάδων (‘these henads’) at 15a6.235 Here is their paraphrase of (Q2): 
 
(Q2-5) ‘How these monads (for example, Intemperate and Temperate 
Man)––each one always being the same […]––nevertheless most 
steadfastly are this one henad (for example, Man).’236 
 
Thus, the views of these modern three-questionists differ from one another in 
the way they secure the genus-and-species relation in (Q2). On the other hand, 
they seem to accord closely with one another in terms of the explanation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                
think of them as distinct from any other such sub-group.’ I wonder whether such a 
usage is really possible in Ancient Greek, for at least I am sure that his example does 
not make sense if it is translated into Japanese. 
233 Barker (1996, 163). 
234 Muniz&Rudebusch (2004, 401). 
235 They claim that the referents of ‘any such monads’ are omitted through brachylogy. 
236 Muniz&Rudebusch (2004, 403). 
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force of ὅµως (‘nevertheless’) at 15b4.237 In essence, they all find the following 
train of thought in Socrates’ words: it is not hard to see how it is possible for 
many sensible particulars to become one, for they can change; but many 
species-Forms are not subject to change; how, then, can these many 
species-Forms, while not subject to change, nevertheless be––for we cannot use 
‘become’ here––this one genus-Form? This is the question, according to the 
updated three-questionists, that is asked in the Philebus. 
   There are, however, serious difficulties inherent in the interpretations along 
these lines. The first, and the most crucial, difficulty is that the updated 
three-questionists only superficially connect 15b1-8 with the passages that come 
before and after it. In fact, if (Q2-3), (Q2-4), or (Q2-5) were the objection Socrates 
has in mind, then his answer would be found already in the opening skirmish. 
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Socrates and Protarchus are 
dealing with the genus-and-species relation of Platonic Forms in 12c8-14b8. 
Under this assumption, it seems clear that what is established in the opening 
skirmish would become the following variant of (OM1): 
 
(OM1*) A Platonic Form is one qua genus, but qua species it is many, and these 
species are dissimilar to one another. 
 
Now, the updated versions of (Q2) ask either how a Platonic Form can be both 
one and many, or how a genus-Form, i.e. a Platonic Form qua genus, can be 
both one and many. If the former, (OM1*) is itself the answer; a Platonic Form is 
                                                       
237 See Meinwald (1996, 101), Barker (1996, 164), and Muniz&Rudebusch (2004, 403). 
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certainly both one and many, but in different respects. If the latter, the answer 
would be: there is no way, for a genus-Form is just one, not many. But, if its 
solution is found in the opening skirmish, it seems hardly appropriate to 
suppose that Socrates should mention such an objection at 15b1-8. If anyone 
tries to argue that he just wants to make it clearer by a further agreement in the 
methodological passage (14c1-18d2) that (OM1*) gives the required solution, 
the answer is that it is not the case that he discusses this issue in detail after 
15b1-8.238 It seems to follow, then, that none of (Q2-3), (Q2-4), and (Q2-5) fits 
into the context. 
   Second, it is not likely that Platonic Forms are directly at issue in the 
surrounding context, either. Specifically, it is implausible that Socrates and 
Protarchus have in mind the Form of Pleasure or Knowledge in the opening 
skirmish, or that dialectic is a dividing process of one genus-Form into many 
species-Forms. First, each of ‘pleasure’ and ‘knowledge’, which are established 
to be both one and many in the opening skirmish, was originally presented as ‘a 
certain state or disposition of the soul’ (11d4-5) that would constitute ‘what is 
the best of all human possessions (τῶν ἀνθϱωπίνων ϰτηµάτων)’ (19c6). But such 
things can hardly be Platonic Forms; a state of the soul is always instantiated in 
the soul, but Platonic Forms are not instantiated in anything, nor are they 
something we can ‘possess’ (ϰτῆσθαι), but something we can only ‘participate 
                                                       
238 One might argue that (Q2) is asking for an answer more fundamental than (OM1*) 
to the question as to how a Platonic Form can be both one and many, and the answer is 
given at 16c7-10, i.e. that our ancestors passed on us the tradition that what is each time 
said to be consists of one and many. But then the question should have been something 
like: ‘how can we justify saying that a Platonic Form has these two aspects?’. As it is, 
(Q2) is supposed to ask, ‘how can we understand the idea that a Form is both one and 
many?’, and it is just unsatisfactory to answer this by saying, ‘our ancestors told us that 
a Form is both one and many’. 
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in’ (µετέχειν). Second, it seems clear that the ‘one form’ (µίαν ἰδέαν 16d1) that is 
posited at the outset of the dialectical procedure is not a Platonic Form. For one 
thing, Socrates says that ‘we find [this one form] in [things]’ (εὑϱήσειν … 
ἐνοῦσαν 16d2), while, once more, Platonic Forms are not instantiated in 
anything. This characteristization of Platonic Forms seems to be confirmed later 
in the dialogue when Socrates says that they are ‘always the same in every 
respect and the least mixed’ (τὰ ἀεὶ ϰατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἀµειϰτότατα ἔχοντα 
59c3-4).239 For another, in the description of the method the investigation of F 
continues after one has discovered and grasped the ‘form’ of F (see 16d2-3), but 
clearly this would not be the case if ‘one form’ at 16d1 referred to a Platonic 
Form, for one will be already knowledgeable about F when one has grasped the 
Platonic Form of F, and there will be no need for further investigation.240 One 
might object that ‘discovering’ or ‘grasping’ a Form is different from knowing it. 
But this will not do. At 17b6-7, illustrating the dialectical procedure by the 
example of vocal sounds, Socrates says that ‘Neither of these two facts alone yet 
makes us knowledgeable, neither that we know its unlimitedness nor that we 
know its unity (τὸ ἕν)’. There is no ambiguity here. If ‘one form’ were to be a 
Platonic Form, Socrates’ words would imply that knowledge of the (genus) 
Form of Vocal Sound (which is to be divided into many species-Forms) does not 
                                                       
239 Note that Plato never uses the term ‘Form’ (εἶδος or ἰδέα) to refer to the entities in 
question in the passage in which Socrates is unambiguously talking about Platonic 
Forms in the Philebus (57e3-59d9). 
240 To put it differently, if the ‘one form’ refers to a Platonic Form, then the following 
case, for example, might occur: someone, who is in the middle of the investigation into 
the Forms of Mammal, Bird, Fish, Reptile, Amphibian, claims that he has already 
grasped the Form of Animal and is knowledgeable about animals (but not 
knowledgeable about mammals, etc.). This appears to be an odd picture. If someone 
were to claim such things, we would be tempted to say that his claim on knowledge of 
animals is false, precisely because he thinks he can know animals without knowing 
mammals, etc. 
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make us knowledgeable about vocal sound. But such a position would be 
completely incompatible with Plato’s own position in other dialogues.241 In 
short, since Platonic Forms are not directly at issue in the passages that come 
before and after 15b1-8, reading the interrelation of Platonic Forms into (Q2) is 
not helpful for understanding the apparent objections in the proper context. 
   Finally, the manoeuvres of the updated three-questionists to extract the 
genus-and-species relation from (Q2) are not entirely plausible. It is hard to 
believe that Plato deliberately omitted the essential clause supplied by 
Meinwald, or used the demonstrative pronouns in a very special way as 
suggested by Barker, or tacitly assumed the significant distinction between 
henads and monads as claimed by Muniz and Rudebusch. It may be the case 
that Plato sometimes challenges his readers by deploying a very concise and 
cryptic argument in spite of its significance. However, our passage is not such 
an occasion; Socrates is here simply describing objections that are easy to raise. 
It seems then unlikely that such clever interpretative devices as designed by the 
updated three-questionists are required in order to identify the objection 
Socrates has in mind. 
   In consideration of such difficulties, it seems clear that the updated 
three-questionists are no more successful in explaining (Q2) than their 
                                                       
241 Benitez (1989, 55-56) tries to avoid this difficulty by claiming that ‘there is an 
ambiguity in Socrates’ use of the term ἕν throughout 16b-19a’ which sometimes means 
‘an undifferentiated unity (e.g. the ‘initial one’: ϰατ’ ἀϱχὰς ἕν 16d5)’ and sometimes 
means ‘the one Form’ (= a genus-Form). Thus, the ‘unity’ at 17b7 whose knowledge 
does not make us knowledgeable, according to him, is the former, i.e. the 
undifferentiated unity of vocal sound, and not the Platonic Form of Vocal Sound. But 
his claim is far from convincing. There is no suggestion at all in the description of 
dialectic (16c10-e2) that we come to know the ‘one form’ we posited at the beginning of 
the procedure just when we have finished the whole procedure. It is fairly clear that 
discovering and grasping one form before turning to its species corresponds to 
knowing the unity of vocal sound before turning to each letter or phoneme. 
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predecessors. Indeed, there is in my view no way of squeezing out of (Q2) an 
apparent objection that fits into the context. I therefore suggest that it is 
necessary to set aside the apparently powerful objections contained in (GP) and 
to accept a plausible emendation (or hyperbaton) in order to find a way out of 
this interpretative cul-de-sac. The main criterion for the correct interpretation 
will then be whether or not the ‘apparent objections’ that are given as a result of 
emendations have a place in the context. In the next sub-section, I would like to 
show that the postulation of two questions, (Q1) and (Q2*), can perfectly 
maintain the flow of the argument in the methodological passages in the 
Philebus. 
 
§3.3. My interpretation 
   One might wonder, if I am right in suggesting that the passages that come 
before and after 15b1-8 are not directly dealing with Platonic Forms, how the 
apparent objections, which are plainly concerned with Platonic Forms, can fit 
into the context. My answer is that they fit well if the context is understood in 
the following way. At the beginning of the investigation of the nature of F, one 
must posit, if one can, the unity (τὸ ἕν or ἑνάς) of F, or F qua F, just as Socrates 
and Philebus posited the unities of knowledge or pleasure. However, the 
ontological and epistemological status of the unity in question is, at this stage, 
inevitably unclear. Exploiting this unclarity, someone might regard the unity of 
F as the Platonic Form of F and raise the objections described at 15b1-8. 
Although his or her way of approaching the one and many at issue is not 
entirely misplaced, Socrates thinks that this approach stops their investigation 
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by causing unnecessary difficulties. Thus, before entering the investigation of 
the nature of pleasure and knowledge, Socrates secures agreement from his 
interlocutors that, in dealing with the one and many at issue, they should adopt 
the dialectical method and dismiss as merely eristic the approach in which the 
objections about Platonic Forms are raised (as well as a young boy’s approach 
described at 15d8-16a3). I shall defend this interpretation in what follows. 
   First, let us consider the ontological and epistemological status of the unity 
of F. Just before mentioning the apparent objections, Socrates informs us that 
the objections are raised about the ‘unities’ (ἑνάδων 15a6) involved when we 
posit, say, man, ox, the beautiful, or the good as ‘one’ (ἕν 15a4-6) (see (P56) 
[15a4-7]). In relation to this passage, scholars almost without exception suppose 
that the reference to ‘unities’ is a reference to Platonic Forms,242 noting as they 
do so that the expression has no parallels in Plato’s other dialogues.243 However, 
such a supposition seems to me to be implausible; it is unlikely that the mere 
postulation of something universal commits someone to the postulation of a 
theoretically loaded Platonic Form. As a matter of fact, while Socrates and 
Philebus posit pleasure and knowledge as ‘one’ (ἕν 18e6) (see (P57) [18e3-19a2]), 
they are concerned with ‘a certain state or disposition of the soul’ (11d4-5) and 
not––at least immediately or directly––with the Platonic Forms of Pleasure and 
Knowledge. It is indeed true that ‘such monads’ (τοιαύτας µονάδας) at 15b1 
refers back to the ‘unities’ at 15a6, and these monads are treated as Platonic 
Forms by those who raise the apparent objections. But we need not suppose 
                                                       
242 So far as I know, Gosling (1975, 143-53) is the only exception. 
243 See Ross (1953, 130): ‘The reference to the Forms as units or monads is not 
paralleled elsewhere in Plato.’ 
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that the opponents of Forms who are overcome with ‘immense enthusiasm’ 
(πολλὴ σπουδή 15a6-7) have correctly identified the referents of the ‘unities’ in 
question.244 Rather, the situation Socrates has in mind, I submit, should be 
understood like this: when someone posits the unity of F at the beginning of the 
investigation of the nature of F, his opponents take this unity as the Platonic 
Form of F and raise objections against the postulation of such an entity. On this 
construal of the context, we can find the connection between the things Socrates 
and his interlocutors are talking about, on the one hand, and the Platonic Forms 
that are at issue in the apparent objections, on the other. I suggest, then, that the 
‘unities’ at 15a6 is not a reference to Platonic Forms. 
   At this point, the following two questions may naturally arise: what is the 
status of the unity of F, and why does not Socrates simply say that the apparent 
objections are raised because of a misunderstanding about the referent of the 
‘unities’? Let us first take up the former question, the answer to which I think 
will shed light on the latter. My answer to the former question is that the status 
of the unity of F is not unequivocally specifiable, for it changes in accordance 
with the development of the investigation, which has the following three stages. 
The first stage is the mere postulation of the unity of F at the very beginning of 
the investigation. At this stage, the unity of F is not something carefully 
reflected upon; it is just treated as the referent of a general noun, whatever that 
might be. The unity of F in this phase does not have any specific ontological 
                                                       
244 Compare Mirhardy (1992, 172-73), who, pointing out that πολλὴ σπουδή sometimes 
implies ‘misspent effort’ (cf. Chrm. 175e4-5; Smp. 177c2, 181e1; Phdr. 248b6; Sph.218e4-5, 
259c3; Lg. 652a3-4), suggests ‘the great fuss’ as the translation of πολλὴ σπουδή in our 
passage. To my mind, ‘the great fuss’ is simply an overtranslation, but I agree with him 
that πολλὴ σπουδή at Phlb. 15a6-7 does not have a positive connotation as suggested by 
the widely shared term for the apparent objections, i.e. the ‘serious problems’. 
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status. Presumably, Philebus’ and Protarchus’ postulation of the unity of 
pleasure belongs to this stage. The second stage corresponds to the first step of 
the dialectical procedure, i.e. the postulation of the form of F and the discovery 
of the form of F in things (see 16d1-2), which is, as I shall argue, nothing other 
than Socrates’ procedure for definition. The unity of F at this stage is 
instantiated in things, and is the subject of definition (or knowledge by 
definition);245 or, in a word, it is the Socratic form of F. The third stage, finally, 
is the completion of the dialectical procedure and the mastery of the science of 
the unity of F. The unity of F is now the object of expertise, and so is the 
Platonic Form of F, whose ontological status I have characterized as 
context-independent (see Ch. 3, §4); it is not instantiated in anything at all. In a 
nutshell, the unity of F can be any one of the following: the unspecified referent 
of ‘F’, the Socratic form of F, and the Platonic Form of F. 
   By now, the answer to the second question is, I think, not hard to see. 
Socrates does not say that the apparent objections are based on a 
misunderstanding about the referent of the ‘unities’, because it is not the case 
that those who raise the objections are entirely mistaken about it. To put it 
differently, in so far as the unity of F can designate a Platonic Form, the 
clarification of the referent of the ‘unities’ does not by itself solve the apparent 
                                                       
245 For the meaning of ‘knowledge by definition’, see Ch.3 §3, where I have argued that 
Socrates’ usage of ‘knowledge’ is ambiguous between (a) knowledge by definition and 
(b) expertise. The same kind of ambiguity of ‘knowledge’ appears in the illustration of 
the dialectical method at 17a6-e6. Thus, when Socrates says, ‘Neither of these two facts 
alone yet makes us knowledgeable, neither that we know (ἴσµεν) its unlimitedness nor 
that we know its unity’ (17b6-7), he has (a) knowledge by definition about the unity of F 
in mind. On the other hand, when he says, ‘when you have grasped the unity of any of 
the other things there are, by investigating in this way, you have become wise about that 
(ἔµφϱων πεϱὶ τοῦτο)’ (17e1-3), he has (b) expertise in the unity of F in mind. 
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objections; a lengthy metaphysical discussion together with a detailed 
characterization of both Socratic forms and Platonic Forms would be necessary 
for that purpose.246 But such a treatment will be suitable only if the objections 
are raised with serious intent. This is not the case, at least as supposed by 
Socrates, with the opponents of Forms mentioned in our passage. Indeed, the 
objections are easy to raise, so that they can be exploited by those who are not 
philosophically-minded just in order to cause difficulties. Besides, Platonic 
Forms come into view only at the completion of the whole process of 
investigation, and so it is not necessary for Socrates and his interlocutors to 
hold up investigation on account of the objections involved in Platonic Forms. It 
stands to reason, then, that Socrates does not undertake to examine whether the 
apparent objections are valid or not, and if so, why. 
   Now one might object that, if my diagnosis is right, at least some word 
would be expected from Socrates to the effect that he would be dismissing the 
apparent objections, when in fact nothing of the sort is to be found anywhere in 
the text. As I have said earlier, I myself think we can find a clear hint in this 
direction if we pay close attention to Socrates’ words. At 16c10-e4 (#3) Socrates 
describes the god-given method for the investigation of F, according to which 
(D1) one should first posit the form of F and search for it until one finds it in 
things, and then (D2) one should enumerate the number (of all the different 
                                                       
246 Plato himself nowhere in his works undertakes such a metaphysical discussion. If 
my interpretation is right, then (Q2*) (or (Q3)) might be countered by pointing out that 
Platonic Forms are not instantiated in, but just ‘participated in’ by, things that come to 
be and cease to be. But an adequate answer should also provide an explanation of what 
‘participation’ amounts to, which Plato seems to have left open. See Ti. 50c4-6: ‘The 
things that enter and leave it are imitations of those things that always are, imprinted 
after their likeness in a marvelous way that is hard to describe.’ 
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kinds of F) between the one and the unlimited. By contrast, 
 
   (P58) (E1) contemporary intellectuals among us make a one, haphazardly, and a 
many, faster and slower than they should (ἓν µέν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσι, ϰαὶ πολλὰ 
θᾶττον ϰαὶ βϱαδύτεϱον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δέοντος); (E2) they go straight from the 
one to the unlimited and omit the intermediates. It is these characteristics 
that have made all the difference as to whether we are engaged with each 
other in dialectical or only in eristic discourse. 
(16e4-17a5; #4) 
 
It is crystal clear that in (P58) Socrates dismisses as merely eristic the 
contemporary intellectuals’ way of dealing with the one and many. Now, my 
suggestion is that the ‘contemporary intellectuals’ is a reference to both those 
who raise the apparent objections at (#1) and the young boys described at (#2). 
If I am right, then Socrates dismisses the apparent objections here, and the 
pieces of the methodological passage neatly fit together. But no one has 
previously understood (P58) this way, and so first let us consider 
interpretations of (P58) that have been offered by other scholars. 
   As a matter of fact, (P58) has been another source of perplexity for scholars. 
Specifically, they have been puzzled over the phrase ‘make […] a many […] 
slower than they should’. On the face of it, the sentence immediately afterwards, 
i.e. (E2), seems to imply that the contemporary intellectuals in question always 
make many faster than they should, for they go straight from the one to the 
unlimited, passing over the intermediates. Accordingly, scholars have proposed 
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several ways of solving this difficulty, but to my mind none of their solutions is 
plausible. First, there are scholars who try to secure consistency in (P58) by 
getting rid of ‘many’ from the text or translation. Some of these scholars directly 
excise ϰαὶ πολλά (‘and many’) from the text as an interpolation;247 the others 
suggest that the πολλά should be understood as an adverbial accusative, 
meaning ‘much’ rather than ‘many’.248 These devices certainly seem to mend 
the apparent inconsistency; (E1) only indicates that the contemporary 
intellectuals make a one badly, which smoothly connects with (E2), i.e. that after 
the one they go immediately to the unlimited. But clearly neither device is 
satisfactory; on the one hand, the elimination of ϰαὶ πολλά is a rather radical 
emendation, which it would certainly be nice to do without; on the other hand, 
it is unlikely that the πολλά that appears with ἕν in (E1) exceptionally means 
‘much’, especially because Socrates uses ἕν and πολλά, the subject of discussion, 
in the sense of ‘one’ and ‘many’ consistently through the methodological 
passage. Second, there are also scholars who suggest that the implication is that 
doing something too quickly ends up making no progress, i.e. doing something 
too slowly.249 Thus, Gosling writes: ‘Socrates is quite clear that because these 
                                                       
247 See Bury (1897, 19), Diès (1949, 9). We may also add Dixsaut (2001, 301) to the 
supporters of this view, judging from her paraphrase: ‘les seconds [sc. les savants d’à 
present] font «un» plus vite ou plus lentement qu’il ne faudrai, et ensuite vont 
immédiatement (euthus) de l’unité à l’illimité.’ There is also another proposal for 
emendation suggested by Badham (1855a, 11-12), who, instead of excising ϰαὶ πολλά, 
accuse βϱαδύτεϱον (‘slower’) and replace it with βϱαχύτεϱον (‘shorter’). Benardete 
(1993, 10) follows Badham’s proposal. 
248 See Taylor (1956, 110); Frede (1993, 9): ‘But nowadays the clever ones among us 
make a one, haphazardly, and make it many times faster or slower than they should’ 
(emphasis mine; note that she has abandoned this translation in Cooper (1997)); 
Pradeau (2002, 89; 242 n.24). 
249 See Gosling (1975, 85), Löhr (1990, 185-88), and Frede (1997, 144), who quotes the 
following passage from the Republic: ‘In my haste to go through them all quickly (ταχύ), 
I’ve only progressed more slowly (βϱαδύνω).’ (528d7-8) 
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men move directly to the indeterminate [= the unlimited in (P58)] the 
intermediates get away, so that for all their speed they are too slow to catch 
them.’ 250  This interpretation would require that the ‘many’ is ambiguous 
between the unlimited and the intermediates: they make a many, i.e. the 
unlimited, too fast, but they make a many, i.e. the intermediates, too slowly. 
However, making the intermediates (whether slowly or not) seems to contradict 
(E2) in which Socrates makes it quite clear that these men entirely omit the 
intermediates. I therefore conclude that the interpretations that have been 
offered so far are not quite satisfactory.251 Clearly, then, another attempt is not 
amiss. 
   I suggest that we should understand ‘make a many slower than they should’ 
as a contemporary intellectual’s refusal, or sheer unwillingness, to admit that 
there are many Fs. In view of the surrounding context, two interpretations 
along these lines seem to be possible: the first interpretation, which I do not 
favour, connects this phrase with a kind of attitude Protarchus took in the 
opening skirmish; the second, which I support, connects it with the apparent 
objections, or more specifically (Q2*). First, one might think of someone who at 
first, like Protarchus, refuses to admit that there are many instances of F, but 
gives up his position at some point, and then, unlike Protarchus (who never 
                                                       
250 Gosling (1975, 85). 
251 I have omitted here Hackforth’s unique view in his (1939, 23-24) mainly because no 
one has supported it since his proposal. In essence, he supposes that ‘faster’ and 
‘slower’ refer to the time occupied by the activity in question. Thus, he suggests that 
‘For the dialectician and his interlocutor the time occupied will depend on no 
subjective factor’, while the Eristics ‘take an unduly short or an unduly long time over 
their demonstration that a Many are One, or (maybe) that a One is Many’. However, it 
is very unlikely that the Eristics, in demonstrating that a one is many or vice versa, 
bother to spend a longer time than the time needed for someone to become 
knowledgeable about the one in question (which would be days or even years). 
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‘goes to the unlimited’),252 starts to claim that there are indeed infinitely many 
Fs. If Plato has this kind of person in mind, the phrase in question seems to be 
intelligible: some contemporary intellectuals make a many too slowly (because 
of their initial refusal to make a many), and they go from the one straight to the 
unlimited (after they have converted). A problem involved in this interpretation 
is that it is not clear why Plato should mention such a person at this point. We 
may be able to justify such apparently capricious behaviour by mixing 
Protarchus’ concession with a young boy’s way of dealing with the one and 
many, but the behaviour in question is in fact neither Protarchus’ nor the young 
boy’s; Protarchus did not claim that there are infinitely many instances of 
pleasure, and the young boy was not described as ready to give up his position. 
An interpretation that could connect (P58) with the surrounding context more 
closely than this would be desirable, and I suggest that my second proposal is 
exactly such an interpretation. 
   The second interpretation proposes that ‘making a many slower than they 
should’ refers to the attitude of those who raise the apparent objections. It is 
clear from (Q2*) that they also refuse to admit that there are many instances of F, 
for they question the possibility of instantiation itself. Moreover, in questioning 
this, they turn their attention first to one Platonic Form, and then to ‘the 
                                                       
252 Delcomminette (2006, 86-87) proposes an interpretation along these lines, but he 
supposes that refusing to admit the existence of many instances in the way Protarchus 
does is compatible with going to the unlimited: ‘D’un côté, il [sc. Protarque] va trop 
lentement lorsqu’il refuse de passer du plaisir lui-même aux différentes espèces de 
plaisirs, et de l’autre, il va trop vite lorsqu’il attribue immédeatement toutes les 
differences entre les plaisirs à leurs sources particulières.’ But the latter half of his 
statement cannot be true, for, as I have made clear in n.193, Protarchus does not admit 
at all that there are differences among the pleasures. Cf. also Moravcsik (1979, 93), who 
understands (E1) in (P58) in a similar manner, but omits any reference to (E2). 
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comings-to-be and unlimited things’ (τοῖς γιγνοµένοις αὖ ϰαὶ ἀπείϱοις 15b5), 
thereby omitting the intermediates. The opponents of Forms, therefore, seem to 
satisfy the conditions for the referent of those contemporary intellectuals who 
make a many slower than they should. 
   Thus having found a way past the difficulty involved in (P58), let us 
consider the passage as a whole. Scholars sometimes propose that 
‘contemporary intellectuals’ is intended to be a reference to the ‘young boys’ 
described at (#2),253 who enjoy making a mess of every discussion, ‘now 
turning [F] to one side and rolling it all up into one, then again unrolling it and 
dividing it up’ (15e2-3). I think that they are right in relation to those who make 
a many faster than they should. If so, the meaning of (P58) seems to be clear. 
First, (D1) a dialectician posits the form of F and searches for it until he finds it 
in things. By contrast, (E1) both a young boy and an opponent of Forms fail to 
perform such an investigation, the former exploiting the unity of F without 
thinking about what F is, the latter taking it as a Platonic Form and starting to 
criticize it on that basis (in (Q1)); in short, both of them make a one haphazardly. 
And then, young boys make a many faster than they should by ‘unrolling it and 
dividing it up’, while the opponent of Forms makes a many slower than he or 
she should by refusing to admit that there are many Fs (in (Q2*)). Second, (D2) a 
dialectician enumerates the intermediates, i.e. the number of the kinds of F 
between the one and the unlimited. By contrast, (E2) both the young boy and 
the opponent of Forms fail to pay attention to the intermediates at all. The 
                                                       
253 See Hackforth (1939, 23), Crombie (1963, 363), Benitez (1989, 42), Frede (1993, xxix; 
1997, 144), Delcomminette (2006, 86-87). For a different view, see Löhr (1990, 186), 
Dixsaut (2001, 301). 
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implication of the last sentence of (P58), then, will be this: we should dismiss 
both the apparent objections and the young boy’s way of dealing with the one 
and many because they are simply eristic. 
 
§4. The dialectical method in the Philebus 
   Now that the surrounding context has been sufficiently discussed, my next 
task is to turn to the dialectical method itself. First of all, I would like to make it 
clear that I regard only 16c10-e2 (#3) as the general description of the dialectical 
procedure. Socrates mentions two cases in which someone deals with F in an 
appropriate manner, namely the case in which he or she gets hold of the one 
(16c10-e2), and the case in which he or she is compelled to get hold of the 
unlimited (18a9-b4). But I suggest that these two cases do not stand for two uses 
of dialectical method. To begin with, as I shall argue, the two cases are 
essentially different in their approaches: the first case is standard, while the 
second case is very rare and special; indeed, no use seems to be made of the 
approach described in the second case either in the Philebus itself or in any other 
dialogue.254 Now, Socrates’ introductory remarks at 16b5-c3 are concerned with 
the method that should be adopted for the investigation of the nature of 
pleasure and knowledge, and so seem only to be related to the first case. Here at 
16c2-3, Socrates says: ‘everything that has ever been discovered, belonging to 
any field of science, has become evident through this [sc. the dialectical method]’ 
                                                       
254 By contrast, Delcomminette (2006, 158) proposes, following Isenberg (1940, 161-62; 
165-66), Gadamer (1991, 125), Dixsaut (1999, xvii-xviii), that it is the approach 
illustrated by the second case that is being applied in the investigation of the nature of 
pleasure. I shall argue later that this is not the case. 
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(πάντα … ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόµενα ἀνευϱέθη πώποτε διὰ ταύτης φανεϱὰ γέγονε 
16c2-3). On a superficial reading, one might be tempted to connect this remark 
with the illustration of the second case, i.e. Theuth’s discovery of the alphabet. 
It should be noted, however, that Socrates does not say that everything in any 
field of science has been discovered through this. 255  Rather, he seems to be 
suggesting that the role of the dialectical method consists in investigation and 
elucidation of a thing whose existence is already known. Moreover, it is only 
the approach in the first case that is explicitly described as ‘dialectical’ 
(διαλεϰτιϰῶς 17a4). On the basis of such observations, I suggest that the passage 
at 18a6-d2 in which Socrates introduces the second case and illustrates it by 
Theuth’s discovery of alphabet is merely a digression.256 Theuth discovered, or 
was compelled to discover, the alphabet independently of the dialectical 
method; it is for the sake of clarification and systematization of the result of his 
discovery that the dialectical method is required. With this restriction of scope 
in mind, I shall argue in what follows that the dialectical method described in 
the Philebus is essentially the same as internal analysis, i.e. one of the two main 
                                                       
255 Although this is the way in which Socrates’ words in question have been often 
understood. See e.g. Benardete (1993, 9), translating the sentence in question: 
‘Everything connected with and dependent on art was always discovered through it 
and has become manifest’; Meinwald (1998, 168): ‘the method is described as one by 
which all results dependent on τέχνη have been obtained’; Delcomminette (2006, 92): 
‘mais il [sc. Socrate] ajoute qu’elle [sc. la dialectique] est responsable de toutes les 
découvertes dans le champ de l’art (τέχνη)’; Harvey (2009, 21): ‘Of special interest here 
is the fact that this method is the means by which any discovery in any τέχνη is made 
(16c2-3)’. 
256 I owe this suggestion to Christopher Rowe. In a similar manner, Sayre (1983,130-33; 
1987, 50-52) proposes that the first case belongs to a dialectician and the second case to 
a divine intelligence, but his interpretation seems to be different from mine in that he 
supposes that Socrates’ prefatory remarks at 16b5-c3 are concerned with both cases, 
since he shares the view of the scholars mentioned in the previous note (see his (1983, 
119): ‘Yet it is to this method that we owe our discoveries in any undertaking requiring 
skill’). 
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applications of the method of collection and division, developed in the Phaedrus 
(269c6-272b6, 273d7-e5, 277b5-c6). 
   Let us then have a look at the text. Socrates prefaces the description of the 
dialectical method with a suggestion of its divine origin and the ‘tradition’ 
(φήµην 16c8) about the structure of the subjects of the method. According to 
this tradition, ‘whatever is each time said to be consists of one and many, 
having in its nature limit and unlimitedness’ (ἐξ ἑνὸς µὲν ϰαὶ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν 
ἀεὶ λεγοµένων εἶναι, πέϱας δὲ ϰαὶ ἀπειϱίαν ἐν αὑτοῖς σύµφυτον ἐχόντων 
16c9-10). He then describes the method in detail as follows (for the sake of 
clarity I shall divide the description of the dialectical method into three parts, in 
accordance with the three steps of the procedure): 
 
   (D1) Since this is the structure of things, having posited one form (µίαν ἰδέαν) for 
every one of them in each case, we always have to search for it, for we will 
indeed find it in [things] (εὑϱήσειν γὰϱ ἐνοῦσαν). (16c10-d2) 
   (D2) And once we have grasped it, we must examine two, if there are somehow 
two, or if not, three or some other number. And we must treat every one of 
those further unities in the same way, until one sees of the original unit (τὸ 
ϰατ’ ἀϱχὰς ἕν) not only that it is one, many and unlimited (ἄπειϱα), but also 
how many it is. (16d3-7) 
   (D3) One must not apply the form of the unlimited to the plurality (τὴν δὲ τοῦ 
ἀπείϱου ἰδέαν πϱὸς τὸ πλῆθος µὴ πϱοσφέϱειν) before one knows the exact 
number of this [sc. the original unit] that lies between the unlimited (τοῦ 
ἀπείϱου) and the one. Only then is it permitted to release each unity of all 
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these into the unlimited (τὸ ἄπειϱον) and let it go. (16d7-e2) 
 
Socrates then makes a brief concluding remark by which he reminds us of the 
divine origin of dialectic and also makes it clear that this method should be 
adopted in investigation, learning, and teaching. 
   After this, Socrates adds illustrations of the dialectical method using literacy 
and music as examples. First, he explains the case of literacy (17b3-10). While 
vocal sound is one as a thing that comes out of the mouth and is also unlimited 
in quantity, to know that it is one or unlimited does not make anyone 
knowledgeable about vocal sound, or literate (γϱαµµατιϰόν 17b8). One needs to 
know how many kinds of vocal sound there are, and what each vocal sound is 
like (πόσα τ’ ἐστὶ ϰαὶ ὁποῖα 17b7-8). Second, Socrates describes the example of 
music (17b11-d3). A student of music starts with musical sound as a unity, and 
then posits low pitch, high pitch, and unison (ὁµότονον 17c4). But he is not yet 
knowledgeable about music, just by knowing these. He becomes an expert in 
music only when he knows how many intervals (διαστήµατα 17c11), or limits 
(τοὺς ὅϱους 17d1) of the intervals, there are, and what each of them is like, as 
well as how many systems or arrangements (συστήµατα 17d2)––which are also 
called ‘harmony’ (ἁϱµονίας 17d3) in association with the number (ἀϱιθµόν 
17c12)257––are constituted from the intervals.258 Socrates then generalises the 
                                                       
257 I suggest that at 17d2-3 Plato offers an etymological analysis that derives ἁρµονίαι 
from ἀριθµόν (17c12) in the spirit of the Cratylus; something which has escaped 
Delcomminette’s notice, even though he has acutely recognised the other etymological 
analysis that derives rhythms and measures (ῥυθµοὺς ϰαὶ µέτρα 17d6) from δι’ 
ἀριθµῶν µετρηθέντα (17d5) in his (2006, 156). 
258 In relation to the characterization of the musical terms, I am basically following 
Barker (1996, 146-48), except for the interpretation of ὁποῖα, on which he comments: 
‘The word ὁποῖα is slightly unexpected in this obtrusively quantitative environment’. 
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lesson of the illustrations, and emphatically states that this way of investigation 
makes one knowledgeable about any unity, while the unlimited quantity leaves 
one in unlimited ignorance. 
   This passage is yet another source of perplexity for scholars. Many have 
tried to reach a satisfactory interpretation by minutely examining it, but they 
have only succeeded in providing widely diverse interpretations of the method 
described in the passage.259 I am not going to review their proposals in detail 
here.260 Instead, I shall focus on the following three controversial issues, which I 
think it is absolutely crucial to settle if we are to reach a correct interpretation: 
(1) what are the objects of the dialectical method? (2) what is the unlimited 
(ἄπειϱον)? (3) how can the illustrations given at 17a6-e6 be connected to the 
description of the method? 
   (1) First, I suggest that the objects the dialectical method immediately deals 
with are Socratic forms, and that the search for one form, F, in step (D1) is 
equivalent to Socrates’ procedure for the definition of F. In relation to the 
objects of the method, scholars often formulate the following question: ‘are the 
objects in question Platonic Forms, sensible particulars, both of Platonic Forms 
and sensible particulars separately, or both of them collectively?’261 But this 
                                                                                                                                                                
In fact, in the context of collection and division ὁποῖα means ‘what they are’ (see e.g. 
Phdr. 237c8, 271d2, Sph. 254c4) rather than ‘what their qualities are’ (Barker (1996, 147)), 
and corresponds to the definition by which each thing is numerically separated from 
others. 
259 See e.g. Hackforth (1972, 20-28); Trevaskis (1960); Striker (1970, 17-30); Gosling (1975, 
153-81); Moravcsik (1979, 87-93); Waterfield (1980, 280-83); Sayre (1983, 118-33; 1987, 
47-53); Benitez (1989, 38-58); Miller (1990, 323-40); Löhr (1990, 101-93); Frede (1993, 
xxiv-xxx; 1997, 130-67); Barker (1996, 143-61); Meinwald (1998), Dixsaut (2001, 285-340); 
Delcomminette (2006, 91-159); Thomas (2006). 
260 Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive and accessible review of the secondary 
literature available on this issue. For some attempts see Gosling (1975, 153-65) and Löhr 
(1990, 102-43). 
261 This question is raised especially in connection with the ‘tradition’ at 16c9-10 in this 
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question seems to me to be inappropriate, for I think none of the options given 
here is correct. I have already argued above (see pp. 270) that the ‘one form’ 
that is posited in (D1) is not a Platonic Form on account of the facts (a) that the 
‘one form’ is said to be found in things and (b) that the investigation must 
continue even after one has grasped it. Now if we take the ‘one form’ as a 
Socratic form, both problems will disappear. A Socratic form is always found in 
things or, more precisely, in contexts, and grasping the Socratic form of F only 
means that one knows F by definition; one has to continue investigation in 
order to become an expert in F. On top of this, the feature that every Socratic 
form is both one and many matches up very well with the description in (D2) 
that one must continue investigation ‘until one sees of the original unit not only 
that it is one, many, and unlimited, but also how many it is’ (16d5-7). It is 
natural to suppose that the ‘original unit’ here refers back to the ‘one form’ a 
dialectician posited at the beginning of the procedure.262 If so, then obviously 
                                                                                                                                                                
way: does ‘τῶν άεὶ λεγοµένων εἶναι’ (whatever is each time said to be) refer to (I) 
Platonic Forms, (II) sensibles, (III) both separately, (IV) both collectively? For a useful 
assessment of each position, see especially Benitez (1989, 39-42). The difference 
between (III) and (IV), according to Benitez, lies in whether (III) one supposes that 
‘being one and many, and having limit and unlimited in its nature’ applies to Forms 
and sensibles separately (perhaps in different ways), or whether (IV) one supposes that 
the characteristic in question applies to a set of undifferentiated objects that share a 
general term, F, which includes both the Form of F and sensible F things. 
262 Cf. e.g. Gosling (1975, 158): ‘”The original unit” (16d5) would most naturally be 
taken to refer to the one form (the summum genus), we found a line or two earlier.’ By 
contrast, Delcomminette (2003, 34 [2006, 65-66]) claims that ‘the original unit’ 
‘corresponds to a general term like “apeiron” (or “pleasure”, or “science”) before 
dialectic takes place: and it is dialectic which shows that it is both one, because it can 
refer to a genus, and many, because it can also refer to many species.’ But this 
interpretation is not plausible because the relation between one general term and a 
genus/many species never comes into focus in the course of the actual applications of 
the dialectical method in the main part of the dialogue (23b5-27c2, 31b2-59d9). 
Delcomminette seems to hold this view mainly because of his assumptions that the 
‘one form’ is a Platonic Form and that a Platonic Form is simply one (see his (2006, 
103): ‘La principale difference entre un universel et une Idée tient au fait que le sens du 
premier est à la fois un et multiple […] tandis que l’Idée est seulement une’ (his 
emphasis)). I agree with him on the latter assumption, but not on the former. 
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the ‘one form’ does not refer to a Platonic Form that is simply one, but to a 
Socratic form that is both one and many.263 
   As for the ‘sensible particulars’, we should be careful about the ambiguity of 
the term which might obfuscate a crucial distinction in Plato’s ontology. On the 
one hand, this term can be understood as observable particular properties, such 
as beauty in Helen or beauty in Andromache or beauty in this series of prime 
numbers I am counting at the moment.264 On the other hand, it can also be 
taken as referring to proper objects of our sense perception, such as beautiful 
particular things, for example, Helen or Andromache or this series of prime 
numbers printed on the sheet of paper I am looking at now.265 In my construal 
of Plato’s ontological scheme, the former correspond to Socratic forms as 
instantiated in particular things, and the latter to many particular F things.266 
Now I suggest that the original unit, or a Socratic form, is unlimited mainly 
because it is instantiated in an unlimited quantity of particular things, or more 
                                                       
263 See Delcomminette (2006, 103) quoted in the previous note. By contrast, Frede (1993, 
xxix-xxx; cf. 1997, 136-37) writes: ‘the genus animal, for instance, is the nature common 
to all animal, and this common nature is invariable and one. […] If the Forms are 
conceived in this “scientific way” neither their unity nor their plurality is problematic 
any longer.’ Her characterization of the ‘Forms’ essentially corresponds to my 
characterization of Socratic forms. 
264 Cf. Devereux (1994, 73): ‘It also seems that many immanent characters can be 
perceived by the senses; we can see the largeness in Simmias, and feel the heat in the 
fire.’ Cf. also Fine’s criticism against Vlastos’ view that Socratic forms are not sensible 
or observable in her (1992, 71-76). Fine suggests that the disagreement between Vlastos 
and her stems from their different views on the nature of Socratic forms; see ibid. (1992, 
72 n.11): ‘I take Socratic forms […] to be properties conceived in realist fashion […]. 
Vlastos, however, may view forms more as concepts or meanings.’ But I suspect that 
their disagreement is rather about the meaning of terms such as ‘sensible’ or 
‘observable’. 
265 For this kind of characterization of ‘sensibles’ (τὰ αἰσθητά) see e.g. R. 507a7-c5. 
266 Here I assume that most properties, including the property courage or the property 
justice or the property having-a-soul, are either directly or indirectly observable. But 
one might say, for example, beauty is observable, but intellect is not, recalling a 
passage in the Phaedrus (250c7-e1). If the range of observable properties is restricted in 
a way that excludes some objects of our knowledge, then we should rather say that 
observable particular properties belong to Socratic forms as instantiated in particular 
things. 
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precisely, particular contexts (I shall argue more on this in connection with the 
meaning of ἄπειϱον below),267 and not because there are unlimitedly many 
particular F things that are F in a certain context, but not F in another 
context––indeed, many particular F things are by themselves irrelevant for the 
dialectical method. For example, the Socratic form of beauty is unlimited qua 
beauties as instantiated in Helen, in Andromache, or in prime numbers, etc., 
and not qua Helen, Andromache, or prime numbers (these are beautiful in a 
certain context, but not beautiful in another context). With this in mind, I 
conclude that in a sense, i.e. in the sense of observable particular properties, 
sensible particulars belong to the immediate objects of the dialectical method. 
But it is simply misleading, in my view, to claim that the objects of the 
dialectical method are sensible particulars. 
   If the ‘one form’ (16d1) is a Socratic form, then the ‘searching’ for it (ζητεῖν 
16d2) must be Socrates’ procedure for definition. I submit that this consequence 
is confirmed later in the course of the discussion of the fourfold classification of 
‘everything that exists now in the universe’ (πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντί 
23c4), in which Socrates defines four ‘forms’ or ‘kinds’ (εἴδη or γένη 23c12, d2, 5, 
et passim), i.e. limit, the unlimited, mixture of limit and the unlimited, and cause, 
as the framework for a further investigation of the nature of pleasure and 
knowledge (23b5-27c2). As some scholars have observed, in defining the nature 
of the unlimited, Socrates seems to refer to (D1) in the following passage.268 
                                                       
267 I say ‘mainly because’ because I think for Plato it is not important whether a Socratic 
form is instantiated in a type or in a token. Plato seems also to hold that a Socratic form 
is unlimited because it is instantiated in the unlimited quantity of types of things or 
species (cf. Tht. 147c4, where ἀπέϱαντον ὁδόν is used for the enumeration of types of 
knowledge). Cf. Hackforth (1972, 23 n.2); Crombie (1963, 364). 
268 See especially Dixsaut (2001, 300). Cf. also Friedländer (1969, 323), Frede (1997, 204), 
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   (P59) Whatever is seen by us to become ‘more or less’ or susceptible to ‘strong and 
mild’ or to ‘too much’ and all of that kind, all that we ought to subsume 
under the kind of the unlimited as under the unity (εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀπείϱου γένος 
ὡς εἰς ἓν δεῖ πάντα ταῦτα τιθέναι). This is in accordance with our earlier 
discussion, where we said that we should try to collect whatever is dispersed 
and split up, and then stamp some one nature on them as far as we can (ὅσα 
διέσπασται ϰαὶ διέσχισται συναγαγόντας χϱῆναι ϰατὰ δύναµιν µίαν 
ἐπισηµαίνεσθαί τινα φύσιν), if you remember. 
(24e7-25a4) 
 
It is true that in (D1) Socrates only said that one should posit and search for one 
form for every object of the method (which is both one and many), and did not 
specify how one should search for it, whether it is the collection of the many or 
not. But since there is no passage in which he said that one should collect a 
many,269 it is reasonable to suppose that it is (D1) that Socrates refers to by ‘our 
                                                                                                                                                                
Delcomminette (2006, 104 n.97). Benitez (1989, 63-65) and Meinwald (1998, 168), by 
contrast, emphatically denies that the fourfold classification is the application of the 
dialectical method. Benitez develops several arguments to support his position that 
‘Socrates’ tactics in 23b-31b merely parody the Heavenly Tradition [= the dialectical 
method]’ (63). But I do not find any of his arguments cogent; I shall discuss some 
relevant points below. Meinwald does not offer any explanation of the reference to ‘our 
previous discussion’ (25a2). 
269 The first reference to ‘collection’ in the Philebus is found just slightly earlier than 
(P59), at 23e3-6 (= (P61) quoted below), but I do not think that τὸν ἔµπϱοσθεν λόγον in 
(P59) refers back to this passage. First, the procedure of collection described in (P61) is 
still being applied in (P59), and so it would be strange that Socrates asks Protarchus if he 
remembers it or not. Second, in (P61) he only says: ‘Let’s make an effort (πειϱώµεθα) to 
collect them’, but in (P59) he says: ‘we said that we should (χϱῆναι) try to collect [them]’. 
Third, ‘to study how each of them is in fact one and many’ in (P61) clearly resonates 
with Socrates’ earlier statement: ‘This is the very point in question to which our 
preceding discussion obliges us to give an answer: to show how each of them is one and 
many’ (18e8-9; in (P57) quoted above), which in turn refers back to (D1). It is then 
reasonable to suppose that in (P59) Socrates reminds Protarchus of the fact that the 
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earlier discussion’ in (P59). Indeed, a close examination of the text will show 
that this interpretation is harmonious with the actual procedure for the 
definition of the unlimited. First, exactly as (D1) prescribed it, the procedure 
starts with the postulation of the form of the unlimited: 
 
   (P60) SOCRATES: We agreed earlier, I think, that the god had revealed the unlimited 
and limit as belonging to beings. 
PROTARCHUS: Certainly. 
SOCRATES: Let us now posit these as two of forms (τούτω δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο 
τιθώµεθα). 
(23c9-12) 
 
Socrates then adds two other forms, i.e. mixture and cause, into the framework, 
and then says: 
 
   (P61) Let us first take up three of the four, and since we observe that two of them 
are split up and dispersed as many (πολλὰ ἑϰάτεϱον ἐσχισµένον ϰαὶ 
διεσπασµένον ἰδόντες), let’s make an effort to collect them into a unity again 
(εἰς ἓν πάλιν ἑϰάτεϱον συναγαγόντες), in order to study how each of them is 
in fact one and many. 
(23e3-6) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                
procedure they are applying has in fact been established in the methodological 
passage. 
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The collection of the many described here is the main process that takes 
Socrates and his interlocutor to the immediate goal of the search, i.e. the 
definition of the unlimited proposed in (P59). It seems fairly clear that the 
postulation of the form of the unlimited in (P60), the collection of the many into 
its unity in (P61), and the discovery of the common characteristic in (P59) 
respectively correspond to the postulation of one form, the search for it, and the 
discovery of it in things in (D1). The search for the one form in (D1) is, therefore, 
equivalent to the collection of the many into its unity.270 Now, in the course of 
the investigation of the unlimited, Socrates only makes use of one example, i.e. 
hotter and colder (see 24a6-d7), before reaching the definition of the unlimited. 
It seems clear, however, that he has also other examples in mind, some of which 
are spelled out slightly later, i.e. dryer and wetter, more and less, faster and 
slower, and taller and shorter (see 25c8-10).271 These are all parts or kinds, and 
so ‘instances’, of the unlimited. Thus, in applying the procedure described in 
(D1), Socrates first posits the form of the unlimited, observes that it is split up 
and dispersed as many instances, and then examines them in order to find the 
common characteristic of the unlimited. This procedure for the definition of the 
                                                       
270 It follows from this that the dialectical method deals with a many from its initial 
stage. One might wonder, then, how contemporary intellectuals, or young boys in my 
interpretation, can make a many faster than dialecticians, as described at 17a1-2. My 
answer is that what makes difference is the fact that a dialectician not only enumerates 
but also examines many instances in order to find a common characteristic (see 18e8-9; 
23e6). A young boy, by contrast, simply enumerates many Fs without considering their 
nature, and so he makes a many faster than he should. 
271 I do not agree with Delcomminette, who considers it significant that Socrates’ 
enumeration of the instances other than hotter and colder comes only after the 
definition. From this fact he claims: ‘Cela montre clairement que le rassemblement est 
un processus virtuel qui nous dispense d’énumérer tous les cas particuliers’ (2006, 104 
n.97) and ‘le rassemblement est un processus virtuel plutôt qu’une énumération de 
participants déjà différenciés.’ (2006, 108). Socrates, in my view, has clearly distinct 
instances in mind before reaching the definition, but just does not mention them. 
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unlimited perfectly corresponds to Socrates’ procedure for definition I have 
discussed in Chapter 1. I therefore conclude that the searching for the form of F 
in (D1) is nothing other than Socrates’ procedure for the definition of F. 
   (2) The second crucial question in connection with the dialectical method is, 
what is the unlimited (ἄπειϱον)? I have already suggested my answer: when 
Socrates states at 16d5-6 that an original unit, or the Socratic form of F, is 
unlimited, the meaning of the ‘unlimited’ is unlimited in quantity, and this 
statement implies that there is an unlimited quantity of instances of F.272 By 
suggesting this, I am closely following the traditional interpretation of the 
unlimited (let us call this line of interpretation the ‘instancist view’).273 
   The instancist view, however, has recently come under vigorous attack from 
many scholars who believe that this view is unable to explain the unlimited 
consistently throughout the dialogue.274 These scholars argue, in essence, in the 
following way. At 23c9-10 (in (P60) quoted above), in reintroducing limit and 
the unlimited as two of the four forms or kinds in the fourfold classification, 
Socrates states that they have already mentioned them as having been shown 
by god. His statement clearly indicates that limit and the unlimited in the 
                                                       
272 I agree with Delcomminette (2006, 106; 116) that any ἀϱιθµός, which is regularly 
translated as ‘number’, should belong to πέϱας on account of its definition, 
‘multiplicity composed of unities’ (τὰ ἐϰ µονάδων συγϰείµενον πλῆθος, Euclid Elements 
VII Def. 2). Accordingly, just in order to steer clear of confusion, I shall always use 
‘unlimited in quantity’ or ‘an unlimited quantity of instances’ instead of the expression 
favoured by scholars, i.e. ‘unlimited in number’ or ‘an unlimited number of instances’. 
273 See e.g. Hackforth (1972, 24 n.1): ‘infinite plurality’; Diès (1949, XXV): ‘individualités 
innombrables; Taylor (1956, 33): ‘”indefinitely many” members’ and ‘the multiplicity of 
individual “instances”’; Crombie (1963, 364): ‘innumerable cases of P-hood’; Striker 
(1970, 29): ‘Einzeldinge’; Benitez (1989, 53-55): ‘unlimited many things’ and ‘sensible 
instances’; De Chiara-Quenzer (1992, 361): ‘an unlimited number of instances’; Frede 
(1993, xxv): ‘an unlimited multitude of the many instances’. 
274 See e.g. Gosling (1975, 165), Moravcsik (1979, 88), Sayre (1983, 140), Miller (1990, 
330), Barker (1998, 145; 157), Meinwald (1996, 167-68), Delcomminette (2006, 105), 
Thomas (2006, 211 n.20). 
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fourfold classification are the same as those that appeared in the dialectical 
method which, according to Socrates, is a gift from gods. Now in the fourfold 
classification the unlimited is explicitly defined as ‘whatever is seen by us to 
become more or less, etc.’ (see (P59) quoted above). That, for example, the 
hotter and colder is unlimited means that the hotter and colder is seen by us 
always to become more or less, or, to put it differently, that the hotter and 
colder constitutes a continuum of temperature. It does not mean at all that there 
is an unlimited quantity of instances of the hotter and colder. It follows, then, 
that Socrates’ statement at 16d5-6 that an original unit is unlimited also 
indicates that the original unit makes up a continuum, since the limit and the 
unlimited are the same in both of the two passages. It is therefore wrong to 
suppose, according to these scholars, that the original unit’s being unlimited 
signifies an unlimited quantity of instances of F (let us call these scholars 
‘continuists’). 
   This argument of the continuists is admittedly very clear and 
straightforward, but its consequence is hard to digest; it seems implausible that 
every object of the dialectical method somehow constitutes a continuum. The 
continuists often claim that they find strong support for their view in the 
illustrations of the dialectical method. According to them, the example of music 
is best explained as the process of division of the high-and-low continuum of 
pitch. However, even if this is the case (I shall argue later that it is not), it will 
not provide a good reason for reading into the other illustration, i.e. the 
example of literacy, the process of division of the ‘maximal release of 
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breath’-and-‘maximal cutting off of breath’ continuum.275 For one thing, there is 
no reference to such a continuum at all in the text, and, for another, such a 
continuum cannot be an instance of the unlimited defined in the fourfold 
classification, which by definition has no ‘maximal’ whatsoever.276 It seems still 
less plausible that other objects of investigation, e.g. health, a man, the beautiful, 
the good, somehow make up a linear continuum of the kind described in the 
fourfold classification. One might suggest that there are several linear continua 
involved in each such case; for example, health consists in at least two linear 
continua, i.e. hot and cold, and dry and wet (cf. Smp. 186d6-e1).277 But this 
suggestion will take us far away from what is actually described in (D1) – (D3). 
Clearly, it is not the process of division of various relevant linear continua that 
is described there; such a process would have to start with an enquiry as to 
what kind of continua the object of investigation somehow constitutes, and not 
with the postulation of, and the search for, one form. Finally, when it comes to 
limit and the unlimited, which, as we have seen, themselves are treated as 
objects of the dialectical method in the fourfold classification, the continuists 
will face a flat contradiction.278 Their view would imply, on the one hand, that 
                                                       
275 This continuum is proposed by Miller (1990, 330-31), and is approved of by 
Meinwald (1998, 179). 
276 This is clear from the definition of the unlimited in (P59). See also Phlb. 31a9: 
‘Pleasure itself is unlimited, and belongs to the kind that in and by itself neither 
possesses nor will ever possess a beginning, middle, or end.’ 
277 For a proposal along these lines, see Harvey (2009, 22). 
278 For an argument along these lines, see Benitez (1989, 64). The continuists tend to 
deny that the dialectical method is applied to limit and the unlimited. See Meinwald 
(1998, 168): ‘For the things studied by the Promethean Method [= the dialectical 
method], having peras and apeiron in them, are all combinations of peras and apeiron and 
so members of the Fourfold Division’s mixed class. From this it follows that the 
Fourfold Division is not itself an application of the Promethean Method’; and Thomas 
(2006, 213): ‘It is plausible to suppose that the mixtures of the fourfold ontology just are 
the objects enquired into via the Promethean method.’ Cf. also Miller (1990, 323-24). It 
is not easy to imagine how these scholars explain the close correspondence between the 
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limit, which cannot be a continuum by definition, somehow constitutes a 
continuum, and, on the other hand, that the unlimited, which is devoid of limit 
by definition, would emerge as being limited if one were to move on to step 
(D2) and to find its number. 
   Having said that, it would be of course unsatisfactory to claim that, despite 
Socrates’ words at 23c9-10, limit and the unlimited in the description of the 
dialectical method just are different from those that appear in the fourfold 
classification, as some instancists do.279 But I think that there is a simple 
solution to this issue. What is absolutely necessary is, in my view, the identity 
of the form of the unlimited (16d7, 23c9-12) that appears in the two distinct 
sections of the dialogue. In connection with the dialectical method, Socrates 
says: 
 
One must not apply the form of the unlimited to the plurality (τὴν δὲ τοῦ 
ἀπείϱου ἰδέαν πϱὸς τὸ πλῆθος µὴ πϱοσφέϱειν) before one knows the exact 
number of this [sc. the original unit] that lies between the unlimited (τοῦ 
ἀπείϱου) and the one. (16d7-e1; this passage has been already quoted in (D3)) 
 
Note that the form of the unlimited is applied to the plurality or quantity of the 
                                                                                                                                                                
procedure for the definition of the unlimited and (D1), and the referent of the ‘our 
earlier discussion’ in (P59). 
279 See e.g. Hackforth (1972, 41); Frede (1993, xxxviii: 1997, 202). By the same token, 
Benitez (1989, 65-67) proposes that the fact that limit and the unlimited have the same 
general meaning ‘limited and unlimited quantity’ throughout the Philebus is ‘enough for 
Socrates to claim that peras and apeiron are the same in 23b-31b as they were in 16b-19a’ 
despite that they are applied differently, that is: ‘In the Heavenly Tradition the terms 
are quantitative in respect of plurality, in the Four-Fold Classification they are 
quantitative in respect of degree’ (his emphases). 
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object of the method, and is not directly applied to the object in question. In 
other words, in (D1) – (D3) it is the quantity involved in the form of F that is 
unlimited, or seen by us always to become more or less, and it is not the case 
that the form of F itself constitutes the unlimited. Socrates sometimes reminds 
us of this fact by using the expression ‘unlimited in quantity’ (ἄπειϱος … πλήθει 
17b4) and ‘the unlimited quantity’ (τὸ … ἄπειϱον πλῆθος 17e3). It is true that he 
often refers to the unlimited without any qualification (see 16d6, e1, 2, 17a2, 
18a9, b6, 9), but this is because he has already made clear the connection 
between the form of the unlimited and the quantity of the form of F in (D3). 
Besides, under the continuist view Socrates’ reference to the number between one 
and the unlimited at 16e2 and 17a2 would be unintelligible; for example, 
speaking of the number of pitch between one and the continuum of pitch does 
not make sense at all. I therefore conclude that in the methodological passage it 
is the application of the form of the unlimited to quantities that is at issue.280 By 
contrast, in the fourfold classification it is the nature of the form of the 
unlimited itself that is discussed. Of course, these different treatments of the 
form of the unlimited do not affect its identity. There seem to be no problems 
for the instancist view that the form of F is unlimited (in quantity) as 
instantiated in the unlimited quantity of contexts, which in turn implies that 
there is an unlimited quantity of instances of F. 
                                                       
280 It may be useful to compare my view with Benitez’s view referred to in the previous 
note. He thinks that terms ‘limit’ and ‘the unlimited’ mean ‘limited and unlimited 
quantity’ both in the methodological passage and in the fourfold classification, but that 
in the former they are quantitative in respect of plurality while in the latter they are 
quantitative in respect of degree. By contrast, I think that the terms basically mean 
‘limited and unlimited quantity in respect of degree’ in both of the two sections, but in 
the former they are applied to plurality, and derivatively become ‘quantitative in respect 
of plurality’. 
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   (3) Finally, let us turn to the third crucial question, i.e. how can the 
illustrations given at 17a6-e6 be connected to the description of the method? My 
answer to this question is simple and perhaps self-evident: the illustrations 
clearly illuminate the fact that the number of kinds between one and the 
unlimited, or ‘how many kinds there are and what they are like’ (ὁπόσα ϰαὶ 
ὁποῖα cf. 17a7-8, c11-d2), makes one knowledgeable in each case. The kernel of 
the dialectical method consists in the determination of the number of kinds 
involved in its objects, which is neatly captured by the lesson Socrates sums up 
at 17d7-e6, to the effect that the number makes one knowledgeable in each case 
just as it does in literacy and music, while the unlimited quantity leaves one in 
unlimited ignorance. However, hardly any scholars have seen matters in this 
way. Indeed, many scholars have just found our third crucial question puzzling, 
so that they have either criticised Plato for inapt illustrations, or developed 
complicated interpretations in order to find an answer to it. It would be, then, 
worthwhile to consider what the problem that has been troubling these scholars 
is. 
   So far as I can see it, this issue was brought into focus by Hackforth’s 
influential criticism of the illustrations. 281  He first puts forward an 
interpretation of the dialectical method, basically following the view that was 
commonly accepted by scholars (the view which I myself am basically 
following; see below), namely: 
 
   (A1) The central feature of the dialectical method consists in the division of 
                                                       
281 See Hackforth (1972, 24-26). 
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a genus into its species. 
 
He then argues that neither of the illustrations clarifies (A1); in the case of 
literacy (17b3-10), we must supplement the actual process of division of the 
alphabet (e.g. the division of vocal sound into vowels, semi-vowels, and 
consonants) from the description of Theuth’s discovery of the alphabet 
(18b6-d2); in the case of music (17b11-d3), the procedure described here, which, 
starting with the high-and-low continuum of musical sound, marks off specific 
intervals on it in order to produce harmony, is concerned with a procedure 
different from (A1). Many scholars have found this argument compelling, but 
most of them have chosen to reject (A1),282 or at least (A1) as traditionally 
understood,283 rather than to blame Plato for inappropriate illustrations. These 
scholars have often paid particular attention to the ‘procedure’ applied to music, 
which according to them yields a valuable clue as to how we should 
understand the dialectical method; and, simultaneously taking into 
consideration the use of the unlimited in the fourfold classification, they have 
advanced the continuist view, according to which the dialectical method is a 
process of marking off specific points on a certain continuum.284 
   In my view, Hackforth’s argument is not compelling. I suggest that his 
                                                       
282 See Trevaskis (1960); Gosling (1975, 162-81; esp. 174: ‘[…] the genus/species 
interpretation would be an intelligent speculation as to what is being said, but not 
more. If the illustrations are to help, then, as we have seen, trouble starts for that 
interpretation’); Waterfield (1980, 281); Thomas (2006, 215 n.26). 
283 See Miller (1990, 326 n.8), quoting Sayre (1969, 223): ‘collection and division do not 
presuppose or work within “the Aristotelian format of genus, subordinate difference , 
and infima species.”’ For similar views, see Meinwald (1998) and Delcomminette (2006, 
110-125). 
284 For details, see esp. Gosling (165-81), Miller (1990, 325-40), Meinwald (1998), and 
Delcomminette (2006, 91-159). 
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criticism of the illustrations is based on the following two closely 
interconnected assumptions, which are, as a matter of fact, shared by most of 
the continuists, even though they are unwarranted by the text: 
 
   (A2) The illustrations should illuminate the process of division.285 
   (A3) The dialectical method should always deal with just one kind of unity 
in relation to each particular science.286 
 
With (A2) in mind, one would claim that the example of literacy is not 
appropriate, since it does not illustrate the process of division. With (A2) or 
(A3) in mind, one would assume that the successive treatments of musical 
sound, intervals, and harmony describe the process of division, either because 
that is what the example should illustrate, or because the unity of musical 
sound is the single object of the method in relation to music. I myself reject both 
assumptions. First, the fact that the example of literacy does not illustrate the 
process of division shows, in my view, that that is not Plato’s point here. Rather, 
his point is, as I have suggested above, only that it is the number, or ‘how many 
and what kind’, of vocal sound––which is the outcome of the division of vocal 
sound––that makes one knowledgeable about it, or literate. If so, then what is to 
be blamed is not the example of literacy, but the assumption about what the 
examples should illustrate, i.e. (A2). Second, a glance at the following passage 
                                                       
285 For explicit commitments to this assumption, see e.g. Striker (1970, 24), Moravcsik 
(1979, 91-92), Waterfield (1980, 281), Barker (1996, 146-47), Frede (1997, 146), 
Delcomminette (2006, 130), Thomas (2006, 214-21). 
286 For explicit commitments to this assumption, see e.g. Moravcsik (1979, 92), Barker 
(1996, 146; 150), Delcomminette (2006, 130). 
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from the Phaedrus will clearly show that (A3) is mistaken: 
 
   (P62) Since the power of speech is in fact a leading of the soul, the man who is 
going to be an expert in rhetoric must know how many forms soul has. Their 
number is so and so, and they are of such and such kinds (ἔστιν οὖν τόσα ϰαὶ 
τόσα, ϰαὶ τοῖα ϰαὶ τοῖα), which is why some people are like this, and others 
like that; and since these have been distinguished in this way, then again 
there are so many forms of speeches, each one of such and such a kind (λόγων αὖ 
τόσα ϰαὶ τόσα ἔστιν εἴδη, τοιόνδε ἕϰαστον). So people of one kind are easily 
persuaded for this reason by one kind of speech to hold one kind of opinion, 
while people of another kind are for these reasons difficult to persuade. 
(271c10-d7) 
 
Note that Socrates explains here that an expert in rhetoric must determine the 
number (‘how many and what kind’) of two things, i.e. soul and speeches. Note 
also that, as is clear from the context surrounding (P62), the emphasis is placed 
on the determination of the forms of soul (see 270c9-271a11, 273d7-e4, 277b8-c2). 
I suggest, then, that, analogously, the example of music in the Philebus deals 
with two things, i.e. musical sound and intervals, and the emphasis is placed on 
the latter; the division of musical sound into high pitch, low pitch, and unison is 
merely preliminary for understanding or defining what interval is. The main 
task for the dialectical method in relation to music is to discern the number 
(ἀϱιθµόν 17c12), or ‘how many and what kind’ (ὁπόσα … ϰαὶ ὁποῖα 17c11-d1), 
of intervals (and the limits of intervals, which I think are not independent of 
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intervals). This may start with the definition of interval as ‘a degree of higher 
and lower that can properly be used in music’, and then divide the intervals in 
accordance with the size of interval, such as 2:1, 3:2, 4:3, 1:1.287 Arrangements of 
intervals (συστήαµατα 17d2), or ἁϱµονίαι, do not seem to constitute an 
independent object of the method, but one gets hold of them through the 
arrangement of the outcome of the application of the method to intervals, which 
is analogous to the combinations of a certain type of soul with a certain type of 
speech described in the Phaedrus (see (P62); cf. Ch. 4 §5). At any rate, to repeat 
my suggestion, it is not the details of the procedure that Plato wants to describe 
here. The point of the illustrations is simply that the number or, ‘how many and 
what kind’, of F will make one knowledgeable about F in each case. It does not 
seem to be right, then, to criticise Plato for not illustrating the process of division 
in detail, as Hackforth has done, nor does it seem to be right, either, to 
reconstruct the dialectical method on the basis of the treatments of musical 
sound, intervals and harmony in the example of music, as the continuists have 
proposed. 
   Thus, I hope to have shown (1) that the immediate objects of the dialectical 
method are Socratic forms, (2) that the statement that the form of F is unlimited 
implies that there is an unlimited quantity of instances of F, and (3) that the 
illustrations illuminate the fact that the number, or ‘how many and what kind’, 
of the form of F makes one knowledgeable about F. In relation to (2) and (3), I 
have basically defended the traditional interpretation against the continuist 
view. With these points in mind, I would like to offer my interpretation of the 
                                                       
287 Cf. Barker (1996, 146-47). 
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whole process of the dialectical method. 
   As has been indicated, (D1) is Socrates’ procedure for the definition of F, 
which consists of the following three sub-steps: first, a dialectician posits the 
form of F; second, he enquires into what F is by generalising or abstracting the 
common characteristic, F, on the basis of many instances of F; third, he 
discovers this common characteristic as instantiated in various contexts, and 
defines it. In consideration of the ontological status of Socratic forms, we may 
be in a position to add that a dialectician’s postulation of the form of F entails 
his commitment to the existence of the form of F by which many F things are F. 
By contrast, the mere postulation of the unity of F (τὸ ἕν 15a1), which he shares 
with the young boys and the opponents of Platonic Forms, does not seem to 
entail such a commitment. 
   Next, a dialectician turns to step (D2), which is essentially the procedure for 
dividing a genus-form into its species. If a genus-form, F, turns out to be equal 
to two species-forms, G and H, in terms of instances,288 then a dialectician 
divides the form of F into the forms of G and H. This means that he collects all the 
instances of F into the instances of G and the instances of H without residue, 
and provides the definitions of G and H through Socrates’ procedure for 
definition. If a dialectician cannot find two species-forms, then he should try 
and see if the form of F can be divided into three, or the smallest possible 
number of, species-forms. After this, a dialectician should examine the 
species-forms that have been discovered through this procedure in the same 
                                                       
288 To put it differently, if the instances of F are equal to the sum of the instances of G 
and the instances of H. 
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way; for example, he should examine if the species-form of G can be divided 
into two subspecies-forms, P and Q. He should repeat this process until he sees, 
of the form of F, not only that it is one as liable to one and the same definition, 
and many and unlimitedly many as instantiated in many and unlimitedly many 
contexts, but also how many species-forms (and subspecies-forms, etc.) it is 
equal to in respect of instances. 
   Finally, after having determined the number of species-forms involved in 
the form of F by defining every one of them, at step (D3) a dialectician applies 
the form of the unlimited to the quantity of the forms of F, G, H, P, Q, etc., 
which implies that there are an unlimited quantity of instances of F, G, H, P, Q, 
etc. This final step seems to indicate that a voluntary acceptance of an unlimited 
quantity of instances entails putting an end to the treatment of these instances 
as data on the basis of which a certain common characteristic is to be found. To 
put it differently, in the preceding steps, i.e. (D1) and (D2), a dialectician has 
regarded instances as enumerable in order to carry out the method, even though 
in reality there is an unlimited quantity of instances from the beginning, as is 
clear from the example of literacy (see 17b4). He has only suppressed this aspect 
of the quantity of instances, since certainly an unlimited quantity of instances 
would be beyond any dialectician’s grasp. Only at step (D3), after he has 
determined the number of the species-forms, is he permitted to claim that there 
are indeed an innumerable quantity of instances for each of the genus-form and 
the species-forms. This concludes the investigation of the form of F by the 
dialectical method. 
   Now that we have obtained a full picture of the dialectical method, my next 
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task is to argue that the method in question is substantially the same as the 
procedure for internal analysis described in the Phaedrus. Let us first recall what 
this procedure is like. For the present purpose, I would like to call attention to 
the passage close to the end of the dialogue in which Socrates sums up the 
discussion on the science of rhetoric (I have discussed this passage in detail in 
Ch.4 §5): 
 
   (P63) Until a man knows the truth about each of the things about which he speaks 
or writes, and (B1) becomes capable of defining the whole itself, and (B2) 
having defined it, knows how to cut it up again according to its forms until it 
can no longer be cut; and until he has reached an understanding of the nature 
of soul along the same lines […] not before then will he be capable of 
pursuing the making of speeches as a whole in a scientific way. 
(277b5-c5) 
 
Socrates here explains several conditions a true and scientific rhetorician should 
satisfy. All the conditions are important for understanding a full application of 
the method, but his explanation of the condition concerning the subject of a 
speech is particularly illuminating. According to this, a student of true rhetoric 
should learn the truth about the subject, F, and (B1) he should define F as a 
whole, and (B2) after he has acquired the definition of F, he should divide F into 
species-forms, subspecies-forms, etc. as far as possible. It is crystal clear that 
(B1) and (B2) in (P63) respectively correspond to (D1) and (D2) in the 
description of the dialectical method in the Philebus. It is true that there is no 
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mention of step (D3) or limit and the unlimited in the Phaedrus. But I do not 
think that this omission alters the nature of the method greatly. To begin with, 
it should be noted that in the Phaedrus Plato hints at the importance of 
enumeration in the context of internal analysis (see ἀϱιθµησάµενον 270d6, 
διαϱιθµήσηται 273e1), which implies that he regards number, which is 
equivalent to limit, as a significant factor for internal analysis.289 Second, the 
reference to limit and the unlimited in the methodological passage in the 
Philebus is mostly explained through its contextual and thematic relevance. If 
my interpretation of the unlimited is correct, then the unlimited is not 
significant for investigation itself; this is the aspect of the quantity of F that 
should be suppressed in the course of investigation. The unlimited comes to the 
fore in the Philebus partly because it is the contrast between dialecticians’ and 
contemporary intellectuals’ ways of dealing with one and many that is at stake 
here. If Plato criticises contemporary intellectuals for directly turning from the 
one to the unlimited, then it is of course important to make it clear at what point 
the dialecticians turn to the unlimited. Another reason seems to be 
compositional; Plato probably wanted to make use of limit and the unlimited as 
the key terms that integrate apparently variegated arguments of the dialogue. 
They are only indirectly at issue as applied to the quantity of the form of F in 
the dialectical method, but they are closely examined as two of the four forms 
that constitute Plato’s mature cosmological framework in the fourfold 
classification, and then, as part of the framework, they lay the foundations of 
                                                       
289 Some scholars have failed to notice this fact. See e.g. Frede (1997, 133): ‘Eine 
Neuerung in der Beschreibung der dialektischen Methode im Philebos liegt vor allem 
darin, daß auf numerisch korrekter „Buchführung“ bestanden wird.’ 
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the main task of the dialogue, i.e. the investigation of the nature of pleasure and 
knowledge. It is not really a surprise, then, that in the Phaedrus Plato does not 
mention limit and the unlimited, or include a step corresponding to (D3), for 
these things do not have a direct pertinence to the actual procedure of the 
dialectical method. I conclude, then, that the procedure for internal analysis in 
the Phaedrus perfectly corresponds to the dialectical method in the Philebus. It 
also follows from this that the application of the dialectical method to the 
investigation of pleasure and knowledge in the main part of the Philebus offers a 
working example of internal analysis. 
 
§5. Two more issues: Theuth’s case and Platonic Forms 
   Before concluding this chapter, I would like briefly to discuss two more 
relevant issues. The first issue is concerned with the case I have excluded from 
my discussion of the dialectical method, that is, the case described at 18a9-d2 in 
which one is first compelled to get hold of the unlimited, just as Theuth was 
when he discovered the alphabet. The second issue is, what is the relation 
between the dialectical method and Platonic Forms? 
   I have suggested, at the beginning of the previous section, that the 
dialectical method and Theuth’s case are essentially different in their 
approaches. I shall now explain what I mean by this suggestion: while a 
dialectician carries out his investigation by defining every form that emerges 
during the procedure, Theuth’s case does not involve any definitions at all. Now, it 
is at least clear from the text that the contrast (cf. τὸ ἐναντίον 18a9) between the 
two cases lies in their starting point; a dialectician starts with the unity of F, 
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while a Theuth starts with the unlimited. The latter does not mean, as some 
scholars have taken it, that he has absolutely no idea about F at this stage,290 
which is simply implausible; what it does mean is that he cannot carry out step 
(D1), or define F, because there are no instances of F under his control. In such a 
case, Socrates advises, one should not directly turn to the unity of F, but 
consider ‘a certain number each of which has some quantity’ (ἀϱιθµόν … τινα 
πλῆθος ἕϰαστον ἔχοντά τι 18b2).291 On the surface of it, one might be tempted 
to take Socrates’ guidance as indicating that one should investigate and define 
species-forms before a genus-form. But here is a snag: as I have argued in 
Chapter 2, Socrates seems to be committed to what I call the principle of the 
priority of the definition of the whole over the definitions of parts: 
 
(PDWP) If one fails to know the definition of F, then one fails to know 
the definition of any part (or any kind) of F. 
 
This principle makes it impossible to define species-forms before a genus-form. 
Had Plato changed his mind about this principle by the time he wrote the 
Philebus? This is unlikely, for (PDWP) explains very well the reason why Plato 
developed the method of division in the late dialogues; (PDWP) is not just a 
minor principle involved in Plato’s later dialectic, but it forms the backbone of 
                                                       
290 For example, Hackforth’s influential criticism of the case of Theuth in his (1972, 26) 
shows, by implication, that he holds such a view. He argues that Plato was wrong in 
thinking that Theuth reached the generic notion of the alphabet at the end of his 
investigation, for ‘it is plain that what Theuth has done is merely to give a name to a 
generic notion which must have been present to his mind from the outset.’ This implies 
that, in Hackforth’s view, Plato meant that Theuth did not have the generic notion at 
the beginning. 
291 For a detailed consideration of this phrase, see Delcomminette (2006, 144 n.177). 
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his methodology. It is true that some scholars have indeed claimed that they 
have found a case of the investigation of species-forms prior to a genus-form in 
the main part of the Philebus. They propose that, in examining the nature of 
pleasure, Socrates first defines bodily pleasure and then turns to pleasure of 
soul (see 31d1-32c5) without defining pleasure as a whole or considering how 
many kinds of pleasure there are, which, according to these scholars, indicates 
that Theuth’s case is being applied here.292 On the face of it, their proposal 
might appear attractive, since it would help to explain the role of Theuth’s case 
in the dialogue. However, at 18e6-19a2 (in (P57) quoted above) Socrates makes 
it perfectly clear that it is steps (D1) – (D3), and not Theuth’s case, that are 
applied to the investigation of both pleasure and knowledge. We would do well 
to remember here that the apparent absence of the definition of F does not 
necessarily mean that F as a whole is still under investigation; it might indicate 
that F is obvious and there is no need for definition (see e.g. Phdr. 263a2-c12). 
Pleasure as a whole would plausibly be considered to be such a case. It would 
be, then, safe not to attribute the withdrawal of (PDWP) to Plato on account of 
the brief description of Theuth’s discovery of the alphabet. The conclusion to be 
drawn from this is that Theuth, who has not obtained the definition of a 
genus-form, cannot obtain the definitions of species-forms either; or, in short, 
Theuth’s case does not involve any definitions at all. Then what was Theuth 
doing? I suggest that his investigation was mostly intuitive, being deprived of 
λόγος. Socrates introduces Theuth’s case in the methodological passage 
presumably because he thinks that Theuth’s intuition worked by not directly 
                                                       
292 See n.254 above. 
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turning from the unlimited to the one. But intuition resists the formulation into 
a systematic procedure; it is impossible to explain the work of intuition 
transparently. Accordingly, I propose that the whole passage about Theuth’s 
case (18a9-d2) is nothing more than general advice to be followed when one 
first gets hold of the unlimited, and not the description of a certain method. 
   Moving on now to the second issue I have proposed to discuss in this final 
section, I suggest that the dialectical method is always concerned with Platonic 
Forms, by looking to them as its ultimate goal.293 Close to the end of the dialogue, 
in the course of the investigation of intellect and knowledge (νοῦ … ϰαὶ 
ἐπιστήµης 55c5), Socrates mentions dialectic (ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναµις 57e6-7) 
as the only science that is ‘concerned with what is, and with the “really and 
truly”, and with what is by nature always the same in every respect’ (πεϱὶ τὸ ὂν 
ϰαὶ τὸ ὄντως ϰαὶ τὸ ϰατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυϰός 58a2-3).294 He also uses some 
variations of this expression in order to depict this entity, most notably ‘what is 
always the same in every respect and the least mixed’ (τὰ ἀεὶ ϰατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ 
ὡσαύτως ἀµειϰτότατα ἔχοντα 59c3-4). These are very close to the expressions 
used exclusively to refer to Platonic Forms in the middle dialogues, and so there 
seems to be little room for doubt that Socrates has the same entities in mind 
here in the Philebus.295 The dialectical method is, then, concerned with Platonic 
                                                       
293 Cf. Delcomminette (2006, 530): ‘La saisie de l’Idée n’est pas le point de départ de la 
dialectique, elle en est le résultat’ (his emphasis). 
294 I have adopted ‘the “really and truly”’ from Benardete’s translation in his (1993, 72). 
295 Under the influence of Owen’s proposal in his (1953) that Plato abandoned the 
theory of Forms in his late dialogues, Shiner (1974, esp. 53-66) argued that the 
metaphysical doctrine in the Philebus does not imply the theory Plato held in the 
middle dialogues, especially in the Republic. His argument sparked off some interesting 
debate; see Fahrnkopf (1977) and Shiner (1979); Mohr (1983) and Shiner (1983). Shiner’s 
argument will be of considerable significance if one shares Shiner’s sympathy towards 
Owen’s proposal and also agrees with his interpretation of Plato’s theory of Forms in 
the middle dialogues. I myself do not agree or sympathise with Shiner on these issues, 
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Forms. I have not given any place for these context-independent entities in my 
picture of the dialectical method, but it does not follow from this that my 
interpretation is inconsistent with this reference to Platonic Forms. The key to 
understanding the role of Platonic Forms in the dialectical method is given by 
Socrates in the following passage: 
 
   (P64) SOCRATES: But there was also a difference between different sciences, since 
one kind looks towards things that come to be and perish, the other towards 
things that do not come to be and perish, being always the same in every 
respect (ἡ µὲν ἐπὶ τὰ γιγνόµενα ϰαὶ ἀπολλύµενα ἀποβλέπουσα, ἡ δ’ ἐπὶ τὰ 
µήτε γιγνόµενα ϰαὶ µήτε ἀπολλύµενα, ϰατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ ϰαὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα ἀεί). 
(61d10-e3) 
 
The kind of science that looks towards Platonic Forms is, of course, dialectic. 
The implication of this passage, I submit, is that dialectic pursues and strives for 
the Platonic Forms as its goal. Thus, when a dialectician engages in the 
investigation of the nature of F, he aims at the perfect understanding of F, or, in 
other words, at knowledge of the Platonic Form of F. In this sense, he is always 
concerned with the Platonic Form of F. Sciences that belong to the other kind, 
by contrast, look towards things that come to be and perish, since their goal is 
successfully to apply the knowledge of F acquired through the dialectical 
method to the sensible world. In order to master the science of rhetoric, for 
                                                                                                                                                                
and so I will not pursue his position here. With the majority of scholars, I simply take 
that Socrates is referring to Platonic Forms with the expressions such as ‘what is always 
the same in every respect’ in the Philebus. 
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example, a student must learn the nature of soul and speeches as revealed by 
the dialectical method, but this is not the end of the story; ‘after that the student 
must observe them as they are in real life, and actually being put into practice, 
and be able to follow them with keen perception (τῇ αἰσθήσει), or otherwise get no 
advantage, as yet, from the things he heard earlier […]’ (Phdr. 271d7-e2). In 
general, any particular sciences that belong to this kind make use of ‘conjecture 
and the training of our senses through experience and routine’ (εἰϰάζειν … ϰαὶ 
τὰς αἰσθήσεις ϰαταµελετᾶν ἐµπειϱίᾳ ϰαί τινι τϱιβῇ Phlb. 55e5-6). This is the 
reason why these particular sciences are concerned with things that come to be 
and perish, even though they must get hold of knowledge of their own subject 
in order to be true sciences.296 In short, then, the dialectical method is ultimately 
concerned with Platonic Forms, while almost all the other sciences are ultimately 
concerned with things that come to be and perish. 
                                                       
296 Incidentally, I suggest that the importance of sense perception for particular 
sciences will explain the situation described at 62a7-b4 in the Philebus, the situation in 
which someone knows the explanation of the divine circle and the divine sphere, but is 
ignorant of the human circle and the human sphere. The situation seems to indicate 
that he has not yet learned how to apply his knowledge to sensible world (note that the 
human circle and the human sphere correspond to many F things, and not to instances 
of F). This situation is analogous to the freed prisoner’s situation after he has returned 
to the cave in the allegory of the cave in the Republic (516e7-517a7). 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
§1. A systematic recapitulation of Plato’s method 
   With the complicated discussion of the Philebus in Chapter 6, I hope to have 
completed the examination of all important passages relevant for our 
understanding of the method of collection and division. It is now time to sum 
up what I have argued throughout this thesis. Here I shall systematically 
recapitulate what, according to my proposals, constitutes the essence of Plato’s 
method throughout the dialogues.297 This recapitulation will at the same time 
illustrate my unitarian understanding of Plato’s method: on my view, the 
Socratic method and the ontology it presupposes, as described in the early 
dialogues, are not superseded but rather incorporated as fundamental elements 
of Platonic philosophy. 
   Underlying Plato’s method is a Socratic intuition that there is a vital 
distinction in our world between the common characteristic (F)––the Socratic 
form of F––on the one hand (e.g. beauty), and many F things and actions, on the 
other (e.g. beautiful girls, beautiful pots). Put it in more contemporary terms, 
this distinction may be characterised as one between properties and contexts. It 
does not correspond to the distinction between universal and particulars, for 
                                                       
297 Having said that, my recapitulation does not include any reference to Socratic 
elenchus––the method Socrates employs in order to examine his interlocutor’s claim 
for knowledge in the early definitional dialogues––or the method of hypothesis 
prominent in the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic, since I have not discussed these methods 
in my present thesis (they are main topics of Robinson’s Plato’s Earlier Dialectic). But I 
believe that they too can be integrated into the framework I am proposing here. 
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the form of F is both one and many, and many F things and actions may be 
either many universals or many particulars. The form of F is always F, but 
many F things and actions are F at one moment, or in one relation, or in one 
part, but are not F at another moment, etc. The consequence is that we can 
obtain a stable understanding or knowledge of F only when we are dealing 
with the form of F. 
   In order to deal with every Socratic form both in its single and in its plural 
aspects, Plato put forward two basic procedures: collection and division. 
Collection is the movement from many to one, since it provides one definition 
on the basis of many instances. It is a procedure that examines many instances 
of F, or the plural aspect of the form of F, in order to determine the common 
characteristic (F), or the single aspect of the form of F, and to provide the 
definition of F. By contrast, division is the movement from one to many, since it 
provides two or more species-forms on the basis of one genus-form. Division 
always operates in tandem with collection: it is the procedure of examining 
many instances of F, or the plural aspect of the form of F, in order to find two, 
or the smallest possible number of, common characteristics (e.g. G and H) that 
divide the instances of F into the instances of G and those of H without residue, 
and provide the definitions of G and H. 
   With respect to these two kinds of procedures, Plato went on to present two 
kinds of application: (1) the procedure for definition and (2) internal analysis. 
The procedure for definition provides understanding in the form of a simple 
proposition that distinguishes a definiendum from all the other things. This 
application can be further divided into two kinds of cases: (1a) cases in which 
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only collection is used, and (1b) cases in which the whole procedure is 
collection, but division is applied in the course of collection. Examples of (1a) 
are the definition of speed in the Laches, and the definitions of colour and shape 
in the Meno. Those of (1b) are the definition of human love in the Phaedrus, the 
definitions of angling and sophistry in the Sophist, and the definitions of 
weaving and statesmanship in the Politicus. Internal analysis, by contrast, 
provides the theoretical aspect of expert knowledge, or knowledge of a Platonic 
Form. Examples of this application are the internal analysis of the alphabet in 
the Cratylus (424b4-425b5), the internal analysis of soul in the Phaedrus, and the 
internal analysis of pleasure in the Philebus.298 
   The result of my argument shows the underlying continuity between the 
Socratic method described in the early definitional dialogues and the Platonic 
method of collection and division described in the Phaedrus, Sophist, Politicus, 
and Philebus. In the early dialogues Socratic forms––the objects with which the 
Platonic method is directly concerned––and the method of collection were 
already at work. In the later dialogues, in addition to these Socratic elements, 
Platonic Forms––the objects with which the Platonic method is ultimately 
concerned––and the method of division came into view. In the current 
interpretative environment in which the revisionist interpretation is dominant, 
                                                       
298 The examples listed in this paragraph are only those in which it seems to me clear 
that the methods in question are being applied. As a matter of fact, I think that these 
methods are applied, at least tacitly, whenever Plato establishes something as a ‘form’ 
or ‘kind’. Examples of such cases are prevalent throughout the dialogues. Here are 
some random samples: the form of persuasion providing conviction without 
knowledge, and the form of persuasion that does provide knowledge in the Gorgias 
(454e3-4); the forms of the visible and the invisible in the Phaedo (79a6-7); the forms or 
kinds of soul in the Republic (435d9-441c3); the forms of by-itself and 
in-relation-to-others in the Sophist (255c14-d6); and the forms of the four primary 
bodies (i.e. fire, air, water, and earth) in the Timaeus (58c5-60e2). 
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one might be tempted to suppose that the proposed continuity should only 
indicate that, just before he undertook to write the Phaedrus, Plato got an idea 
about the new method for philosophers generally to attain their goal, wisdom, 
on the basis of the Socratic foundation. But since there is no inconsistency 
involved, it is not impossible to suppose that Plato had the whole system of his 
methodology from the very beginning of his career but just did not present it. I 
myself believe that the truth is somewhere between these two suppositions: 
Plato had not worked out the whole system of his methodology when he was 
writing his first several dialogues, but obtained a fairly clear idea about it by the 
time he started to write the middle dialogues. The aim of my work, however, 
will be fulfilled if a reader is tempted to think about the possibility of a 
unitarian interpretation of Plato’s method just a little more seriously than 
before. 
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